

HERESIOGRAPHY IN CONTEXT

PHILOSOPHIA ANTIQUA

A SERIES OF STUDIES
ON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

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J. MANSFELD, D.T. RUNIA
W.J. VERDENIUS AND J.C.M. VAN WINDEN

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JAAP MANSFELD
HERESIOGRAPHY IN CONTEXT



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*Hippolytus' Elenchos as a Source for
Greek Philosophy*

BY

JAAP MANSFELD



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*For Lien and Gilles,
also for other reasons*

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PREFACE

ὥσπερ ξένοι χαίρουσιν ἰδεῖν πατρίδα
καὶ οἱ θαλαττεύοντες ἰδεῖν λιμένα,
οὕτω καὶ οἱ γράψαντες βιβλίου τέλος.

Work on this book was begun in 1979, when I was invited to contribute a paper for the *Festschrift* of Gilles Quispel and began to read the ancient sources in Greek on Gnosticism. Because I had become interested in the study of the ancient historiographical traditions concerned with philosophy, I had already planned to study the *Elenchos* in some depth. I failed to publish a paper on Hippolytus in the *Festschrift* because the subject proved to be both too vast and too tough, but have gone on writing it up since then, sometimes setting it aside for several years, then trying to pick up things where I had left off and occasionally publishing partial results. Chapters One to Four were more or less ready by 1982. A penultimate draft of Chapters One to Seven and the Excursus was completed in 1987-88. I then had other things to do, so Chapters Eight, Nine and Ten were only added in the first half of 1991, at the same time that the rest underwent a final revision. I have moreover tried to include references to literature which has been published since 1987.

If one works on a subject such as this for a long time the result does not necessarily become better; as it is, I am painfully aware of what the book still lacks on the one hand and may have lost because of its long incubation on the other. However, in view of the amount of rather diverse material that had to be assembled and digested and the fact that ideas as how to handle it are not available at one's beck and call, there was no other way. What still remains to be done for instance is a thorough comparison of the physical doctrines transmitted by Hippolytus with the *Placita* literature, but this is a subject in its own right. Some readers may find that on occasion the argument spirals off and deals with matters which are rather far removed from the *Elenchos*. My justification is that a study of this work in its various contexts involves a study of these contexts, because it is not only illuminated by its historical environment but illuminates it in its turn.

What I should add is that this book is brick-and-mortar work and that the reader with little Latin and less Greek has not been at the forefront of my concerns, although I have provided translations in the Chapters on Pythagoras Empedocles Heraclitus. Secondary literature has been

cited in the original language. Footnotes sometimes are unwieldy.¹ This inquiry is addressed to the professional student of ancient philosophy and, hopefully, also to the student of the Greek sources for Gnosticism.

I have received assistance from several quarters. Hans Gottschalk, Alexander Mourelatos, Bertram van Winden and John Whittaker in 1987-88 read various drafts of parts of the present study and provided acute comments and criticisms. Pier-Luigi Donini read the whole in instalments, and sent and phoned numerous useful observations. Gilles Quispel and Roel van den Broek read the draft of Appendix 1 and of Chapters Eight, Nine and Ten and likewise suggested improvements. In November 1988, I lectured on themes taken from the torso before academic audiences at the University of Texas at Austin (Chapters One to Four, dealing basically with the *Philosophoumena*) and at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (Chapters Five to Seven and the Excursus, dealing with the Aristotelian section and the Middle Platonist background), and so was able to profit from the ensuing discussions. Henri van de Laar performed the laborious task of compiling the bibliography and checking the references, and of helping me with the *Index locorum*. Keimpe Algra, David Runia and Bertram van Winden read and usefully criticised not only drafts of parts of the torso but also the laser-print of the book as completed, and in the process David Runia weeded out a number of Batavisms. Gonni Runia produced the final desk-top version. I thank these friends and scholars for their invaluable assistance and of course claim sole responsibility for such defects as remain.

Bilthoven
23 September 1991

Jaap Mansfeld

¹ References to secondary literature in the footnotes are to author and year of publication. No separate section on the standard ancient texts used has been included in the Bibliography at the end of the volume, but a number of editions are cited there under the name of the editor, especially editions of fragments. References to the editions that have been used and cited are to be found in the *Index locorum*. For instance, a reference to Alcinous with page number is to Hermann's Teubneriana of 'Albinus', not to Whittaker's Budé text of Alcinous (although I have followed the latter's *constitutio*), and one to a numbered fragment of Numenius to the collection of Des Places in the Budé series. These editions are listed in the Bibliography, but editions of e.g. Cicero or Aristotle are not.

INTRODUCTION

HERESIOGRAPHY IN CONTEXT

It is not my purpose, in these few pages of introduction, to provide a synopsis of the various inquiries which I have attempted to pursue in this book. Those who wish to discover whether it offers anything they may put to use are referred to the Table of Contents, which will tell them where to look. What I shall try here is to justify the way in which these investigations have been carried out and above all to set out the reasons why I have endeavoured, within the limits of my competence, to study the *Elenchos* as a whole. I shall state, as briefly as possible, what I believe I have found out about Hippolytus' aims and methods, and in particular try to provide an overall impression of the traditions he depended on when writing about the philosophies of the Greeks.

The treatise has been studied from different angles by scholars from a plurality of disciplines. Students of Gnosticism and Early Christianity have used it, and continue to use it, as an important albeit baffling source for Gnosticism and Early Christianity. Many of them have read the whole work, or at least the whole of books IV to X. Students of Greek philosophy, for their part, have used it as a source for Greek philosophical doctrines, but very few indeed will have actually looked at the work itself. Most of the time they have availed and continue to avail themselves of the labours of their scissor-happy predecessors who have cut out portions of the text of the so-called *Philosophoumena* (book I of the *Elenchos*) and the later books and brought them home to roost in collections of so-called fragments—of Presocratics mainly, but also of Stoics, Epicureans and Skeptics. The Plato chapter in book I has received some attention on the part of students of Middle Platonism. But this prosopographic approach obfuscates the important links between the doctrines of individual philosophers and schools that are to be found in the *Elenchos*. To the extent that such linkage is there the treatise does not differ from the majority of our ancient sources insofar as these too habitually present concatenations and clusterings of a variety of tenets and doctrines.

As a matter of fact, since 1879, when Hermann Diels in his monumental *Doxographi graeci* argued that large chunks of the *Philosophoumena* dealing with the Presocratics ultimately derive from Theophrastus, and especially since 1903, when the chapters involved were enshrined in individual sections dealing with individual philosophers in

the *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, these fragments of Hippolytus' treatise have enjoyed the reputation of being reliable sources. Furthermore, in the later books of the *Elenchos* Hippolytus quotes and in this way preserves a number of verbatim fragments of Empedocles and Heraclitus not found elsewhere, and so is an invaluable source also in this respect, as is attested by the collections of fragments of these two philosophers published since the sensational discovery of the manuscript containing the later books in the mid-nineteenth century. But a more correct evaluation of the *Elenchos* as a source for Greek philosophy has been obstructed by the universal belief that the *Philosophoumena* and the philosophical sections in these later books should be kept strictly apart, or more specifically that the chapters on Empedocles and Heraclitus in the first and those in the later books have nothing to do with one another. I argue that this view—which one may trace back to Diels, who in the *Doxographi Graeci* printed the *Philosophoumena* only—is false. Moreover, other sections of the *Elenchos* concerned with philosophical matters, especially those dealing with Pythagoras in the later books, have been very much neglected. I am convinced that this is a grave mistake. One should not treat this work in the way that gentleman archaeologists in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries treated their sites, looking for startling treasures and discarding the rest as nothing but rubble.

Collections of fragments of ancient philosophers, however useful or necessary, are like petrified museums, or like collections of paintings or snuff-boxes assembled by individuals which have been left as they were. Only choice pieces of the most various provenance are on show, the selection itself depending on the judgement and prejudice of the person in charge of the exhibition, or of the taste and means of the deceased owner of the objects. The fact of the matter, however, is that Hippolytus himself is a sort of collector, with value judgements and prejudices of his own. Your average collector, whatever his personal preferences, tends to buy what is available to him on the market, and his appreciation of the art of the present as well as of the past as a rule is determined by current fashion. Though it certainly is deplorable that certain sections of the *Elenchos* have been neglected, what is much more to be deplored is that little or no attention has been given to Hippolytus' view and presentation of Greek philosophy as a whole, and that those who in a plurality of eclectic ways have looked at his treatise have not bothered at all, or only marginally, about the traditions he depends on. But in order to understand the information of a philosophical kind he presents, one should apply the notion of its 'context' in the widest possible sense.

The semi-historiographical traditions Hippolytus depends on are

much more concerned with doctrines than with names, with schools and successions than with individuals. Centuries of classification, interpretation and re-interpretation have formed and transformed the material at Hippolytus' disposal, and it is quite self-evident that he presents us with a view of the history of Greek philosophy, that is to say with what he considers to be its most important component, which was shared by the majority of his contemporaries and immediate predecessors. The fact that in certain outstanding cases he attaches great importance to names, or to what appear to be the doctrines of a single philosopher (e.g. Empedocles, Heraclitus), is connected with his specific polemical purpose. He has inherited (from Justin and others) and in part constructed himself an arrangement of Gnostic systems according to *diadoche*, 'succession'. The various traditions of Greek philosophy had also been arranged and rearranged as successions and schools of thought—a legacy of the scholastic institutionalization which began in Athens in the fourth century BCE. The Gnostic *diadoche* beginning with Simon Magus is presented by Hippolytus as a movement which is entirely parasitical, because in his view it merely apes the doctrines of what he believes to be the main *diadoche* among the schools of the Greeks, viz. that beginning with Pythagoras. Availing himself of a historiographical trend which he did not establish but followed and which he only modified and refined to a certain extent, he set out a succession involving Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, and worked hard to establish one-to-one correspondences between these philosophers on the one hand and the major Gnostic heresiarchs and a few Christian theologians he disliked on the other. Hence the emphasis on the names, even though it is the tradition, the school of thought, which really forms the backdrop of his exposition and argumentation. Understandably so, for Pythagoras and Plato (and their real or presumed following) were in his time widely considered to be the only philosophers worthy of note.

Much can be learned from Hippolytus about the varieties of the insufficiently known pre-Neoplatonic vulgate, and it is mainly for this reason that I have spent some time in the company of the *Elenchos*. Dark ages are dark only because we know too little about them, not because nothing happened. The other reason, hardly less important, is that I wanted to satisfy part of my curiosity about the various receptions of the Presocratics, or of certain Presocratics, and of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics from the first century BCE onwards. What I have come to realize is that these receptions are in various ways connected with and dependent upon another, and that they are a quite important component of the varieties of this vulgate. It is a well-known fact that in the period that is

involved, doing philosophy is often hard to distinguish from using philosophy, that is to say that it is virtually tantamount to a selective and creative reinterpretation of earlier philosophies. Yet what thinking people really were concerned with were large themes such as the vicissitudes of the human soul, the problem of good and evil, the power of numbers and magnitudes, the issue of the origin (or perhaps eternity) and of the structure of the cosmos and of the role of the gods in and beyond it, the very speculative question of the relation of this cosmos to another intelligible one and of the structure of this intelligible world, as well as with other, more technical matters—which actually are a quite prominent feature of the present inquiry—such as the Aristotelian categories and the Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic methods of division and collection against the backdrop of the metaphysics with which they belong.

Accordingly, I have tried to find out why Hippolytus wants us to concentrate on certain things rather than on others, and what is his strategy in arranging his exhibits the way he does. He is an intelligent and erudite person, an industrious Christian intellectual, but one without an interest in philosophy for its own sake. Philosophy is important to him insofar as, following in Irenaeus' footsteps, he can use it, or rather those of its ingredients which were most favoured in his own time, as powerful polemical tools. Yet there is one aspect of his book that is enigmatic, although to the best of my knowledge the riddle has never been properly formulated. In the *Philosophoumena* we are provided with a selective but still quite full overview of the whole of Greek philosophy from Thales to the main Hellenistic schools, while the doctrines of the non-Greek Brahmins, of the Druids and of the poet Hesiod are added as a sort of appendix. In books V-IX, however, Hippolytus for the most part only makes use of the representatives of his Pythagorean *diadoche*. Why such fullness on the one hand and such a limited selection on the other? The solution of this riddle is so simple that it eluded me for a long time.

Hippolytus avails himself of an inverted form of the dialectical method developed by the Greek philosophers themselves, most notably by Aristotle. First, one collects all the views that are available or are believed to be relevant to a question at issue. This is what Hippolytus does in the *Philosophoumena*. Next, one selects those views which on reflection one finds to be useful. Aristotle and others make use of this technique in order to further the study of philosophy; they discard what they are able to prove wrong or inconsistent and go on with what points in the right direction. Hippolytus, however, selects a set of interrelated views for a destructive purpose only, in order to use them as ammuni-

tion against his opponents. To some extent his method resembles that of the Skeptics, who also employed a variety of Peripatetic dialectic for negative purposes. The views picked out by Hippolytus are those of the chief representatives of his Pythagorean *diadoche*, i.e. those of Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, whereas those of the others—apart from an isolated reference to Thales' principle—are simply dropped.

There is a single exception to this selection from the doctrines set out or sketched in a preliminary way in the dialectical doxography of the *Philosophoumena*, and one that is quite instructive. I have said that to Hippolytus and the majority of his contemporaries the traditions concerned with Pythagoras and Plato are the important ones. Yet in books V-IX of the *Elenchos*, when Hippolytus goes about his work of demolition, the standard Middle Platonist Plato described in a long chapter of the *Philosophoumena* is surprisingly and notoriously absent. The Plato of these later books is a true-blue Pythagorean, a propounder of (Neo-)Pythagorean doctrines. Such a view of Plato is by no means exceptional in the second century CE, or even earlier; just as Pythagoras has been Platonized, so Plato becomes a Pythagorean. But in Hippolytus' case there is a further reason for the Pythagoreanization of Plato, viz. the constraints imposed by his polemical framework. The three principles (God / the Ideas / matter) attributed to Plato by the Middle Platonists followed by Hippolytus in the *Philosophoumena* were useless as ammunition against the heretics. The two-principles doctrine and the whole theory of numbers and magnitudes attributed to Pythagoras, on the other hand, were highly useful for this purpose and only needed a bit of tailoring to be made to fit. The doctrines of Aristotle, Empedocles and Heraclitus were also useful for these destructive ends, although they too needed to be tampered with to a degree.

Hippolytus must be considered guilty of doctoring the evidence concerned with the Greek philosophers. I would not be surprised at all if it turned out to be the case that his accounts of the doctrines of his heretics have been adjusted in a similar way, but I must leave these matters in the hands of the experts, viz. the students of Gnosticism and Early Christianity. My impression is, however, that Hippolytus did what he could to make both ends meet. What he could not foresee, of course, is that in our time the *Elenchos* would continue to be valued as an important source of information about the very enemies he wanted to destroy, that is to say the heretics as well as the philosophers who in his view paved the way for them, but that its hard-core theological position (in contrast to that of his great *Vorbild*, Irenaeus) would in the long run prove to be so remarkably uninteresting.

CHAPTER ONE

DIELS' ERROR

1.1 Introduction

The first book of Hippolytus'¹ Κατὰ πασῶν αἱρέσεων ἔλεγχος (*Refutation of All Heresies*), also known as the Φιλοσοφούμενα (*Philosophoumena*), constitutes a short History of Greek Philosophy² including, in its final chapter, the Brahmins, Druids and Hesiod. Unfortunately, the discussion of its sources that still largely dominates the field is that of Diels in the *Doxographi graeci* published more than a century ago. Diels gave two instances (only one good) of what he considered to be Hippolytus' scissors-and-paste methods and argued that as a rule he simply copied out what he found in his sources. But this is a too simplistic approach, providing an epistemic obstacle to the important truth that Hippolytus manipulated his sources whenever this suited his convenience.³ Furthermore, *Ref.* I should be compared with the evidence available from other ancient historiographic sources in a more thorough and unprejudiced way than was advocated by Diels, as such a comparison provides important additional clues as to Hippolytus' method of presenting the material at his disposal. Finally, the way in which the doctrines of some Greek philosophers already treated in book I are used in *Ref.* books IV-IX should be taken into account as well, and this Diels remarkably enough also failed to do. Although recently attempts have been made to correct some of Diels' mistakes, the fact remains that his authority has prevented scholars from even considering the possibility that the chapters on Pythagoras, Empedocles and Heraclitus in the *Philosophoumena* are directly related to the substantial and important sections in the later books of the *Ref.* which deal with these philosophers.

¹ For Hippolytus as the author see *infra*, Appendix 1 *ad init.* The title *Refutatio omnium haeresium* is hereafter abbreviated *Ref.*

² The sub-title *Philosophoumena* occurs at e.g. *Ref.* IX 8.2; Scholten (1990) 511 is wrong.

³ For references to the literature concerned with Hippolytus' working-methods and with the sources of the *Ref.* see *infra*, App. 1.

I 2 *Views on the Sources of the Philosophoumena*

In the *D.G.*, Diels contended that *Ref.* I consists of a combination of *two* different sources, which for convenience I shall call source D1 and source D2. The implication, important for Diels' reconstruction of what he calls the doxographic tradition, is that these sources would have been transcribed by Hippolytus in a laudably faithful way. According to Diels, for *Ref.* I 1-4 + 18-25 Hippolytus transcribed source D1, a meagre biographico-diadochic compendium (ch. 26 remaining somewhat of a riddle). For chs. 6-16, he transcribed source D2, which in Diels' view is a surprisingly good doxographic compendium ultimately deriving from Theophrastus' lost *Physikon* (or, as I prefer, *Physikai*) *Doxai* into which, however, interpolations would occasionally have been inserted from source D1. Diels argued that Hippolytus himself indicates that he is switching to another source, viz. from one κατὰ διαδοχὴν to one that provided τὰ τοῖς φυσικοῖς δόξαντα. That Hippolytus fabricated the *Philosophoumena* from a plurality of sources I am most willing to accept. The cento method of composition which is to be investigated in Chapters VIII and IX below is indeed used in the first book of the *Ref.* as well. But Diels' analysis of the kind of sources used and his identification of the position of what he sees as interpolations is vulnerable to a degree, so I shall try to work out a more viable set of hypotheses.

Arguably, in the *D.G.* Diels' analysis of *Ref.* book I is his most important argument in favour of a rigorous distinction between the genre of purely doxographic literature⁴ on the one hand and that of biographic literature which also contained a few *doxai* on the other. This larger question is not the main issue in the present study,⁵ although it will prove impossible to ignore it altogether.

Diels' analysis of *Ref.* I was accepted by Wendland in his influential and still indispensable edition;⁶ it had already become the *opinio commu-*

⁴ There is some evidence that doxography according to subject-matter in the manner of ps.Plutarch (Aëtius) was considered a separate genre. Aëtius' book is cited by Theodor. *Graec. aff. cur.* IV 31 as Περὶ ἀρεσκόντων ξυναγωγή, ps.Plutarch's as Περὶ τῶν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις δοξάντων ἐπιτομή. The latter is cited more fully by Eus. *P.E.* XIV xiii 9, p. 293.16 as Περὶ τῶν ἀρεσκόντων τοῖς φιλοσόφοις φυσικῶν δογμάτων, which is also what we find in Mau's Teubneriana. Note that Eusebius transcribes large chunks of ps.Plutarch and so must have quoted the title from the copy he used. Opinions have differed as to whether the predecessor of this title, viz. that of Theophrastus' treatise, should run Φυσικῶν rather than Φυσικαὶ δόξαι, see Mansfeld (1991a) 64.

⁵ I have discussed it to some extent in Mansfeld (1986a) 1 ff., (1986b) 295 ff.

⁶ Wendland (1916) xviii f.; note that Osborne (1987) does not seem to know the reprint of 1977 and reproduces large chunks of his text with an English translation that is not without blemishes. Wendland's introduction is a torso; his book was published posthumously. Note that Marcovich (1986) 18-9, in his overview of the

nis. It was accepted, although to some extent modified, by Howald, and e.g. still forms the background of a study by Hershbell evaluating Hippolytus as a source for Empedocles.⁷ Doubts concerning the details of Diels' inquiry into the sources were formulated by von Kienle, who argued that at *Ref.* I 5 κατὰ διαδοχὴν may pertain both to what follows and to what precedes, but states: "Klar hat jedoch Diels erkannt, daß das Niveau der Doxographie in den cap. 1-4 erheblich anders ist als in den cap. 6-16. Dieser grundsätzlichen Scheidung von Diels ist unbedingt zuzustimmen" (my italics).⁸ A similar criticism is formulated by Mejer in his indispensable study of Diogenes Laërtius.⁹ He, too, argues that it is not at all clear that at *Ref.* I 5 the words κατὰ διαδοχὴν should apply to Hippolytus' reference to source D1, since they go equally well with that to source D2. He infers that they are useless as evidence that source D1 belongs with the so-called *Successions* literature.¹⁰ Hippolytus' sources, according to Mejer, are doxographic throughout and the links with the biographic tradition equally valid for both D1 and D2; perhaps Hippolytus even used only one source. But Mejer still accepts that there is (as Diels had posited) a considerable difference between *Ref.* I chs. 1-4 and 6-16. He suggests that the distinction is not "one of genres, but of *quality*" (my italics);¹¹ anyhow, Hippolytus' source(s) would be rather late, because—as Mejer points out—parts of his chapter on Pythagoras can be paralleled from sections in Porphyry's *Vita Pythagorae* and other rather late sources,¹² and his chapter on Plato compares well with Albinus' (or rather Alcinous')¹³ *Didascalicus*, i.e. without doubt is of Middle Platonist provenance.¹⁴

purported sources, does not refer to Diels' reconstruction of the doxographic and biographic sources of book I and merely provides a few indications of secondary sources used by the source(s) used by Hippolytus; in his upper apparatus *ad* I 1.1, however, he refers to Diels for the whole block consisting of *Ref.* I chs. 1-25.

⁷ Hershbell (1973).

⁸ von Kienle (1961) 21 f., 24, quot. 102 n. 29, point about κ. διαδ. 102 n. 30. Von Kienle hardly touches on chs. 17 ff. and missed Howald (1920).

⁹ Mejer (1978) 83 f.

¹⁰ von Kienle (1961) 24 points out that what he calls the biographic source of chs. 1-4 was not "ausschliesslich κατὰ διαδοχὴν angelegt; mit Rücksicht auf die Einteilung in Physiker, Ethiker und Dialektiker sind die Diadochien aufgelöst in Teile".

¹¹ Mejer (1978) 84.

¹² Cf. Wendland's and Marcovich's upper apparatuses *ad Ref.* I 2; Scholten (1990) 513.

¹³ Cf. already Howald (1920) 75 n. 1; see further Giusta (1960-1), Whittaker (1974 and 1977), Donini (1982) 103, Deuse (1983) 81 ff. Moraux (1983) 441 f. prefers to accept the attribution to Albinus. The case in favour of Alcinous has now been definitively proved by Whittaker (1987) 83 ff.; see also Whittaker (1990) vii ff.

¹⁴ Cf. Wendland's and Marcovich's upper apparatuses *ad Ref.* I.19 and see further Dillon (1977) 410 ff. Moreschini (1972) 254 ff. discusses the parallels with Alcinous, adds a series of parallels to Apuleius' *De Platone et eius dogmate*, and concludes

A more radical criticism of Diels' analysis has been provided by Osborne.¹⁵ She first points out that it is clear from the proem that Hippolytus had carefully planned the structure of his work in advance and from the very beginning already intended to link the various Gnostic heresies (including, I assume, that of Pope Callistus) with the Greek philosophers whom in his view they imitate.¹⁶ This entails that he knew about the main philosophical doctrines at issue, viz. those of Plato, Aristotle, Pythagoras, Empedocles and Heraclitus, which according to Osborne he makes most use of in the other parts of his work. He had access to important material for Heraclitus (*Ref.* IX 9.1-10.8) and Empedocles (esp. VII 29-31), including numerous verbatim quotations.¹⁷ Consequently, if he had wished to do so, he could have provided much better accounts of Empedocles and Heraclitus than he actually does in *Ref.* I 3-4 (so Osborne endorses Diels' and Mejer's verdict that the *quality* of the evidence found in I 3-4 is not good). The account of Pythagoras in *Ref.* I 2 actually is very substantial. Consequently, source D1 (used, according to Osborne, by Hippolytus for *Ref.* I 1-4) may have been a fairly extensive work, not the slim compendium Diels believed it must have been. She further advances the original argument that *Ref.* I 6-9 (Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras and Archelaus) is quite different both from what comes before and what comes after: extensive treatment, according to a fixed pattern, of the physical doctrines of the *physikoi* involved. Topics that are important in *Ref.* I chs. 1-4 and 11-16, such as the nature of the divine and the soul, are not at issue in chs. 6-9. She is prepared to accept that chs. 6-9, ultimately, derive from Theophrastus,¹⁸ but somewhat cavalierly argues that chs. 11-16 (on Parmenides, Leucippus, Democritus, Xenophanes, Ecphantus and Hippon) are much less Theophrastean and in several ways (i.e. in the topics at issue) much closer to chs. 1-4 than to chs. 6-9. Consequently, chs. 1-4 and 11-16 may in her view derive from one and the same source,¹⁹ whereas chs. 6-9 must derive from a different source.²⁰

This deconstruction however suffers from several weaknesses, to which I shall advert in what follows. My main objection is that Os-

that the account in Hippolytus belongs with what I would like to call the Middle Platonist vulgata. See also Whittaker (1987) 105 ff.

¹⁵ Osborne (1987) 187 ff., "Appendix A. Hippolytus on the *physikoi*".

¹⁶ Osborne (1987) 189 f. This involves the naive assumption that the preface was the first piece to be composed.

¹⁷ Osborne (1987) 190.

¹⁸ Yet the only safe parallels are concerned with the principles, not with the other topics.

¹⁹ Osborne (1987) 206, 219 n. 19.

²⁰ Osborne (1987) 191 ff. This is accepted by Scholten (1990) 513.

borne still follows Diels in attributing to Hippolytus changes of mind and sources while composing and actually writing out, or rather dictating, *Ref.* I.²¹ She argues that he started by using one source for *Ref.* I chs. 1-4 and according to what he says in ch. 5 had decided to leave out the other *physikoi* that are to be located after those treated in chs. 1-4. However, "having acquired a new ... source, Hippolytus discovers that these philosophers are more interesting than he thought and is thus persuaded to include them after all; on the other hand it does not look any more likely that he was looking for more material for the third group starting from Parmenides".²² Furthermore, in ch. 5 he announces that after his treatment of the *physikoi* who are the successors of Thales he will turn to ethics (Socrates) and dialectic (Aristotle), but having arrived as far as ch. 10 he "appears suddenly to discover that, far from his having finished with the Presocratics, there are a whole lot more ... He proceeds to give brief paragraphs on Parmenides, Leucippus, Democritus, Xenophanes, Ecphantus and Hippon".²³ Osborne is aware that the *physikoi* treated in *Ref.* I chs. 11-16 "are not thinkers of whom he will make extensive use in the later books".²⁴ It should be pointed out, however, that he does not make use of them *at all* in the main argument of books IV-IX, and the same holds for those described in chs. 6-9. Why on earth, one may well ask, should Hippolytus labour to include extensive (chs. 6-9) or more summary (chs. 11-16) accounts of thinkers who fail to play a part in the other sections of his work? The changes of mind postulated by Osborne, involving the use of other sources or at least of one such source encountered on the way, are hard to square with her hypothesis that, according to what he implies in his preface, Hippolytus had carefully planned the polemical lay-out of the *Ref.* in advance. I believe that it is more likely that the proem, just as the overture to an opera, was the last piece to be composed, though I am prepared to accept that Hippolytus went through a planning stage before he began the actual work of making a first draft.

More to the point is Osborne's suggestion that the main motive for the erudition displayed in the *Philosophoumena* seems to be to establish this as a scholarly work and "to impress the reader with its learning".²⁵ But this acute observation does not solve the problem of the source(s) used

²¹ Osborne (1987) 190, 191, 192. For the methods used in collecting evidence and for the fact that texts were dictated see Dorandi (1991), also for further references.

²² Osborne (1987) 191.

²³ Osborne (1987) 192.

²⁴ Osborne (1987) 191.

²⁵ Osborne (1987) 190. See further *supra*, Introduction, *infra*, Ch. IV 2.

by Hippolytus, or of his actual procedure in selecting and handling them when setting out his account of the history of Greek philosophy.

I 3 *A Further Suggestion on the Sources*

The discussion by von Kienle, Mejer and Osborne constitutes a considerable advance. But it is possible to go further. The argument I shall present hinges on the analysis of the transitions in the exposition at *Ref.* I 5 and I 17, chapters which most people, or so I believe, would agree to have been written by Hippolytus himself.

Diels argued that Hippolytus, transcribing source D1, first set out to describe the views of Thales, Pythagoras, Empedocles and Heraclitus (*Ref.* I 1-4).²⁶ This in his view *inferior* work among other things attributed Anaximenes' theory of rarefaction and condensation to Thales, gave a repetitious and quite anachronistic account of Pythagoras' life and doctrines, and mixed up Empedocles and Heraclitus by attributing the latter's Fire to the former and a pair of principles corresponding to the former's Love and Strife to the latter. Diels suggests that according to chs. 2-4 source D1 constructed both a systematic link among and a line of succession connecting Pythagoras, Empedocles and Heraclitus.²⁷ In his eyes this was too much even for Hippolytus. He argues that the worthy ecclesiastic put down source D1 and started all over again, now transcribing the *excellent* source D2. However, Hippolytus must have overcome his disgust to some extent if, as Diels further argues, he interpolated anecdotic and chronographic bits and pieces from the bad book into the (until then) immaculate source D2 and even swallowed it hook line and sinker for his transcription of chs. 18 ff.

On Diels' terms, the Hippolytean cento would therefore consist of two ingredients only. My hypothesis—and the point in which I differ, in different ways, from Diels, Wendland, Howald, von Kienle, Mejer and Osborne—is that, although the cento which constitutes the backbone of *Ref.* I ultimately goes back to, say, at least three or four sources²⁸ (if for the sake of the argument chs. 18 ff. may for the moment be referred to as source IV),²⁹ and although chs. 1-16 are constructed from two or three sources, or rather reflect two or three more or less different historio-

²⁶ So also Osborne (1987) 192.

²⁷ *D.G.* 145-6; cf. Wendland (1916) xviii. Diels does not now mention Thales.

²⁸ If we assume, with Mejer, that he perhaps used only one immediate source, we still are faced with the question of the composition of this source. In what follows, I use the word 'source' for the sake of convenience.

²⁹ Actually, source IV seems to be ultimately derived from a plurality of sources, and I would agree with Diels, although not on the same grounds, that parts of it are in some way or other related to source D1.

graphic traditions,³⁰ we should not, in chs. 1-16, operate with Diels' single caesura, viz. 1-4 // 6-16 (or, according to Osborne's analysis, with two: 1-4 // 6-9 // 11-16), but with four:³¹ 1 // 2-4 // 6-9 // 11-15 // 16. In other words, I argue that in *Ref. I* 1-16 source (or tradition) D1 should be limited to chs. 2-4, the remarkable succession Pythagoras—Empedocles—Heraclitus which, as I shall argue, has been *interpolated* by Hippolytus in the account according to source D2.

Another important point is concerned with Diels' simplistic criterium for quality. What is (or derives from) Theophrastus is early and therefore good. What does not derive from Theophrastus, viz. source D1, is bad. Today, as we have seen, scholars are still unanimous in condemning the quality of source D1 (at least for *Ref. I* 1-4). But *Ref. I* 2-4 are not different in *quality* from *Ref. I* 6-9; they are *just different*, and different in that they reflect a view, or interpretation, of the history of Greek philosophy which differs from the view reflected in these other chapters. In the final Chapters of the present inquiry, I shall argue that *Ref. I* 2-4 (and the concomitant sections in the later books) derive from a Platonizing-and-Pythagoreanizing re-interpretation of early Greek philosophy, and therefore deserve to be studied in their own right, viz. as important documents from which much is to be learned about the history of what, for lack of a better term, we are accustomed to call Middle Platonism or Neopythagoreanism. Before pronouncing value judgements on such later receptions of early thought, we should try to determine what they are. In the eyes of the present writer, it is as counter-suggestive to condemn them as bad as, for instance, to say that Plotinus is not good because his *Plato interpretatus* is unhistorical.

I 4 *Distinction Between Biography and Doxography Not Valid Here*

In my view, the account that is based on source D2 begins by treating the Presocratic philosophers of nature in the order one expects in a compendium that, *for the Ionian succession*, to a certain extent perhaps derives, ultimately, from Theophrastus: Thales (I 1), Anaximander (I 6), Anaximenes (I 7)³² etc.

³⁰ I agree with Mejer (see *supra*, text to n. 11) that no conspicuous difference of genre is involved.

³¹ For the caesura between chs. 11-13 and 14-15 see *infra*, Ch. III 2-4.

³² Cf. *Phys. op.* Frs. 1 and 2 at *D.G.* 475 ff., which Diels, in a way, arranged κατά διαδοχὴν, but note that he assumes without proof that Theophrastus treated the Ionians first. Fr. 1, *D.G.* 475.10 f., has it that Thales πρῶτος παραδέδοται τὴν περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἐκφῆναι, a phrase not printed at *Vorsokr.* 11A13 (cf. *Ref. I* 1.1, λέγεται Θαλῆν ... πρῶτον ἐπιχειρηκέναι φιλοσοφίαν φυσικὴν), but this does not entail that Theophrastus' account of the Presocratics started with Thales rather

Howald followed Diels as to the distinction between a biographico-diadochical and a doxographic source, but acutely argued that Hippolytus was familiar with *three* successions, viz. the Ionian beginning with Thales, the Pythagorean and the Eleatic. The biographer, he submits, begins with Thales, then treats the Pythagorean succession, and next “turns again to the successors of Thales”, starting with the credentials of Anaximander (‘son of Praxiades from Miletus’)—but from there, according to Howald, the (Theophrastean) doxographer takes over.³³ What is good in this analysis is that Howald has seen that in chs. 5-6 someone—Hippolytus, I presume—reverts to the Ionian succession. What is not good is that he attributes both ch. 1 and the first words of ch. 6 (the credentials of Anaximander) to Diels’ biographer. This of course would entail that all indications of paternity, place of birth and affiliation to be found in chs. 7 ff. are to be attributed to the biographer. But the fragments of Theophrastus’ *Phys. op.* (or rather of his *Physics*) in Simplicius also provide such credentials.³⁴

Moreover, ch. 1 describes the tenets of Thales in what is really a sober doxographic way not much different from the manner of chs. 6-9 and 11-16.³⁵ The overview of his *doxai* can be paralleled almost item by item from the Thales-chapter at *Vorsokr.* 11. His priority as the archegete

than with the Eleatics. At any rate, however, *Phys. op.* Fr. 2 tells us that Anaximander is Thales’ successor and that Anaximenes is Anaximander’s. For suggestions about Theophrastus’ views on schools of thought and lines of succession see von Kienle (1961) 58 ff., Steinmetz (1964) 334 ff. However, I believe that Theophrastus’ exposition may have begun not with Thales and his followers, but with the non-physicists, viz. the Eleatics (*Phys. op.* Fr. 5 in Diels’ arrangement, which in Simplicius comes before Frs. 1 and 2), just as Aristotle’s in *Phys. A*; see Mansfeld (1989b), where I also argue for the assumption that the fragments in Simplicius’ account of the principles derive from Theophrastus’ *Physics*, as suggested by Steinmetz, and not from the doxographic work.

³³ Howald (1920) 69-72, quot. 72.

³⁴ Cf. Steinmetz (1964) 334 f. It is not absolutely certain that all of these derive from Theophrastus. But Alex. *In Met.* 31.7 ff. gives a verbatim quotation from what he says is the first book of Theophrastus’ *Περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν*; this text presents Parmenides’ full credentials (Theophr. *Phys. op.* Fr. 6 = *Vorsokr.* 28A7).

³⁵ Diels’ description of source D1 (his biographic source κατὰ διαδοχὴν) in no way applies to the Thales chapter: “conspicuus est apophthegmatis vulgaribus et narratiunculis, opiniones strictim noviciisque argumentis locupletatae referuntur”, *D.G.* 145. In ch. 2, according to Diels, ‘eaedem res bis memorantur’—this is incorrect anyway, cf. Osborne (1987) 207 f. —; but no such repetitions occur in ch. 1. Thales is of course not Pythagoreanized the way Empedocles and Heraclitus are in chs. 3-4. Note that, even as to these two chs., Diels’ comment is far too sweeping. Ch. 3 (Empedocles) is purely doxographic, however anachronistic some of the *doxai* may appear to us. Ch. 4 is very similar to ch. 3, the only biographic element being the reference to Heraclitus’ weeping. Only ch. 2 gives us, among other things, a rather full-blown although mostly intellectual biography of Pythagoras. In ch. 1, the biographic element is limited to the story of the well and, if you wish, the date.

of physics had already been stated by Aristotle and Theophrastus.³⁶ The ascription to Thales of Anaximenes' view on rarefaction and condensation, as Diels admits,³⁷ can be paralleled from respectable authors. One should add that, ultimately, it derives from Aristotle's generalizing statement concerning one group of early physicist monists at *Phys. A* 4.187a11 ff. (where no names are given).³⁸ Simplicius, commenting on this passage (*In Phys.* 149.6-150.4; insufficient abstracts printed in Diels' apparatus to Theophr. *Phys. op.* Fr. 2 and at *Vorsokr.* 13A5), provides the names: Thales—Hippon, Anaximenes—Diogenes, Heraclitus—Hippasus, i.e. the sextet of early monists to be found at Arist. *Met.* A 3.984a2-8.³⁹ He adds (according to Diels' CAG text of Simplicius as printed, *In Phys.* 149.32) that Theophrastus ἐν τῇ Ἰστορίᾳ (i.e., either in the *Physics* or, less probably, in the *Physikai Doxai*) attributed rarefaction and condensation to Anaximenes 'alone' (ἐπὶ ... τούτου μόνου). This is odd, because according to *Phys. op.* Fr. 1 (*D.G.* 475.16-7, cf. *Vorsokr.* 22A5) cited by Simpl. *In Phys.* 24.2-3, Theophrastus attributed rarefaction and condensation to Hippasus and Heraclitus as well,⁴⁰ and according to Fr. 2 (*D.G.* 477.9, Simpl. *In Phys.* 25.5, cf. *Vorsokr.* 64A5) to Diogenes of Apollonia too. Either the attribution to Theophrastus of the part of Fr. 1 dealing with Hippasus and Heraclitus (and of that of Fr. 2 dealing with Diogenes) or the transmitted μόνου must be wrong. Usener suggested πρώτου, which, as Diels once argued, should be accepted.⁴¹ Usener's reading would still exclude rarefaction and condensation for Theophrastus' *Thales*, and *Phys. op.* Fr. 1 indeed is incompatible with the attribution of this view to Thales. But it is precisely Simplicius' point that Thales (whose name, as we have noticed, he had mentioned at *In Phys.* 149.6 ff.) *should* be included; that is to say, he follows *Aristotle* (as he believes), not Theophrastus, cf. *In Phys.* 150.1 ff.: δῆλον δὲ ὡς καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι τῇ μανότητι καὶ πυκνότητι ἐχρῶντο· καὶ γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλης περὶ πάντων τούτων εἶπε κοινῶς κτλ. It is a safe assumption that, in Simplicius' commentary, the rejection of Theophrastus' view in favour of what (mistakenly)⁴² he implies to be Aristotle's view about Thales is tralatitious,

³⁶ Arist. *Met.* A 3.983b20 f. (*Vorsokr.* 11A12); Theophr. *Phys. op.* Fr. 1 (*supra*, n. 32).

³⁷ *D.G.* 145. Cf. also Marcovich's parallels *ad loc.*, where however the *Physics* passage (not mentioned by Diels either) is lacking.

³⁸ Cf. also *De cael.* Γ 5.303b10 ff., cited by Marcovich *ad loc.*

³⁹ Cf. Mansfeld (1986a) 12.

⁴⁰ Cf. Rösler (1973) 50 ff., but note that he cites the wrong parallel from Aristotle (viz. *Met.* A 3.983b8 ff.).

⁴¹ *D.G.* 164 f. n. 2. Diels later suggested that μόνου here means πρώτου, which is unlikely. Unfortunately, the transmitted text is printed at *Vorsokr.* 13A5 (3rd text); Kranz' apparatus is muddled.

⁴² For Aristotle's view of Thales see Mansfeld (1985a).

because the ascription of rarefaction and condensation to Thales is found in earlier authors, among whom the source followed by Hippolytus should of course be included. There is nothing that is biographic about this error, or rather reception; it undoubtedly derives from a learned, or at any rate scholastic, exegesis of *Phys. A* 4.187a12 f. (and *De cael.* Γ 5.303b10 ff.).

Osborne argues that the Thales chapter does not belong with chs. 6-9 on Anaximander—Archelaus because it does not treat a number of subjects typical for these later chapters,⁴³ but this simply is not true. The subjects *kinesis* (4.17 W. = 57.5-6 M., τὰ πάντα φέρεσθαι τε καὶ ῥεῖν), ‘position of the earth’ (4.15 W. = 57.4 M., ἐπιφέρεσθαι τε αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα), and ‘winds’ (4.16 W. = 57.5 M., πνευμάτων συστροφὰς) should be provided with black dots in the overview for Thales in her comparative table of the contents of these chapters, and the astronomical subjects treated in copious detail in chs. 6-9 are certainly covered by the remark at ch. 1 4.19-21 W. = 57.8-9 M.: οὗτος περὶ τὸν τῶν ἄστρον λόγον καὶ τὴν ζήτησιν ἀσχοληθεὶς Ἑλλῆσι ταύτης τῆς μαθήσεως αἴτιος πρῶτος γίνεται, however odd it may seem to us that Hippolytus does not refer to the famous prediction of a solar eclipse. In other words, the reference to Thales’ invention of astronomy justifies the extensive treatment of the astronomical and cosmological tenets of his successors down to and including Archelaus in chs. 6-9, and the further physical theories of these men should be seen as continuations of the tenets of Thales mentioned in ch. 1, *ad init.* Hippolytus really means what he says when in ch. 5 he tells us that, after his description of the doctrines of Pythagoras and his followers, he now wishes to return to those who came after Thales, i.e. his successors.

Furthermore, the so-called biographic story about the heaven-gazing Thales falling in a well and being mocked by a slave, condemned as objectionable by Diels, which immediately follows upon the statement concerned with the introduction of astronomy to Greece is already found in as despicable an author as Plato.⁴⁴ In Hippolytus, it has special point; the astronomy of the Greeks, viz. that of Thales and especially that of his successors discussed in such noteworthy detail at *Ref.* I 6-9, is utter foolishness.

Finally, the synchronism with Croesus at the end of ch. 1 is rather good. In its present form it will derive from the chronographic vulgate derived from Apollodorus of Athens,⁴⁵ a quite respectable source, who of

⁴³ Osborne (1987) 192 ff. (esp. the table at 194-5), 206.

⁴⁴ *Thl.* 174a (*Vorsokr.* 11A9).

⁴⁵ 4.24 W. = 57.12 M., ἐγένετο δὲ κατὰ Κροῖσον ~ Apollod. *FGrH* 244F28 *ap.* Diog. Laërt. I 38 γεγονότα κατὰ Κροῖσον. On Apollodorus and his methods see Moss-

course took his cue from the great liar Herodotus.⁴⁶ To these (so-called) biographic elements I shall return below; it should be noted that the little biography of Thales at ps.Plutarch (Aëtius) I 3.1 is more biographic than the one in Hippolytus,⁴⁷ for the latter omits to speak of Thales' traditional relation with Egypt.

At *Ref.* 2.1, Hippolytus says that there was 'another philosophy' as well (ἑτέρα φιλοσοφία) roughly contemporaneous with Thales (οὐ μακρὰν τῶν αὐτῶν χρόνων), thus introducing a rough synchronism. This philosophy was inaugurated by Pythagoras, who is then dated more exactly by a synchronism with Polycrates (which also will derive from Apollodorus).⁴⁸ Next we are in for a small surprise; Pythagoras' successors, who are said to "have not deviated much from his doctrine" (οὐ πολὺ διήνεγκαν τοῦ αὐτοῦ φρονήματος, 2.1), are designated τὴν αἵρεσιν οἱ διαδεξάμενοι. In Hippolytus, *hairesis* as a rule means '(abominable) heretical sect',⁴⁹ not 'philosophical school (of thought)'.⁵⁰ Consequently, the tradition which is at the basis of *Ref.* I 2.1 is related not only to the *Successions* literature (cf. διαδεξάμενοι), but also to some extent speaks the language of the historiographical genre *Peri haireseon*,⁵¹ and

hammer (1976), Mosshammer (1979) 113 ff. and *passim*, and my review of this important work, Mansfeld (1983d), as well as (1979b), (1983a), and (1986) 41 ff. On the dates in Hippolytus see further below. It should, moreover, be kept in mind but rarely is—no reference to this fact in Mosshammer or, for that matter, in either Diels or Osborne—that (just as Eusebius) Hippolytus wrote a *Chronicon*, the remains of which have been edited by Bauer and Helm (21955). Cf. also Scholten (1990) 507 f., 513. This work, which may or may not be posterior to the *Ref.*, belongs with the traditions of the chronographic vulgate. His expertise and fame as a chronologist/chronographer are also clear from the chronological tables for the computations of Easter, based on a 16-year cycle, inscribed on the famous so-called statue of Hippolytus (on which see Frickel (1988) 65 ff., and Scholten (1990) 509 ff., 541 ff., with references to the earlier literature).

⁴⁶ Hdt. I 75 (*Vorsokr.* 11A6).

⁴⁷ Cf. *infra*, Ch. II 21.

⁴⁸ Cf. *FGrH* 244F339. Croesus and Polycrates are of course near contemporaries (also according to the chronographic vulgate). Cf. also *infra*, text to Ch. II n. 14.

⁴⁹ This connotation was invented by Justin, see Le Boulluec (1985) 36 ff., and taken over by Irenaeus and Hippolytus.

⁵⁰ It also has this meaning at *Ref.* I 23.1, ἄλλη δὲ αἵρεσις φιλοσόφων ἐκλήθη Ἀκαδημαϊκή. In view of ἄλλη, also the Epicureans (*Ref.* I 22) were considered a *hairesis* by Hippolytus, or rather by his source. Cf. also *Ref.* I 24.1, παρὰ Ἰνδοῖς αἵρεσις φιλοσοφουμένων ἐν τοῖς Βραχμάναις. The term was later used indiscriminately for both religious and philosophical doctrines; Epiphanius unblushingly uses it to designate the Greek philosophical schools, see *Pan.* I 183.6-7, the whole of I 5.1-7.5, as well as *De fide, Pan.* III p. 504.27 ff. (list of the philosophical *haireseis* at pp. 505.1-509.22; the passages at issue—except I p. 183.6 f. and III p. 504.27 ff.—have also been printed at *D.G.* 587 ff.). On *hairesis* as school of thought see Glucker (1978) 174 ff. and Le Boulluec (1985) 39 ff; cf. also *infra*, Ch. II n. 17, and text thereto. For Aëtius I 3 see further below, Ch. II.

⁵¹ See Mansfeld (1986b) 304 ff., where references are given (add Wehrli (1978) 14 f.).

Hippolytus' mechanical use of the word *hairesis* here and in the parallel passages in book I undoubtedly reflects the terminology of his philosophical source, which of course is quite uninterested in the revolutionary Christian concept of heresy.

In what follows, we are given an account of Pythagoras' philosophical doctrines which—the theory of transmigration excepted—by no means corresponds to today's views concerning Early Pythagoreanism.⁵² Some information is provided about the distinction between the two groups of early followers, viz. the inner and the outer circles, most of which appears to be rather reliable.⁵³ The biographic parts of this chapter seem to be less anachronistic than those concerned with the doctrines.

Ch. 3 briefly treats Empedocles, who is said to have lived after Pythagoras and his early followers (μετὰ τούτους γενόμενος) and in this way is provided with a relative date.⁵⁴ His theology is a variety of that of Pythagoras (3.1, 9.6 W. = 62.4 M., τὸ τῆς μονάδος νοερὸν πῦρ τὸν θεόν, cf. on Pythagoras 2.2, 5.7-8 W. = 58.3 M., μονάδα ... τὸν θεόν). Pythagoras is called his—and Heraclitus'—'teacher' (3.3 διδάσκαλος);⁵⁵ as to *metempsychosis*, note the explicit reference to the wanderings of Pythagoras' soul which resumes the larger treatment of the same topic in the Pythagoras-chapter (2.11 f.). Ch. 4, also quite brief, treats Heraclitus who is not dated in an explicit way but perhaps is suggested to be roughly contemporaneous with or a little later than Empedocles, most of whose views he, to our initial surprise, is said to have shared (σχεδὸν σύμφωνα τῷ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ ἐφθέγγετο, 9.19 f. W. = 63.4 f. M.), viz. those concerned with Strife and Love and with πῦρ νοερὸν τὸν θεόν (note that the monad of Pythagoras and Empedocles is absent). Like Empedocles, Hippolytus says, Heraclitus believed the world below the moon to be filled with evil.⁵⁶ In ch. 3, however, this view is *not* explicitly attributed to Empedocles. It is also noteworthy that in ch. 3, on the other hand, the view that all things come from Fire and return to Fire is attributed to Empedocles, and that the Stoics, who are waiting for the ἐκπύρωσις, are

⁵² For the Platonizing later traditions see, e.g., the standard account of Burkert (1972) 53 ff. Note that the Neopythagorean doctrine of the two principles was adjusted by Hippolytus, see *infra*, Ch. VI 13, Ch. VIII 2.

⁵³ Cf. e.g. von Fritz (1940) and Minar (1942).

⁵⁴ This is not incompatible with the chronology of Apollodorus, cf. *FGrH* 244F32 *ap. Diog. Laërt.* VIII 52 (*Vorsokr.* 31A1).

⁵⁵ Diels *D.G.* 145 and Marcovich point out that τούτων pertains to Empedocles and Heraclitus. For the links between the chapters on Pythagoras, Empedocles and Heraclitus in the *Philosophoumena* and the Stoic aspects of the doctrine attributed to Empedocles/Heraclitus see also Hershbell (1973) 101.

⁵⁶ A tenet ascribed to Aristotle as well, *Ref.* I 20.6 and VII 19.2. See also Hershbell (1973) 103, and *infra*, Ch. VII 2.

said to have accepted this doctrine. Again to our surprise this tenet, familiar from other sources as the vulgate Heraclitean doctrine which we know to be based on an *interpretatio stoica*, and as one of the main features of Stoic cosmology, is not explicitly attributed to Heraclitus in ch. 4.

I 5 Chapters I 5 and 17

I shall return to the doctrinal contents of chs. 2-4 (and their relation with the substantial accounts of Empedocles and Heraclitus in books VII and IX) in Chapters VIII and IX below. In the present Chapter, I wish to discuss the results of Diels' *Quellenforschung*. A closer reading of *Ref.* I chs. 5 and 17 is of capital importance. Diels, as will be recalled, had posited that the account in chs. 1-4 (source D1) is 'according to the succession' (cf. I 5, 10.9 W. = 63.5-6 M.) and therefore biographic, and that the account in chs. 6-16 (source D2) contains 'the tenets of the physicists' (cf. ch.17, 18.21 W. = 75.2 M.) and is therefore doxographic; see *D.G.* 145, "... duo compendia conflata esse patet. unum ex genere διαδοχῶν, alterum dogmatum. duplex origo quodam pacto significatur c. 5 φιλοσοφίαν κατὰ διαδοχὴν ἀναδραμεῖν et c. 17 τὰ τοῖς φυσικοῖς δόξαντα". But these references to Hippolytus' own designations of the subject-matter at issue are, to say the least, utterly selective.

In the transitional ch. 5 Hippolytus does *not*, as Diels' description would lead us to believe, say that he will hereafter treat τὰ τοῖς φυσικοῖς δόξαντα, but τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς μετὰ Θαλῆν, "the tenets of those who come *after Thales*" (10.9-10 W. = 63.6 M.).⁵⁷ Diels remains silent about this fact. Furthermore, his appeal to chs. 5 and 17 in support of his pet distinction between a biographico-diadochical source D1 and a doxographic source D2 amounts to a *petitio principii*. In ch. 17, the words ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἱκανῶς δοκοῦμεν παρατεθεικέναι as taken up by αὐτάρκως διαδραμόντων ἡμῶν τὰ τοῖς φυσικοῖς δόξαντα pertain to *all* of chs. 1-16. In ch. 1, Thales is said to have introduced the φιλοσοφία φυσική. In ch. 2.2, Pythagoras 'too'—i.e. just like Thales—is said to have practised physical inquiry (καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ φυσικῶν ζητήσας). In ch. 4.1 Heraclitus is called ὁ φυσικὸς φιλόσοφος. In ch. 5, first sentence, the subsequent early thinkers belonging to the Pythagorean school of thought are called ἕτεροι φυσικοί. Accordingly Pythagoras, (Empedocles), Heraclitus and their anonymous followers are philosophers of nature, or *physikoi*, according to Hippolytus' reading of what Diels calls source D1, and so chs. 2-4 for this further reason too prove to be included

⁵⁷ Cf. Osborne (1987) 192.

in the backward reference in ch. 17. There are no grounds whatsoever to attribute chs. 1-4 (or 2-4) to a different genre than chs. 6-9 + 11-16. At the end of the proem, 4.6 f. W. = 56.64 f. M., Hippolytus announces that he will start by finding out *τίνας οἱ παρ' Ἑλληνσι πρῶτοι φιλοσοφίαν φυσικὴν ἐπιδείξαντες*, for these according to him have been especially plundered by the heretics (from our study of books IV-IX it will become clear that he mainly thinks of *Pythagoras* and what he considers to be his following). The *Kephalaia*, or table of contents (brief abstracts, summaries) at the beginning of *Ref.* book I, which I assume Hippolytus wrote himself, lists at 1.7 f. W. = 53.6 f. M. as *φυσικοὶ* the whole series Thales—Hippon treated in chs. 1-16, and this list had been announced in the first *kephalaion*: *τίνα τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς φυσικοῖς φιλοσόφοις καὶ τίνες οὗτοι* (1.4 W. = 53.2 M.).⁵⁸ The first six words pertain to the entire doctrinal contents of chs. 1-16; the final three reveal that the personal factor will not go neglected. Consequently, it has to be admitted that, according to this text, the expression *τὰ δόξαντα* which according to Diels would only pertain to and indeed identify the doxographic source D2 also refers to the contents of source D1. This is also the case in ch. 17. Finally, it is noteworthy that at ch. 5 (10.5 W. = 63.2 M.) Hippolytus speaks of *τὰς δόξας* of those who came after Thales and Pythagoras (and his followers) which at first he had not thought it worth his while to include but now decides to include after all (10.4 f. W. = 63.1 f. M., *μετὰ τούτους ἐγένοντο καὶ ἕτεροι φυσικοὶ κτλ.*).⁵⁹ This is the same terminology as in the comparable passage⁶⁰ at ch. 10, where he says that he will only describe *τὰς δόξας* of those others which are of some importance.

I 6 *The Meaning of ἀναδραμεῖν ἐπὶ*

From the wording of ch. 5 it is clear that Hippolytus considers the philosophy of the *physikoi* to be a sort of unity, a single *σχολή* which however should be subdivided into various groups, or successions. At 10.8 ff. W. = 63.5 ff. M., he writes: ... *δοκεῖ ἡμῖν τὴν ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου*

⁵⁸ The 1st *kephalaion* also announces the treatment of the tenets of the ethical and of the dialectical philosophers, and of their identities. The 3rd gives a list of the physicists, the 4th a list of the dialecticians to be treated. This division according to the canonical parts of philosophy is also acknowledged elsewhere by Hippolytus (cf. *infra*, Ch. I 7); it is paralleled at Diog. Laërt. I 17. The 5th *kephalaion* refers to the contrary view of Epicurus, the 6th to 'Pyrrho the Academic' (see *infra*, Ch. III n. 17 and text thereto), the 7th to Brahmins Druids Hesiod. The sequence of names in the *Kephalaia* corresponds exactly to the order of treatment in *Ref.* book I.

⁵⁹ Cf. Osborne (1987) 190 f.

⁶⁰ Cf. *infra*, Ch. I 6 *ad finem*.

ἐκθεμένους φιλοσοφίαν κατὰ διαδοχὴν ἀναδραμεῖν ἐπὶ τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς μετὰ Θαλῆν, καὶ κτλ. Diels affirmed that κατὰ διαδοχὴν goes with what precedes and that this proves his source D1 (Thales—Heraclitus) to be biographic. But why should Hippolytus, faithfully transcribing a single source, refer to an overview which began with *Thales* in the words 'the philosophy from Pythagoras'?⁶¹ Von Kienle and Mejer, as we have noticed,⁶² argue against Diels that κατὰ διαδοχὴν may also pertain to what follows. However, this ambiguity is not the main point at issue, the real question being how one should translate ἀναδραμεῖν ἐπὶ. Diels refrains from translating this expression, but from his quotation of the formula which he believes to be at issue in ch. 5 as well as from his general evaluation of Hippolytus' presumed procedure when transcribing his sources one may infer that he understood it as 'to deal with'.⁶³ Mejer translates 'to go through', i.e. 'to treat', and we have noticed that (like von Kienle) he still assumes that there is an important qualitative distinction between chs. 1-4 (Diels' source D1 inclusive of ch. 1) and 6-16. Support for these translations may be believed to be forthcoming from ch. 17, where Hippolytus, after his statement that the treatment of the philosophers of nature is now complete, continues with the words δοκεῖ ... λοιπὸν ... ἀναδραμεῖν ἐπὶ⁶⁴ Σωκράτην καὶ Πλάτωνα, οἱ τὸ ἠθικὸν μάλιστα προετίμησαν. In ch. 5 he had said that he would presently treat ethics and Socrates (and then dialectic and Aristotle), in ch. 17 he states that he is now going to do as he had promised. Because Socrates and Plato have not been treated in the preceding chs. 6-16, it is arguable that in ch. 17 ἀναδραμεῖν ἐπὶ means 'to continue with' *vel sim.*, and that we should also assume this for ch. 5. However, that this is not correct can be established by reference to LSJ *s.v.* ἀνατρέχω I.1 and I.3; the usual meaning is 'to run (go) back', with ἐπί: 'to revert to', 'to resume' (e.g. an earlier argument or subject). This is also the usual

⁶¹ Marcovich *ad loc.* correctly believes the reference to be to the succession Pythagoras—Heraclitus; it is to be noted that Diels *D.G.* 145-6 saw this too: "... c. 5 τὴν ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου ἐκθεμένους φιλοσοφίαν Empedoclem et Heraclitum Pythagoreorum successionem clare comprehendit". Cf. also *supra*, n. 55.

⁶² *Supra*, Ch. I 2.

⁶³ Diels had his difficulties with this sentence. At *D.G.* 145.14-5 he (impossibly!) combines φιλοσοφίαν κατὰ διαδοχὴν ἀναδραμεῖν (to be translated, presumably, as 'to treat philosophy according to succession'), leaving out the ἐπὶ and masking the fact that ἀναδραμεῖν (ἐπὶ) goes with what follows, not with φιλ. κ. διαδ. His suggestion, *ibid.* n. 1, that the καὶ before δοκεῖ should be eliminated [so also in his ed. of the text, 559.10, now followed by Marcovich] should however be accepted. In the note at 145 Diels suggests that νῦν should be inserted; this is retracted in the apparatus at 559 ('nunc dubito'), where other suggestions are proposed. In the *index verborum*, *s.v.* διαδοχή he quotes κατὰ διαδ. ... μετὰ Θαλῆν as a whole.

⁶⁴ Practically the same formula as in ch. 5.

meaning in Hippolytus,⁶⁵ and ‘to revert to’ or ‘to resume’ is the correct translation in both chs. 5 and 17.⁶⁶ In ch. 5, moreover, the main opposition is between τὴν ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου φιλοσοφίαν and τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς μετὰ Θαλῆν. The reason why Thales’ successors are treated at all is that the Ionian school, or succession, is important according to the tradition here followed by Hippolytus, or rather by his source, and that Thales is after all the earliest philosopher on record according to this tradition. Note that Aëtius I 3 (both ps.Plutarch and Stobaeus) too devotes much more space to the Ionians than to the other Presocratics;⁶⁷ the fact that the two treatments are parallel in this respect suggest a common tradition rather than whimsy on Hippolytus’ part. The expression κατὰ διαδοχὴν, which according to Diels should apply to what precedes, may go with what follows. The part of the sentence at issue should then be translated thus: “having set out the philosophy from Pythagoras, I believe we should revert, according to the succession, to the tenets of those who come after Thales”. But the formula may also go with what pre-

⁶⁵ Valentinus’ Sophia ‘goes back’ (ἀνέδραμεν) to the Depth of the Father (*Ref.* VI 30.6, 157.25 W. = 240.24 M.), his Christ and Holy Spirit to Noûs (VI 31.8, 159.23 W. = 242.38 M.). Basilides’ finer Sonhood ‘goes back’ (ἀνῆλθε καὶ ἀνέδραμε (VII 22.8, 198.30 W. = 290.40-1 M.), which the coarser Sonhood is at first unable to do (VII 22.9, 199.4-5 W. = 290.46 M.). Saturninus’ Man threatens to return at once (ἀναδραμεῖν (VII 28.2, 208.15 W. = 303.8 M.), so the angels make a poor copy to which the supreme power out of pity sends a ‘spark of life’, viz. the soul, which after death ‘returns to its kin’ (ἀνατρέχειν πρὸς τὰ ὁμόφυλα (VII 28.4, 209.3 W. = 303.14-5 M.). Cf. also the indexes in Wendland and Marcovich *s.v.* ἀναδρομή. At *Ref.* VII 15.2 Hippolytus tells us that the exposition of Aristotle’s logical doctrines (chs. 15-19.1) is to be interrupted by an illustration (given in chs. 16-7). This is introduced as follows: ἵνα δὲ σαφὲς ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον, δείξω διὰ τοῦ παραδείγματος, δι’ οὗ ἐπὶ τὴν ὅλην τοῦ Περιπάτου θεωρίαν ἀναδραμεῖν ἔσται. Which means: “... an example, by means of which it will be possible to get to the core of the whole Peripatetic doctrine”—the backward motion here being that to the principles (cf. expressions such as ἀναφέρειν). Festugière (1932) 236 correctly translates “... un exemple qui permettra de revenir d’un seul coup sur toute la théorie du Lycée”.

⁶⁶ I have compared several available translations. Macmahon (1868) translates “recur to the opinions entertained by those living after the time of Thales” (ch. 5, correct) and “now turn to Socrates and Plato” (ch. 17, incorrect). Meyboom (1916) has “terug te gaan op de meeningen (der wijsgeren) na Thales” (ch. 5) and “teruggaan op Socrates en Plato” (ch. 17). Preysing (1922) has “bis auf die Ansichten der auf Thales folgenden Denker zurückgehen” (ch. 5, correct) and “auf Platon und Sokrates zu sprechen kommen” (ch. 17, incorrect). Of these translations, only Meyboom’s is consistent, and not only consistent but right as well. Von Kienle (1961) 22 correctly has “wieder auf die Lehren der Philosophen nach Thales zurückkommen” (ch. 5); he does not translate ch. 17. Osborne (1987) 192 correctly translates (in ch. 5) ‘we should go back to’. Siouville (1928) provides a summary of *Ref.* I, not a translation.

⁶⁷ Also note that August. *Civ. Dei* VIII 2, though referring not only to the Ionians but also to Pythagoras and his followers, describes the tenets of Thales’ successors only, not those of Pythagoras’ (cf. *infra*, Ch. III n. 12); presumably, his source, just as ps.Plutarch’s and Hippolytus’, provided ample information on the Ionians and much less on the others.

cedes; then the translation should be: "having set out the philosophy from Pythagoras according to the succession, I believe we should revert to those who come after Thales".⁶⁸ 'Revert to', because the successors of Thales had not been described, as one would have expected, in the chapters following ch. 1, the chapter dealing with Thales, and because the early followers of Thales antedate the later followers of Pythagoras. Chs. 6-9, *pace* Osborne, therefore belong with ch. 1, and chs. 2-4, in a way, are a digression.

In the same way, in ch. 17 the meaning must be: having run through (διαδραμόντων) the tenets of all the physicists, I shall now revert to, take up again, Socrates and Plato. Why 'revert to'? The first sentence of ch. 18 runs: ὁ μὲν οὖν Σωκράτης γίνεται Ἀρχελάου τοῦ φυσικοῦ ἀκροατῆς (cf. *Keph.* 1.10 W. = 53.9 M. Σωκράτης Ἀρχελάου μαθητῆς τοῦ φυσικοῦ). Archelaus' doctrine had been described way back, in ch. 9; in ch. 10.1 we are told that ἡ ... φυσικὴ φιλοσοφία ἀπὸ Θάλητος ἕως Ἀρχελάου διέμεινε· τούτου γίνεται Σωκράτης ἀκροατῆς. In other words: in terms of succession (κατὰ διαδοχὴν), chs. 18 ff. link up which chs. 9-10.1. That Socrates was 'said to be' Archelaus' pupil seems to have been already stated by Theophrastus.⁶⁹

For 'to deal with' Hippolytus uses δια- not ἀνατρέχω. In ch. 17, the distinction between διαδραμόντων and ἀναδραμεῖν is explicit. Compare Clem. *Protr.* v 64.1, who introduces the new topic of the tenets of the philosophers concerning the gods with ἐπιδράμωμεν. At *Strom.* II v 23.1, on the other hand, he resumes his treatment of faith with the words τούτων δὴ ἐπιδεδειγμένων [i.e. after this excursus] ἀναδράμωμεν αὐθις ἐπὶ τὸν περὶ τῆς πίστεως λόγον. See also Numenius Fr. 1 a4, ἀναχωρήσασθαι, 'remonter plus haut' (tr. Des Places) or 'to go back' (tr. Droge), viz. in order to link the doctrines of Plato with those of Pythagoras and the renowned ancient barbarian civilisations.⁷⁰ Theon, *Progymn. ap.* Spengel, *Rhet. graec.* II 86.9 ff. describes the plot of the Odyssey as follows: καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων ἐστὶν ἀρξάμενον ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀναδραμεῖν, εἴτα ἐπὶ τὰ τελευταῖα καταντῆσαι, ὅπερ ἐν Ὀδυσσεΐᾳ Ὅμηρος πεποίηκεν· ἥρξατο μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν χρόνων, καθ' οὓς Ὀδυσσεὺς ἦν παρὰ Καλυψοῖ, εἴτα ἀνέδραμεν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν μετὰ τινος οἰκονομίας γλαφυρᾶς· ἐποίει γὰρ τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα τοῖς Φαίαξι τὰ καθ' ἑαυτὸν διηγουμένον κτλ. He says that in literary works it is also possible to start at the

⁶⁸ Cf. Howald (1920) 72: "er wendet sich nunmehr wieder zu den Nachfolgern des Thales".

⁶⁹ *Phys. op.* Fr. 4 (D.G. 479.17) = *Vorsokr.* 60A5.

⁷⁰ See Des Places (1973) *ad loc.*, 103 n. 2, and Droge (1989) 90 f., also for further references.

end and then to revert to the beginning etc., *ibid.* 87.8-9 (καὶ πάλιν ἀπὸ τῶν τελευταίων ἀρξάμενον ἀναδραμεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ λῆξαι εἰς τὰ μέσα). Galen, returning to a section in Chrysippus' *On the Soul* from which he had quoted a few lines at *PHP* III 2.5 (*SVF* II 890 *ad finem*), much later introduces his quotation of the same lines—in a slightly different form—and what came after them (*SVF* II 891) thus, *PHP* III 5.1: ἀποχωρήσαντες οὖν ἤδη τῶν τοιούτων [*viz.*, his excursus] ἴδωμεν ἐξῆς ἅπαντας οὓς ἐρωτᾷ λόγους ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὖθις ἀνελθόντες ἅπαντος τοῦ λόγου πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν παρελθεῖν. Diog. Laërt. X 29 lists Epicurus' three *Letters* and says that he will begin with the first of these (ἀρκτέον δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης), after a few preliminary remarks on the division of philosophy. These remarks follow X 19 *ad finem*—34; in fact, this passage also includes a summary treatment of the criterium, see the formal concluding statement καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῆς διαιρέσεως καὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου στοιχειωδῶς. At X 34 *ad finem*, he tersely introduces the transcription of the *Letter to Herodotus* by saying ἀνιτέον δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐπιστολήν, i. e. “but we must return to the *Letter*”. Compare further Hierocl. *In Carm. aur.* p. 10.24-5, νῦν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα πάλιν ἐπανέλθωμεν, Procl. *In Tim.* III p. 105.20-1, δεῖ δὲ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὰς εἰρημένας ἀποδείξεις ἀναδραμεῖν, ἐν αἷς ἐλέγομεν κτλ., and *In Tim.* I p. 149.3-4, III p. 296.9-11. See also the excursus printed by Busse in the apparatus to Ammon. *In Cat.* 8.6,⁷¹ which ends with the words ἄλλ' ἐπανιτέον ὅθεν ἐξέβημεν.

I 7 Arrangement According to the Parts of Philosophy and According to Succession

Nevertheless the systematic treatment according to a division physics—ethics—logic (in that order), that is to say according to the parts of philosophy as announced in the *Kephalaia*⁷² and maintained throughout (cf. ch. 5, ch. 17 and the opening sentences of chs. 20 and 21) does not fully square with the treatment according to the order of succession. In ch. 17, Hippolytus says he has now finished physics (or rather the views of the [early] physicists), and that it is the turn of ethics to be treated. In the order of succession, however, this explicitly entails reverting to the διαδοχὴ as indicated in chs. 9-10.

From Hippolytus' explicit statements concerning the structure of his exposition of the history of philosophy according to (a) the systematic sequence of its parts in their presumed historical order of discovery and

⁷¹ Hadot (1990a) 144 f., 150 ff. argues that this excursus should either be attributed to Ammonius or is a fragment of another Alexandrian commentary interpolated in the text.

⁷² Cf. *supra* n. 58, also for the parallel in Diog. Laërt.

(b) the various orders of succession (διαδοχή), it follows that he knew what he was doing. He was faced with a traditional problem, because ancient traditions about the number of *diadochai* to be assumed for the Presocratic period vacillated between two or three such successions. This fact goes a long way to explain his wavering exposition of the *physikoi* in *Ref.* I chs. 5 and 10. Blending the account of the various successions as continued after Socrates with a treatment according to the further parts of philosophy involved, viz. ethics and logic, was no easy matter either.

CHAPTER TWO

HIPPOLYTUS AND AETIUS I 3

II 1 *The Ionian Diadoche*

The Pythagorean philosophy (or succession and *hairesis*) as set out in chs. 2-4 *interrupts* the order of succession of Thales and his followers (chs. 1 + 6-9 + 10, first sentence). The first words of ch. 6, Θαλοῦ τοίνυν Ἀναξίμανδρος γίνεται ἀκροατής, Ἀναξίμανδρος Πραξιάδου Μιλήσιος, are linked up with the first words of ch. 1, λέγεται Θαλῆν τὸν Μιλήσιον Anaximander's name is repeated for the sake of emphasis, i.e. to underpin the return to and resumption of the διαδοχὴ of Thales indicated in ch. 5. The link between the opening words of ch. 6 and ch. 1 is of the same kind as that between the first words of ch. 7, Ἀναξιμένης δέ, καὶ αὐτὸς ὢν Μιλήσιος, υἱὸς δὲ Εὐρυστράτου, and the first words of ch. 6. Anaximenes, also from Miletus, is Anaximander's successor. In a similar way, the first words of ch. 8, μετὰ τοῦτον [*scil.*, Anaximenes] γίνεται Ἀναξαγόρας Ἡγησιβούλου ὁ Κλαζομένιος, make Anaxagoras the successor of the personage treated in the previous chapter. Next, at the beginning of ch. 9, Archelaus is linked up with Anaxagoras, who has been treated in the previous chapter: Ἀρχέλαος τὸ μὲν γένος Ἀθηναῖος, υἱὸς δὲ Ἀπολλοδώρου· οὗτος ... ὁμοίως Ἀναξαγόρα κτλ. In the first sentence of ch. 10, Hippolytus says that the physical philosophy deriving from Thales persisted until Archelaus, whose pupil is Socrates (ἡ ... φυσικὴ φιλοσοφία ἀπὸ Θάλητος ἕως Ἀρχέλαου διέμεινε κτλ.). There can indeed be no doubt that Diels' source D2, according to the intimations provided by Hippolytus as to the succession starting with Thales, should include ch. 1, and that a continuous account of the Ionian *diadoche* is at issue.

II 2 *Hairesis and Diadoche*

In the *Successions* literature, the line Thales—Archelaus constitutes what as a rule is called the Ionian succession; it is this line which in *Ref.* I is interrupted by Hippolytus' insertion of his Pythagorean line. In ps.Plutarch (Aëtius) I 3, the correct order of exposition has been preserved: I 3.1-7 Thales—Archelaus, I 3.8 Pythagoras (and the Pythagoreans, cf. *D.G.* 282a6 ~ b1). Hippolytus does not call the succession from

Thales 'Ionian'; at the beginning of ch. 2, however, where the 'other philosophy' starting with Pythagoras is roughly synchronized with the 'physical philosophy' deriving from and starting with Thales, we have, according to the usual denomination, an explicit reference to the 'Italian philosophy':¹ φιλοσοφία ... ἣν Ἰταλικὴν προσηγόρευσαν. In ch. 1, Thales is called 'the Milesian'; we shall see presently that in Aëtius the designation 'Ionian' succession is explained by means of Thales' Milesian provenance.² In the surviving accounts of the successions, the distinction between the Ionian and Italian lines is a standard feature.

Ps.Plut. (Aët.) I 3.1, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9 provides information much resembling what is to be found in Hippolytus. At I 3.1, *D.G.* 276a6-11, Thales is said to have got philosophy going, καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἡ Ἰωνικὴ αἵρεσις προσηγορεύθη.³ ἐγένοντο γὰρ πλείεσται διαδοχαὶ φιλοσοφίας. φιλοσοφίας δὲ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ἦλθεν εἰς Μίλητον πρεσβύτερος. It is to be noted that here διαδοχὴ and αἵρεσις are used indistinguishably, and that both these terms (as in Hippolytus) are synonymous with φιλοσοφία. Diels argued that *D.G.* 276a6-11 is an interpolation in the text of Aëtius added by ps.Plutarch because (a) there is no parallel in Stobaeus' section on Thales, and (b) (γὰρ) at 276a12 refers back to 276a6-7.⁴ But (γὰρ) has been inserted by Diels from Stobaeus and ps.Justin, and he has excluded from the text the οὗς⁵ which in ps.Plutarch makes for a smooth transition. What is more, a parallel exists. After his description of the *archai* according to Thales—Anaximander—Anaximenes—Anaxagoras—Archelaus (exactly the same succession as in Hippolytus), ps.Plutarch continues (I 3.7): οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἐφεξῆς ἀλλήλοις ταῖς διαδοχαῖς γενομένοι τὴν *λεχθεῖσαν* [this refers back to I 3.1] Ἰωνικὴν συμπληροῦσι φιλοσοφίαν ἀπὸ Θάλητος. Stobaeus (I 10.12, 124.13 ff. = *D.G.* 280b7 ff.) does not have *λεχθεῖσαν*⁶—as we have noticed, there is in Stobaeus no previous mention of the succession; but after φιλοσοφίαν, his text continues with the words: οὕτω προσαγορευθεῖσαν⁷ διότι Μιλήσιος αὐτῆς κατήρξεν ἀνὴρ ὁ Θαλῆς ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Ἰόνων μητροπόλεως. In other words, the explanation of the term 'Ionian' philosophy in Stobaeus is the same as in ps.Plutarch, though the wording is not identical. If inter-

¹ Cf. von Kienle (1961) 22.

² At Diog. Laërt. I 13, the same explanation for the names of the Ionian and Italian successions are to be found: Thales came from Miletus, Pythagoras for the most part was active in Italy.

³ The same verb as at *Ref.* I 2.1.

⁴ *D.G.* 61. In his edition of the text of Aëtius, he put the passage between specially adapted square brackets.

⁵ Diels is followed by Mau in the Teubneriana of ps.Plutarch (p. 53.16).

⁶ He also reads ἐκπληροῦσι, not συμπλ.

⁷ Cf. *supra*, n. 3 and text thereto.

polation there is in ps.Plut. I 3.1, it derives from the source for ps.Plut. I 3.7.⁸ The Stobaeon excerpts which according to Diels derive from Aëtius are in Stob. I 10 mingled with excerpts from other sources. In the succession Thales—Archelaus (corresponding to what is in ps.Plutarch), Stobaeus has inserted two brief excerpts concerning Xenocrates and Xenophanes (in this alphabetical order, *Ecl. phys.* I p. 123.7-11), which Diels prints and redistributes as Aët. I 3.23 (Xenocrates) and I 3.12 (Xenophanes) although there are no parallels in ps.Plutarch for these two lemmata.⁹ The reference to the *Ionian* succession in Stobaeus hardly makes sense for a series which includes Xenophanes who, although born in Ionian Colophon, is nowhere else listed as belonging to the Ionian succession. The paragraph about the Ionian succession has been transcribed without good reason in Stobaeus; it actually is foreign to his purpose in *Ecl. phys.* I 10. It follows that the Ionian succession was included and its name explained in the common source of Stobaeus and ps.Plutarch. Note that the text of ps.Plutarch at I 3.1 and I 3.7 is confirmed by the Arabic translation¹⁰ (at I 3.1, it is also confirmed by Eusebius).

At I 3.9, i.e. in the paragraph immediately after¹¹ the section on

⁸ Diels *D.G.* 62 argues that in ps.Plutarch §7 has been abridged.

⁹ The paragraph on Xenophanes is not from Theophrastus and presumably not from Aëtius either; see Mansfeld (1985a) 110 n. 4, 127 n. 64.

¹⁰ See the edition by Daiber (1980). —There are a few further remains of references to successions in Stobaeus' excerpts from Aëtius, e.g. Aët. I 9.2, I 11.6.

¹¹ According to Diels' restored text, printed also by Mau. I here accept this emendation, though not without misgivings. If we leave what is now Aët. I 3.9 (ps. Plut. p. 57.14-17) at the end of ps.Plut. I 3, the latter's Italian succession would include Heraclitus and Hippasus, Epicurus and Democritus, Empedocles, Socrates and Plato, Aristoteles, and Zeno of Citium (whether we should also include the other philosophers added to Aët. I 3 by Diels from Stobaeus, or should stick to Diels' order, is another matter). There is in ps.Plutarch no trace of a separate Eleatic succession; he may have been indebted to a tradition comparable to that followed by Diog. Laërt. I 14-5, where the Eleatic succession has been incorporated in the Italian. If this is feasible, ps.Plutarch's inclusion of Democritus and Epicurus in the Italian succession is acceptable. That of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Zeno, who in other sources are linked up with the Ionian stemma, remains odd. It is less odd to have (the Pythagorean) Hippasus 'of Metapontum' after Pythagoras. If for the moment we forget about *Ref.* I 2-4, Heraclitus is always outside any stemma and Empedocles is so quite often (cf. further *infra*, Ch. III n. 54). Now Heraclitus, linked with Hippasus since Arist. *Met.* A3.984a8 f. and Theophr. *Phys. op.* Fr. 1, may at Aët. I 3.10 have been brought in by association with Hippasus; Empedocles 'of Agrigentum', of course, is an Italian, and already linked up with the Pythagoreans at Theophr. *Phys. op.* Fr. 3 *ap. Simplicius*. In *Phys.* 25.1 (note that Diels does not print this part of the sentence in *Sperrdruck*, but the version of this Fr. at Diog. Laërt. VIII 55 should, I believe, include 56 ὅστερον δὲ τοῖς Πυθαγορικοῖς ἐντυχεῖν, because 56 "Ἐρμύππος—ἐποποιῶν may be a typical Diogenean excerpt that has been interpolated in the Theophrastus abstract. Wehrli includes the whole of ὅστερον—ἐντυχεῖν in Hermipp. Fr. 26). Consequently, it is equally arguable that the final sentence which is now Aët. I 3.9 should be restored to the position after the paragraph on

Pythagoras (3.8), ps.Plutarch speaks of the αἵρεσις of Pythagoras (note that *D.G.* ps.Plut. 282a6 ~ Stob. 282b1 mentions οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι). There is no parallel in Stobaeus. It should be noted, however, that in the manuscripts this paragraph is found at the end of ch. 3; this order of transmission is confirmed by the Arabic translation of ps.Plutarch.¹² It is not odd at all that there is no parallel in Stobaeus, whose account of Pythagoras (I 10.12, 124.19-125.16) is anyhow much shorter than ps.Plutarch's (I 3.8), and for whose purpose in *Ecl. phys.* I 10 a reference to the Italian succession would have been irrelevant (it is, as we have noticed, after all a minor miracle that the explanation of the Ionian succession did survive in the Stobaeus abstract). The text runs: ἡ δὲ τούτων αἵρεσις Ἰταλικὴ προσηγορεύθη¹³ διὰ τὸ τὸν Πυθαγόραν ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ σχολάσαι· μετέστη γὰρ ἀπὸ Σάμου τῆς πατρίδος, τῇ Πολυκράτους¹⁴ τυραννίδι δυσαρεστήσας). Ps.Plutarch opposes the Ionian *hairesis*¹⁵ (I 3.1) deriving from Thales to the Italian *hairesis* (I 3.9) deriving from Pythagoras. We have noticed above¹⁶ that Hippolytus speaks of the Italian philosophy inaugurated by Pythagoras and of the successors who continued this αἵρεσις (*Ref.* I 2.1). The significant word *hairesis* therefore is shared by ps.Plutarch and Hippolytus, and is found at nodal points which are structurally comparable. The difference is that ps.Plutarch uses *hairesis* for both the successions that are involved, Hippolytus for the Pythagorean school only. Now αἵρεσις as a designation of a Presocratic group (i.e. not including schools of thought after Socrates) is rather uncommon.¹⁷ According to Diog. Laërt. I 15 ff., there are successions in

Empedocles, i.e. at ps.Plut. p. 59.7. It is anyhow clear that the lemmata in ps.Plut. I 3 following that on Pythagoras (which at its end has a lacuna) are in some sort of disorder, and that in the text as it stands no serious effort has been made to arrange the philosophers treated according to succession and *hairesis* (yet the block Socrates—Plato—Aristotle—Zeno may be a rudiment of an arrangement according to the Ionian succession found at the beginning of the chapter). The disorder in Stobaeus is even greater. One may safely assume that the part of the original version of ps.Plut. I 3 subsequent to the Pythagoras section has been drastically epitomized in ps.Plutarch's text, and that the note on the Ionian succession was placed *ad finem* because it was first left out and put back only later. That abridgement and rearrangement occurred also follows from (a) the Stobaeian parallels to ps.Plutarch and (b) the Aëtian items not paralleled in ps.Plutarch to be found in Stobaeus and printed by Diels in Aët. I 3, if, that is, his ascription and reconstruction are correct as to the latter. As long as no better text or even *Lesetext* of Aëtius is available, one should go on consulting the original texts from which Diels' Aëtius was reassembled. For Alt's comments on Aët. I 3 see *infra*, n. 23 and text thereto

¹² The lacuna at the end of § 8 therefore came about rather early; in the so-called *Aëtius arabus* it is masked by a *flosculus* from an Arab poet.

¹³ Cf. *supra*, n. 3, n. 7, and text thereto.

¹⁴ Cf. *supra*, Ch. I n. 48 and text thereto.

¹⁵ Cf. *supra*, Ch. I 4.

¹⁶ See previous n.

¹⁷ The only parallels I know are later or even much later than Aëtius. Ps.Plut.

the Presocratic period and both successions and *haireseis* after Socrates; this is confirmed, e.g., by Sext. *M.* VII 141.¹⁸ The rather unusual notion of an exclusively Presocratic *hairesis* therefore provides a close link between these paragraphs in ps.Plutarch and Hippolytus; again, a tradition followed by both must be involved. In other ways too, *Ref.* I 2.1 recalls ps.Plut./Aët. I 3.9, viz. in the reference to Pythagoras' exile from Samos because of Polycrates: ἑτέρα φιλοσοφία ..., ἥς ἤρξε Πυθαγόρας, ὃν Σάμιόν τινες λέγουσιν· ἦν Ἰταλικὴν προσηγόρευσαν διὰ τὸν Πυθαγόραν φεύγοντα Πολυκράτην τὸν Σαμίων τύραννον οἰκῆσαι πόλιν τῆς Ἰταλίας κακεῖ τὸν βίον πληρῶσαι. What is in ps.Plutarch's mini-biography of Pythagoras at Aët. I 3.9 impresses one as an abridgement of what is in Hippolytus', and the remarks about the *hairesis* or succession are virtually the same in both authors. One should add that ps.Plutarch, at the beginning of Aët. I 3.8 (i.e. immediately after his piece about the Ionian philosophy and succession) points out that with "Pythagoras the son of Mnesarchus of Samos, the first to call philosophy by that very name"¹⁹ philosophy had 'another beginning' (*D.G.* 280a17, πάλιν δὲ ἀπὸ ἄλλης ἀρχῆς).²⁰ *Ad sententiam*, this is equivalent to the beginning of *Ref.* I 2, where the 'other (tradition of) philosophy' started by Pythagoras is roughly synchronized with Thales,²¹ viz. as to its beginning. Again,

De Hom. 2, c. 150.1, speaks of those who choose ἰδίας τινὰς αἱρέσεις and then instances Democritus, Epicurus and Aristippus. Clem. *Strom.* I xiv 64.2 says Xenophanes started τῆς ... Ἑλεατικῆς ἀγωγῆς. Theodor. *Graec. aff. cur.* I 55 has Pythagoras ὁ τῆς Ἰταλικῆς αἱρέσεως ἡγησάμενος, IV 5 Xenophanes ὁ τῆς Ἑλεατικῆς αἱρέσεως ἡγησάμενος, and V 61 speaks of those who do not even know the names of the Ἰταλικῆς καὶ Ἰωνικῆς καὶ Ἑλεατικῆς ξυμμορίας (cf. *infra*, Ch. III n. 12: Theodoret does not deal with the Pythagoreans as a separate sect). The list of twenty *haireseis* ascribed to 'the Pythagorean Heracleides' transmitted by a certain Ioseppus (printed *D.G.* 149) is impossible to date but seems to be rather late; see the comments of Wehrli (1978) 16 ff.; the identification of this Heracleides with Heraclides Lembus, the epitomator of Sotion, proposed by Diels, *loc. cit.*, cannot be sustained. His list provides no less than six Presocratic *haireseis*: (10) Πυθαγόρειος, (11) Ἐμπεδόκλειος, (12) Ἡρακλείτειος, (13) Ἑλεατική, (14) Δημοκρίτειος and (15) Πρωταγόρειος. In ps.Gal. *Philos. hist.* 7 (the interesting ch. περὶ αἱρέσεων), where only four philosophical *haireseis* are distinguished, two seem to begin in the Presocratic period: the 'Skeptical', which includes Zeno of Elea, and the 'mixed' (i.e. mostly Skeptical but in part dogmatic), for which Xenophanes and Democritus are mentioned; the relevant portion of the text is printed as Pyrrho T27. Simplicius, in his overview of the names of the *haireseis*, refers to the Pythagoreans (*In Cat.* 3.31) and the Eleatics (*ibid.* 4.2); Ammonius, in his overview (*In Cat.* 1.14-5), mentions the Pythagoreans and the Democriteans. For Epiphanius see *supra*, Ch. I n. 50.

¹⁸ Cf. Mansfeld (1986b) 317.

¹⁹ This formula is also in Stobaeus, where however the explicit reference to the 'other beginning' is lacking. The πρῶτος εὐρετῆς motif (prominent in Aëtius) is found in Hippolytus too (*Ref.* I 1.1 and 3, I 1.4, I 2.3, I 6.2, I 8.9, I 14.1, I 23.1, IV 51.1 and 2).

²⁰ Cf. Wehrli (1978) 12.

²¹ Cf. *supra*, Ch. I text to n. 48.

the parallel between ps.Plut. I 3 and Hippolytus is striking. It is therefore safe to assume that the information at issue in both authors depends on the same tradition. It is important to observe that both provide little biographies of the two founding fathers of these two important early schools, and not of any others. Apparently, these biographies and successions were *de rigueur* in the tradition reflected by both ps.Plutarch²² and Hippolytus. What is of course equally noteworthy is that Hippolytus stuck to the treatment according to succession for much of book I, whereas in the Aëtius chapters after I 3 (as reconstructed by Diels from ps.Plutarch, Stobaeus and Theodoret) very few traces of this type of organization are to be found.

Aëtius I 3 has been rewardingly studied by Alt.²³ She correctly argues that this chapter, or at any rate its first part, in Aëtius has been reorganized according to the pattern of the *Successions* literature. She believes that the doctrinal contents of the entire chapter go back to Theophrastus, but were reformulated by later Peripatetics in the decades after 260 BCE; the next stage would have been a reformulation in terms of successions after Sotion's pioneering work, i.e. after ca. 200 BCE.²⁴ She omits to take the particular use of *hairesis* in ps.Plutarch as the designation of a philosophical school into account.²⁵ We may assume that this meaning of αἵρεσις was already current before the *floruit* of Hippobotus, the author of the first Περὶ αἱρέσεων, who possibly is a somewhat later contemporary of Sotion.²⁶ But Hippobotus does not count the Ionian or the Italian school among the nine *haireseis* to be treated (Diog. Laërt. I 19 = Hippob. Fr. 1 Gigante). The authoritative ten *haireseis* as set out by an unknown authority *ap.* Diog. Laërt. I 18 do not include the Presocratics. Even the list of *haireseis* in the *Suda*, s.v. Σωκράτης, does not include the Presocratics although, as we have noticed, late authorities such as Ammonius and Simplicius in their overviews of the *haireseis* refer to the Pythagoreans, Eleatics and Democriteans. The application of the term *hairesis* to the Presocratic sections of the Ionian and Italian successions in ps.Plutarch and Hippolytus presupposes that its denotation had, so to speak, been extended backwards from the *haireseis* after Socrates to include those Presocratics who, preceding Socrates, figured in the *diadochai* of these *haireseis* and so arguably led up to them. This

²² We have noticed that most traces have been abridged by Stobaeus out of the excerpts deriving from Aëtius.

²³ Alt (1973) 134 ff. The relevant passages in Hippolytus however are not adduced by her for comparison.

²⁴ Alt (1973) 161 f. Cf. also *supra*, n. 11.

²⁵ I 3.1: ἡ Ἴωνικὴ αἵρεσις, I 3.9: ἡ ... αἵρεσις Ἰταλική.

²⁶ For the *status quaestionis* see Gigante (1984) 155 ff. The arguments of Glucker (1978) 176 ff. in favour of a later date for Hippobotus are not fully cogent.

mechanical use of the term *hairesis* seems possible only well after the genre *Περὶ αἰρέσεων* had reached maturity and works bearing this title, such as those composed by Panaetius and Carneades' pupil Clitomachus,²⁷ had become part of the standard literature. This can hardly have happened earlier than the beginning of the first century BCE. We have noticed above that Hippolytus speaks of the αἵρεσις of Pythagoras (2.1),²⁸ and have also pointed out other peculiarities common to ps.Plut. (~ Aët. I 3) and Hippolytus which suggest a common source or tradition. Consequently, it hardly seems possible to date this proximate source earlier than the earlier part of the first century BCE. I cannot enter here into Alt's arguments in favour of the assumption that most of the contents of Aët. I 3 are Theophrastean as reformulated by later Early Peripatetics.²⁹ What counts, however, is that the final redaction of this chapter in terms of a historiographic *koine* concerned with *hairesis* and *diadoche* will have been relatively late.

²⁷ On them see Mejer (1978) 75 ff.

²⁸ *Supra*, Ch. I 4.

²⁹ Note, for the moment, that ps.Plut. *Plac.* I 3.2, on Homer, cannot derive from either Theophrastus or Aristotle; see Mansfeld (1985a) 123 f.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ITALIAN SUCCESSION

III 1 *Harmony and Dissension*

It has been pointed out above¹ that in *Ref.* I 5 Hippolytus speaks of 'other physicists who came after' Pythagoras, Empedocles and Heraclitus, and states that it is not worthwhile to describe the tenets of these [for us moderns] anonymous people because they do not really differ from their predecessors (viz., in the Italian succession). Cf. also *Ref.* I 2.1, τὴν αἵρεσιν οἱ διαδεξάμενοι οὐ πολὺ διήνεγκαν τοῦ αὐτοῦ [*scil.*, Pythagoras'] φρονήματος. One wonders whom Hippolytus had in mind, but it is a definite possibility that he had seen a predecessor of the 'diadoche of Pythagoras' (so the announcement at Iambl. *De vit. pyth.* p. 4.28; cf. also *ibid.* p. 4.22, οἱ διαδεξάμενοι αὐτοῦ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν) in Iambl. *De vit. pyth.* ch. 36, where §§ 265-6 a succession Pythagoras—Aristaeus son of Damophon of Croton—Mnesarchus son of Pythagoras—Boulagoras—Gartudas of Croton—Aresas of Leucania—Diodorus of Aspendos is found, and finally a number of Pythagoreans are mentioned who wrote books, viz. Kleinias and Philolaus in Herakleia, Theorides and Eurytus in Metapontum and Archytas in Tarentum. Iamblichus also mentions Epicharmus, and continues §§ 267 ff. = *Vorsokr.* 58 A with a long list of early Pythagoreans whose names are known while admitting that many remain anonymous (p. 143.16-7 = *Vorsokr.* I p. 446.8-10), τῶν δὲ συμπάντων Πυθαγορείων τοὺς μὲν ἀγνώτας τε καὶ ἀνωνύμους τινὰς πολλοὺς εἰκὸς γεγονέναι). At *De vit. pyth.* ch. 33, § 241, Iamblichus in general terms speaks of Leucanians, Messapians, Peucetians and Romans as flocking to Pythagoras (cf. Diog. Laërt. VIII 14). Accordingly, if Hippolytus had seen lists such as the one in Iamblichus, one may understand both why he speaks of Pythagoras' numerous following and omits to describe in details the views of those who wrote. We may note, however, that he has placed Ecphantus (who is on Iamblichus' list of known Pythagoreans, *De vit. pyth.* p. 143.20 f.) outside the Italian succession.

In *Ref.* I 5 the Pythagorean harmony is contrasted with the disagreement among the Ionian physicists to be treated after the Italian succession: ἄλλοι ἄλλως περὶ φύσεως τοῦ παντὸς διηγούμενοι (10.7-8 W. = 63.4

¹ *Supra*, Ch. I 4, Ch. II 2.

M.). A comparable situation is to be found in *Ref.* I 10, 16.2 ff. W. = 71.2 ff. M. Having stated that physical philosophy (i.e. the Ionian succession) deriving from Thales persisted until Archelaus, whose pupil was Socrates,² Hippolytus says that there are also a good many others, viz. other physicists, who proposed 'contrasting tenets' (διαφόρους δόξας) on the divine and the nature of the whole (τῆς τοῦ πάντος φύσεως—the same formula as in ch. 5). To set out all the tenets at issue would involve organizing the contents of a substantial body of literature. So he will limit himself—in chs. 11-16—to the 'top people' (κορυφαίων)³ because, as he says, their doctrines provided the spring-board for all subsequent philosophies. Hippolytus' program is clearly formulated. Of the Pythagorean succession, only the more important figures receive treatment, it being unnecessary to account for the others because there is little or no disagreement. The important Ionian succession is to be set out complete *because of the disagreement among its members*. Of the others, i.e. what turns out to be (mainly) the Eleatic succession, only the top people will be dealt with, because although there is sufficient *disagreement* among these philosophers as well there are simply too many of them (ch. 10). This program is carried out as planned.

Consequently, for the succession from Pythagoras the emphasis is on harmony and for the succession from Thales on disagreement. As to the 'others' to be treated in chs. 11-16, the emphasis again is on the divergencies among their tenets. This introduces a Skeptical colouring. The dissension among the philosophers is a favourite topic in Philo of Alexandria (see e.g. *Her.* 246-8, *Abr.* 162-4) and among Christian authors;⁴ in chs. 5 and 10, however, Hippolytus is explicit about the contrasting views of the 'other' physicists only, i.e. the Ionians, the Eleatics and the two individuals treated in chs. 15-16. It is important that he does not include his Pythagoreans.

III 2 *The Position of the Xenophanes Chapter*

As we all know, Diels argued that the doctrinal contents of chs. 11-16

² Cf. *supra*, Ch. II 1.

³ Also a technical term in Diog. Laërt., e.g. II 47 (main successors of Socrates).

⁴ Cf. e.g. Eus. *P.E.* I 7.16, the chapter-title of I 8, and XIV 13.9; Theodor. *Graec. aff. cur.* I 62-4 and *passim*. See further Wendland (1897) 1074 ff. on Philo *Somn.* I 22 ff.; Grant (1952) 80 f. on Iren. *Adv. haeres.* II 28.1-2; Grant (1967) 158 ff.; van den Broek (1983) 104 ff. For Philo see further Mansfeld (1988c) 70 ff. Frickel (1988) 128 ff. argues that the (Sextan or Skeptical) account at *Ref.* X 6-8, which derives from a source different from the source(s) for the *Philosophoumena*, emphasizes the 'einander widersprechende Lehren' (*ibid.* 131) of the philosophers. But at X 6-8 this angle is not explicit, whereas it is explicit in the *Philosophoumena* where Frickel has failed to notice its presence. For X 6-8 see further *infra*, Ch. IV 9.

are as good as those of chs. 6-9, and that therefore chs. 11-16, too, ultimately must derive from Theophrastus.⁵ He also points out, quite correctly, that the order of treatment is noteworthy: Parmenides in ch. 11, but an implicit prochronism for Xenophanes who is dealt with in ch. 14 after the Atomists Leucippus (ch. 12) and Democritus (ch. 13). After Xenophanes, Hippolytus has two rather late figures, viz. the Skeptical Atomist Ecphantus (ch. 15), and Hippon (ch. 16).⁶ Diels further argued that in the source, as one would expect, Xenophanes originally came before Parmenides, since this is the only explanation for the abruptness of the opening sentence of ch. 11: καὶ γὰρ καὶ Παρμενίδης (translate: 'Also Parmenides') ἔν μὲν τὸ πᾶν αἰδιόν τε καὶ ἀγέννητον καὶ σφαιροειδές (cf. ch. 14.2: Xenophanes held that ... οὐδὲν γίνεται ..., and that τὸν θεὸν εἶναι αἰδιόν καὶ ἓνα καὶ ὅμοιον παντὶ καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ σφαιροειδῆ).⁷ There is indeed no logical connection between the opening sentence of ch. 11 and the immediately preceding final sentence of ch. 10. Diels also pointed out that at ch. 14.1 Xenophanes is called the inventor of inapprehensibility—a remark which of course cannot derive from Theophrastus; this, Diels argued, is the point of view of Sotion (cf. Diog. Laërt. IX 20 = Sotion Fr. 29). However, the resemblance between ch. 14.1 and this point of Sotion does not, *pace* Diels, entail that the disorderly insertion of Xenophanes reflects, or has been influenced by, the order of succession as in Sotion.⁸ For Sotion stated that Parmenides was the pupil of a Pythagorean, viz. Ameinias, rather than of Xenophanes (Diog. Laërt. IX 21 = Sotion Fr. 27). So if Hippolytus had wished to

⁵ D.G. 146, 153. For *Ref.* I 14 this is at any rate impossible, see *supra*, Ch. II n. 9, *infra*, Ch. III 2.

⁶ Diels' explanation of this disorderly arrangement is far from clear, at least to me; Wendland (1916) xix, who purportedly summarizes Diels' view, supposes that in the biographic source Parmenides came after Empedocles and that Hippolytus followed the biographic source as to the order of presentation, taking the tenets from the doxographic source.

⁷ It does not, however, necessarily follow that the Xenophanes chapter to be found in Hippolytus derives from the source excerpted for Parmenides. See *infra*, Ch. III 6. For καὶ γὰρ καὶ as equivalent to καὶ γὰρ see LSJ s.v. καὶ γὰρ (with the reference to Plato *Prot.* 317c1-2, καίτοι πολλά γε ἔτη ἤδη εἰμι ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ σύμπαντα πολλά μοί ἐστιν κτλ. Note the logical connection, the second πολλά taking up the first). For καὶ γὰρ see Denniston (1954) 108 f.: "normally γὰρ is the connective, and καὶ means either (1) 'also' or 'even': or (2) 'in fact'" (an example of καὶ γὰρ καὶ in the latter sense *ibid.* 109: Hdt. VI 108.1). It does not seem possible to me to translate καὶ γὰρ καὶ Π. in ch. 11 with 'In fact, Parmenides ...'.

⁸ von Kienle (1961) 23 argues that Skeptical traditions explain the pairing of Ecphantus and Xenophanes. Mejer (1978) 84 accepts a link of the Xenophanes chapter with a tradition derived from Sotion but suggests that "Hippolytus' immediate source is to be found within the Skeptical tradition". For the Skeptical (or rather Skeptically coloured) traditions involved see Steinmetz (1966) 35 ff., Turrini (1982), Mansfeld (1987b). For *akatalepsia* as the *shibboleth* of Arcesilaus see Sext. *M.* VII 155 ~ Arces. Fr. 2 Mette (1984).

follow Sotion's suggestion as to the pupil-teacher relationship involved, he would have put Parmenides in the Pythagorean succession. The reference to the invention of inapprehensibility is a different matter.

Howald correctly pointed out that the tradition(s) which influenced Hippolytus provided three successions, and that chs. 11 ff. set out the Eleatic line.⁹ Three lines of succession are attested by Clem. *Strom.* I 62.1: Italian, Ionian, Eleatic; by Eus. *P.E.* X 14.9-16;¹⁰ and by ps.Gal. *Philos. hist.*, *ap. D.G.* 598.21-601.1 and 601.2 ff. They are also presupposed by other authors discussed by von Kienle,¹¹ and by a rather important critical witness he missed, viz. the Aristotelian scholar Aristocles of Messana *ap. Eus. P.E.* XI 3.1: Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ Θαλοῦ φυσιολογοῦντες διέτελεσαν· οἱ δὲ περὶ Πυθαγόραν ἀπεκρύψαντο πάντα· Ξενοφάνης δὲ καὶ οἱ ἀπ' ἐκείνου τοὺς ἐριστικούς κινήσαντες λόγους πολλὴν μὲν ἐνέβαλον ἰλιγγον τοῖς φιλοσοφοῖς, οὐ μὴν ἐπόρισαν γέ τινα βοήθειαν. This tripartition is almost universal in the later literature, Diog. Laërt. (in the proem, I 13-5) and August. *Civ. Dei* VIII 2 being the most notable exceptions.¹²

⁹ Howald (1920) 69 ff.

¹⁰ With a typically Eusebian chronographic confusion: the *floruits* of Xenophanes and Pythagoras are said to be contemporaneous with that of Anaxagoras.

¹¹ von Kienle (1961) 11 ff., 32 ff.

¹² Cf. von Kienle (1961) 9 f., 17 f., 32 f. (for Epiphan. *ap. D.G.* 589 f. as a possible parallel see *ibid.* 25). Augustine refers to the Italian *genus* of philosophy beginning with Pythagoras and to the Ionian beginning with Thales, but he only deals with Thales' successors, not with those of Pythagoras (cf. *supra*, Ch. I n. 67 and text thereto). In Diogenes Laërtius' Italian list, Pherecydes [not an Italian but, according to some, Pythagoras' teacher]—Pythagoras—Telauges [Pythagoras' son and, often, his successor] are put before Xenophanes and his successors. My own guess—cf. also von Kienle (1961) 32—is that this is the result of conflation, somehow plausible because many people on the list were from Italy or had their careers there. From a chronological point of view it is most remarkable that Telauges, anyhow a shadowy figure, is put before Xenophanes. Wehrli (1978) 55 supposes that Sotion put "Pythagoras ... neben Xenophanes an die Spitze der westgriechischen Abfolge-reihe", but we have no proof. It should be noted that Arist. *Met.* A5.987a10, 987a31, 6.988a26 uses οἱ Ἰταλικοὶ for the Pythagoreans only. On Augustine's overview see Diels *D.G.* 173 f., Hagendahl (1967) 153 n. 1.

Successions are also at issue at Theodor. *Graec. aff. cur.* II 9-11 and IV 5-12 (cf. also *supra*, Ch. II n. 11); both times, the Pythagoreans are absent. At II 9 ff. (for which see Diels *D.G.* 170 f.), there are explicit references to the succession from Thales to Anaximenes and from Xenophanes to Parmenides; between Anaximenes and Xenophanes, Hipparchus and Heraclitus and Empedocles are mentioned, and after Parmenides we have (the Atomists, cf. *infra*, n. 13) Democritus, Epicurus, Metrodorus, and then Zeno of Elea and Diogenes of Smyrna (a later follower of Democritus according to the *Successions* literature; this reference is lacking at *Vorsokr.* 71). Here he starts with the Ionians (although he does not use this designation) and continues with the Eleatics-cum-Atomists (although he does not use these designations either). At *Graec. aff. cur.* IV 5 ff., chapters Diels derived from Aëtius, the early Ionian succession is notably absent; Theodoret begins with the Eleatics (this time using the designation) Xenophanes, Parmenides and Melissus, and continues with the Atomists (though not using this designation) Democritus, Metrodorus, Epicurus and Ecphantus. Then we have Plato, Aristotle, Xenocrates and

The Eleatic succession is not only topsy-turvy, but also much compressed. Parmenides, the first to be mentioned (*Ref.* I 11), lacks both patronymic and city of birth and is given no teacher (which one may understand in view of the fact that Xenophanes has been amputated). The next, Leucippus (ch. 12), also lacks both patronymic and city of birth, but is provided with a teacher: Ζήνωνος ἑταῖρος. But Zeno of Elea had *not* been treated by Hippolytus; actually, I 11 is the only place in the *Ref.* where he is mentioned. This maverick reference certainly is a sign of compression. The next is Democritus (ch. 13), who is added to the succession:¹³ Λευκίππου ... γνώριμος, and given his full credentials: 'Democritus son of Damasippus of Abdera',¹⁴ according to the pattern also found in chs. 6, 7, 8 and 9. The inference that for the Eleatics (including the Atomists) Hippolytus' source originally provided the succession Xenophanes¹⁵—Parmenides—Zeno—Leucippus—Democritus is inescapable.

Xenophanes (ch. 14) is also given his full credentials: 'of Colophon, son of Orthomenes'. Apart from the delayed description of his doctrines and the severing of the link with Parmenides caused by his removal from the first position in the stemma, there are several other interesting phenomena. First, the invention of inapprehensibility here attributed to Xenophanes¹⁶ is later on by Hippolytus attributed to Pyrrho, 'the founder of the [Skeptical] Academy' (*sic*), viz. in ch. 23 (Pyrrho T82 2nd text).¹⁷

"Zeno the pupil of Crates, the founder of the Stoic *hairesis*", and at the end Hippasus—Heraclitus and Diogenes of Apollonia. The Pythagorean succession is found elsewhere, viz. II 23-24 (according to Raeder, from Eus. *P. E.* X 14.12-15, for which see *infra*, text to n. 53): first he speaks of Anaxagoras, whose contemporary (*sic*) is Pythagoras whose school (διατρίβην) was taken over by his wife Theano and his sons Telauges and Mnesarchus; as a pupil Telauges had Empedocles (cf. *infra*, n. 54), whereas Anaxagoras had Archelaus whose pupil was Socrates—in fact, this is the final section of the early Ionian succession.

¹³ For the "gewohnte Sukzession Xenophanes—Parmenides—Atomisten" see von Kienle (1961) 23, 29, and Praechter (1923) 21, Xenophanes—Parmenides—Zeno—Leucippus—Democritus.

¹⁴ Hippolytus continues by saying that Democritus was taught by Indian iatrosophists, Egyptian priests, astrologers and Babylonian magi. He found it worth his while to transcribe this information from his source, because it tallies with his view that Greek philosophy derives from Oriental wisdom. For Democritus' presumed Oriental affiliations cf. Diog. Laërt. IX 34-5, who *inter alia* cites earlier authorities such as Demetrius (author of an *On Persons with the Same Name*) and Antisthenes (author of a *Diadochai*) and the texts at *Vorsokr.* 68A2, A9, A16. The doxography proper is resumed with λέγει δε ὁμοίως Λευκίππῳ.

¹⁵ Cf. *supra*, Ch. II n. 9 and text thereto.

¹⁶ Cf. *supra*, n. 8 and text thereto, n. 12, also for the doxographic links with the Skeptically coloured traditions of various provenance.

¹⁷ In the *Kephalaia*, inapprehensibility is associated with Pyrrho 'the Academic' not Xenophanes: 1.15 W. = 54.14 M. (Pyrrho T82 1st text). For the attribution of this Academic notion see Decleva Caizzi (1981) 280 f.

This may presumably be explained on the assumption that the source used by Hippolytus (or by his immediate source) for ch. 14 is not the same as that for ch. 23.¹⁸

Secondly, the account of Xenophanes' physics sports a quite unexpected and at first glance even irrelevant piece of information concerned with the explanation of the salinity of the sea given by Metrodorus (14.4, 17.24 f. W. = 74.12 f. M.), which is different from Xenophanes'. Xenophanes posited that the sea is salt because many mixtures flow into it, Metrodorus that it has this quality because [water] filters through the earth. We also know this tenet of Metrodorus from ps.Plut. (~ Aët.) III 16.5;¹⁹ it should be noted that this chapter of ps.Plutarch (the parallel section in Stobaeus, however, is lost) does *not* include Xenophanes. The Metrodorus at issue is Democritus' pupil Metrodorus of Chius.²⁰ A succession²¹ Xenophanes—Parmenides—Leucippus—Democritus—Metrodorus is already implied at Theophr., *Phys. op.* Fr. 8.²² Clearly, the reference in *Ref.* I 13 to Metrodorus has something to do with the succession in chs. 11 ff., and we may infer that in his source Hippolytus probably found a description of Metrodorus' doctrines after those of Democritus. He left out this paragraph; see ch. 10, where he says that although there are a lot of other physicists he will only deal with the more seminal thinkers.²³ Yet he inserted a little excerpt concerned with one of Metrodorus' tenets right in the middle of the Xenophanes chapter. Why? In Hippolytus' mind, Metrodorus and Xenophanes must have been associated for a more important reason than their difference in explaining the salinity of the sea.

III 3 *Xenophanes and Metrodorus*

Such an association can be indicated. The mysterious reference to Metrodorus helps to answer why Hippolytus treats Xenophanes here, i.e. after Democritus, and in this way is explained itself.

¹⁸ One may, of course, contend that Hippolytus' source contained the same inconsistency, but it is hard to deny that ultimately different sources or traditions must be at issue. Von Kienle (1961) 24 argues that the 'Dielsche Biograph' who in his view is the source of ch. 23 and did not know Xenophanes as a Skeptic is responsible for the odd treatment of Pyrrho. But one assumes that such a biographer would have been familiar with Sotion's view (for which see *supra*, n. 8 and text thereto).

¹⁹ *Vorsokr.* 70A19 (the Hippolytus passage is there printed as a parallel).

²⁰ On Metrodorus Zeller-Nestle (1920) 1185 ff. is still indispensable. Guthrie (1965) does not provide a systematic treatment of Democritus' pupils and early successors (see his 382 n. 1).

²¹ For the succession in other sources see *infra*, Ch. III 3.

²² For the part dealing with Metrodorus see *Vorsokr.* 70A3.

²³ Cf. *supra*, Ch. I 5 *ad finem*.

Hippolytus says that Xenophanes was the first to introduce inapprehensibility; that is to say, he (or rather the source or tradition followed) makes him a physicist who, apart from being an ontologist and a theologian, also professed a most important (Academic) Skeptical tenet. But Metrodorus, too, was a philosopher of Skeptical leanings. His treatise began with a skeptical statement, partly preserved in Greek and complete in Cicero's Latin.²⁴ I translate Cicero: "Democritus' greatest admirer, Metrodorus of Chius,²⁵ says at the beginning of his treatise *On Nature*: «I deny that we know whether we know something or know nothing, and even the mere fact that we do not know or do know, or know at all whether something exists [or: is the case] or nothing exists [or: is the case]»".

From other sources, we have some evidence about the succession which was constructed to link Democritus with Epicurus on the one hand and Pyrrho on the other.²⁶ Diog. Laërt. I 15, in his Italian stemma, has (Pherecydes—Pythagoras—Telauges)²⁷—Xenophanes—Parmenides—Zeno of Elea—Leucippus—"Democritus, who had many pupils, notably Nausiphanes"—Epicurus. The tradition followed by Diogenes Laërtius appears to be as reluctant to identify the πολλοὶ who came after Democritus as Hippolytus is to provide details about the ἕτεροι πλείστοι (ch. 10). At IX 58 (*Vorsokr.* 69A2), however, Diogenes Laërtius is more generous: Democritus or Nessas—Metrodorus, ὃς ἔλεγε μηδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδὲν οἶδε²⁸—Diogenes of Smyrna—Anaxarchus. At Diog. Laërt. IX 61 (*Vorsokr.* 72A2), Anaxarchus is one of Pyrrho's teachers. It follows that earlier (viz., at I 15) Diogenes Laërtius has not cited the Italian stemma in its complete form.²⁹ Clem. *Strom.* I 64.2-4 (the final part of which is printed at *Vorsokr.* 70A1) gives a complete list: Xenophanes—Parmenides—Zeno—Leucippus—Democritus—Protagoras³⁰ and Metrodorus of Chius—Diogenes of Smyrna—Anaxarchus—Pyrrho—Nausiphanes—Epicurus.³¹ Eus. *P.E.* XIV 17.10 (*Vorsokr.* 69A1) has

²⁴ Eus. *P.E.* XIV 19.8, Cic. *Ac. pr.* I (= *Luc.*) 73 (both texts at *Vorsokr.* 70B1). *P.E.* XIV 19.8-10 is a short piece by Eusebius which forms the transition between two fragments of Aristocles. He must have relied on a fairly good source, because his version of Protagoras *Vorsokr.* 80B4 is here better than at XIV 3.7 (though not as good as Diogenes Laërtius' long version).

²⁵ Note the succession. 'Greatest' pertains to the importance of Metrodorus.

²⁶ See Praechter (1923) 110.

²⁷ Cf. *supra*, n. 12 and text thereto.

²⁸ A *doxographic* summary of the fragment quoted above, noticeably inserted into a *succession* consisting of a string of names. For such overlapping of genres see Mansfeld (1986b) 303 ff.

²⁹ Cf. Mansfeld (1986b) 303, 311 f.

³⁰ Later sources, exhibiting a typically chronographic confusion, make Protagoras a pupil of Democritus which of course is chronologically impossible.

³¹ See von Kienle (1961) 11 f.

Parmenides—Melissus—Zeno—Leucippus—Democritus—Protagoras and Nessas—Metrodorus (Nessas' pupil)—Diogenes—Anaxarchus—Pyrrho.³² One thing is clear. In these successions, whose historical accuracy is not now at issue, Metrodorus is (a) a pupil of Democritus, (b) a (proto) Skeptic and (c) the link connecting Democritus with the Skeptics of Pyrrho's persuasion. It is a well-known fact that later Skeptics claimed Democritus as one of their ancestors.³³

What happened has now become obvious. Hippolytus, having detached Xenophanes from his legitimate position before Parmenides, put him after Democritus and nowhere else because he substituted the (Skeptically inclined) Xenophanes for the (Skeptical) successor of Democritus, viz. Metrodorus of Chius. In his tortuous way, he gave his manipulation away by quoting one of Metrodorus' more innocuous tenets in his Xenophanes chapter, leaving the unsuspecting reader with the impression that what matters about Xenophanes and Metrodorus is their difference. He cannot resist the temptation of slipping in a note to the effect that there is *diaphonia* among the proto-Skeptics (that the Skeptics differ among themselves is also a point exploited by their critics elsewhere, e.g. Diog. Laërt. IX 87, Philo *Her.* 246). Freud would have been delighted.

To recapitulate: *Ref.* I 11-14 is about Eleatic philosophers only. There are in these chapters unmistakable traces of a regular succession Xenophanes—Parmenides—Zeno (of Elea)—Leucippus—Democritus—Metrodorus. Hippolytus omitted the paragraphs dealing with Zeno and Metrodorus and put Xenophanes after Democritus. Yet Zeno is briefly referred to as Leucippus' teacher, whereas Metrodorus is cavalierly cited for a physical doctrine.

III 4 *The Eleatic Stemma Nearly Complete*

Hippolytus in *Ref.* I 10 had said he would be highly selective, but if we include his passing references to Zeno and Metrodorus, his Eleatic stemma, with its head like that of Saint Denis in medieval French statuary tucked away somewhere below, is complete up to the generation after Democritus. The reallocation of Xenophanes and the deletion of the paragraphs describing the views of Zeno and Metrodorus throw sand in our eyes. Hippolytus is far less selective than he pretends to be.

³² See von Kienle (1961) 12 f.

³³ For the Academics see e.g. Cic. *Ac. pr.* II (= *Luc.*) 73 = *Vorsokr.* 68B165, immediately before the quote from Metrodorus cited *supra*, text to n. 25. For the Neopyrrhonists see e.g. Sext. *M.* VII 105-13 where several Democritean fragments are quoted.

Only the last two physicists to be dealt with, Ecphantus and Hippon, represent a selection made from a number of possible candidates; only they are *partes pro toto*. Still, Ecphantus has been effectively and cleverly chosen. For one thing, he according to Hippolytus is linked up with Xenophanes (who in the topsy-turvy stemma of these chapters precedes him) because he, too, is a sort of Skeptic: ἔφη μὴ εἶναι ἀληθίνην τῶν ὄντων λαβεῖν γνῶσιν (15.1, 18.6 W. = 74.1 M.). For another, he is said to be an Atomist: τὰ μὲν (γὰρ) πρῶτα ἀδιαίρετα εἶναι σώματα (15.1, 18.7 W. = 74.2-3 M.), and therefore is implicitly linked up with Leucippus and Democritus who, in Hippolytus, precede Xenophanes. A parallel exists. In Theodor. *Graec. aff. cur.* IV 5-10 the Eleatic succession is Xenophanes—Parmenides—Melissus, and then [the Atomists] Democritus—Metrodorus—Epicurus, the latter in the πέμπτη γενεᾷ μετὰ Δημόκριτον. *Ibid.* IV 11 we read: τοῦτοις [*scil.*, the Atomists] καὶ Ἐκφαντος ὁ Συρακούσιος ὁ Πυθαγόρειος ἠκολούθησε. The reason for this connection as formulated by Theodoret is clearly of a systematic nature; in the case of Ecphantus, doctrine prevails over membership of a succession, or school. Furthermore, the combination of Skepticism and Atomism attributed by Hippolytus (or rather the tradition followed by him) to Ecphantus recalls the views of Metrodorus³⁴ which as we have noticed appear to have been suppressed by Hippolytus. What is equally noteworthy is that either the source did not identify Ecphantus as a Pythagorean or—which is rather more likely—that Hippolytus deleted this identification; he would have been obliged to add him to his Italian succession had he omitted to do so, and this, of course, would have destroyed the harmony he attributes to his Pythagorean succession which, as we have noticed, plays such a vital part in the account of the Presocratics in *Ref.* I. Stob. I 10.16 (printed by Diels as Aët. I 3.19;³⁵ no parallel in ps.Plutarch) explicitly calls Ecphantus εἷς τῶν Πυθαγορείων (cf. Theodor. *loc. cit.*), and we have already noticed that he figures on Iamblichus' list of known Pythagoreans, *De vit. pyth.* p. 143.20 f. Just as Theodoret (and Hippolytus), Stobaeus makes him an Atomist—because, as his text has it, he was the first to declare that τὰς Πυθαγορικὰς μονάδας are corporeal. The meagre information about Ecphantus to be found at *Vorsokr.* 51A2-A5 fully tallies with the more detailed account in *Ref.* I 15 (*Vorsokr.* 51A1), but it is noteworthy that Hippolytus is our only source for Ecphantus' Skepticism. Arguably, a form of Skepticism was professed by Ecphantus because he not only followed Democritus

³⁴ Cf. *Vorsokr.* 70B1, A2, A3.

³⁵ *Vorsokr.* 51A2. See also *supra*, text to n. 18 (Parmenides not a member of the Pythagorean succession).

in physics, but also in epistemology (or if he did not follow Democritus as to his epistemology, a doctrine resembling the mild or less mild Skepticism professed by Democritus and Metrodorus came to be ascribed to him because of his Democritean atomism). Consequently, the inclusion of Ecphantus in Hippolytus is not a mere coincidence, as one would assume in view of the bland announcement in *Ref.* I 10.³⁶ My guess (educated, I hope) is that in his source or sources Hippolytus found a reference to Ecphantus in a setting comparable to Ecphantus' position in Theodoret and Stobaeus, viz. after and linked up with the Atomists (Leucippus, Democritus and Metrodorus).

III 5 *The Hippon Chapter*

No such backdrop can be indicated for the selection of Hippon (a name not found in *Aët.* I 3). There are no particular links; rather, there are partial similarities with all the physicists previously treated. Someone, at any rate, had to be last. The absence of any noticeable link enhances the impression of disorder and disagreement created by the arrangement of the preceding chapters, and thus serves to underpin the announcement as to a highly selective procedure to be followed made in *Ref.* I 10. Perhaps Hippon was selected for aesthetic reasons. Traditionally, his name was coupled with that of Thales (*Arist. Met.* A3.984a2 f., for us the earliest text, refers to the pair Thales + Hippon but refuses to deal with the latter, which suggests that the pairing was already traditional by his time; *Theophr. Phys. op.* Fr. 1 deals with both simultaneously). There is a remote possibility that it may have seemed a satisfactory idea to have Hippon as the conclusion of an overview of the Presocratics beginning with Thales. As we have noticed, the interpolation (by means of an application of the cento method) of the Pythagorean stemma in the Ionian succession puts Thales in an isolated position. From a stylistic or rhetorical point of view, the appendix to the treatment of Presocratic philosophy concerned with Thales' traditional late follower Hippon is the counterpart of the isolated Thales chapter at the beginning of this overview.

III 6 *Xenophanes Again*

We should, briefly, revert to *Ref.* I 14. I have argued elsewhere³⁷ that the vulgate ontology-cum-theology and physics of Xenophanes to be found there cannot derive from Theophrastus. The arguments are: (a)

³⁶ Cf. *supra*, Ch. I 5 *ad finem*.

³⁷ See Mansfeld (1987b).

some of the positive qualifications of the divine ('limited', 'spherical'), and the contention that the Whole is unmoved, are incompatible with the *non liquet* ("neither limited nor unlimited and neither in motion nor at rest") which characterizes Theophrastus' analysis of Xenophanes' principle according to the explicit statement of *Simpl. In Phys.* 22.22 ff. (Theophr. *Phys. dox.* Fr. 5 ~ *Vorsokr.* 21A31); (b) the ascription by Theophr., *loc. cit.*, of the One as the single principle beyond physics to Xenophanes is incompatible with Hippolytus' (and the doxographic vulgate's) ascription to him of earth as the one physical principle. It follows that Diels' contention that the ontology, theology and physics in *Ref.* I 14 derive from Theophrastus is untenable (we have noticed above³⁸ that he already excluded the epistemological part which he attributed to the influence of Sotion). There is no evidence that Theophrastus discussed Ecphantus.³⁹ Although chs. 11-13, to some extent, may ultimately derive from Theophrastus or at any rate may contain some Theophrastean material, this is precluded for ch. 14 and not proven for ch. 15. On the other hand, we have noticed that the source excerpted for Parmenides must have contained a discussion of Xenophanes—at any rate of his ontology-cum-theology—before the Parmenides section.⁴⁰ This however was a vulgate version of his theology (the result of the traditional Parmenideization of Xenophanes' innuendos), and so cannot derive from Theophrastus. The source excerpted for (Xenophanes and) Parmenides and their successors therefore had already been contaminated, at least as to its treatment of Xenophanes, with vulgate items not to be ascribed to a tradition deriving from Theophrastus. Accordingly, chs. 14 (Xenophanes) certainly and 15 (Ecphantus) presumably are not Theophrastean. A not unlikely hypothesis is that Hippolytus lifted the materials for chs. 15-16 from a source, viz. a Skeptically coloured one, that differed from the source used for Parmenides, (Zeno), Leucippus, Democritus and (Metrodorus).⁴¹ There is no trace of a Skeptical colouring in chs. 11-13, although an account of Democritus could easily have contained a reference to his skeptical utterances; it is, indeed, rather odd that it does not. Such a switch would explain the abrupt start at ch. 11, where one is forced to assume that a previous paragraph on Xenophanes has been brutally amputated. On the above assumption,

³⁸ *Supra*, text to n. 8.

³⁹ He discussed a doctrine of Hicetas not Ecphantus according to *Cic. Ac. pr.* II (= *Luc.*) 123 (*Vorsokr.* 50.1), but Diels' attribution of this passage to the *Phys. op.* (Fr. 18) is a mere guess.

⁴⁰ Cf. *supra*, text to n. 7.

⁴¹ We may assume that his remark about the πολλήν ... ὕλην βιβλίων (*Ref.* I 10.1) is not merely rhetorical. At any rate, he knew that others knew that a lot of literature existed.

Hippolytus thought he was in a position to omit the account of Xenophanes from the source used for Parmenides and the Atomists, because he had decided to transcribe the doctrines of the two proto-Skeptics Xenophanes and Ecphantus from a differently coloured source. In this way, he saddled his readers with the unexplained reference at the beginning of ch. 11, but was in a position to do so because the vulgate ontology-cum-theology at issue was the same as that to be found in the account of Xenophanes in the Skeptically coloured source. Alternatively, a single source excerpted for the Eleatic succession as a whole may have referred to Xenophanes' Skeptical tenet, and emphasized the Skeptical leanings (real and/or surmized) of the Atomists Metrodorus and Ecphantus. In that case, Hippolytus may have decided to remove Xenophanes from the first position in the Eleatic succession in order to link him with these later proto-Skeptic Atomists. However this may be, the position after Democritus so to speak suggested itself for the insertion of Xenophanes, for in the traditional treatment according to the succession a brief reference to the extreme cognitive nihilism of Metrodorus (who comes after Democritus) could be included, cf. Diog. Laërt. IX 58;⁴² and Hippolytus, as we have seen,⁴³ betrays that he puts Xenophanes where Metrodorus had been. There is method in Hippolytus' game of hopscotch; his interpolations at any rate are not haphazard, or rather, his cento is constructed to serve a definite purpose.

That Xenophanes occupies a pivotal position is also suggested by the date following his credentials at 14.1: οὗτος ἕως Κύρου διέμεινεν, 'he persisted [i.e. lived on] until Cyrus'.⁴⁴ Thales, the first in the Ionian stemma, is synchronized with Croesus (*Ref.* I 1.1). Pythagoras, the first in the Italian stemma, is synchronized with Polycrates (*Ref.* I 2.1). These, as we have noticed, are vulgate Apollodoran dates.⁴⁵ Hippolytus moreover explicitly states that Pythagoras is about contemporaneous with Thales (2.1). It has long been recognized that his date for Xenophanes derives from the Apollodoran chronographic vulgate as well:⁴⁶ *FGrH* 244F68c,⁴⁷ παρατετακέναι ἄχρι Δαρείου τε καὶ Κύρου χρόνων, a line which has not yet been satisfactorily explained.⁴⁸ Hippolytus' abridged version, the historical accuracy of which is not now at issue, would make Xenophanes roughly contemporaneous with both Thales

⁴² Cf. *supra*, n. 28 and text thereto.

⁴³ *Supra*, text to n. 19.

⁴⁴ 'Until' here meaning 'up to and including', cf. *Ref.* I 10.1, ἡ ... φυσικὴ φιλοσοφία ἀπὸ Θάλητος ἕως Ἀρχελάου διέμεινε. Note that διέμεινε is also paralleled.

⁴⁵ Cf. *supra*, Ch. I n. 45 and text thereto, Ch. I n. 48 and text thereto.

⁴⁶ See Jacoby (1962) 748 *ad FGrH* 244F68, and already Diels (1876) 23.

⁴⁷ Clem. *Strom.* I 64.2, also printed *Vorsokr.* 21A8.

⁴⁸ I shall have a go at it on another occasion.

and Pythagoras, because Croesus who serves to date Thales is a contemporary of Cyrus, and Polycrates who serves to date Pythagoras only survived Cyrus († 529 BCE) by a few years. Through the rough dates provided for the archegetes of the three traditional lines of succession, Hippolytus effectively dates the beginning of Greek philosophy to the 6th cent. BCE. It is most remarkable that Xenophanes has been dated although he has been removed from the beginning of the Eleatic succession and only been preserved as the first figure of an abridged stemma of proto-Skeptics. Of the 'top people' treated in chs. 11-16, he is the only one to be provided with a chronographic date (in Hippolytus' Ionian succession, such dates are the rule). Without any doubt, he was dated in the source or sources used by Hippolytus. It should, moreover, be realized that the date preserved in Hippolytus actually makes Xenophanes somewhat older than Pythagoras. For Xenophanes did not survive Cyrus, whereas Pythagoras, it is said, who left Samos because of Polycrates, went to live in a city of Italy and there completed his life, being killed in Croton with his pupils (*Ref.* I 2.1, cf. 2.16); i.e. he lived on for a number of years. The artfully disorderly arrangement of chs. 11-16, with its prochronism of Xenophanes, obfuscates this fact and to all effects eliminates him as Pythagoras' competitor. Furthermore, the conservation of the date affixed to his credentials may be linked up with the idea that, rather than being the first of the Eleatics, he belongs with those natural philosophers who, at least for part of their doctrines, were proto-Skeptics and were opposed to the others in an important way.

However this may be, Hippolytus' early date for Xenophanes⁴⁹ would make it perhaps just possible although highly unlikely for Parmenides to be his pupil. We do not know Hippolytus' date for Parmenides, do not even know whether he had one or whether his source provided one. The vulgate Apollodoran *floruit* of Parmenides is the 69th Olympiad (504-1 BCE).⁵⁰ In ch. 11, Hippolytus refrains from dating Parmenides, although he is the first of the third collection of physicists to be actually mentioned and analyzed. The severing of Parmenides' traditional link with Xenophanes indeed appears to be intentional.

⁴⁹ He may not have understood the difficult sentence quoted in the text to n. 44, but the omission of the name of Cyrus' successor Darius may be intentional, and the most probable interpretation of Hippolytus' version is: 'he did not survive Cyrus'.

⁵⁰ Diog. Laërt. IX 23 = *FGrH* 244F341; *Vorsokr.* 28A1, I p. 218.15. This is earlier than Plato's fictional date (*Parm.* 127a f.), which was not accepted by the chronographers; see Mansfeld (1986b) 41 ff.

III 7 *The Successions Disturbed*

Accordingly, in *Ref.* I 6-16 the successions have been handled roughly. The orderly Hippolytean succession Pythagoras—Empedocles—Heraclitus in *Ref.* I 2-4, on the other hand, is unparalleled elsewhere in the *Successions* literature. Diels however argued that there are two parallels.⁵¹ The first is in the list of *haireseis* of 'Heracleides the Pythagorean', hypothetically identified by Diels with Heracleides Lembos.⁵² Of the twenty *haireseis* assembled by Heracleides, the Πυθαγόρειος, the Ἐμπεδοκλείος and the Ἡρακλείτειος are the 10th, 11th and 12th. It is true that the order of these sects is the same as that of the corresponding persons in Hippolytus. The difference, however, is that the Empedocleans and Heracliteans in Heracleides' list are explicitly *distinguished* from the Pythagoreans and from one another, and not, as in Hippolytus, placed in one and the same succession and *hairesis*. Diels' second parallel is from the final chapter of Eus. *P.E.* X 14.14. Here Pythagoras—together with Xenophanes—is (wrongly)⁵³ synchronized with Anaxagoras, and here we find a succession Pythagoras—Theano—Telauges (and Mnesarchus)—Τηλαύγουσ δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἀκουστής γίνεται, καθ' ὃν Ἡράκλειτος ὁ σκοτεινὸς ἐγνωρίζετο. This time, Empedocles indeed has become a member of the succession deriving from Pythagoras. But Heraclitus, I would say, has not. The synchronism of Heraclitus with Empedocles⁵⁴ no more puts the former in the Pythagorean succession

⁵¹ *D.G.* 148 ff.

⁵² For arguments *con* see Wehrli (1978) 16 ff.

⁵³ Cf. *supra*, n. 10.

⁵⁴ von Kienle's treatment of this pair is not good. He states (1961) 29 that they belong to οἱ σποράδην, but argues (a) that not only Hippolytus but also ps.Galen (*Philos. hist.*), Clement, Eusebius and Aët. I 3 have a succession *Pythagoras—Telauges—Empedocles—Heraclitus* (*ibid.* 25), and (b) that Theophrastus already associated Empedocles and Heraclitus because he wanted to indicate links among οἱ σποράδην (*ibid.* 63). *Ad* (a): the list of ps.Gal. *ap. D.G.* 601 does not mention Empedocles and Heraclitus; Clem. *Strom.* I 62 f. and Diog. Laërt. I 15 do not mention them either. Diog. Laërt. puts Heraclitus (and Xenophanes) among οἱ σποράδην, VIII 91, IX 21; at VIII 55-6 (= *Vorsokr.* 31A1) he lists five authorities (among whom however we do not find an author of *Successions*) who assign a plurality of teachers to Empedocles: the historian Timaeus (*FGrH* 566F14) made him a pupil of Pythagoras; the biographer Neanthes made him a Pythagorean but refused to accept as genuine a letter ascribed to Telauges which made him the pupil of Hippasus and Brotinus; for Theophrastus (Empedocles a pupil of Parmenides, and [?] later of the Pythagoreans) see *supra*, Ch. II n. 11; Hermippus (Fr. 26) said he was the pupil not of Parmenides but of Xenophanes; Alcidas (Fr. 8) said that he first was a pupil of Parmenides and later one of Pythagoras and Anaxagoras. Accordingly, there is a widespread opinion at least since Timaeus but possibly as early as Theophrastus that Empedocles was a Pythagorean, or at least in part a Pythagorean. These authorities, however, never mention Heraclitus in this context. Diog. Laërt. VIII 42 anticipates his subsequent account by telling us that Empedocles κατὰ τινὰς was a pupil of Pythagoras' successor Telauges and quotes a line after Hippobotus—presumably from

the 'Ἀναγραφὴ τῶν φιλοσόφων, a work in the *Successions* tradition, see Mejer (1978) 69, 72—ascribed to Empedocles in which Telauges is addressed (at VIII 55-6, however, Hippobotus is not mentioned). The view Diog. Laërt. subscribes to is that Empedocles belongs with the Pythagoreans, VIII 50: ἐπειδὴ δὲ περὶ Πυθαγόρου διεληλύθαμεν, ῥητέον περὶ τῶν ἐλλογίων Πυθαγορικῶν. [...] λεκτέον δὲ νῦν περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους πρῶτον· κατὰ γὰρ τινὰς Πυθαγόρου διήκουσεν. After Empedocles Diog. Laërt. discusses Epicharmus, Archytas, Alcmeon, Hippasus, Philolaus and Eudoxus (the latter because he counts as a pupil of Archytas, see Diog. Laërt. VIII 86) before turning in book IX to the treatment of the 'sporadic' philosophers announced at VIII 50 (... Πυθαγορικῶν, μεθ' οὓς περὶ τῶν σποράδην κατὰ τινὰς φερομένων). For Eus. *P.E.* X 14.14 see text to this note (Eusebius is followed by Theodor. *Graec. aff. cur.* II 23, see *supra*, n. 12, who however leaves out Heraclitus). For Aët. I 3 and the theoretical possibility that Heraclitus here, through the link with Hippasus (for which see already Arist. *Met.* A3.984a7 f. and Theophr. *Phys. op.* Fr. 1), not with Empedocles, is part of a Pythagorean succession see *supra*, Ch. II n. 11. The Stoicized Heraclitus (see e.g. Kirk (1954) 318) of Aët. I 3.9—in both ps.Plutarch and Stobaeus—has a certain affinity with the Heraclitus of Hipp. *Ref.* I 4, but the Empedocles of Aët. I 3.20 (in ps.Plutarch only, after Epicurus and before Plato) is very much different from that of *Ref.* I 3, and in ps.Plutarch no link whatever with either Pythagoras or Heraclitus is indicated. *Ad* (b): there is no indication that Theophrastus associated Heraclitus with Pythagoras, although, following Aristotle, he associated him with (the Pythagorean) Hippasus because both held fire to be the element. Empedocles he may have associated with the Pythagoreans (*Phys. op.* Fr. 3 *ap.* Simpl. *In Phys.* 15.19-21, see *supra* Ch. II n. 11; for the parallel *ap.* Diog. Laërt. VIII 55-56 see above), but in this connection Heraclitus plays no part whatever. Indeed, there are no indications that Theophrastus spoke of Heraclitus and Empedocles *as a pair*. We may add that in the list of Epiphanius, *ap.* D.G. 590-1, Empedocles and Heraclitus (§§ 19-20 = Epiph. *Pan.* III, *De fide* 9.23-4), between whom in this account here is no doctrinal affinity, are in no way connected with Pythagoras (§ 8 = *De fide* 9.12). The selective list at Cic. *Ac. pr.* II (= *Luc.*) 118 presents members of the Ionian and Eleatic lines and then has Empedocles and Heraclitus, clearly as representatives of οἱ σποράδην (one may compare Theodor. *Graec. aff. cur.* II 10, see *supra*, n. 12). No conclusion as to a doctrinal link between Empedocles and Heraclitus follows, or as to either one or both with the Pythagoreans (not Pythagoras!), who *ap.* Cic. *loc. cit.* are mentioned at the end of the list, after Melissus and Plato who come after Empedocles and Heraclitus. However, it is to be noted that Plato (*Soph.* 242de = *Vorsokr.* 22A10 1st text, 31A29) couples the 'Ionian and Sicilian Muses'—viz. Heraclitus and Empedocles—and attributes to *both* of them the view that ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ φιλία (*scil.*, τὸ ὄν) συνέχεται. *Ad sententiam* (the wording is slightly different) this exactly corresponds to what is attributed to both Empedocles and Heraclitus at *Ref.* I 3.1 and 4.2 (see *supra*, Ch. I 4 and *infra*, Ch. VIII n. 103 and text thereto, Ch. X text to n. 214 and to n. 241), but in Plato there is no suggestion whatever that these 'Muses' are to be considered *Pythagorean*. Aristotle, too, couples Heraclitus and Empedocles (*De cael.* A 10.279b16 ff. = *Vorsokr.* 22A10, 2nd text) for reasons similar to those given by Plato in the sentence subsequent to the one from which I have quoted above, but in Aristotle there is no suggestion that they are *Pythagoreans* either. But ps.Heracl. *Hom. probl.* 24 couples Heraclitus and Empedocles as two outstanding imitators of Homer's allegorical way of speaking and does consider both to be Pythagoreans (but see further *infra*, Chapter VIII text to nn. 112 and 113). Iambl. *De vit. pyth.* pp. 60.6, 65.5, 76.25 ff., 77.3, 94.5 and 144.9 a number of times counts Empedocles among the followers of Pythagoras, but never mentions Heraclitus in this work. Porph. *Vit. Pyth.* p. 32.13 ff. in one passage (almost identical with Iambl. *De vit. pyth.* p. 76.25 ff.) mentions Empedocles among the followers of Pythagoras, but never mentions Heraclitus in this work. I note that Scholten (1990) 513 is insufficient. The table in Kirk (1962) 25 demonstrating what he calls the "progressive confusion between Heraclitus and Empedocles, initiated perhaps by Theophrastus

than the synchronism of Pythagoras and Xenophanes with Anaxagoras to be found a few lines before in Eusebius puts these men in the Ionian succession. And although Empedocles is occasionally put in the Pythagorean stemma, Heraclitus is almost always a loner, to be found among οἱ σποράδην.⁵⁵

One may set out the modifications brought about by Hippolytus as compared with the successions as found in his sources in the table on page 43.

In this table it is clearly visible that the distinction between sources (or traditions) D2, D1 and III, and especially between D2 and III, is to a certain extent arbitrary, because we are confronted with a definite degree of overlapping insofar as the individuals listed and treated are the same, and especially to the extent that they occur in similar relative positions. Likely enough, traditions D2 and III had already been combined in the source actually used by Hippolytus; if so, Xenophanes presumably occurred only once, that is to say as the archegete of the Eleatic succession, whose contribution to the history of Skepticism was pointed out with some care. In this case, as we have noticed earlier, we have to assume that Hippolytus removed him from his original position in order to associate him with another proto-Skeptic, Ecphantus.⁵⁶ What remains true—and here indeed Diels was in part right—is *that source D1 is to be distinguished from the others.*

III 8 *Hippolytus' Sources for the Presocratics in Ref. I*

What is also clear is that the sources or traditions for the Presocratics followed by Hippolytus were doxographies arranged κατὰ διαδοχήν, which from this structural point of view may therefore be rewardingly compared with the relevant section of Ps.Plut. (~ Aët.) I 3.⁵⁷ A number of absolute dates were included in these sources, as well as, incidentally, some odds and ends of a purely biographic nature.⁵⁸ The treatment much resembles that in Diogenes Laërtius, minus, of course, the wealth of biographic and especially apophthegmatic detail to be found in the latter.

[why, one may well ask, not by Plato? Cf. Hershbell (1973) 104] and aggravated by Heraclides Lembus" is confusing to a degree; though he cites most of the relevant evidence, he follows Diels *D.G.* 149 in assuming that Ioseppus may be traced back to Heraclides Lembus (see *supra*, Ch. II n. 17; Kirk, in his turn, is followed by Hershbell (1973) 101) and has failed to notice that on this list of *haireseis* the Heraclitean and Empedoclean sects are distinguished from the Pythagorean.

⁵⁵ But cf. *supra*, Ch. II n. 11.

⁵⁶ Cf. *supra*, Ch. III 4.

⁵⁷ Cf. *supra*, Ch. II.

⁵⁸ Cf. Mansfeld (1986b) 304 ff., for dates and biographic ingredients in doxographies, and doxographic elements in biographies and successions.

SOURCES (OR TRADITIONS) D2, D1, III

HIPPOLYTUS *REF.* I CHS. 1-16

D2	D1	III		
A IONIANS			A (IONIANS)	B ITALIANS
Thales			Ch.1 Thales	
Anaximander				Ch.2 Pythagoras
Anaximenes				Ch.3 Empedocles
Anaxagoras				Ch.4 Heraclitus
Archelaus (+Socr.)				
			Ch.6 Anaximander	
			Ch.7 Anaximenes	
			Ch.8 Anaxagoras	
			Ch.9 Archelaus (+ Socr.)	
B ITALIANS				
(D2)	(D1)			
Pythagoras	Pythagoras			
[and ... ?]	Empedocles			
	Heraclitus			
	[and ... ?]			
C ELEATICS				OTHERS
(D2)				
Xenophanes				
Parmenides			Ch.11 Parmenides	[Eleat.]
Zeno			(12) (Zeno)	[Eleat.]
(Atomists in Eleatic Succession)				
Leucippus			Ch.12 Leucippus	[Atom.]
Democritus			Ch.13 Democritus	[Atom.]
Metrodorus			(14) (Metrodorus)	[Atom., Skept.]
	(III, proto-Skept.)			
[and ... ?]	Xenophanes		Ch.14 Xenophanes	[Skept.]
	[?]Metrodorus			
[?]Ecphantus	Ecphantus		Ch.15 Ecphantus	[Atom., Skept.]
	[and ... ?]			
[?]Others				
Hippon			Ch.16 Hippon	
[and ... ?]				

CHAPTER FOUR

GREEK PHILOSOPHERS IN *REF.* BOOK I AND IN BOOKS IV - IX

IV 1 *Which Philosophers Are Listed*

In *Ref.* I Hippolytus describes the doctrines of (or, in some cases, refers by name to) twenty-three¹ Greek philosophers: Thales, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Parmenides, Zeno (of Elea), Leucippus, Democritus, Xenophanes, Metrodorus, Ecphantus, Hippon, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Chrysippus, Zeno (of Citium; Chrysippus and Zeno—note the order—are οἱ Στωικοί), Epicurus and Pyrrho (the latter in a chapter about the Ἀκαδημαϊκὴ αἵρεσις² which he is said to have founded and which is not distinguished from the Πυρρώνειοι).

Apart from the faithful Pythagoreans and the numerous other philosophers (who remain anonymous) referred to at *Ref.* I 5 and I 10 but excluded from further treatment, there are also other groups which are referred to although as a rule their doctrines are not described. Socrates founded a large school and had pupils, of whom only Plato is mentioned and treated (*Ref.* I 18-9). In the Plato chapter, we find a discussion of divergent views among the Platonists, but no names are given (19.5 τινὲς ... τῶν Πλατωνικῶν. 19.6-8 οἱ μὲν ... οἱ δὲ ... οἱ δὲ ... οἱ δέ. 19.10-3 οἱ μὲν ... οἱ δὲ ... οἱ δὲ ... οἱ δὲ ... τινὲς μὲν οὖν ... οἱ δὲ οὐ). At *Ref.* I 20.7 both οἱ ... ἀπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος and οἱ ... ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους are mentioned in the context of an explanation of the names Peripatos and Stoa. At *Ref.* I 22.4 reference is made to a difference of opinion between otherwise unidentified groups of Stoics (οἱ μὲν ... οἱ δέ). And *Ref.* I 23, as we have noticed, deals with Hippolytus' Academic-Pyrrhonist *hairesis* as a whole.

I suggest that we forget about Socrates' other pupils and count as one

¹ I do not include Aristoxenus (Fr. 13, but Wehrli seems to award Aristoxenus more than his due) who at *Ref.* I 2.12 is only a source referred to by a source. We must further note that the Cynics are not mentioned in *Ref.* I, although Marcion (*Ref.* VII 29.1, X 19.4) and Tatian (*Ref.* X 18) are connected with the Cynic *bios* and Marcion's followers are called 'dogs barking at the Demiurge' (*Ref.* VII 30.1). Iren. (cf. *infra*, n. 19) *Adv. haeres.* II 14.5 compares the Valentinians to the Cynics, so Hippolytus' compliments addressed to Marcion and Tatian may be a reminiscence of Irenaeus.

each of the following four: (a) Plato and the Platonists, (b) Aristotle and the Peripatos,³ (c) Chrysippus, Zeno, the Stoics and (d) Pyrrho, the Academics, the Pyrrhonists. By means of this inclusion of the post-Socratic schools connected with Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Epicurus and Pyrrho we may bring down our total of philosophers to 22, Zeno, Chrysippus and the Stoics counting as 1. If we add the two groups and the one individual (the Brahmins, Druids and Hesiod) which conclude book I at chs. 24-6, this total rises to 25, at the cost, however, of adding the non-Greek Brahmins and Druids. Presumably, we should at any rate subtract the Druids or at least not count them among the non-Greeks; having been taught by 'Pythagoras' slave Zamolxis—cf. *Ref.* I 2.17, where this is also said—, they "belong with the Pythagorean philosophy right from the start" (*Ref.* I 25.1 τῇ Πυθαγορείῳ φιλοσοφίᾳ κατ' ἄκρον ἐγκύψαντες).⁴ With some apologies for so much computation and not including the Brahmins and Druids but only adding Hesiod, I therefore suggest 23 as the number of Greek philosophical individuals-and-groups treated in the *Philosophoumena*, or 22 excluding Hesiod. I have not taken 'the Egyptians' into account who are said to have taught Pythagoras (*Ref.* I 2.18), or the Indian gymnosophists, Egyptian priests, astrologers and Babylonian Magoi who are said to have taught Democritus (*Ref.* I 13.1).

IV 2 Which Philosophers Are Used

I have checked the occurrences of these names of Greek philosophers and philosophical schools in the body of the *Ref.* which contains the refutation of the Gnostic sects and heresiarchs by means of the argument that they stole their doctrines from the Greek *philosophers*, viz. in books IV-IX.⁵

² Cf. *supra*, Ch. I n. 50, Ch. III n. 17. The ch. is printed as Pyrr. T82 2nd text.

³ At *Ref.* V 21.1-2, there is an isolated and neglected but historically important reference to Andronicus of Rhodes ('Ανδρονίκῳ τῷ Περιπατητικῷ), whose book (?) Περί κράσεως καὶ μίξεως and the similar views of others the Sethians are said to have plagiarized. On Andronicus see further *infra*, Ch. V 3.

⁴ A good metaphor for the establishing of a connection with a stemma. The expression κατ' ἄκρον is apt for 'the top of the line', while ἐγκύπτειν is synonymous with νεύειν which is often used of lines inclining or verging to a given point. Note that *Ref.* I 25 is thus linked to source D1. D. T. Runia suggests to me that κατ' ἄκρον means 'at its zenith' because the origin of a *hairesis* represents this in its purest form.

⁵ We should notice (cf. *infra*, App. 1 p. 318) that the summary of Greek philosophy in *Ref.* X does not derive from *Ref.* I but from an independent source, viz. Sextus or—less likely—a Skeptical source common to Sextus and Hippolytus. For this survey (and the references to philosophical doctrines in *Ref.* X 32) see *infra*, Ch. IV 9; in book X, there is no explicit argument that the Gnostics stole their ideas from the Greeks. Furthermore, it has to be acknowledged that one cannot tell to what

The following 14 philosophers (and this includes, in the appropriate cases, the corresponding schools) are *never* mentioned or used in *Ref.* books IV-IX: Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Parmenides, Zeno of Elea, Leucippus, Democritus, Xenophanes, Metrodorus, Ecphantus, Hippon, Epicurus and Pyrrho. Some among them are however discussed in the (Sextan) account in *Ref.* X 6-8, and some of their doctrines are singled out for mention at *Ref.* X 32.1. Study of this different treatment has to be postponed, for in book X there is no explicit argument that the doctrines (summarized *Ref.* X 9-29) of the leading Gnostics have been derived from the philosophers.

The non-Greek Brahmins are never mentioned in *Ref.* books IV-IX.⁶ The (Pythagorean) Druids are never mentioned. Hesiod's name only occurs twice: once in a fragment of Heraclitus, once in the sentence leading up to this fragment (*Ref.* IX 10.2). This cannot count as an autonomous reference. We may therefore forget about the Brahmins, Druids and Hesiod.

When we subtract the 14 philosophers-and-schools that are never mentioned from the 22 to be found in book I computed above, we find that only 8 thereof play a part in books IV-IX: Thales, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics.

IV 3 *Thales*

There are in these later books only two very short references to Thales. The first is in the section on the Naässenes, *Ref.* V 9.13: εἶναι δὲ τὸν Ὅφιν λέγουσιν οὗτοι τὴν ὑγρὰν οὐσίαν, καθάπερ καὶ Θαλῆς⁷ ὁ Μιλήσιος, καὶ μηδὲν δύνασθαι τῶν ὄντων ὅλως, ἀθανάτων ἢ θνητῶν, [τῶν] ἐμψύχων ἢ ἀψύχων, συνεστηκέναι χωρὶς Αὐτοῦ. The words καθάπερ—Μιλήσιος κτλ. must have been interpolated by Hippolytus (the cento method again).⁸ According to *Ref.* proem 1, Hippolytus' *Syntagma*

extent in the lost books II, III and the first part of IV astrology was linked up by Hippolytus with the Presocratic Ionian astronomy described in detail in book I.

⁶ A solitary reference to Indian gymnosophists (not Brahmins) is to be found at *Ref.* VIII *keph.* 7; it was deleted in the Göttingen ed. and by Wendland, but has been reinstated by Marcovich. There is nothing in the text of book VIII that corresponds to it. I note that Numen. Fr. 1 says that from Plato one should go back to Pythagoras and take the doctrines etc. of the Brahmins, Jews, Magi and Egyptians that agree with Plato's into account. On this fragment see Puech (1934); also Waszink (1963) 52 ff. See further *infra*, Ch. X 5.3.

⁷ (ἔφη) added by Marcovich, unnecessarily.

⁸ At *Ref.* I 1 he speaks of Thales' 'water', not 'liquid substance', and merely says that 'all things' consist thereof, not that "none of the things that are, immortal or mortal, ensouled or without soul, can be compounded without it". Note that at *Ref.* V 9.13 Αὐτοῦ refers to the Snake, not to the liquid substance it represents. The carefully arranged pairs of opposites suggest hymnic religious language, not doxo-

was a rather brief account, whereas the novel feature of the *Ref.* itself not only is its greater wealth of detail (*ibid.* 1-2, 5), but also the explicit *synkrisis* with the tenets of the Greek philosophers (*ibid.* 8-10). Yet the learned reference remains surprisingly unexploited: no explicit accusation of thieving practices! The assumption that it derives from the Gnostic document at issue may seem attractive, but I believe this temptation should be firmly resisted.⁹ The second is to be found in the verdict on Elchasai/Alcibiades, *Ref.* IX 17.2. Here Hippolytus ironically says that if at the time there had been an Elchasai, neither Pythagoras nor Thales nor Solon nor the wise Plato nor the other wise men of the Greeks need have become pupils of the Egyptian priests. Note the order: first Pythagoras, then Thales (the other couple, first Solon then Plato, is less surprising). Also note that Hippolytus, carried away by his irony, has forgotten that at *Ref.* I 1 he had suppressed the evidence relating to Thales' connection with Egypt, although he correctly remembers his previous reference, at VI 22.1,¹⁰ to 'Solon ... in Plato's *Timaeus*' as the pupil of the Egyptians (which, by the way, explains why at IX 17.2 Solon and Plato are coupled). Still, the second time Thales' name is mentioned in the later books it is undoubtedly Hippolytus himself who is speaking. But the references to Thales are of modest importance, and his philosophical doctrines can hardly be said to be conspicuous in the argument against the Gnostics. The parallels that are indicated merely provide a little piece of additional proof for the general contention that

graphic prose; *χωρίς Αὐτοῦ*, too, may have a religious overtone. Hippolytus clearly detected a similarity between the Naässenes and Thales. For the cento method see *infra*, Chs. VIII-IX.

⁹ Cf. in the paraphrastic transcript of Simon's *Apophysis*, *Ref.* VI 9.6: ὅπερ Ἀριστοτέλης δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ καλεῖ ἢ Πλάτων νοητὸν καὶ αἰσθητὸν. The latter pair does not occur in the chapter on Plato, *Ref.* I 19, although we find it in the account of the Academic (*sic*) Pyrrho at *Ref.* I 23.2, and the concept of the νοητὸν is often used in connection with Pythagoras and even Empedocles, cf. Marcovich's *index*, s.v. νοητός. The former pair is not found in the chapters on Aristotle (*Ref.* I 20, VII 15-19), but attributed to Plato at *Ref.* I 19.3 (in the Middle Platonist account of Plato's 'matter' in what are originally Aristotelian terms). These parallels do not fully square with what is found at *Ref.* VI 9.6. Frickel (1968) 115 f., 119 f. argues that the learned reference at *Ref.* VI 9.6 is not a Hippolytean interpolation but occurred in the Gnostic document; I believe that he is wrong, although there is no sustained polemical exploitation of this particular instantiation of the theft from the Greeks and the terms themselves play a part in the transcribed Simonian document at issue. Here too, however, Hippolytus' criticism is implicit rather than explicit; he noticed the similarity (or convergence) and added what he believed to be the *proper reference* to the Greek tenets exploited by the Gnostics. We should remember that he seems to know a bit more about Greek philosophy than he actually sets out, that is to say that he abridges his sources. However, a contrast remains with a remark in the same ch. (VI 9.4): ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν σκοτεινὸν Ἡράκλειτον συλαγαγῶν. This is the more explicit Hippolytus.

¹⁰ Cf. *infra*, Ch. VIII text to n. 73.

the Gnostics plagiarized Greek philosophy, of which Thales after all is one of the archegetes, or perhaps, according to the tradition deriving from Aristotle and still influential today, *the* archegete. Accordingly, we must acknowledge that they provide a sufficient justification a posteriori for the treatment of Thales at *Ref.* I 1.

IV 4 *Socrates*

There are only four brief references to Socrates. The first is to be found in an extract from the ps.Platonic *Second Letter* (314c) at *Ref.* VI 37.5. The second occurs in the survey of Aristotle's views at *Ref.* VII 18.1, where the names 'Socrates' and 'Diogenes' serve as examples (it will be recalled that Socrates' name regularly serves this function in Aristotle and others). The third and fourth, on the other hand, look more promising because a doctrine is at issue, viz. that of Hermogenes which is explained as deriving from Socrates' views. This is stated *Ref.* VIII *keph.* 4, and explained VIII 17.2 οὐκ ἐνενόει δὲ [*scil.*, Hermogenes] ὅτι Σωκρατικὸς ὁ μῦθος οὗτος τυγχάνει, ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος ἐξειργασμένος βέλτιον ἢ ὑπὸ Ἑρμογένους; In *Ref.* I 17, Socrates (who at I 5 is called the archegete of ethics) and Plato are said to have honoured ethics most of all. In *Ref.* I 18, the Socrates chapter, the only information of a doctrinal nature given about Socrates is that he gave special honour to the maxim 'know thyself'; we are also told there that Plato, who copied out the whole of Socrates' wisdom, made a blend of physics, ethics and dialectic.¹¹ But at *Ref.* VIII 17, physics not ethics is at issue in the myth referred to, viz. the theory of God and matter 'worked out' by Plato in the *Timaeus*, and described in the first subsections of *Ref.* I 19 (where however we have three factors, that is to say God, matter and the paradigm). Where doctrine is at issue the view of Socrates boils down to one of Plato's.¹² It follows that, in *Ref.* IV-IX, there is no real reference to the views of *Socrates*. The master has been encapsulated in the pupil.

IV 5 *The Stoics*

There is only one meagre albeit important explicit reference to the Stoics. At *Ref.* IX 27.3, Πυθαγόρας καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς are said to have been taught about God and *ekpyrosis* by the Egyptians who in their turn have been taught by the Jews. This note has been interpolated¹³ in the

¹¹ Cf. Diog. Laërt. III 56.

¹² See further *infra*, text to n. 16.

¹³ Cf. Koschorke (1975), cited *infra*, App. 1 p. 319.

text dealing with the Essenes freely copied from Flavius Josephus (the cento method). It is important in that it gives us Hippolytus' *own* view. It will be recalled that at *Ref.* I 3 the theory of the final conflagration is attributed to Empedocles (who in this chapter, as we recall, is said to be a true-blue Pythagorean) and that the Stoics¹⁴ who are 'waiting for' the final conflagration (*ekpyrosis*, cf. also the chapter on the Stoics, *Ref.* I 21.4) are said to have agreed with Empedocles. There is further evidence that for Hippolytus the Stoics belong with the Pythagoreans.¹⁵ The combination 'Pythagoras and the Stoics' (*Ref.* IX 27.3) is therefore not surprising. The Stoics do not play an independent role in Hippolytus' argument against the Gnostics, and their subordinate role is relatively unimportant. They belong with Hippolytus' all-important Pythagorean succession, or *hairesis* (of which Aristotle, as we shall presently see, represents a sort of lateral branch). This is also clear from other items in the chapter on the Stoics, at *Ref.* I 21.1. They are in some way linked up with Aristotle inasmuch as 'they, too' (καὶ αὐτοὶ) contributed substantially to logic. Furthermore, 'they, too' (καὶ αὐτοὶ again) said that God is the principle of all things (ἀρχὴν μὲν θεὸν τῶν πάντων). This is not a backward reference to the immediately preceding Aristotle chapter, but to the chapters on Empedocles (*Ref.* I 3.1) and Heraclitus (I 4.2). On the other hand, that the Stoic God is the 'most refined body' (σῶμα ὄντα τὸ καθαρώτατον) certainly is meant to recall the description of the Aristotelian fifth body at *Ref.* I 20.4 as τοῦ τε πυρὸς καὶ τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος καὶ τοῦ ἀέρος λεπτότερον. At *Ref.* VII 19.3-4, where this element is also described, we hear that the theory concerned with it is theological (see below, Ch. VII 2). The third item is about providence; the πρόνοια of God permeates all things, but καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ τὸ καθ' εἰμαρμένην εἶναι πάντα διεβεβαίωσαντο. As a summary of a Stoic doctrine (providence being the same as fate, see *SVF* II 912 ff.) this is of course acceptable. The third καὶ αὐτοί, however, remains difficult and can only be explained if we assume an implied reference to the vulgate Aristotelian doctrine of fate in a much later passage, viz. at *Ref.* VII 19.2-4 (see below, Ch. VII 2). This later treatment is foreshadowed by the brief remark at *Ref.* I 20.6 according to which Aristotle held that there only are evils below the moon, not above it (or rather, the larger treatment at VII 19 contains material that was omitted in I 20). The same doctrine, again, is explicitly attributed to both Empedocles and Heraclitus at *Ref.* I 4.3. It will be clear that these Stoics firmly belong with what according to Hippolytus is the mainstream of Greek thought.

¹⁴ Cf. *supra*, Ch. I 4.

¹⁵ Cf. *infra*, Ch. IV 6, Ch. IX text to n. 97.

IV 6 *Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Plato and Aristotle*

Five names on our list of Greek philosophers used in the anti-Gnostic polemics of *Ref.* books IV-IX remain to be discussed, viz. Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Plato and Aristotle. Although these philosophers had already been treated in book I (Empedocles and Heraclitus briefly, Aristotle less briefly, Pythagoras and Plato quite extensively), their doctrines are described all over again in what actually are quite substantial sections.

Let us take Plato first. We are confronted with a remarkable phenomenon. The Plato of books IV-IX is rather different from the Middle Platonist Plato of I 19. The large section *Ref.* VI 21-28 is about the Pythagorean and Platonic philosophies which are said to be the same (and, as we shall see, includes doctrines deriving from other Hippolytean followers of Pythagoras). At *Ref.* VI 37, the pseudo-Platonic *Second Letter* (a Pythagorean forgery popular among the Middle Platonists and Neoplatonists) is attributed to Plato but excerpted to prove Valentinus' dependence on *Pythagoras* not Plato (who after all himself merely follows Pythagoras according to Hippolytus). At *Ref.* VI 22, the *Timaeus* is said to be a *Pythagorean* work. By implication, this turns the verbatim quotation of *Tim.* 36cd at *Ref.* IV 8.1 (introduced not by Plato's name but by λέγουσι δὲ ταῦτα; we hear only subsequently, viz. at IV 10.1, that the doctrine involved was formulated by Plato) into one of a Pythagorean doctrine. The same holds for the reference to this dialogue at *Ref.* VIII 17.¹⁶ According to Hippolytus' actual practice, Plato (as to the doctrines attributed to him) is removed from the Ionian and allocated to the Pythagorean succession. The treatment in the later books according to the doctrines involved prevails over the succession as set out in book I. Parallels for this classification of Plato exist; I shall say more about them in Ch. X below.

Only Aristotle is not, apparently, converted into a full-blown Pythagorean by Hippolytus. As we shall see in Chs. VI and VII below, the extensive account at *Ref.* VII 15-9 really does link up with the shorter treatment of his philosophical views at I 20. Note, however, that at *Ref.* I 20.1 (as also at VII 22.10) he is said to be Plato's pupil, and at I 20.3-4 to have agreed with Plato in most respects, the theory of the soul excepted. From the point of view of the *diadoche* Hippolytus, by means of the link with Plato, connects Aristotle with the doctrinal Pythagorean line. As to his doctrine of the soul, however, he according to Hippolytus differs sharply from Plato, and most of all, we must add, from those Platonists

¹⁶ Cf. *supra*, text to n. 12, and for *Ref.* IV 8.1 and 10.1 see *infra*, App. 1, p. 324.

who—just as Pythagoras (*Ref.* I 2.11), Empedocles (I 3.2) and the Stoics (I 21.4)—had accepted the doctrine of transmigration (I 19.12). But this difference with Plato need not entail a difference with Platonism, for Hippolytus tells us (*Ref.* I 19.10) that according to some Platonists the soul is σύνθετον καὶ γενητὴν καὶ φθαρτὴν. Such heterodox Platonists were also known to Atticus, if what he says at *Fr.* 7 *ap.* Eus. *P.E.* XV 9.2, indeed entails that the serious followers of Plato upheld the immortality of the soul also against the attacks of other Platonists.¹⁷

At *Ref.* I 20 and VII 15-8, Aristotle's logic, that is to say theories connected with his doctrine of the categories and of substance in particular, gets most of the attention; this fully agrees with I 5, which tells us that Aristotle is the archegete of *logical* philosophy and *dialectic* (cf. also I *keph.* 5). We should note that for Iren. *Adv. haeres.* II 14.5 Aristotle's way of arguing, which according to him is characterized by brevity and subtlety (*minutiloquium ... et subtilitatem circa quaestiones cum sit aristotelicum ...*) seems to represent logic, or dialectic, *tout court*. Cicero often characterizes the logic of the Stoics in precisely this way. The fact that Irenaeus does not mention the Stoics at all seems to indicate that in his day the dominant system of logic was already the Aristotelian. Hippolytus provides substantial information on Aristotle's logic, not on that of the Stoics, only saying that they contributed to the field. Irenaeus' reaction anticipates the famous, or infamous, adagium *a dialecticis libera nos*, but this is by the way.

Notwithstanding the undeniable differences between Hippolytus' Aristotle on the one hand and Hippolytus' Pythagoreans (Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus and Plato) as treated in *Ref.* IV-IX on the other, it would still be correct to say that in Hippolytus' view Aristotle, because he is Plato's pupil and agreed with him in most things, belongs with the main (Pythagorean) tradition in Greek philosophy which he believes to be at the bottom of the Gnostic heresies; the important peculiarity is that Aristotle's doctrine of the soul is not Pythagorean. We may however note that at *Ref.* VI 24.2 the doctrine of the ten Aristotelian categories (see *Ref.* I 20.1-3, where it is outlined at some length, and VII 17 ff., where it is used) is attributed to the *Pythagoreans*. We may add an important parallel concerned with the succession which is found in the so-called *Anonymus Photii* (Phot. cod. 249), excerpted from a *Life of Pythagoras*, which begins as follows: ὅτι ἔνατος ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου διάδοχος γέγονέ φησι Πλάτων, Ἀρχύτου τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου [*sic*] μαθητὴς γενόμε-

¹⁷ Galen, not a Platonist but often enough close to Middle Platonism, at *De sequela* ch. 3 (and elsewhere) attacks Plato's doctrine that the rational part of the soul is immortal, arguing that this is something one cannot know; see Donini (1974) 136 f. n. 23. Cf. also Dillon (1977) 410 ff.

νος, δέκατος δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης (Phot. 438b = p. 237.5-7 Th.).¹⁸ This text puts not only Plato in the Pythagorean succession, but Aristotle as well.

As to the sources or traditions used by Hippolytus, it would follow that *Ref.* I 19-20, on Plato and Aristotle, may belong with the tradition to which chs. 2-4 (Pythagoras—Empedocles—Heraclitus) appear to be related, i.e. may belong with what I have called source, or tradition, D1. *Ref.* VII 15-19.1, on Aristotle, which largely tallies with I 20 (see below, Chapter V), may therefore provisionally be linked with source D1 as well. But there is no evidence other than the succession Archelaus—Socrates—Plato—Aristotle to connect these chapters in *Ref.* books I (19-20, Plato and Aristotle) and VII (15-19.1, Aristotle) with what I have called source D2, from which Hippolytus, at the very least, derived his account of the Presocratic Ionian succession in I 1 + 6-9. But the account of the successions in the different sources used by him appears to have been largely similar. Overlapping successions of course lend themselves to contamination. Accordingly, *Ref.* I 19-20 and VII 15-19.1 may derive from, or have been influenced by, a tradition or traditions that are different from the traditions that form the backdrop of *Ref.* I 1 + 5-9 + 11-18. *Ref.* I 21, on the Stoics, at any rate clearly belongs in the context of source D1, to the extent, that is, that the Stoic doctrines have been Pythagoreanized and both explicitly and implicitly linked up with those of the Pythagoreanized Empedocles and Heraclitus, and implicitly with those of Aristotle, who himself is connected with Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus and Plato. As we have noticed, the accounts of Socrates and Plato to be found in *Ref.* IV-IX too have been brought into line with the Pythagoreanizing tradition represented by source D1. In *Ref.* I Empedocles and Heraclitus are Pythagoreans (source D1); the extensive sections in *Ref.* books VI, VII and IX dealing with, or using, their views are consistent with this denomination. Inevitably, several loose ends remain.

IV 7 *A Preliminary Comparison with Iren.* Adv. haeres. II 14

We may rapidly compare what Hippolytus does with what Irenaeus had done before him at *Adv. haeres.* II 14, the famous chapter in which he accuses the Valentinian Gnostics of plagiarizing the Greek poets and philosophers.¹⁹ Irenaeus begins with the poet ‘Antifanus’ (an error for

¹⁸ See further *infra*, Chs. V and VI, and esp. Ch. V n. 19 and text thereto. The Photius text is ‘Baustein’ 38.10 in Dörrie (1990) 28; in his commentary, *ibid.* 261 f., Dörrie argues that the claim of the *Anonymus* is exceptional.

¹⁹ Diels *D.G.* 171 f. argues that this passage (just as Theodor. *Graec. aff. cur.* II 9-11) is related to what is in Aëtius but also contains other material. See further

Aristophanes, perhaps due to the transmission), whose cosmogony is set out in some detail (*Adv. haeres.* II 14.1), and next mentions the philosophers (II 14.2-6). His account (an excursus really) is of course far more compressed than and also in other ways different from what we find in Hippolytus. What is of interest in the present context, however, is that in each separate case Irenaeus compares the tenets of the philosopher, or combination of philosophers, listed by him with a specific doctrine of the Valentinians which according to him derives from it. This holds for what he says about the trio Thales—(Homer)—Anaximander, about Anaxagoras, about the pairs Democritus—Plato and Democritus—Epicurus, about the trio Anaxagoras—Empedocles—Plato, about the Stoics, about the Cynics and about the Pythagoreans.

IV 8 *A Remarkable Pythagorean Hairesis and its Function*

An interesting manoeuvre on Hippolytus' part now becomes clear. Insofar as the *synkrisis* between philosophers and Gnostics in *Ref.* IV-IX is concerned, much of the learning exhibited in the *Philosophoumena* seems to be mere padding. What matters in the context of his explicit polemics against the Gnostic heresiarchs and sects in these later books is a to us moderns highly irregular Pythagorean tradition comprising Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Socrates, Plato and the Stoics.²⁰ Only Thales (of course) and part of Aristotle are not explicitly pressed into Pythagorean service in *Ref.* IV-IX. The Plato and Socrates to be found there are no longer the Socrates and Plato of the *Philosophoumena*. All the others discussed or mentioned in book I [Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Parmenides, (Zeno), Leucippus, Demo-

Grant (1967) 158 f., who argues that Irenaeus' information about pre-Platonic philosophy is mostly derived from doxographic sources, but this also holds for what he says about Plato (*Adv. haeres.* II 14.3, cf. *Aët.* I 7.31) and Democritus-cum-Epicurus (*Adv. haeres.* II 14.3; cf. *Aët.* I 3.15-9: Leucippus—Democritus—Metrodorus—Epicurus). The sequence Thales—Homer—Anaximander corresponds to *Aët.* I 3.1-3 as reconstructed by Diels (I believe the insertion in *Aëtius* of the Homer lemma is mistaken, see Mansfeld (1985a) 123 ff.), but *Aëtius* quotes *Il.* XIV 246 and Irenaeus quotes *Il.* XIV 201; in the relevant traditions, these lines are alternative quotations. The couplings of name-labels in Irenaeus too conforms to the doxographic pattern: Democritus and Epicurus; Democritus and Plato; Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato. Grant, *loc. cit.*, correctly points out that Irenaeus 'distorts it [*scil.*, Greek philosophy] for polemical reasons'. See further *infra*, Ch. VIII 1.2.

²⁰ The reception of Pythagoreanism in late antiquity has been rewardingly studied by O'Meara (1989). The earliest philosophical source discussed by him is Numenius. He is not much concerned with the Pythagorean succession and does not deal with the history of the reception of Pythagoras, Empedocles, and Heraclitus before Numenius, or with the position of Empedocles in the Pythagorean-and-Platonic context in the late commentators, matters which will be dealt with in Chs. VIII-X of the present study.

critus, (Metrodorus), Xenophanes, Ecphantus, Hippon, Epicurus and Pyrrho], as we have seen, are not heard of again in *Ref.* IV-IX. The suggestion conveyed by Hippolytus is that the whole of Greek philosophy is at the bottom of the whole of Gnostic heresy, but what his explicit argument in books IV-IX boils down to is that the various representatives of the Pythagorean tradition he presents us with, viz. Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Socrates, Plato and the Stoics (although, as we have seen, according to the system of successions which forms the backdrop of Hippolytus' account in the *Philosophoumena* Socrates and Plato, at least, belong with the Ionian succession), to which part of Aristotle should be added, are the really important and in fact the only relevant philosophical sources of the Gnostic heresiarchs. The arguable, or at least argued contribution of the Presocratic Ionian succession to Gnostic heresy (Thales only) is slight, but as we have noticed provides sufficient justification for Thales' prominent position as the starting-point of the Ionian succession—and indeed of the whole of Greek philosophy—in *Ref.* I 1. It is to be noted that only Thales' tenet that water is the principle is referred to; his astronomy which, like that of his successors up to and including Archelaus, may or may not have played a part in the lost astrological section of the *Ref.*, is not at issue in books IV-IX. But Thales of course remains the archegete of Greek philosophy and *Ref.* I 1 emphasizes the fact that he gave to the Greeks astronomy and in general the investigation of what is above our heads.

Once in a while, Hippolytus' argument is implicit rather than explicit. His statement in *Ref.* I 5 that, having treated Pythagoras and his following, he now wants to *revert to* those who came after Thales, may be read as justifying the lavish detail in which the details of the astronomical and meteorological theories of the Ionian from Anaximander to Archelaus are to be recorded, for his account of Thales' theories concerned with these topics is very summary.

The noteworthy interpolation of a Pythagorean *diadoche* from Pythagoras to Heraclitus in the Presocratic Ionian succession in *Ref.* book I, resulting in a cento providing a highly original view of Presocratic philosophy, is justified by the importance Pythagoreanism *more Hippolyteio* comes to acquire in the *Ref.* as a whole. Hippolytus makes it very clear (*Ref.* I 2.1) that Greek philosophy had *two* starting-points which are about contemporaneous, that is to say Thales and Pythagoras. At the end of his proem, he submits that the heretics have most of all been influenced by the παρ' Ἑλλησι πρῶτοι φιλοσοφίαν φυσικὴν ἐπιδείξαντες, that is to say by Thales and Pythagoras (to which Xenophanes should have been added, who however as we have seen is effectively eliminated). According to his actual practice, however, Pythagoras and

his presumed followers (Empedocles, Heraclitus, Plato, the Stoics) and the to some extent (viz., as to his theory of the soul) dissident Aristotle are the only important victims of the Gnostic robbers. This particular selection of philosophers, as I intend to show in Chapter X below, is not accidental.

Although in *Ref.* book I Hippolytus several times claims that he only provides what is essential, from his own polemical point of view he has transcribed far too much: Thales' successors up to Archelaus, the Eleatics, and a few others. It may be thought he was too lazy or too much in a hurry to make a more effective selection. What is more to the point, however, is to observe that this generosity in transcribing the sources (or rather having them taken down by his tachygraphists while dictating and/or copied out by his secretaries according to his indications) is typical. The accounts of the philosophies of Empedocles as the source of Marcion's heresy and of Heraclitus as the source of Noëtus' heresy in *Ref.* books VII and IX are more copious than is necessary for his purpose, because in these accounts only certain important elements are relevant to the theme of the theft committed by these Gnostic heresiarchs; the rest, however interesting in itself, is superfluous. As to what is in *Ref.* book I, the redundancies are camouflaged and to some extent excused by the claim that the Ionian physicists and the 'others' (i.e. the Eleatics and some others) *disagree* among themselves, which would seem to justify the fact that of the others no one and of the Ionians only Thales play a part in books IV-IX, whereas the harmonious Pythagoreans, at any rate those mentioned by name (Pythagoras/Plato, Empedocles and Heraclitus), are vitally important in these later books. The from a polemical point of view redundant sections of the chapters on Empedocles and Heraclitus in *Ref.* books VII and IX are not apologized for at all.

The insight in Hippolytus' working-methods that we may derive from thinking about such redundancies is rewarding. For the most part, his contention that individual Gnostics plagiarized individual Greek philosophers (most of whom belonged to a unique Pythagorean succession) is a bit difficult to support. In order to shore up his point, he throws in an abundance of evidence most of which is irrelevant to his polemical argument, but which by the sheer difficulty of its seemingly endless series of details to some extent numbs the critical faculties of the reader who, having accepted that there are some points of similarity between some Greek philosophers and some Gnostic believers, may thus be persuaded to swallow the suggestion that the resemblances go much farther.

IV 9 Ref. *Book I in Relation to Book X*

One should however add that the material collected in the *Philosophoumena* to some extent anticipates what we find in *Ref. X*. At *Ref. I* 26.3, Hippolytus points out that the philosophers, without exception, have failed to recognize the true nature of the Divine, for they limited their investigations to the created world, each choosing a different part of this whole as a divine principle. This much resembles the verdict at *Ref. X* 32, where various philosophical theories are listed that fail to account for the true nature of the Divinity. Yet it remains true that, even from the point of view of what is in book X, much of what is in book I remains redundant. One should recognize, however, that in book I Hippolytus clears the ground for his attempt to kill two birds with one stone. Gnosticism stands condemned because it is a mere plagiarism of Greek philosophy (the argument of books V-IX, announced at *Ref. I* 26.4, in the proem and at V 5). However, Greek philosophy itself when compared to the true Christian doctrine fails the test of reliability as well (the argument of *Ref. X* 32, announced at I 26.3).

In *Ref. X*, where as we have noticed before the summarized tenets of the philosophers are for the most part derived from a Skeptical source (Sextus) different from that, or those, of the *Philosophoumena*, and the summarized doctrines of the Gnostics are taken either from Hippolytus' *Syntagma*, or from the original Gnostic sources, or from both but not from what is in books IV-IX, there is no explicit argument that the Gnostics did derive their doctrines from the philosophers. But the simple juxtaposition of the tenets of the philosophers and the doctrines of the Gnostics, which comes after the long and detailed argument in books IV-IX concerned with Gnostic plagiarism, should be read in the light of this previous exposition. This again enables Hippolytus to proceed as if Greek philosophy in general is in some way or other at the bottom of Gnosticism in general and to have the tenets of Anaximenes, Xenophanes and others make a come-back in *Ref. X* 32, where he sets off the true Christian doctrine of God against the tenets of the Greek philosophers.

CHAPTER FIVE

ARISTOTELIAN CATEGORIES AND OPPOSITES

V 1 *Introduction*

Because among the philosophers adduced in the later books of the *Refutatio* Aristotle, as we have noticed, occupies a position of his own, it seems preferable to begin with what Hippolytus tells us about his doctrines, and then to continue with Pythagoras and the others. The chapter in the *Philosophoumena*, I 20, and the extensive discussion in *Ref.* VII 15-19.8 (to be supplemented with passages to be found in the critical account of the Gnostic system of Basilides at VII 20-27) belong together to a degree.

Hippolytus' account of Aristotle has been much neglected.¹ The only recent discussion available is that by Osborne which is however spoiled by the author's naive contention that e.g. the treatment of the doctrine of substance in *Ref.* VII 15 ff. is based on Hippolytus' own careful and intelligent study of Aristotle's *Categories* and *Metaphysics Z*.²

¹ For instance, a number of often quite extensive texts relating in one way or another to Aristotle have been collected by Gigon (1987), but he has failed to print what is in Hippolytus.

² Osborne (1987) 35 ff., cf. the criticisms of Barnes (1988) 336 and esp. Mueller (1989). I shall as a rule argue contra by implication rather than by one to one references. The claim that Hippolytus had studied the original works is explicitly made e.g. *ibid.* 49, 51. Osborne believes that Hippolytus was also familiar with *Physics A*, *De anima*, and *Metaphysics A*. As Runia (1989) 28 n. 6 points out she has a predecessor in Festugière (1932) 233 ff., who punctiliously translates Wendland's text (that is to say the sections concerned with Aristotle), provides an exegesis, and meticulously compares the section on Aristotle with that on Basilides. Festugière argues that the cosmology at *Ref.* I 20 and VII 19 and the ethics at I 20 derive from the ancient secondary literature or from works following this literature, but like Osborne believes that Hippolytus studied certain works of Aristotle on his own, because his account contains a number of quotations. Cf. Festugière (1932) 249 f.: "... il faudrait déterminer exactement les écrits d'Aristote que l'auteur a dû connaître et la manière dont ont les interprétait de son temps. On ne peut douter qu'il ne soit entré en contact plus direct avec le système que nombre de ses devanciers ou contemporains chrétiens. Il a eu en main mieux que ces *Placita* dont on se transmettait, sans contrôle, quelques extraits. Il cite, à la lettre, des passages des *Catégories* ... , la définition de l'âme [*quod non*, J.M.] ... , la définition de Dieu ... ". Festugière points out that since Andronicus' great edition of Aristotle and his comments on the *Categories* "l'on revenait davantage au texte du maître" and that numerous others, from Boëthius of Sidon to Alexander of Aphrodisias, wrote comments and commentaries on the *Cat.* "Hippolyte est le contemporain d'Alexandre ... Il n'avait donc pas trop grand mérite à utiliser les *Catégories*". This reference to the

But the earlier account at *Ref.* I 20 is dismissed in less than a page.³ Unlike *Ref.* VII 15 ff. it is not, in her view, based on Hippolytus' own intelligent study of Aristotle but "probably derives from some handbook, and it reflects a tendency to assimilate the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. It shows no extensive knowledge of the school works ... beyond a summary of the ten categories". Other items in the account, viz. the tenet that the soul lingers on for some time after death only to be reabsorbed into the fifth element, and the doctrine of the three kinds of good things one needs to be happy "may reflect a knowledge of exoteric works"; via the popular manual, I presume, so the manual would have contained material based on knowledge of both the exoteric and the esoteric works.

V 2 *Categories, Opposites and Division: The Scholastic Tradition*

That *Ref.* I 20 derives from a secondary source, or sources, is certain. But the account deserves closer study. The tendency to assimilate the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle (*Ref.* I 20.3 *σχεδὸν τὰ πλεῖστα τῷ Πλάτῳ σύμφωνός ἐστιν*), which as is well known was first promoted by Antiochus of Ascalon in the second quarter of the first century BCE, is characteristic of the majority of the Middle Platonists; it enabled these men to incorporate into the Platonic systems they constructed such chunks of Aristotelian doctrine as suited their convenience.⁴ If Aristotle according to the account in *Ref.* I 20 for the most part agreed with Plato, this Aristotle agreed with the Middle Platonist Plato of *Ref.* I 19.⁵ The doctrine of the things which have *μεσότητα* and those which are

exegetical tradition is most useful. However, I would argue that even if Hippolytus had read certain works of Aristotle on his own (which one cannot, of course, exclude a priori), the impact thereof on his presentation, which is entirely indebted to secondary sources, remained nil. Perhaps Seneca had read works by Plato and Aristotle, as he certainly had read a lot of Stoic literature and also was familiar with Epicurus; yet his presentation of the doctrines of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics to be found in *Ep.* 58 (see *infra*, Exc. 3) is based on secondary literature. I should add that, before Festugière, Siouville (1928) 103 n. 2 already argued that Hippolytus had read nothing by Aristotle himself except, perhaps, the *Categories*. For the little paper by Edwards (1990) who criticizes Osborne see *infra*, App. 1, p. 324.

³ Osborne (1987) 35.

⁴ See e.g. the convenient overview of the 'platonismo aristotelizzante' in Donini (1982) 103 ff., and Whittaker's illuminating remarks (1987) 110 ff. For Antiochus' syncretism see Donini (1982) 73 ff., Dillon (1977) 53 ff., and especially Barnes (1989) 78 ff. Cf. also Görler (1990), though his argument that Antiochus' physics is Stoic with an unimportant Platonic veneer cannot be the whole truth, cf. *Cic. Ac. po.* I (= *Luc.*) 6, *adhibenda etiam geometria est*.

⁵ For the latter cf. *supra*, Ch. I n. 14 and text thereto.

ἄμεσα is at I 20.3 attributed to Aristotle (ὑποτίθεται καὶ αὐτός) but had also been attributed to Plato (ὡς εἵπομεν καὶ περὶ τοῦ Πλάτωνος). The backward reference is to the Plato chapter, *Ref.* I 19.14, where the tenet at issue is set out more completely, and where we learn that the ἄμεσα are opposites such as wakefulness and sleep, which have nothing in between, the ἕμμεσα such opposites as good and evil, which do have something in between, and the μέσσα such qualities as grey which are in between black and white. Before adverting to this Platonic-Aristotelian doctrine of the opposites,⁶ Hippolytus lists Aristotle's ten categories and briefly illustrates them by means of examples (*Ref.* I 20.1-2).

V 3 *The Categories*

This section on the categories and opposites ultimately derives from the critical and exegetical professional literature of the first century BCE and the first and second centuries CE which developed around Aristotle's *Categories*, inclusive of the so-called *Postpraedicamenta*.⁷ Perhaps it derives from a handbook (or more than one) or a section of a systematico-historical work (or from sections of several such works) belonging to the genre *On the Sects* based on and to some extent summarizing this literature.

We should take the introductory sentences first (*Ref.* I 20.1, 24.2-4 W. = 81.2-4 M.): τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα τῶν πάντων ὑποθέμενος [*scil.*, Aristotle] οὐσίαν καὶ συμβεβηκότα· τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μίαν τὴν πᾶσιν ὑποκειμένην, τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα ἑννέα. Although Aristotle himself at *Cat.* 5.2a34 f. and elsewhere draws a clear distinction between substance, which is self-subsistent and not predicated of anything else, and the other categories the bipartite division of the ten categories as found in Hippolytus is a later interpretive systematization. It can be plausibly traced to as early an authority on Aristotle as Andronicus of Rhodes (1st cent. BCE) who wrote an interpretive paraphrase of the Aristotelian *Categories*,⁸ and it

⁶ See *infra*, Ch. V 5.

⁷ Because the upper apparatuses in Wendland and Marcovich lack the appropriate references to this discussion, it will be necessary to state these in some detail. It will also be necessary to study the parallel texts in some depth in order to provide the indispensable background for what is in Hippolytus.

⁸ See Moraux (1973) 103, 107 ff., and the useful overview by Gottschalk (1987) 1101 ff., 1104 ff. *Simpl. In Cat.* 63.21 f. says that Andronicus and Xenocrates (Xenocr. Fr. 12 Heinze = 95 Isnardi Parente) argued that the ten categories may be reduced to the καθ' αὐτὸ and the relative (on this passage see also Babut (1969) 48 f.). But, unlike Xenocrates, Andronicus, as appears from other passages in Simplicius' commentary, did not consider the relative to be a superior category and continued to speak of quantity, quality, etc. At *Simpl. In Cat.* 157.18 ff. the relative according to Andronicus is so to speak additional to the other(s): παραφυσάδι ἔοικεν. Here he

clearly follows Aristotle himself, *Eth. Nic.* A 6.1096a20 ff., τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρὸς τι· παραφυσάδι γὰρ τοῦτ' εἴκει καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος. For the use of this passage—and presumably also its parallel in the *Ethica Eudemea*—for the interpretation of the *Categories* see *infra*, text after n. 34. According to Moraux Andronicus distinguished between two 'Hauptgruppen', viz. 'Substanz' and 'Akzidens'. Isnardi Parente (1982) 328 does not yet take this argument into account; better Isnardi Parente (1986) 9 and n. 16. Gottschalk (1987) 1105 shares Moraux's view. It is far less likely that Andronicus put the nine categories other than the relative in the set of the καθ' αὐτό, *pace* Prantl (1855) 537; for this alternative division see Clem. *Strom.* VIII 24.1. If Andronicus' view resembled that of Clement's source, he still would have been capable of distinguishing quantity from quality, or of arguing that time and space rather than when and where should be categories, when and where being in his view subordinate to time and space. We should recognise that four different combinations are theoretically possible: (1) substance—accidents; (2) substance—relative; (3) 'what is by itself'—what is relative; (4) 'what is by itself'—accidents. As applied to the ten categories, the accidents are always nine and substance always one in number, but 'what is by itself' may pertain either to substance only or, as in Clement, to substance along with all the others, the relative excepted. Note, moreover, that Aristotle occasionally designates the categories other than substance as what is not καθ' αὐτό, e.g. *Met.* Z 1.1028a23; a blend of Aristotelian and Platonizing terminology was therefore feasible. Eudorus *ap. Simpl. In Cat.* 174.14 ff. = Eudor. Fr. 15 criticized Aristotle for failing to oppose, in the *Categories*, the καθ' αὐτό to the relative; this may be in favour of the assumption that Andronicus did not speak of the καθ' αὐτό either. For the curious passage *Simpl. In Cat.* 165.32 ff. (*SVF* II 403), where a Platonizing division of the categories is attributed to the Stoics, see Isnardi Parente (1986), whose argument is not entirely clear to me (see also Hülser in his edition of the Stoic fragments (1987-8) [hereafter abbreviated *FDS*], comment to *FDS* 833). Dexipp. *In Cat.* 31.11 ff. refers to and argues against attempts to reduce the number of the categories to two: ἄλλη πάλιν αἰτία καθ' ἕτερον τρόπον τὴν περιττότητα αἰτιάται· τὰ μὲν γὰρ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι διαίρουνται, καὶ ἐν τούτοις περιλαμβάνειν δοκοῦσι πάντα τὰ γένη· ἄλλοι δὲ εἰς οὐσίαν καὶ συμβεβηκὸς διατέμνοντες αὐτὰ ἡγούνται ἀρκούντως διακρίσθαι. Porph. *In Cat.* 71.19 ff. argues that the categories must be divided into four, viz. particular and universal substances and particular and universal accidents; this is merely a variation of the standard dichotomy. —The earliest surviving post-Andronican use of the standard doctrine of the ten categories seems to be Ar. Did. *ap. Stob.* II p. 137.8-12, quoted *infra* Ch. VI text after n. 40 (but this passage is not instructive as to the division of the categories into sets); cf. also Whittaker (1990) 87 n. 70, whose reference to Ar. Did. *ap. Stob.* II p. 42.1-4 is not good; that to Aspas. *In Eth. Nic.* 12.2-4 is useful. For the division substance—accidents in Marius Victorinus cf. *infra*, n. 13.

The division seems to have been imported into rhetoric (the theory of *stasis*, for which see Calboli Montefusco (1986)) by Theodorus of Gadara (1st cent. BCE), see Quintil. III 6.36: *idem Theodorus, qui de eo an sit et de accidentibus ei, quod esse constat, id est* περὶ οὐσίας καὶ συμβεβηκόντων *existimat quaeri*. Note however that οὐσία here does not signify 'substance' but 'existence' (εἰ ἔστι; cf. also *ibid.* 6.23); the accidents are subdivided by Theodorus *ap. ibid.* into *quid, quale, quantum, ad aliquid*, i.e. into the four Aristotelian categories of substance, quality, quantity, and the relative. Cf. also *ibid.* III 6.51: ... *an sit? quid sit? quale sit? quantum sit? ad aliquid*. It is noteworthy that Theodorus, just as Eudorus (see *infra*, n. 26 and text thereto) and Quintilian himself (see *infra*), has quality before quantity; however, this may be so because, ultimately, in rhetorical contexts the division goes back to Arist. *Rhet.* Γ 16.1416b20 ff., τοῦτο (*scil.*, the ἐκ τῆς τέχνης) δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ὅτι ἔστι δεῖξαι, ἐὰν ἡ ἀπιστον, ἡ ὅτι ποῖον, ἡ ὅτι ποσόν, ἡ καὶ ἅπαντα. Cf. also Quintil. III 6.23-4, *primum Aristoteles elementa decem constituit, circa quae versari videatur omnis quaestio: οὐσίαν (quam Plautus essentiam vocat), ... qualitatem, ... , quantitatem, ... ad aliquid, ... ubi et quando, ... facere, pati, habere, ... , novissime κείσθαι* (already quoted by Prantl (1855) 515 f. n. 28). The Plautus cited for

was quietly incorporated into the system of the Aristotelizing current of Middle Platonism. This means that it is not Aristotle himself but rather an *Aristoteles interpretatus* that is integrated in this way. See the entirely representative⁹ doctrine of Alcin. *Didasc.* 5.156.21 f. H.: τῆς διαλεκτικῆς δὲ στοιχειωδέστατον ἡγείται πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐπιβλέπειν πάντος ὁτουοῦν, ἔπειτα περὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων. In the so-called *Divisiones aristoteleae ap.* Diog. Laërt., which are presented as Plato's divisions according to Aristotle (III 80, διήρει δέ, φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης, κτλ.), we find a bipartite diaeresis (III 108-9) of things that are in themselves (ἔστι καθ' αὐτά) and those that are called relative (πρὸς τι λέγεται). The former are instanced by 'man, horse and the other animals', the latter by relatives proper; so presumably this is not a division of Aristotelian categories but a variety of the Early Academic doctrine. A bipartition of the categories, as in Andronicus and Hippolytus, is anyhow a sign of Platonizing influence; cf. Xenocr. *loc. cit.*, and Hermod. Fr. 7 (Hermodorus' bipartite division exhibiting further sub-divisions of the relative). The *locus classicus* in Plato himself is *Soph.* 255c, ἀλλ' οἶμαί σε συγχωρεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα ἀεὶ λέγεσθαι (cf. also e.g. *Phileb.* 53d). Aristotle's set of ten may have been meant as a critical alternative to the Early Academic dichotomous sets. Andronicus may have wanted to reduce the gap between the Aristotelian and the Early Academic accounts of the categories;¹⁰ in its turn, this facilitated the reception of the ten categories in Middle Platonist thought. In Simplicius' monumental *Commentary on the Categories*, the division of the categories into substance (οὐσία) and the nine accidents (συμβεβηκότα) is standard, e.g. *In Cat.* 42.13 ff., 62.5; cf. also e.g. Dexipp. *In Cat.* 21.25, 48.22-23. I already note in a preliminary way¹¹ that the division of the categories into two sets also occurs in the account of Aristotle's substance at *Ref.* VII 18.6, this time in the form καθ' αὐτὸ (cf. the fragments of Xenocrates and Hermodorus cited above)—συμβεβηκότα, and at VI 24.1-2, in the form οὐσία—συμβεβηκότα. This can be paralleled from ps. Archyt.

this translation of οὐσία is Sergius Plautus, a Stoic who translated Greek philosophical terminology into Latin, see Schanz - Hosius (1935) 361; the same translation is found in Seneca, see *infra*, text to Exc. n. 21. For the relation between philosophical inquiry and dialectic on the one hand and *stasis* theory on the other see Mansfeld (1990a) 3125 ff., 3149 ff., 3193 ff., (1991a) 76 ff.

⁹ Cf. Whittaker (1987) 109: the *Didascalicus* is "emblematic of a largely lost tradition of Middle Platonic scholasticism".

¹⁰ Cf. Donini (1982) 89; Prantl (1855) *loc. cit.*, whose interpretation, as we have noticed, is less likely consistently suggests that Andronicus may have put the relative last in order to make the Aristotelian sequence more like the Stoic. Gottschalk (1987) 1105 considers Stoic influence too.

¹¹ See *infra*, Ch. VI 5.

Categ. p. 26.22-23 Th.,¹² *πᾶσα γὰρ οὐσία καθ' αὐτάν, τὰ δὲ (scil., the other nine categories) συνυπάρχοντα καὶ συμβεβηκότα κτλ.*

The next point to be considered is Hippolytus' statement that "substance and attributes are the *elements* of all things". This can be rather precisely paralleled from Clem. *Strom.* VIII 23.6, where the list of the ten categories is followed by the statement ἃ δὴ καὶ στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων φαμέν τῶν ἐν ὕλῃ καὶ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχάς· ἔστι γὰρ λόγῳ θεωρητὰ ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ ἄϋλα νῶ μόνῳ ληπτὰ ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐπιβολήν (... "for these [*scil.*, the material elements] are to be considered by means of discursive reasoning, whereas the immaterial things can only be grasped by the intellect according to the primary intuition").¹³ *Strom.* VIII is a series of excerpts from a much longer exposition by Clement, whose sources have to be located among the handbook-literature,¹⁴ to which one may perhaps add the logico-epistemological section of a work

¹² Edited in the collection of Thesleff (1965), whose pagination will be quoted. On this tract, which mirrors the early exegetical and critical literature on Aristotle, see further below, this section.

¹³ We should also compare two passages from a rather late source, Marius Victorinus' commentary on Cicero's *Topica*, the *In Rhetoricam Ciceronis* (ed. Halm (1886) 153 ff.). At p. 232.6-9 he says: *Secundum Aristotelem decem categoriae sunt, id est decem res, in quibus omnia, qui in mundo sunt, continentur. Harum rerum una substantia est, reliquae novem qualitates, id est, quae substantiae accidunt* (my emphasis). But what he seems to mean may be gauged from an earlier passage in the commentary, p. 183.32-8: *Aristoteles ait res omnes, quae in dictis et factis et in omni mundo agentur, decem esse, quarum nomina ponemus. Prima substantia est, deinde quantitas, qualitas* [note that Victorinus does not follow the Eudoran sequence, cf. *supra*, n. 8; *infra*, text to n. 26], *ad aliquid, ubi, quando, situs, habere, facere, pati. Graeco autem vocabulo sic vocantur*: [the names in Greek follow]. *Harum prima, ut diximus, substantia vocatur. Reliquae novem in substantia sunt, quae accidentales vocantur* (my emphasis again). Here Victorinus adds propositions and actions to the physical phenomena, in this way clearly alluding to the traditional tripartition of philosophy: logic ethics physics. These passages are discussed by Hadot (1971) 93 f. (who by mistake interpolates p. 232.6-8 in his translation of pp. 183.32-184.6). He suggests that the substitution of *qualitates* for *accidentales* is a symptom of Stoic influence.

¹⁴ See Ernst (1910) who argued that Clement used the material of *Strom.* VIII in other sections of the *Strom.* (one should say, however, that he used the original source(s) of bk. VIII also elsewhere). Cf. further e.g. Osborn (1957) 148 ff., Lilla (1971) 121 ff., Solmsen (1973) 281 ff. Nautin (1976) convincingly argues that the so-called eighth book of the *Strom.* is a selection of abstracts from the final part of the *Strom.* transcribed by a scribe, and not a collection of notes made by Clement for his private use and piously published by his literary executors (he compares the *Tura papyrus* containing abstracts from Origen's *Contra Celsum* and other works found in 1946; one may also compare, at least for part of their contents viz. the fragments which are by Alexander, the *Quaestiones* attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias). The compilation of Berchman (1984) 176 ff., 206 ff., based moreover on an insufficient bibliography, is of little value. Von Arnim in the *SVF* and Hülser in the *FDS* print several passages from *Strom.* VIII as Stoic fragments (or rather testimonia). Witt (1937) 31 ff. argued that *Strom.* VIII through an intermediate source derives from Antiochus, but this is not proven; he and others who have discerned the mixture of Aristotelian and Stoic doctrines have oddly neglected the specifically Platonist ingredients indicated *infra*, n. 15.

dealing with systematic philosophy in the manner of an Alcinous written by a member of a philosophical school. The theories involved are a blend of Aristotelian and Stoic doctrines, but it should be pointed out that the dominant view is without doubt a Platonist one.¹⁵ The source or sources used by Clement belong with the Middle Platonist scholastic literature; what is more, his account has preserved details deriving from the learned discussions of the first century BCE and the first two centuries CE some of which can only be paralleled in Simplicius' much later *In Cat.*¹⁶

¹⁵ I cannot here deal with the details. Note however that Clement's account of diaeresis and definition in *Strom.* VIII can be paralleled from Sen. *Ep.* 58.8-12 and Alcin. *Didasc.* ch. 5; see the classical discussion of these two passages and other parallels by Theiler (1930) 2 ff., and further below, Exc.; for the parallels with Alcinous see also Witt (1937) 31 ff. and Lilla (1971) 131 ff. At *Strom.* VIII 19.2, Clement points out that definitions are not concerned with (sensible) things or Ideas (οὐτ' αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων οὔτε τῶν ἰδεῶν οἱ ὅροι), but with conceptions in the mind (διανοιών; for this somewhat unusual meaning cf. LSJ s.v. διάνοια I and the version of the Stoic definition of τέχνη [see SVF I 73] at ps.Gal. *Introd. sive med.* XIX 685.3 f. K.: τέχνη ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐκ καταληψέων καὶ διανοίων κτλ.). This may be combined with what is at *Strom.* VIII 23.6 (quoted in the text). Clearly, Clement's source, just as Seneca and Alcinous, makes a distinction between (Platonic) Ideas and (Aristotelian) immanent forms; for the latter see Theiler (1930) *loc. cit.* and the excellent study by Donini (1979) 152 ff. For the φυσικὴ ἔννοια of the incarnate soul which has the immanent forms as its objects see Alcin. *Didasc.* 4.156.6 ff. Discursive reasoning by means of division and definition according to Clement and Alcinous is concerned with the conceptions that, apparently, derive from the immanent forms, whereas ideas can only be grasped in an immediate way by a superior organ of cognition. For νῶ μόνῳ ληπτὰ cf. Alcin. *Didasc.* 10.165.4-5 (see Whittaker (1990) 105 n. 196), the First God is ἄρρητος ... καὶ τῷ νῶ μόνῳ ληπτός (cf. also 4.155.14 f., on the cognition of Ideas and immanent forms), and Sen. *Ep.* 58.16 *primum illud quod est nec visu nec tactu nec ullo sensu comprehenditur: cogitabile est*. For the Platonic character of Clement's dialectic see the rather unsystematic but useful study of Apostolopoulou (1977) 39, 60 f., 63 ff., 99 ff. Note however that Clement elsewhere in the *Strom.* refers to and employs a purely Platonic division which is concerned with τὰ νοητά (*Strom.* I 177.3, cf. VI 80.4); see Pépin (1972) 376 ff. Osborn (1987) is disappointing.

¹⁶ See Pépin (1980) 272 ff., who comments on Clement's account of homonyms etc. But both here and in Pépin (1972) he fails to recognise the Middle Platonist ingredient in *Strom.* VIII. Furthermore, he has not noticed that the illustration for the polyonyms at 24.5 (ἄορ, ξίφος, φάσγανον) was already provided by Speusippus (ἄορ, ξίφος, μάχαιρα, φάσγανον: Clement omits the third item, and so does Gal. *Diff. puls.* II 3, VIII 574 K.), Fr. 32a Lang = 45 Isnardi Parente = 68a Tarán, according to Boëthus *ap. Simpl. In Cat.* 38.11 ff. Tarán excludes the section of Simplicius containing ἄορ etc., but the parallels in Galen and Clement prove the part concerned with Speusippus' polyonyms to be earlier than Porphyry, from whom Simplicius presumably derived his information about the discussion in Boëthus' *Commentary on the Cat.*, and of course earlier than Simplicius himself, who therefore cannot have invented the examples that are provided. For the definition of πολυώνυμα in Porphyry see *In Cat.* 60.29-30 and 68.29-31; *ibid.* 69.2 ff. the examples provided are ἄορ, ξίφος, φάσγανον. Mart. Cap. IV 339 mentions homonym, synonym, and (*ut ita dicam*) plurivocum, where *ut ita dicam* shows that the source excerpted translated the term from the Greek; *ibid.* 357 he mentions *ensis et mucro* referring to *gladius* as

According to Clement's source(s), the ten Aristotelian categories are the elements of *physical* things. According to Hippolytus' source they are the elements of *all* things; the use of the word στοιχεῖα seems to point to the physical world but need not imply this denotation. The statement should be placed in the context of the learned discussion con-

instances (cf. Pfligersdorffer (1953) 136, who also cites the treatment of *multivoca* at Boeth. *In Cat.* p. 164 and p. 168 Migne). For the discussion, with references to further literature, see Tarán (1981) 410 ff., Luna *ap.* Hadot (1990b) 159 ff. —Simplicius and Dexippus to a large extent depend on Porphyry's lost great commentary on the *Categories*, which was very informative about the discussions in the previous literature. Some traces are also to be found in Ammonius' commentary. Simplicius also frequently used Iamblichus' lost commentary, and Iamblichus too used Porphyry's.

In the present Chapter and in the Exc. I shall quote a number of parallels from Martianus Capella's account of what according to him is the first part of dialectic, the *de loquendo* (so IV 338) at IV 344-387. To a large extent, from 355, this section consists of abstracts—including exegesis—of Aristotle's *Categories* (and *Postpredicamenta*), but it begins, significantly enough, with the Porphyrian five predicables (344-9; cf. Prantl (1855) 674), and then discusses division, partition, etc. (350-4, cf. Prantl *loc. cit.* Note that Porph. *Isag.* 1.5 ff., says that information about the five predicables is indispensable for definition and division). Varro (probably the lost *De dialectica*) has been suggested as a source, or an ultimate Latin source, for Martianus' account of dialectic, see e.g. Pépin (1976) 102 ff., 128 f. (with further references). But the sustained paraphrase, with comments and amplifications, of the contents of Aristotle's *Categories* cannot be attributed to Varro (cf. Pfligersdorffer (1953) 146, "... der römischen Dialektik dieser Zeit (muß) ein in der peripatetischen Logik hochbedeutsamer Teil gefehlt haben, die Kategorienlehre"). Furthermore, Martianus' account of the five predicables must depend on Porphyry's *Isagoge* which was first translated into Latin by Victorinus (cf. Hadot (1968) 179 ff., 367 ff., and Pfligersdorffer (1953) 131 f., 150; on Varro see further *infra*, App. 2). Hadot (1968) 109 ff., using an extremely complicated and in my view implausible hypothesis of P. Courcelle concerned with various redactions of Cassiod. *Institut.* II 3.18, denies that Victorinus translated Aristotle's *Categories* and that he wrote a commentary on this work in eight books, although this is what Cassiod. p. 128.16-7 affirms, and although Victorinus was familiar with Aristotle's treatise (*ibid.* 92 ff.). But in bk. V Martianus excerpted Victorinus' lost commentary on Cicero's *Topica* (Hadot (1968) 115 ff., 313 ff.), and in book IV Victorinus' lost treatise on hypothetical syllogisms (Hadot (1968) 143 ff., 323 ff.); Pfligersdorffer's argument (1953) 135 f. that Victorinus is involved has not been refuted. The source of Martianus' section *de loquendo* seems familiar with Cicero's *Topica*, *De inventione* and other rhetorical works (e.g. IV 354, 387), and Cicero's name often occurs as an instance. I have to leave the question of this immediate source *sub iudice*, but assume it is safe to posit that Martianus' *de loquendo* belongs with the post-Andronican exegetical literature, perhaps via Porphyry and Victorinus. Hadot (1984) 156 ff. correctly argues that almost nothing is known about the contents of Varro's *Disciplinae*, that Martianus' order of treatment corresponds with the post-Porphyrian order of teaching the *Organon*, and that there are no indications that Varro was Martianus' source (cf. already Pfligersdorffer (1953) 131 ff., 140 ff.). But *ibid.* 160 she goes too far in submitting that we do not even know whether Varro treated dialectic; one of the very few things which are certain is that he used Zeno's simile distinguishing dialectic and rhetoric (*ap.* Cassiod. *Instit.* II 3.2, p. 109.16-8; cf. *SVF* I 75), which rather suggests that he did treat both disciplines than that he did not. For Martianus' date (before Boethius and presumably after Augustine) see Shanzer (1986) 5 ff.

cerned with the status of the categories: do they pertain to the physical world, or to the intelligible world, or to both? The problem¹⁷ was formulated by the Platonist Nicostratus (second half of the second century CE) and by his predecessor Lucius. But it was already known to the Peripatetic Boëthus of Sidon, a pupil of Andronicus, in the first century BCE, who in his great commentary on the *Categories* (as cited Simpl. *In Cat.* 78.5 f.) stated that the question whether the categories apply to the intelligible being is irrelevant, because this is not something Aristotle had in mind (when writing the *Categories*).¹⁸ Ps.Archyt. *Categ.* pp. 22.31-23.2 insists in his phony Doric that *πάσα ... ὡσία φυσικά τε καὶ αἰσθητὰ ἦτοι ἐν τούτοις* (the ten categories) *ἢ διὰ τούτων ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ τούτων πέφυκεν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑποπίπτειν*. However, he does not state the converse, viz. that the ten categories apply to the physical world only. At pp. 30.19-31.5, he argues that among the ten the category of substance applies to the intelligible world as well. This, again, agrees with the account of the (Aristotelian) ten categories 'according to the Pythagoreans' at Hippol. *Ref.* VI 24.1-2 = ps.Archyt. test. 1. Here Hippolytus speaks of the *iota* (the perfect number 10) in the tetractys which is "the first and principal substance of the intelligibles (and the perceptibles) and conceived both intelligibly and according to perception".¹⁹ Sub-

¹⁷ See Praechter (1922) 500 ff., also for Plotinus' dependence on the earlier learned literature, for which cf. *infra*, n. 40, Moraux (1973) 147 ff., Szlezák (1972) 104 f., Donini (1982) 88 f., Moraux (1983) 542 ff., 610 and especially Strange (1987) 955 ff. Also Evangelidou (1988). The problem itself is analogous to the 'deeper questions' pertaining to the ontological status of genera and species mentioned by Porphyry in a famous passage, *Isag.* 1.7-13.

¹⁸ Gottschalk (1987) 1109 n. 155 must be right that Boëthus, as cited *ap.* Simpl. *In Cat.* 302.12 ff., applied the category of ποιεῖν (κινεῖν not κινεῖσθαι) to the Unmoved Mover. Although the argument is ascribed to both Iamblichus and Boëthus, it is unlikely that the former would have modified the position of the latter. On Boëthus see Moraux (1973) 528 ff.

¹⁹ I quote the relevant portion of the text: καὶ ἔστι κατὰ τοὺς Πυθαγορικούς τὸ ἰ' ... πρώτη καὶ κυριωτάτη καὶ τῶν νοητῶν καὶ αἰσθητῶν οὐσία νοητῶς καὶ αἰσθητῶς λαμβανομένη· (ἢ) συμβεβηκότα γένη ἀσώματα ἐννέα, ἃ χωρὶς εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας οὐ δύναται, ποῖον καὶ ποσὸν καὶ πρὸς τι καὶ ποῦ καὶ πότε καὶ κεῖσθαι καὶ ἔχειν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν. ἔστιν οὖν ἐννέα τὰ συμβεβηκότα τῇ οὐσίᾳ ... (for the Aristotelian definition of substance see *infra*, Ch. VI n. 17 and text thereto). See further Szlezák (1972) 89 f., who argues (a bit *ad hoc*) that this passage ultimately derives from ps.Archytas but reached Hippolytus via an intermediary Pythagoreanizing source which emphasized the intelligible decad, or ten ideal numbers. See however *supra*, Ch. IV n. 18 and text thereto, and *infra*, Ch. VIII, nn. 81 and 82 and text thereto. O'Meara (1989) 17 states that according to the *Theol. arithm.* (or rather to its source, Nicomachus) the "categories are *all* virtually present already in the monad and are shown forth actually in the first ten numbers, the decad" (italics added). The passages quoted by him as evidence fail to support this contention (see also *infra*, n. 20a). I note that οὐσία is one of the names of the monad at *Theol. arithm.* 6.6 (from Anatolius, see 5.20 and de Falco *ad loc.*). The reference to αἱ δέκα λεγόμεναι κατηγορίαι at Nicom. *Introd.* 122.21-2 is irrelevant, because it is one among several

stance, therefore, belongs with both the intelligible and the perceptible realms. The other 'nine' are "incorporeal genera that are accidents of" this substance; it is not clear, at least to me, whether these are meant to be intelligibles as well as perceptibles, but they are at any rate to be understood as perceptibles.

The Archytan parallels are important, because this pseudepigraphic tract, religiously accepted as genuine by Simplicius but presumably to be dated to the later second century CE, mirrors the debates concerned with Aristotle's *Categories* of the first century BCE and the first two centuries CE²⁰ and, like Clem. *Strom.* VIII, preserves a number of features that can only be paralleled from Simplicius' much later account of his predecessors, both anonymous and named. It should however be pointed out that Nicomachus *Introd.* 2.21-3.5 states that the categories and other conditions (but not οὐσία, which he does not mention), though incorporeal, are also present in the world of bodies. Ps.Iambl. *Theol. arithm.* 20.15 ff. (perhaps deriving from Nicomachus) and 44.8 ff. (in an abstract from Anatolius, see 42.18) states that the categories—again excluding substance, which is not mentioned—serve to structure matter.^{20a}

It is instructive to read Plotinus' comments on the *status quaestionis*. Plotinus sometimes submits that the ten (Aristotelian) categories do not pertain to the intelligible world (*Enn.* VI 1 [42] 1). He also states *ibid.* 1.10 ff. ὅτι τὰ ὑποκείμενα οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὅλον στοιχεῖα, γένη δὴ τινα οὗτοι εἰρήκασιν, οἱ μὲν δέκα (the Aristotelians), οἱ δὲ ἑλάττω (the Stoics),²¹ which clearly constitutes an implicit, though hurried, criticism of those who assumed that the categories *are* elements. On the other hand, he also argues that the categories are to be found in the intelligible world (*Enn.* II 6 [17]; V 9 [5] 10).

instances of decads, e.g. those of fingers and toes, provided in a chapter which deals with ἀναλογίαι, 'proportions' (see also D'Ooge (1926) 267 n. 1).

²⁰Cf. Szlezák (1972) 13 ff. and *passim*, Moraux (1983) 608 ff., Gottschalk (1987) 1102, 1131 f. The first to adduce the pseudo-Pythagorean treatise for the interpretation of the *Categories* seems to have been Iamblichus, see Simplic. *In Cat.* 2.15 ff. and the comments of Hadot (1990a) 6 f. n. 18, 7. f. n. 20. Iamblichus' commentary was the major model of Simplicius, see *In Cat.* 3.2 ff. and *supra*, n. 16.

^{20a} On these passages see O'Meara (1989) 16 f., who seems to claim 44.8 ff. for Nicomachus and somewhat rashly suggests that the latter's idiosyncratic view amounts to a reduction of the "Platonic Forms, the models of the universe which he identifies with the Aristotelian categories, to the formal properties of numbers ..." (italics added). At *Introd.* 2.21 ff. matter (or substance, if you wish) is used in a Stoic sense (Bertier (1978) 142 n. 7, n. 8). There is no attempt on O'Meara's part to justify the absence of the Aristotelian category of substance (cf. also *supra*, n. 19).

²¹ Translate: "because the underlying things (are) incorrectly (designated) a sort of elements, these (thinkers) have spoken of certain genera" etc. Cf. Harder - Beutler - Theiler (1967); it is however not necessary to add (λέγεται) after στοιχεῖα. See also Wurm (1973) 144 ff., Evangeliou (1988) 93 ff. For Plotinus on the categories cf. further *infra*, n. 40 and text thereto.

A remark in Philo (the earliest parallel known to me) looks like an implicit reference to such learned discussions and interpretations, *Decal.* 30: τὰς γὰρ ἐν τῇ φύσει λεγόμενας κατηγορίας δέκα μόνας εἶναι φασιν οἱ ἐνδιατρίβοντες τοῖς τῆς φιλοσοφίας δόγμασιν. According to this report, the categories are to be found in nature only.²²

Consequently, Hippolytus' accounts of what is meant by the Aristotelian categories echo Middle Platonist positions in which an authoritative Aristotelian²³ exegesis of the doctrine of the ten categories had been integrated; we may roughly date this to the first two centuries CE. The source or sources concerned were more explicit than Alcín. *Didasc.* 6.159.43 f., who without enumerating or further discussing them merely states that Plato adumbrated the ten categories in the *Parmenides* and elsewhere²⁴ (a point of view rejected by Plotinus, who derived the categories of the intelligible world from Plato's *Sophist*, *Enn.* VI 2 [43]); yet, as we have noticed, the Andronican distinction between substance and the accidents had been incorporated in the Middle Platonist system according to *Didasc.* ch. 5, *ad init.* We may observe that Attic. Fr. 2.136 f. strongly protested against this Aristotelian element. We may also adduce the anonymous author of the Middle Platonist *Commentary on Plato's Theaetetus* who occasionally uses the Aristotelian categories in the course of his sometimes laboured exegesis (see esp. col. 68.1-24: substance, quantity, quality, relative).²⁵ Plutarch wrote a lost treatise on the categories (Nr. 192 in the so-called Lamprias Catalogue) and manages to

²² Cf. Staehle (1931) 56 f. We must however observe that he takes οὐσία to mean 'material substrate', viz. the four elements, and that 'quality' for him is what Aristotle would have called 'substance' (μετέχω δὲ καὶ ποιότητος, καθ' ἣν ἄνθρωπός εἰμι). The first two categories on this list of ten have been Stoicized; this would help explain why Eudorus modified the sequence of the categories (see *infra*, n. 30 and text thereto). For Philo on the categories see also *infra*, text to Exc. n. 31, Ch. VIII n. 85.

²³ I.e. deriving from the exegesis of the early commentators.

²⁴ Cf. Moraux (1983) 458, Whittaker (1990) 91 n. 103.

²⁵ Cf. Moraux (1983) 485 ff. (I do not agree that it is unclear whether Anonymus at col. 68.15-24 means the relative in the sense of Aristotle or in that of Xenocrates: it clearly is Aristotelian, though the examples provided for it are mostly not). It is quite interesting that in order to produce the canonical Aristotelian sequence corresponding to what is in Arist. *Cat.* 4, Anonymus has to cite the items in Plato's text from which he extracts each category in an order different from that at *Tht.* 152d (where they would occur in the order corresponding to a sequence quantity / substance / quality / relative). Accordingly, Anonymus manipulated the text in order to achieve the sequence he preferred. Eudorus advocated the sequence substance / quality / quantity (see text to next note). Consequently, it is virtually precluded that Eudorus wrote the anonymous commentary, *pace* Tarrant (1983) 180 ff.; see Mansfeld (1991b). Note that at Gal. *Instit. log.* ch. 2, p. 5, too, the ten categories as applied to propositions are enumerated in the order of Arist. *Cat.* 4; Galen however speaks of 'simple ὑπαρξίς', not of οὐσία (Kalbfleisch's (περὶ τῆς οὐσίας καθάπερ), p. 5.3-4, should be rejected), and of μέγεθος, not of ποσόν; the instances provided seem to be largely of his own devising.

find Aristotle's ten at Plato *Tim.* 37ab (*An. Procr.* 1023E), just as the anonymous commentator of the *Theaetetus* had found the first four at *Th.* 152d.

With only one divergence, viz. ἔχειν before κείσθαι which is paralleled at ps.Archyt. *Categ.* p. 22.25 (note, however, that in the 'Pythagorean' list at *Ref.* VI 24.1-2 too ἔχειν comes after κείσθαι), the sequence of the ten categories in the list at *Ref.* I 19.1-2 corresponds with that of Aristotle at *Cat.* 4.1b26 ff. This sequence (which is identical with that at Arist. *Top.* A 9.103b25 ff., where the οὐσία is represented by the τί ἐστίν) was considered to be canonical by the commentators.

In Hippolytus' exemplification the sequence is significantly different from Aristotle's list: ποιὸν before ποσόν, and κείσθαι after ἔχειν and ποιεῖν (and also from the sequence according to Aristotle's detailed exposition at *Cat.* chs. 5-8: substance, quantity, relative, quality, where quality even comes last). The first of these differences, viz. quality before quantity (paralleled in the 'Pythagorean' list of the ten categories at *Ref.* VI 24.1-2), is significant from a historical point of view; the swap ultimately derives from Eudorus of Alexandria (*Simpl. In Cat.* 206.10 ff. = Eudor. Fr. 17)²⁶ whom we may call a Platonist or even an early Middle Platonist,²⁷ and is paralleled at ps.Archyt. pp. 22.14 and 23.21 f.,²⁸ Philo *Decal.* 30,²⁹ Ar. Did. *ap.* Stob. II p. 42.2-4, Theodorus of Gadara *ap.* Quintil. III 6.36, and Mart. Cap. IV 340. Arius Didymus in this passage speaks in his own right, having finished his discussion of Philo of Larissa and before commencing that of Eudorus. One cannot exclude that one of the motives behind Eudorus' innovation was the desire to reduce the gap between the Aristotelian and the Stoic so-called categories; in the lists of the latter that survive, quality (both individual and general) is always second and quantity of course absent.³⁰

I have found no parallel for the minor second difference (according

²⁶ Cf. *supra*, n. 8, n. 13, n. 25. On Eudorus and other Platonists on the categories see Dörrie (1976) 300 f. It is important to note that Aristotle elsewhere, in less complete listings of the categories, quite often has ποιὸν before ποσόν; see the table in Oehler (1986) 352 ff.; Prantl's less complete table at (1855) 207 n. 356 does not take the ordering into account. Eudorus may have appealed to such passages (cf. also *infra*, n. 34). Porph. *In Cat.*, e.g. 86.14 ff., 100.11 ff. (where an argument for this order is provided), following Aristotle's text, has the sequence quantity—quality (but 87.24-5 he has quality before quantity); so also Marius Victorinus, see *supra*, n. 13.

²⁷ See e.g. Dillon (1977) 115 ff.

²⁸ Cf. Szlezák (1972) *ad loc.*, and on *Ref.* VI 24.1-2 which is ps.Archyt. Test. 1 in his edition. *Simpl. In Cat.* 206.8 ff. points out the parallel between Eudorus and (ps.)Archytas.

²⁹ Cf. Theiler (1965) 204 f. = (1970) 489 f., Dillon (1977) 178 ff.

³⁰ Stoic influences on Eudorus are suggested by Gottschalk (1987) 1111. Philo *Decal.* 31 (see *supra*, n. 22) may be quoted in support of this suggestion.

to Hippolytus' exemplification at *Ref.* I 20.2, not to his list at I 20.1). Perhaps it is not arbitrary; at the end of the list, we now first have two verbs that express an activity or active condition and then two that express a passive condition or passivity.³¹

V 4 Hippolytus' Instances of Categories

It is also worthwhile to look at the examples provided by Hippolytus at *Ref.* I 20.2.^{31a} Only a few are the same as Aristotle's in *Cat.* 4, viz. 'man' for substance, 'white' for quality and 'two cubits long' and 'three cubits long' for quantity. But the addition of 'god' as an instance of substance is noteworthy; Arist. *Cat.* 4.1b28 has 'man' and 'horse'. It is paralleled at *Ref.* VII 16.1: 'ox', 'horse', 'man', 'god'.³² The instance 'god' can be explained on the assumption that in the exegetical literature also other works of Aristotle, e.g. the *Metaphysics*, were adduced, as indeed they were.³³ One may therefore quote *Met.* Z 1.1028a14 ff., the 'what it is' signifies the substance, not one of the other categories; ὅταν δὲ [*scil.*, εἰπόμεν] τί ἐστίν, οὐ λευκὸν οὐδὲ θερμὸν [quality] οὐδὲ τρίπηχυν [quantity]³⁴ [*scil.*, λέγομεν], ἀλλὰ ἄνθρωπον ἢ θεόν, and refer to *Met.* Λ 8.1073a30-b1, where the first God and the divine intellects are said to be οὐσία and οὐσίαι. Also compare the virtually identical incomplete lists of the categories at *Eth. Eud.* A 8.1217b24 ff., where 'god' is in the category of οὐσία, and *Eth. Nic.* A 6.1096a22 ff., where 'god' is in the category of the τί (*scil.*, the τί ἐστίν in the sense of substance). At *An. Po.* B 1.89b34-5 the examples for a problem concerned with the τί ἐστίν are τί οὖν ἐστίν θεὸς ἢ τί ἐστίν ἄνθρωπος. We should further think of the standard division of ζῶον into the accidents 'immortal' and 'mortal'. For 'god' next to 'man' as an instance of ζῶον cf. also *Met.* Δ 26.1023b28 ff.:

³¹ Simpl. *In Cat.* 64.15 f., 372.29 f. argues that no category of ἔχασθαι need be assumed which would correspond to πάσχειν the way ποιεῖν corresponds to ἔχειν. He apparently cites an argument contra a captious (Stoic?) criticism pertaining to linguistic aspects.

^{31a} As Tardieu (1990) 137 points out, a study of the examples used by Aristotle and his commentators to illustrate logical and other questions is a desideratum. Tardieu *ibid.* 137 ff. shows in what ways such a study may be illuminating.

³² So Marcovich wrongly puts οὐ θεὸς at *Ref.* VII 16.1 between square brackets. That θεὸς occurs both here and at *Ref.* I 20.2 is part of the evidence proving that the two accounts belong together; cf. especially the text from the *De an.* quoted *infra*, Ch. VI n. 1.

³³ Cf. *supra*, n. 8, on Andronicus' use of *Eth. Nic.* A 6.1096a19 ff., and *infra*, Ch. VI text after n. 40 (the passage from Arius Didymus on the plurality of meanings of the good).

³⁴ Passages such as this in Aristotle, who himself did not pay pedantic attention to the order of the categories, may have been adduced in support by Eudorus, cf. *supra* n. 26.

the universal *qua* whole is predicated of all the entities it contains; in this way, living being is predicated of man, horse, god (οἶον ἄνθρωπον ἵππον θεόν, ὅτι ἅπαντα ζῶα). For ὁ ἵππος καὶ ὁ κύων καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ θεός as species of the genus ζῶον in a scholastic discussion see Alex. (?) *Quaest.* II xib, 23.4-5.

It is also interesting to note that Hippolytus under substance lists 'god, man, and each thing that may be subsumed under the same *logos*', viz. the same as god and man (καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τῷ ὁμοίῳ λόγῳ ὑποπεσεῖν δυναμένων). This is a sloppy formula; what Hippolytus means is that god and man are substances, and that a number of other things are substances as well because they belong with the same genus as god and man, viz. ζῶον, which is the common part of their definition³⁵ (substance itself should not be included the definition, for this will then become too wide; cf. e.g. Mart. Cap. IV 344). The definition of substances containing the genus is explained in an entirely similar way in the account of the division of substance attributed to Aristotle at *Ref.* VII 18.3-4;³⁶ this is further proof that the sections on Aristotle's logic in *Ref.* books I and VII belong together and that Hippolytus is excerpting secondary literature rather than Aristotle himself. One may compare Sen. *Ep.* 58.9:³⁷ *ergo commune* [cf. Hippolytus' ὁμοίῳ] *aliquod quaerendum est his omnibus vinculum, quod illa conplectatur et sub se habeat. Hoc quid est? Animal. Ergo genus esse coepit horum omnium, quae modo rettuli, hominis equi canis, animal.* Hippolytus' general description *Ref.* I 19.1 of what comes under substance, and of its definition at VII 18.3-4, is connected with the theory of definition, division, and analysis (or collection) which we know from e.g. Sen. *Ep.* 58, Clem. *Strom.* VIII, and Alcin. *Didasc.* ch. 5.³⁸

I have pointed out above that most of Hippolytus' examples are not to be found in Arist. *Cat.* 4. Yet they will be traditionally scholastic items. 'Black' and 'white', which (instead of 'white' and 'grammatical') in Hippolytus illustrate quality,³⁹ are of course already found elsewhere in the *Categories*, viz. in the chapter on substance 5.4a15.19.32, in that on quantity 6.6a3, in that on quality 8.10b15, and then several times in the *Postpraedicamenta*. This instance of quality therefore derives from a systematic exegesis of the whole work. Black and white, moreover, have the additional advantage of being opposites and so of providing a connection with the subsequent account of the opposites (ἔμμεσα etc.).

³⁵ It is a definite possibility that, in the category of substance, Hippolytus' source only accepted natural kinds and only instanced animal species, including gods.

³⁶ Cf. *infra*, Ch. VI 1-5.

³⁷ Cf. *infra*, Exc. 3. For *commune* cf. Cic. *Top.* 29 (*definitionis modus*): *cum sumpseris ea quae sint ei rei quam definire velis cum aliis communia* (see further *infra*, n. 54).

³⁸ See *infra*, Exc. 1-2.

³⁹ Cf. also e.g. Simplicius. *In Cat.* 11.32-5.

'Father' and 'son' as instances of relatives are neither to be found in Arist. *Cat.* 4 nor elsewhere in the little treatise, but can be paralleled from Simpl. *In Cat.* 190.15 f. and 326.31-327.1. They are also found in Plotinus' critical discussion of the doctrine of the ten categories;⁴⁰ one of his examples is 'father, son' (*Enn.* VI 1 [42] 6.9; also *ibid.* 7.39, and 8.15). Actually, 'father' was already used to illustrate the relative by Boëthus, see Simpl. *In Cat.* 373.29; it is echoed at ps.Archyt. *De oppos.*⁴¹ p. 19.2 Th., and also found at Porph. *In Cat.* 115.27 ff. and in Dexipp. *In Cat.* 13.15. The example is also given by (ps.)Dion. Thr. 35.3⁴² (= *FDS* 873, but I believe this to be of scholastic Peripatetic rather than Stoic provenance): πρὸς τι ἔχον δέ ἐστιν ὡς πατήρ υἱός φίλος δεξιός. We may also compare Mart. Cap. IV 363, 374-5.

The alternative illustrations for the categories where and when I cannot parallel, except for the example 'in Athens', for which see Simpl. *In Cat.* 358.27 and 360.34 (for 'in Megara' cf. perhaps Arist. *Met.* Γ 4.1008b14, 'to Megara'). Andronicus' subsumption of where and when under space and time⁴³ was not followed, for the traditional names of the categories have been maintained.

The example for the category of having, τὸ δὲ ἔχειν οἶον κεκτηῖσθαι, is most interesting. Simpl. *In Cat.* 366.8 ff. quotes Plato *Tht.* 197bc, who distinguishes ἔχειν from κεκτηῖσθαι, and comments on the ensuing problem at some length. The objection by means of the polemical use of the passage in Plato must already have been known to Andronicus' pupil Boëthus,⁴⁴ who *ap.* Simpl. *In Cat.* 373.27-8 (the passage already quoted above for providing 'father' as the instance of the relative), concludes an argument by stating that ὁ ... κεκτημένος τοῦ πρὸς τι ἔσται, τὸ δὲ κεκτηῖσθαι τοῦ ἔχειν. Accordingly, the tradition followed by Hippolytus accepted Boëthus' defence. Hippolytus' instance for κείσθαι,

⁴⁰ Cf. Bréhier (1936) 8: "On se représenterait mal la manière dont Plotin travaillait, si l'on croyait qu'il a abordé directement le texte d'Aristote; il a dû, là aussi, se faire lire les commentaires existants, en y ajoutant ses réflexions et ses remarques". For Plotinus' dependence on earlier learned discussions and the parallels in Simplicius see also Praechter (1922) 500 ff., Harder - Beutler - Theiler (1967) Bd. Vb, 416 f. On Plotinus' comments on the Aristotelian categories in VI 1 [42] see further Rutten (1961) 43 ff., and especially Strange (1987) 964 ff.

⁴¹ On this tract, which just as ps.Archyt. *Categ.* mirrors the early critical and exegetical literature, see *infra*, text to n. 49.

⁴² The greater part of the *Ars* ascribed to Dionysius Thrax should presumably be dated to the second-third centuries CE; see the discussion in Pinborg (1975) 103 ff., also for references to earlier literature. For 'father and son' one may further adduce the comments on this passage in the so-called *Schol. in Dionys. Thrax.*, which in some cases are selections from Late Alexandrian Neoplatonist commentaries on the *Ars* (see di Benedetto (1958) and (1959)).

⁴³ Cf. *supra*, n. 8.

⁴⁴ Cf. Moraux (1973) 162 f.

viz. κατακείσθαι, is also different though not much different from Aristotle's examples, but can be paralleled from Simpl. *In Cat.* 339.2 and 339.25-6.

Interesting also are the instances of the category doing: τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν οἷον γραφεῖν καὶ ὅλως ἐνεργεῖν τι (Aristotle has the time-honoured medical activities 'to cut' and 'to burn'). 'To write' can be paralleled from Simpl. *In Cat.* 300.4 and from Plot. *Enn.* VI 1 [42] 19.26; and 'to be active' from ps.Archyt. *Categ.* p. 22.22-3, ὃ ἀπλῶς ἐνέργειαν περὶ τι σημαίνει γινομένην⁴⁵ (cf. *ibid.* p. 23.10), from Plot. *ibid.* 15.10-11, ἐνέργειαν μᾶλλον εἶναι τὴν κατηγορίαν, and also from Amm. *In Cat.* 92.17, where it is the only explanation of 'doing' that is provided.

Finally, Hippolytus' instance for 'to be affected', τύπτεσθαι, can be paralleled from Simpl. *In Cat.* 327.3. It will be clear that these examples, possibly with the exception of ἐνεργεῖν, pertain to the visible realm.⁴⁶

V 5 *The Opposites*

Above, I have already mentioned the theory of opposites which Hippolytus ascribes to Plato (*Ref.* I 19.14) and Aristotle (I 20.3, following the account of the categories). This section belongs with Aristotle's discussion of the ἐναντία in the *Postpraedicamenta* (*Cat.* 10.11b38 ff. and 11.13b36 ff.) and therefore, as I shall argue, derives from the exegetical literature concerned with the second part of the *Categories*. The theory is Aristotle's; the logical terminology at issue, viz. the triplet ἔμμεσα⁴⁷ (or μεσότηα ἔχειν), ἄμεσα⁴⁸ and μέσα is not, although μεσότης—in a different sense—occurs once in the *Categories*, viz. at 11.14a4, and numerous examples for μέσος indicating "id quod inter qualitates contrarias medium quasi locum tenet" are enumerated in Bonitz' *Index s.v.*, 456b40-457a14. The triad can however to some extent be paralleled from ps.Archyt. *De oppos.*, again religiously accepted as genuine by Simplicius who has preserved several fragments. This treatise presumably is contemporaneous with the pseudepigraphic dissertation on the categories;⁴⁹ see ps.Archyt. *De oppos.*, ap. Simpl. *In Cat.* 384.8-9,⁵⁰ ἐπιδέχεται

⁴⁵ Text as in Simplicius.

⁴⁶ 'God' need not be excepted for there are visible gods, viz. the heavenly bodies (cf. also *supra*, n. 32 and text thereto).

⁴⁷ Aristotle says τούτων ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον (12a10-11); cf. also *Top.* A 15.106b4 ff., Δ 3.123b1 ff. According to Bonitz' *Index*, the word ἔμμεσος does not occur in Aristotle.

⁴⁸ Aristotle says τούτων οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀνὰ μέσον (12a2). That ἄμεσα is Aristotle's term for underived premises (the only meaning of the word according to Bonitz' *Index*) is another matter. See also Whittaker (1990) 129 n. 393.

⁴⁹ See Moraux (1983) 623 ff., who points out that this tract too is based on the exegetical and critical literature of the first two centuries CE. That two different pieces attributed to ps.Archytas were published (whether the same man wrote both

μεσότηας, 391.15 = p. 16.19 Th., ἐπιδέχονται μεσότητα, 391.10 = p. 17.16 Th., μέσον. Simplicius regularly uses the terminology himself, e.g. *In Cat.* 386.7 ff., 390.8 ff. (390.8-9 διελόντος δὲ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους τὰ ἐναντία εἰς τε τὰ ἄμεσα καὶ τὰ ἔμμεσα, 390.14 τὰ μέσα), 399.12 ff., 400.4 ff., 401.2 f.⁵¹ It is also found at Amm. *In Cat.* 95.12 f., 95.27. That the terminology is earlier than Simplicius not only follows from the parallels in ps.Archytas and Alexander of Aphrodisias (for the latter see below), but also from the fact that the theory was opposed by the second-century Platonist Nicostratus (Simpl. *In Cat.* 390.15 ff., *ubi vide*).^{51a} Again, it clearly is the case that Hippolytus (or rather his source) has preserved for us an echo of the scholastic literature of the first century BCE and the first and second centuries CE. That he attributes the doctrine not only to Aristotle but to Plato as well indicates that the background is Middle Platonist. Note that the treatment of the ἐναντία in the *Divisiones aristoteleae ap.* Diog. Laërt. III 104 is different, and that Nr. [68] Mu. of the same work, not paralleled in Diogenes Laërtius, which also deals with the ἐναντία, uses the genuinely Aristotelian terminology of *Cat.* 10 and *Top.* Δ 3. But there are two parallels of Middle Platonist provenance. (1) The example of the diaeresis of accidents (for which see below) at Alcín. *Didasc.* 5.156.36-157.1 refers explicitly to what is in between and implicitly to the opposites themselves: τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς, τοὺς δὲ μέσους (rather precisely paralleled in the Aristotelian section of Ar. Did. *ap.* Stob. II p. 142.25-6, ... τὸν μὲν σπουδαῖον, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον, τὸν δὲ μέσον). Goods and evils are mentioned as instances of ἔμμεσα in the Plato chapter at *Ref.* I 19.14. At Arist., *Cat.* 10.11b35 f. and 11.13b36-14a6, we find good and evil as instances of the opposites (ἐναντία). In the first passage, good—evil are put in parallel with white—black, which certainly admit of intermediates; in the second passage Aristotle actually says that there are intermediates between good and evil. (2) The ἄμεσα are found at Alcín. *Didasc.* 25.177.30 ff., τὰ τε ἄμεσα ἐναντία κτλ. The instances of ἄμεσα provided at *Ref.* I 19.14, viz. ἐγρήγορσιν and ὕπνον, which are not derived from Arist. *Cat.* chs. 10-11, can be paralleled from ps.Archyt. *De oppos.*, *ap.* Simpl. *In Cat.* 116.13 and 391.10 ff; they are originally Platonic, cf. *Phaed.* 71c.⁵² But the illustration of the μέσα at *Ref.* I 19.4 (οἷον τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος τὸ

of them or not is immaterial) shows that Andronicus' argument that originally the two parts of the *Categories* do not belong together (cf. Gottschalk (1987) 1131) was influential.

⁵⁰ The fragment has been overlooked by Thesleff, although he cites another piece from the same page in Simplicius.

⁵¹ For some instances in Simplicius and Alexander see Dillon (1977) 411 n. 1.

^{51a} On Lucius and Nicostratus see Moraux (1984) 528 ff.

⁵² See Whittaker (1987) 86, and *supra*, n. 48.

φαιὸν ἢ τι ἄλλο χρῶμα) can be paralleled at Arist. *Cat.* 10.12a17.21 (Platonic precedent at *Resp.* IX 585a). The illustration is also found at *Met.* I 7.1057a18 ff. Ps.Archyt. *De oppos.* p. 17.16 f. Th., μεταξὺ γὰρ λευκῶ καὶ μέλανος τὸ φαιόν, provides a parallel and Amm. *In Cat.* 95.16, 96.1, a further one. The terminology (ἔμμεσα ἄμεσα μέσα) is also found in Alex.⁵³ *In Top.* 101.19 ff., 175.3, 185.21 ff., 326.12 f., and *In Met.* 177.20, 257.31 f., 258.23 (cf. also *Eth. probl.* iii on the μέση ἔξις in between virtue and vice). Consequently, it may have been Aristotelian (i.e. created by later followers of Aristotle) to begin with. The formal tripartite diaeresis itself (cf. the instance at Alcin. *Didasc.* 5.156.30 ff. quoted above, and Simpl. *In Cat.* 390.8 διελόντος κτλ. also quoted above) and the terminology involved may derive from Andronicus' monograph *On Division*.⁵⁴ It seems to be a case of the division of accidents into subjects.⁵⁵

The conceptual set ἄμεσα, ἔμμεσα, and μέσα cannot be linked with the doctrine of virtue as the mean between two vices in Aristotle, because 'mean' or 'middle' in this context has another sense. One of Aristotle's recurrent examples for the opposites in *Cat.* chs. 10-11, as we have noticed, is ethical: 'good and evil'; 11.13b36 ff. actually instances several virtues (cf. also *Top.* Δ 3.123b1 ff.) and even uses the term μεσότης which is so familiar from the *Ethics*. At *Eth. Nic.* B 7.1107b31, 1108a5, 8.1108b24, the virtuous type between the ἄκροι is called μέσος. Τὸ μέσον occurs at e.g. B 5.1106b18 (see further Bonitz' *Index s.v.* μέσος, 456a14-34). The term μεσότης, as is of course well known, is used several times by Aristotle to denote virtue: e.g. *Eth. Nic.* B 2.1104a26, 5.1106b12, 6.1106b36 (in the definition of virtue). It is to be noted that Hippolytus' Middle Platonist account of Plato's doctrines continues after the opposites with the (Platonic) virtues as (Aristotelian) μεσότητας at *Ref.* I 19.15 f.⁵⁶ One

⁵³ Cf. Moreschini (1972) 258; note that he has missed the parallels in Alcinous.

⁵⁴ On Andronicus of Rhodes' περὶ διαιρέσεως see Moraux (1973) 120 ff. For the argument that Boethius in the *De divisione* (of which the best accessible edition is still Migne, *P.L.* 64, 875D ff.; the Latin text has been reprinted in Pozzi (1969)) to some extent followed Andronicus whom he knew through Porphyry see Moraux *loc. cit.* and Gottschalk (1987) 1115 f.; significantly, Alcinous' five kinds of division (see *infra*, Exc. 1) are the same as the first five in Boeth. *De divis.* 877BC (Moraux (1973) 124 f.). See also Boeth. *In Isagog. Porph. Comm. ed. sec.* I 6. Gottschalk, *loc. cit.*, argues that "Andronicus' intention was to formulate rules for using the method of division to arrive at correct definitions". Donini (1982) 90 f. also argues that Andronicus linked division and definition and points out that this combination is applied in Andronicus' paraphrase of Aristotle's *Categories*, *ad init.* If Donini and Gottschalk are right, the link between division and the definition of *substance* as found in Alcinous and other Middle Platonists (for which see *infra*, Exc. 1-2) has presumably been derived from Andronicus rather than from Aristotle's own works. For Andronicus and Boethius see Talamanca (1977) 75 f., 92 f., 97. On diaeresis see further *infra*, Exc., and App. 2.

⁵⁵ Cf. *infra*, text to Exc. n. 3.

⁵⁶ Cf. e.g. Plut. *De virt. mor.* 5, 444C, Alcin. *Didasc.* 30.184.30, Apul. *De Plat.* II 228.

may compare the division of the passions into good, bad, and μέσα in the Aristotelian section of Ar. Did. *ap. Stob.* II p. 142.15-26; however, Wachsmuth *ad loc.* correctly points out: “tota haec distinctio ab Aristotele aliena”. The logical division of opposites in general (with intermediates in some cases) differs from that of sets of ethical attitudes into two opposite vices with virtue as their mean; when a virtue and a vice constitute the poles the mean, or what is in between, is of course not virtue but a sort of neutral ground. Xenocrates already seems to have used a similar division of ethical terms into e.g. good, evil and what is neither good nor evil as a third (Fr. 76 Heinze = 231 Isnardi Parente). Later, of course, this procedure became standard among the Stoics, and μέσον in the ethical sense of ἀδιάφορον is often found in Stoic texts (there is no need to quote the evidence, which can be easily found by looking up the word μέσον in Adler’s *Index* to the *SVF*). Aristotle is quite explicit about the various uses of μέσον (*Eth. Nic.* B 5.1106a26 ff.), and Plut. *De virt. mor.* 6, 444DE, who seems to know this passage, points out that the term is capable of various interpretations, and that instances such as ‘grey’ (a compound of white and black), or ‘eight’ (which is between twelve and four), or ‘indifferent’ (which partakes neither of good nor of evil) are not on the same level as virtue qua μεσότης.

V 6 The Category of Substance

We should now turn to Hippolytus’ account of Aristotle’s doctrine of substance at *Ref.* VII 14 ff., which links up with his account of the categories at I 19.1-2. He provides a reference to his earlier treatment, *Ref.* VII 14.1: ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ πρότερον ἔκκεται⁵⁷ τὰ Ἀριστοτέλει δοκοῦντα, οὐδὲ νῦν ὀκνήσομεν προὑποθέσθαι ἐν συντόμῳ κτλ. This backward reference is not, as I believe and argue, a mere adornment.

In *Ref.* VII 15.1, we read: Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν οὖν τὴν οὐσίαν διαιρεῖ τριχῶς. ἔστι γὰρ αὐτῆς τὸ μὲν τι γένος, τὸ δέ τι εἶδος, ὡς ἐκεῖνος λέγει, τὸ δέ τι ἄτομον· (ἄτομον δὲ οὐ διὰ σμικρότητα σώματος, ἀλλὰ φύσει τομὴν ἀναδέξασθαι μηδ’ ἠντιναοῦν δυνάμενον).⁵⁸

There is an account of the theory, with apposite references, in the Peripatetic section of Ar. Did. *ap. Stob.* II p. 140.7-14.

⁵⁷ Marcovich here interpolates (ὕφ’ ἡμῶν), unnecessarily.

⁵⁸ I follow Wendland’s *constitutio* but have added the round brackets. Marcovich emends to εἶδος [ὡς] σώματος ἐκεῖνος λέγει, ἀλλὰ κτλ. This is ill-advised; note that Marcovich does not tell us where Aristotle gives this explanation of the logical as distinguished from the physical atom. The term ἄτομον for the individual and particular substance is Aristotelian (*Cat.*, *passim*), not Platonic, for according to Platonic usage it denotes the infima species, cf. e.g. *infra*, Exc. 2 (Clement). That by Hippolytus’ time it had become common parlance is suggested by Gal. *Plac. Hipp. Plat.* VIII 2.6 p. 490.29-30, ὡς καὶ τὸν Δίωνα [note the originally Stoic standard

Hippolytus' *distinguo* concerned with the meaning of the term ἄτομον is important. This probably is not due to his own reading, but will be derived from the tradition he depends on; if it comes from his own reading, it may derive from a collection of Ὅροι. The evidence, to be sure, is mostly late but we have seen and shall see numerous other instances of materials in Hippolytus which can only be paralleled in (much) later sources. In the present case the parallels are provided by his near-contemporary Galen, and by Theodoret and the Late Neoplatonists Elias, David, and Stephanus (Amm. *In Cat.* 30.10 f. refers to his own *In Isag.* for the various senses of ἄτομον, but at Amm. *In Isag.* 30.10 ff. nothing is found). Gal. *Plac. Hipp. Plat.* VIII 2.1-9, pp. 490.10-492.11, too long to quote, provides a detailed exposition of the distinction between what is logically, or *qua* elementary constituent, indivisible and what is divisible in infinitum as to magnitude. This is not a precise parallel for what is in Hippolytus, because Galen handles the question in his own way; but the concept of what is logically indivisible is found in both authors. The later parallels are more apposite. Theodor. *Graec. aff. cur.* IV 10 distinguishes two meanings of 'atom': some use the terms ἀδιαίρετον δὲ καὶ ἄτομον καὶ ναστὸν because of τὸ ἀπαθὲς (i.e. in a logical sense), others because of τὸ ἄγαν σμικρόν, ἅτε δὴ τομὴν καὶ διαίρεσιν δέξασθαι οὐ δυνάμενον (i.e. in a physical sense). Elias *In Isag.* 74.20-25 lists several meanings and distinguishes what is indivisible because it is τὸ σμικρότατον (cf. *Suda s.v.* ἄτομα, I 1 4373: the atom is indivisible etc.; οὕτω δὲ καλοῦσι τὰ λεπτότατα καὶ σμικρότατα σώματα) from what does not survive a division, ὥς εἴ τις τὸν Σωκράτην διέλοι ἐνεργεία εἰς χεῖρας καὶ πόδας, καθ' ὃ σημαίνόμενον νῦν δεῖ ἀκοῦσαι τὸ ἄτομον. David *In Isag.* 169.18-25 says much the same, and so does Philoponus syr. *In Isag.* 206.3-12.⁵⁹ What is clear, however, is that Hippolytus' explanation of the logical 'atom' is confusing; what, like Galen and Elias and David and Philoponus, he should have said is that the logical atom, though physically divisible, ceases being what it is by being divided in this way, and not that it cannot be divided at all.

The word διαίρεῖ is important in a different way. Aristotle according to Hippolytus provided a *division* of οὐσία; but in the *Categories*, the account of substance as individual, species, and genus is *not* said to be a diaeresis (the term only occurs in the *Postpraedicamenta*, 8.10a19 and

example] καλεῖν ἕθος ἐστὶ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἄτομον οὐσίαν (for the context in Galen see further *infra*).

A different tripartite division of substance according to Aristotle (τὴν οὐσίαν τριχῶς λέγει—note that Nemesius says λέγει not διαίρει) into matter, form, and the compound of both matter and form is mentioned by Nemes. *De nat. hom.* p. 26.12 ff. Cf. *infra*, Ch. VI text to n. 21, on Boëthius.

⁵⁹ Edited by Baumstark (1900).

13.14b35, and in a different application). This 'Aristotelian division' of substance is set out and critically discussed at length in *Ref.* VII 16-17.

Before commenting on those chapters, we should first study several Middle Platonist accounts of the methodology at issue which will provide ample parallels for Hippolytus' diaeresis and terminology at VII 15.1, prove that the division of substance is not his own idea, and also in other ways prepare the ground for the study of what is in the Aristotle chapters at *Ref.* VII 15 ff. These parallel accounts are in Alcinous, Clement and Seneca. It should of course be acknowledged that the theories to be found in the passages concerned are very much alike rather than identical; the *family* resemblance is strong enough, however, to warrant attribution to a common tradition.

A long detour cannot be avoided. Those who find such a digression distracting (seeing it growing and growing I have had my own misgivings) should skip the Excursus and proceed to Ch. VI.

EXCURSUS

SUBSTANCE, BEING AND DIVISION IN MIDDLE PLATONIST AND LATER ARISTOTELIAN CONTEXTS

1 *Alcinous*

According to Alcin. *Didasc.* 5.156.21 ff. the most fundamental task of dialectic is, first, the study of the οὐσία of any thing, and secondly that of its συμβεβηκότα. The method to be used is that of *division* and *definition* by means of the way down, or that of analysis (or collection) by means of the way up. At p. 156.29-30 two kinds of division are distinguished, viz. (1) that of a genus into species and (2) that of a whole into parts:¹ διαίρεσις ... ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν γένους εἰς εἶδη τομὴ, ἡ δὲ ὅλου εἰς μέρη. Alcinous also mentions three further modes of division: (3) of a word into its meanings,² (4) of subjects into accidents, and (5) of accidents into subjects. We shall see below that these five modes are paralleled, in various ways, in other authors.³ Examples are provided; as to the division of a genus, Alcinous continues, p. 157.1 ff., τῇ τοίνυν τοῦ γένους πρῶτον εἰς εἶδη τομῇ χρῆσθαι δεῖ ὑπὲρ τοῦ διαγινώσκειν αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστι κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. This division, in other words, produces the knowledge of the οὐσία which according to the beginning of the chapter is the primary objective of dialectic. Division and the study of substance are necessarily related, and the definition provides the connection between the logical (διαίρεσις) and the logico-ontological (οὐσία) aspects.⁴

Alcinous tells us how a definition may be got out of a division of the genus, p. 157.4 ff.: τοῦ μέλλοντος ὄρω ὑποπίπτειν πράγματος δεῖ τὸ γένος λαβεῖν, ὥς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῶον, ἔπειτα τοῦτο τέμνειν κατὰ τὰς προσεχεῖς διαφορὰς κατιόντας μέχρι τῶν εἰδῶν, οἷον εἰς λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ θνητὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον, ὥστε εἰ συνθετεῖεν αἱ προσεχεῖς διαφοραὶ τῷ γένει


¹ For diaeresis see also *supra*, Ch. V n. 54 and text thereto.

² Cf. Whittaker (1990) 88 n. 74.

³ See also *infra*, App. 2.

⁴ Cf. Donini (1982) 153.

τῷ ἐξ αὐτῶν, ὅρον ἀνθρώπου γίνεσθαι.⁵ We may illustrate this by the following diagram:



Accordingly, the definition of man *qua* substance is: man is a mortal rational animal (or, in the literal order of the Greek which starts with the highest appropriate genus, animal rational mortal). This definition is already found at Philo *Deter.* 139, ὅρος οὖν τοῦ μὲν συγκρίματος ἡμῶν ζῶον λογικὸν θνητὸν ἐστι.

That definition should first and foremost be of *substance* is specifically Aristotelian, not Platonic; that *all* the differences to be found at the subsequent and successive levels should be included therein is Platonic, not Aristotelian. Furthermore, the diaeresis of the genus as illustrated by Alcinous is dichotomous and works with single *differentiae*, or single-character distinctions; each time, the second member of a pair of such *differentiae* is the negation, or privation, of the first (ἄλογον, ἀθάνατον). This dichotomous and privative procedure is typically Platonic or at least Early Academic, and is devastatingly criticized by Aristotle in the *De part. animal.* A 2-3.⁶ Consequently, the diaeresis as provided

⁵ See DeDurand (1973) for this definition of man. I assume that this definition is of the kind called οὐσιώδης by ps.Gal. *Philos. hist.* ch. 11, περὶ ὅρου, woefully brief, which *ap. D.G.* 606.6 distinguishes two kinds of definitions: τῶν δὲ ὅρων οἱ μὲν εἰσιν οὐσιώδεις, οἱ δὲ ἐννοηματικοί. This terminology has been studied by Hadot (1971) 164 ff. in his account of the *Liber de definitionibus* of Marius Victorinus—edited by Stangl (1888) 12-48, repr. with the same pagination at Hadot (1971) 329-62—but he has not noticed the parallel in ps.Galen. At Victor. *Lib. de def.* pp. 6.33-8.5 the οὐσιώδης definition is said to begin with the genus and to continue with the *differentiae* (cf. also *infra*, n. 42); for the ἐννοηματική see *ibid.* p. 17.9 ff. Parallels for the ἐννοηματική definition in Porph. *ap. Simpl. In Cat.* 213.11 ff., 213.23 ff. are quoted by Hadot (1971) 172 n. 42, but his contention that the term is originally Stoic seems doubtful to me. Hadot (1971) 178 f. plausibly argues that Victorinus' source may have been a treatise by Porphyry into which he conscientiously worked materials derived from the *Topica* of Cicero which he knew so well (166 ff.).

⁶ For Aristotle's objections to the Platonic and Academic methods of diaeresis

by Alcinous is a blend of Platonic dialectic and Aristotelian logic. Aristotle's revision of the diaeretic method of Plato and Speusippus has not percolated to the Aristotelizing variety of Middle Platonism.

Note furthermore that Alcinous (unlike Hippolytus, as we shall see) does not speak of individual substances, but only uses genera, *differentiae* and species.

This account of substance and division has an important corollary. In the negative theology of *Disdasc.* 10.165.4 ff. the First God is said to be ineffable and only to be grasped by the intellect. The reason is that he cannot be the object of the first kind of division: οὔτε γένος ἐστὶν οὔτε εἶδος οὔτε διαφορά.⁷ The First God, in other words, is not a substance in the sense of *Didasc.* ch. 5; furthermore, no accidents can be predicated of him (165.6, οὐδὲ συμβέβηκε τι αὐτῷ), so he cannot be the object of the fourth kind of division either. This entails that it is impossible to give a definition of the First God. Finally, God cannot be the object of the second kind of division, for he is not ὡς ὅλον ἔχον τινὰ μέρη (165.12). A variety of the same doctrine is to be found at Clem. *Strom.* V 81.5 ff.⁸

2 Clement of Alexandria

Alcinous' account of substance, division, and definition in the *Didascalicus* can be neatly paralleled⁹ from Clem. *Strom.* VIII vi. First, we mention the description of diaeresis and definition at *Strom.* VIII 17.4-5: αἱ δὲ διαιρέσεις [*scil.*, φέρονται] τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄτομον· ... πάλιν τὸ κεφαλαιωθὲν ἐκ τῆς διαιρέσεως ὅρος γίνεται. Note that Clement here does not refer to the genus; but it is of course a genus that is divided into the εἶδη that are mentioned, as is indeed clear from what follows in the same chapter. The expression τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ('essence') pertains to the genus + the species-producing differences (see 18.2). The ἄτομον represents the individual species called ἀπλούστατον εἶδος at 18.6, and does not, as in Hippolytus and Arist. *Cat.* 2.1b6, 5.3a35 ff., 3b12 denote the particular or primary substance. The example of the division at 18.5-7, as in Alcinous, is that of ζῷον until we arrive at man, which lowest species then may be defined. The enumeration of species-producing differences is rather full; it is interesting to note that some of the dichotomies

see *infra*, App. 2.

⁷ Cf. Whittaker (1990) 106 n. 198. Wolfson (1947) 104 ff. claims that in Philo too (just as in numerous later Greek, Arab and Jewish theologians; cf. also Kaufmann (1877) 313 f.) God has neither genus nor species but fails to provide textual proof; perhaps, however, this idea fluttered somewhere at the back of Philo's mind.

⁸ See *infra*, text to n. 19. The texts in Clement and Alcinous are compared by Früchtel (1937), Whittaker (1976) 156 ff., Mansfeld (1988a) 114 f. Cf. also Whittaker (1990) 106 n. 197.

⁹ Cf. e.g. Witt (1937) 61 f., Moraux (1973) 126.

tomous notions used by Clement and not found in Alcinous, viz. 'on dry land'¹⁰ / 'in the water' and 'winged' / 'footed', recall Plato's divisions of the angler and the hunting sophist at Plato *Soph.* 220a-222b (πεζόν at 220a and 221e, πτηνόν and ἔνυδρον at 220b, ἔνυδρον also at 221e; the reference to what is on land is implicit), as well as divisions in other dialogues.¹¹ Also note, however, that 'footed', 'winged', and 'in the water' (but not 'on dry land') often enough occur in Aristotle's *Categories* as well; Aristotle and Plato are here in harmony, the former apparently using examples invented by the latter which may have become the common property of the Early Academy.

It will be recalled that Alcinous distinguishes five kinds of diaeresis. Clement (19.3 ff.) distinguishes not five but three, viz. that of the genus, that of the whole and that of the *differentiae*, and states that only the division of the genus into species is of approved usefulness because the others do not provide the οὐσία. The division of the whole according to Clement is mostly a matter of (the category of) *quantity*. Interestingly enough, this remark about the whole can be exactly paralleled from Boëth. *De divis.* 879B: *generis ... distributio a totius distributione seiungitur, quod totius divisio secundum quantitate fit*. Also Alexander of Aphrodisias, who lists the same three modes of division as Clement, speaks of a diaeresis κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν which is to be distinguished from that of the genus into species. Such a division according to quantity produces the individuals contained in the lowest species, see Alex. *In Top.* 293.7 ff. and 532.18 ff., *In Met.* 208.10 ff.

As in Alcinous and Hippolytus, the division of the genus and the definition of substance in Clement's account are again connected by a necessary link, the former now being said to relate to the latter as matter to a craftsman or demiurge (19.1). Clement further tells us that the division of the genus brings out the sameness according to the genus and the difference according to the specific *differentiae* (ἐ)ἰδικῶς

¹⁰ See DeDurand (1973) 335 f. on Clement, though his *Quellenforschung* is obsolete. Both χερσαῖον and ἔνυδρον are paralleled in the division at *Schol. in Dionys. Thr.* 70.17. In Alex. *In Top.* 93.3, cf. 139.15, we find the diaeresis πᾶν ζῷον ἢ πεζὸν ἢ ἔνυδρον ἢ πτηνόν, but at *ibid.* 320.16 πεζὸν is replaced by χερσαῖον. For πεζὸν ἔνυδρον πτηνόν cf. also the division of ζῷα and γένος καὶ εἶδος at *Divis. arist.* [64] p. 63.10 ff. Mu. (portion of the text not paralleled in Diog. Laërt.). A rather full set is found at Mart. Cap. IV 346 (see Talamanca (1977) 90 f.), who says one may divide *animal* in many ways, of which I quote the following: *possumus (dividere) in varietatem motus, quia alia sunt gradientia, alia serpentia, alia natantia; possumus <in> habitaculorum diversitates, quia alia aquatilia, alia terrena, alia aëria, alia, ut nonnulli dicunt, ignea*; in the sequel, he lists *bipedia*. Martianus' divisions according to gender and age are paralleled at Cic. *De inv.* I 35.

¹¹ See Cherniss (1944) 54 ff. For πεζόν τε καὶ χερσαῖον see Plato *Tim.* 39e-40a. On the division of ζῷον in Aristotle and its Platonic antecedents see also Hambruch (1904) 7. Cf. also DeDurand (1973) 339 f., for further Aristotelian examples.

διαφοράς), which may be interpreted as applying to definition *per genus et differentiam*. The terminology however recalls the well-known doctrine of the Same and the Different in Plato *Soph.* 254d ff. and 262e ff. (cf. esp. *Strom.* VIII 20.1, τῷ τε αὐτῷ καὶ θατέρῳ).

At first glance, what then follows in Clement seems to be an interesting though definitely odd echo of two related passages in Aristotle's *Categories*, viz. firstly the account of the distinction between things said of a subject and of things being in a subject (the species only being 'said of' the subject, or primary substance) at *Cat.* 2.1a20 ff. and, secondly, the account of primary and secondary substance at *Cat.* 5.2a13 ff., where we learn that the individual is in the species and, by implication, the species in the genus (which however in Aristotle's *Categories* can hardly mean that the individual is a portion or part of the species, or the species of the genus).¹² Conversely, the genus according to Arist. *loc. cit.* is said of both the species and the individual, as the species is said of the individual, without 'being in' the latter. Aristotle is here talking of logical classes and their members.

Clement apparently stands this doctrine on its head (VIII vi 19.6-8). The species, he says, is always considered to be in a part (ἀεὶ ἐν τινὶ μέρει θεωρεῖται), although the converse is not true: a part of something is not *ipso facto* a species of something. E.g. hand, being a part of man, is not a species of man.¹³ For the species in a part an interesting parallel is to be found at Porph. *Isag.* 8.1-3: τὸ ... εἶδος καὶ ὅλον καὶ μέρος, ἀλλὰ μέρος μὲν ἄλλου [*scil.*, of a genus], ὅλον δὲ οὐκ ἄλλου ἀλλ' ἐν ἄλλοις· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μέρεσι τὸ ὅλον. What Clement means is that the term 'part' is used homonymously in that it is applied both to a species *qua* part of a genus and to a part *qua* part of a whole. All species are parts (of their

¹² For the relations between genus, species and individual in the *Categories* see Frede (1987a) 50 ff. Note that at *Met.* Δ 25.1023b22 ff. Aristotle says that, *in a definition*, the genus is part of the species (τὸ γένος τοῦ εἶδους καὶ μέρος λέγεται).

¹³ The example of the man and the hand, which in some way or other may be indebted to Aristotle's discussions at *Cat.* 7.8a16 ff. and *Phys.* Δ 3.210a15 ff., was used by the Stoics, see Sext. *M.* XI 22-25 (*SVF* III 75 = *FDS* 311). A noteworthy and early parallel is found at Cic. *Top.* 30, *in partitione quasi membra sunt, ut corporis caput humeri manus latera crura pedes et cetera; in divisione formae, quas Graeci εἶδη vocant*. The parallels in Clement and Cicero are not in *FDS*. Cf. also Mart. Cap. IV 350 on the division of the *totum*, and *ibid.* 354 (see also next n.), on the difference between division and partition: *caput vero et pedes, quas partes esse diximus, neque definitionem hominis neque nomen accipere possunt, quia nec caput potest dici homo, animal risibile, nec pedes nec manus*. For the definition of man as *animal risibile* by means of the determining property (ἴδιον) cf. Porph. *Isag.* 2.21, 3.3, 13.17, 20.13 etc., and the already scholastic examples at Clem. *Strom.* VIII vi 21.1, and 21.5, ζῶον γελαστικόν, and Quintil. V 10.58, *proprium autem est ... quod soli accidit, ut homini sermo, risus*; the ultimate source is apparently Arist. *De part. an.* Γ 10.673a8. Cf. also Joh. Damasc. *Dial.* ch. 6.65-7.

genera; cf. Arist. *Met.* Δ 25.1023b18 f., τὰ εἶδη τοῦ γένους φασὶν εἶναι μόρια, *ibid.* 24-5, τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους μέρος), but not all parts are species and not all wholes are genera. Cf. also Arist. *Phys.* Δ 3.210a15 ff. The argument against the confusion of species and part must be traditional. It is already alluded to at Cic. *Top.* 31, who says that they are not the same but merely similar: *formas qui putat idem esse quod partes, confundit artem et similitudine quadam conturbatus non satis acute quae sunt discernenda distinguit.*¹⁴ But Cicero, unlike Clement or Martianus Capella, does not provide an argument. A rather substantial chain of reasoning against the confusion is found at Boëth. *De divis.*¹⁵ 879B-D, too long to quote. Among other things, Boëthius tells us that the genus is prior to the species whereas the parts are prior to the whole; that the destruction of the genus destroys all the species whereas that of the whole does not destroy all the parts; and conversely that you may take away one species without destroying the genus, whereas when you take away one part you destroy the whole. He also has an argument which to some extent resembles Clement's, Boëth. *De divis.* 879D: ... *species idem semper quod genus est, ut homo idem est quod animal pars vero non semper idem est quod totum. neque enim idem est manus quod homo ...*.¹⁶

The genus, Clement continues, is in the species, as ζῷον in man and ox. But the 'whole' (we recall that the division of the whole into its parts is one of Clement's and Alexander's three and Alcinous' five kinds of division) is not in the parts; the man is not in the feet. Here Clement differs from Porphy. *Isag.* 8.2-3 (quoted above), although we should recall that Porphyry is not speaking about wholes in general but about the species as a ὅλον. Consequently, Clement concludes, the species of a genus is superior (for the purpose of finding the definition of a substance, no doubt) to the part of a whole, and whatever is predicated of the genus is predicated of the species as well.

It is also important that in this section, if only by implication, Clement appears to take the individual into account as well. The whole man who is not in his feet, just as the man who does not have hand as his species, seems to represent the individual no less than the species.¹⁷

Furthermore, it is relevant that he tells us that the bipartite division is the best there is, and that a tripartite one is feasible only where a dichotomy

¹⁴ Cf. *supra*, Ch. V n. 54, and Mart. Cap. IV 354: *Interest autem inter divisionem et partitionem, quod in divisione per formas currimus, in partitione per partes* (see also *supra*, n. 13). See further Nörr (1974) 36, Talamanca (1977) 105 ff., 129, 142 n. 424, and *infra*, App. 2.

¹⁵ For this work in relation to Andronicus see *supra*, Ch. V n. 54.

¹⁶ For the confusion between parts and species see further *infra*, Exc. 4.

¹⁷ Clement continues with the account of the ten (Aristotelian) categories which I have discussed *supra*, Ch. V text to n. 13.

tomous one is precluded (20.1). One may compare Cicero's critique of Epicurus' tripartite division of desire, *De fin.* II 26: ... *divisit ineleganter; duo enim genera quae erant, fecit tria. Hoc est non dividere sed frangere. Qui haec didicerunt quae ille [scil., Epicurus] contemnit, sic solent: duo genera cupiditatum, naturales et inanes; naturalium duo, necessariae et non necessariae.*¹⁸

Finally, it should be pointed out that Clement's doctrine of substance and division has the same corollary as Alcinous'.¹⁹ According to the adaptation of the Middle Platonist negative theology at *Strom.* V 81.5 ff. Clement's ineffable God too cannot be the object of the first and third kinds of division: ... μήτε γένος ἐστὶ μήτε διαφορὰ μήτε εἶδος μήτε ἄτομον ... , ἀλλὰ μηδὲ συμβεβηκός τι In the same way, he cannot be the object of the second kind of division either: οὐκ ἂν δὲ ὅλον εἴποι τις αὐτὸν ὁρθῶς.²⁰ Consequently, also according to Clement God cannot be defined. The details and the terminology of this section can all be paralleled from the account of diaeresis in *Strom.* VIII.

3 Aristotle, the Stoics and Plato in Seneca, Epistula 58

As our last important parallel, we have to consider the account of Aristotelian οὐσία (*essentia*),²¹ a term quickly replaced by τὸ ὄν (*quod est*), in Sen. *Ep.* 58.²² According to Seneca, the doctrine is Plato's, which

¹⁸ Aristotle had protested against the use of *dichotomous* divisions (see *infra*, App. 2), so Clement's and Cicero's point may represent a justification of what was seen as the correct Platonic method.

¹⁹ For which see *supra*, text to n. 8, and Wolfson (1947) 113. On the link between logic and negative theology in Clement see also Apostolopoulou (1977) 99 ff.

²⁰ The reason provided by Clement, viz. ἐπὶ μεγέθει γὰρ τὰττεται τὸ ὅλον, is consistent with his statement at *Strom.* VIII 19.4 that the whole for the most part belongs with quantity; see *supra*, text after n. 11.

²¹ This translation presumably derives from L. Sergius Plautus, see *supra*, Ch. V n. 8.

²² The account of the Senecan passage by Talamanca (1977) 85 f. is unsatisfactory. The most recent discussion known to me is that of Brunschwig (1988) 21 ff., esp. 51 ff. I am much indebted to this monumental paper, even where I feel inclined to disagree. Brunschwig proves (46-50) that Sext. *M.* VIII 32 and Diog. Laërt. VII 61, passages which have been adduced by numerous scholars in support of a Stoic division with being as its highest genus, must be discounted. He argues (54 ff.) that a division of being as the highest genus into corporeals and incorporeals is upheld by Seneca himself, that it may therefore count as Stoic, and that Seneca must have had Stoic predecessors who put this division in the left column of the standard Stoic division of the τὶ (cf. *infra*, n. 49) as the highest genus. But the numerous instances of the first person (singular or plural) used by Seneca in his account of the Aristotelian division cited by Brunschwig in support of this interpretation are didactic, the teacher explaining these abstruse matters to his pupil (also note the numerous questions the answers to are provided by the teacher himself—a by no means unusual use of the erotapocritic dialogue). It is true that Seneca, before describing the Stoic division, says that he will show that the 'being' about which he has spoken so far has rightly been considered to be the highest genus (*Ep.* 58.13), but this need not entail, *pace* Brunschwig (53), that he believes the Stoic idea that the

means that it is a scholastic (Middle) Platonist one:²³ *sex modis hoc a Platone dici* (*Ep.* 58.8). First, however, he will set out *esse aliquid genus, esse et speciem*. As to the presentation, the parallel with Alcin. *Didasc.* ch. 5, the beginning, is precise: first οὐσία, then diaeresis and analysis (or collection); this in part explains why Seneca postpones the account of the Platonic doctrine. Note, however, that unlike Alcinous and Clement he does not introduce definition as the link between substance (or 'being') and diaeresis. That he was familiar with the method of division is clear e.g. from his account of the parts of philosophy at *Ep.* 89.1-16.

3.1 The Diaeresis of Being Attributed to Aristotle

Seneca first illustrates analysis (*retro legere*, *Ep.* 58.8-15), but already blends in diaeresis (*ibid.* 8 *divisio*, 10 *dividam*; and even 11 *in species secabitur*; note that genus and species—cf. also 12, more on which below—here are relative, or rather relational, concepts; Porph. *Isag.* 5.21 uses the term ὑπάλληλα for such relations). He then proves the collection through division, i.e. by repeating the process in the opposite direction (*ibid.* 13-14). There is an explicit reference to Aristotle at the beginning of this account: *homo species est, ut Aristoteles ait, equus species est*, etc. (*ibid.* 9; *Ep.* 58.7-11 = Arist. Fr. 944 Gigon). Yet the method of diaeresis as developed here is in certain ways more Platonic and even Stoic than Aristotelian. Aristotle, although acknowledging diaeresis to be useful and using it often enough and even revising it to a degree, did not consider it to be *the* method of dialectic or logic, and certainly did not provide a taxonomic division of the whole of reality. Another point that should be stressed is that the diaeresis of being into *corporalia* and *incorporalia*, as that of corporeal into *animantia* and *inanima* is a dichotomous division which operates with the negation, or privation, of a *single differentia*, and therefore goes against the grain of the method of diaeresis as revised by

τὶ is the highest genus is wrong (note that Brunshwig, *ibid.* 51 ff., says that Seneca does not criticize the standard Stoic division), but merely that it is correct to say that being is the highest genus in the context of the Aristotelian division.

²³ Cf. the literature cited *supra*, Ch. V n. 4. In what follows, I shall assume that this sixfold account, which clearly is a scholastic systematization of disparate data, can to some extent be paralleled from various passages in Plato himself which therefore may have served as proof-texts. The highest level, Being, can be paralleled from *Soph.* 246a ff.—on this passage see Mansfeld (1980) 351—and perhaps also from *Tim.* 27d (cf. *infra*, n. 34). The God on the second level may correspond to the Demiurge of the *Tim.*, the Ideas clearly correspond to the Platonic Ideas in general, the immanent forms in some way perhaps correspond to the forms put into matter by craftsmen at *Crat.* 389ac, and/or to the forms entering and leaving the receptacle in *Tim.* 50b ff. (cf. *infra*, n. 57), and the quasi-beings perhaps represent the shadows and other images to be encountered in the parable of the cave and the illustration by means of the divided line in the *Rep.*, or the images discussed at the end of the *Soph.* (cf. *infra*, text after n. 67).

Aristotle in the *De part. animal.* A 2-3.²⁴ However, Seneca's division of the genus *animal* into species is not dichotomous.

Aristotle's name is not found in the parallel passage at Alcin. *Didasc.* 5. In the parallel chapters of *Strom.* VIII Clement refers neither to Aristotle nor to Plato. Seneca mentions both by name and will presently also refer to the Stoics; his systematic interpretive overview is adorned with apposite references. The general idea behind this is presumably the conviction, first stated (as thanks to Cicero we know) by Antiochus of Ascalon and then taken over by the Aristotelizing current of Middle Platonism, that Aristotle for the most part belongs with Plato and says the same things in different words—the Middle Platonists, moreover, were sometimes encouraged by interpretations provided by eminent Aristotelians—and that even the Stoics belong with Plato and Aristotle and their early followers to a degree (an idea somewhat less popular with the Middle Platonists of the second century CE).

Seneca's collection is at first conducted in five stages (see below for the last stages, concerned with what is below the species/genus man).²⁵ It starts with (1) the species, 'man' 'horse' 'dog', and then goes on to (2) the genus *animal* (ζῷον) which is the *commune vinculum* of the species that are below it. It is precisely here that Seneca could have said something about definition.²⁶ As it speeds upwards the collection, just as the divisions in Alcinous and Clement, takes the relevant specific differences into account. We may observe that Seneca already blends in division, for he finds the differences by dividing the genus.

Above the *animalia* (the Greek equivalent is ζῷα), you have (3) the *animantia* (in Greek ἔμψυχα), including both animals and plants: *placet enim satis et arbustis animam inesse*. That plants have souls is *Aristotelian*, e.g. *De an.* B 2, and *Platonic*, *Tim.* 77ab, not *Stoic* (cf. e.g. *Gal. Plac. Hipp. Plat.* VI p. 374.18-19 = *SVF* II 710, οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ οὐδὲ ψυχὴν ὅλως ὀνομάζουσι τὴν τὰ φυτὰ διοικοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ φύσιν, and two passages where the doctrines of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics are set off against one another, viz. *Clem. Strom.* VIII 10.3-11.1 [cf. *Theodor. Graec. aff. cur.* V 24-5], and *ps.Plut./Aët.* V 26.1-3 [26.3 = *SVF* II 708]). But this part of the division is *Aristotelian* rather than *Platonic* because according to Plato plants are ζῷα, which in Aristotle's view they are not; in other words, as to plants and animals an orthodox Platonic division would not distinguish between *animantia* and *animalia*.

²⁴ Cf. *infra*, App. 2.

²⁵ As appears from *ibid.* 12, you have (6) the *nationes* as sub-species under man, and (7) the particulars under the peoples. See *infra*, n. 42 and text thereto.

²⁶ Cf. *supra*, text to n. 4, *infra*, Ch. VI 5, *infra*, App. 2 p. 328, quotation of *Cic. De orat.* I 189.

On the same level as and opposed to the *animantia* we find the inanimate things (in Greek ἄψυχα). Above the *animantia* you have (4) *corpus*, viz. the corporeal which includes both animate and inanimate bodies; one may compare the parallel in Alexander(?)'s argument against the Stoics, *De an. mant.* 114.6-8, τὴν διαίρεσιν τῶν σωμάτων τὴν λέγουσαν τὰ μὲν ἔμψυχα εἶναι αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ ἄψυχα. On the same level as the corporeal you have the incorporeal. Finally, there is also something above *corpus*, that is to say the highest genus or (5) *quod est*. We may compare Clem. *Strom.* VIII vi 20.2, ὥσπερ ὅταν λέγωμεν· τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν σώματά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα. This remark is found in Clement's account of Aristotelian-Platonic diaeresis.

At first sight, it would seem that the corporeal as a genus *above* the animate and inanimate bodies is not genuinely Platonic or Aristotelian, but Stoic. Furthermore, the fact that the animate bodies (the class of animals + plants) constitute a sub-species of body would seem to entail that the soul itself is considered to be a corporeal rather than an immaterial entity, i.e. is presented not in a Platonic or Aristotelian but in a Stoicizing way. In its turn, this would imply that the incorporeal which is located next to and on the same level as this corporeal will be Stoic as well as Aristotelian-Platonic. However, we must take into account that Plato's own diaeresis of being into body and the incorporeal in the *Sophist* is an ingredient of Seneca's Aristotelian division. One should adduce *Soph.* 246a ff., where reality (τὸ ὄν) is divided into the σῶμα upheld as real by the corporealists and the νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἶδη upheld as real by the 'friends of the Forms'; the corporealists have to admit that the θνητὸν ζῶον exists and is a σῶμα ἔμψυχον, and get into trouble with the status of the soul and its virtues and vices (246e ff.). In the so-called tree of Porphyry too, as we shall see, animate body is placed below body, and for Porphyry the soul of course is not a corporeal. *Differentiae* within a genus derive from an outside genus. What therefore we have to assume is that the diaeresis at *Soph.* 246a ff., which, for all the Platonic truth it may be hinting at, in its context in the dialogue is first and foremost a dialectical device, was taken at face-value and put on a par with part of the Stoic division (for which see further below). Furthermore, the so-called Aristotelian collection is in part analogous to the Stoic *scala entis*.²⁷

²⁷ In the order which is the reverse of that in Seneca's Aristotelean collection: ἔξῃς (lifeless things), φύσις (plants), ψυχὴ (animals). For the Stoic series see e.g. Diog. Laërt. VII 85-6, who reproduces an early variety leaving out ἔξῃς; for further references see Pohlenz (1964) 83, Inwood (1985) 18 ff. For the views of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics on animation with regard to plants and animals see Mansfeld (1990a) 3186 ff.

The analogy with Stoic notions becomes even more obvious if we compare the first part of a Stoicizing diaeresis preserved by Philo *Agric.* 139 f. = *SVF* II 182, *FDS* 695: τῶν ὄντων [~ level (5) in Seneca] τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ σώματα, τὰ δ' ἄσώματα [~ Seneca's level (4); in what follows, *Agric.* 140 ff., Philo provides a detailed and noteworthy diaeresis of λεκτά]· καὶ (viz., of bodies) τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα, τὰ δὲ ψυχὴν ἔχοντα [~ level (3)]; what then follows in Philo is different. I already note in passing that Philo elsewhere, viz. *Leg. all.* II 86 (not in *SVF* or *FDS*) speaks of the (Stoic) τι, ὃ πάντων ἐστὶ γένος.

'Being', or *quod est*, as the highest genus is also remarkable. It is of course true that according to Aristotle being (ὄν, on a par with 'one') is the most general concept, but in Aristotle's view it is not itself a genus.²⁸ Thinking in the manner of an Aristotle, one therefore at first does not understand in what way this so-called Aristotelian being *qua* genus may be believed to include other genera. *Arist. Cat.* 5.2a11 ff. states that οὐσία pertains to the existing individual substance as well as to the semantic, or conceptual, species and equally semantic, or conceptual, genus. However, the analysis in Seneca treats genus and species not only as conceptual or semantic entities, i.e. as meta-things, but also as really existing things (I shall return to this below). We may therefore assume an *interpretatio platonica* of the doctrine of the primary and the two secondary substances of Aristotle's *Categories*. The Aristotelian οὐσία at the top of the division is treated as being equivalent to the ὄν of *Soph.* 246a ff. If individual, species, and genus share the denomination οὐσία, they have something in common; all of them 'are', which to a Platonist means something else than to a true-blue Aristotelian. In the real Aristotle, the triad genus, species and individual substance is not included by οὐσία as by a universal or genus; it is an excellent example of an ordered series, or ἐφεξῆς, comparable to e.g. the series of the three types of soul in the *De an.*²⁹ Hence, presumably, the division of sub-

²⁸ Cf. e.g. *Top.* Δ 2.122b15, *Met.* B 3.998b22 ff., *An. Po.* B 7.92b14, and Porph. *Isag.* 6.5-6, οὐ γάρ ἐστι κοινὸν ἐν γένος πάντων τὸ ὄν οὐδὲ πάντα ὁμογενῇ καθ' ἐν τὸ ἀνωτάτω γένος, ὡς φησιν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης. See Festugière (1932) 244, Hall (1977) 420. Porph. *ibid.* 4.25 f. mentions not τὸ ὄν but οὐσία (the category of substance) as his instance of what is γενικώτατον καὶ ... μόνον γένος. In Aristotle, even οὐσία is not a genus, cf. Talamanca (1977) 43 f. Setaioli (1988) 160 n. 477 argues that this may be compared with what is in Seneca and therefore is a parallel for Seneca's introductory words about οὐσία, but Porphyry explicitly states that οὐσία is an example of a highest genus, not *the* highest genus, and (*Isag.* 6.5 ff.) that the categories 'are' in a homonymous way only.

²⁹ See Lloyd (1962) 67 ff.; cf. esp. *ibid.* 79 ff. for the way Plotinus and later ancient commentators dealt with this question (this argument is continued in Lloyd (1990), esp. 76 ff.). I would argue that what we find in Seneca, and in Hippolytus (see *infra*, Ch. VI), proves that the matter was a point of discussion from the time of the Andronican revival of Aristotelian studies. See further *infra*, Ch. VI n. 61 and text

stance at Hipp. *Ref.* VII 15.1 is not one into genus, species and substance, but rather into genus, species and 'indivisible', for using the equally Aristotelian term 'indivisible' is another way of avoiding the suggestion that substance is a genus of itself.

That the substitution, in a predominantly ontological context, of 'being' for 'substance' is quite early follows from a parallel in Philo, who this time too will have been influenced by the available literature, both commentaries and handbooks. At *Mut.* 27 ff. he argues that God is designated by traditional appellations in an improper way (27, λέγεται καταχρηστικῶς οὐ κυρίως).³⁰ Because theologizing linguistic usage, i.e. the ascription of attributes etc. to God as the subject of a statement, is at issue Philo feels in a position to make his point by exploiting a doctrine of categories, *ibid.*: τὸ γὰρ ὄν, ἢ ὃν ἐστὶ, οὐχὶ τῶν πρὸς τι. This lapidary statement uses either the Platonizing bipartition of the categories into substance and the relative, or a form of the bipartition of Aristotle's ten according to which the categories other than substance are subsumed under the relative.³¹ On both assumptions, the categories other than substance can only be applied to God in what Philo calls an 'abusive way'. The ὄν ἢ ὃν clearly is a stand-in for substance *qua καθ'* αὐτό; however, it presumably should also be understood in one of the senses it has in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.³² Philo's application of the category distinction is first and foremost ontological; it is especially noteworthy that in such an ontological context οὐσία is replaced by τὸ ὄν, and that God is the unique referent of the latter, viz. ἢ ὃν.³³ The parallel in Philo, to be sure, is only partial, because the Aristotelian diaeresis in Seneca lacks a theological aspect (although his subsequent Platonic scala does refer to God). However this may be, we may at any rate have found several reasons why, in the course of his exposition, Seneca (artfully hiding the substitution behind small talk about the difficulties of translating Greek philosophical terminology, *Ep.* 58.6-8) substitutes the *quod est* for the

thereto for the ancient debate concerned with the problem of defining the soul *qua* universal according to Aristotle's *De an.*

³⁰ The passage has been studied by Runia (1988). For *Mut.* 27 see Runia (1988) 79 f.

³¹ See *supra*, Ch. V n. 8. For Philo on the categories see *supra*, Ch. V n. 22 and text thereto, *infra*, Ch. VIII n. 85.

³² Runia (1988) 79 does not believe this to be the case. However I assume that the Aristotelian God *qua* ὄν ἢ ὃν has been blended in as well.

³³ Philo's negative theology in this passage is less sophisticated than Clement's (for which see *supra*, text to n. 19), who at *Strom.* V 82.1 states that the attribute αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν can only be predicated of the ineffable God in an 'improper way' (the same expression, as we have seen, is used by Philo). Alcin. *Didasc.* 10.164.30 lists οὐσιότης among the attributes of this God; however this is the section where attributes according to the *viae analogiae* and *eminentiae* are juxtaposed to the attribute ἀρρητος (cf. Mansfeld (1988a) 108 ff.), and 'beingness' clearly belongs with eminence.

Aristotelian *essentia*, or οὐσία, he began with. We shall moreover see that this move is explicitly rejected by Porphyry.

3.2 Harmonizing Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics

It may safely be assumed that the artificial and to some extent superficial harmonizing of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics we have noticed so far is not Seneca's doing, but stems from the early Middle Platonist tradition(s) on which he depends. The source or sources, moreover, will have contained a more technical explanation for the substitution of substance by 'being' than the translator's excuse provided by Seneca. A further clue is to be found in Seneca's definition of οὐσία at *Ep.* 58.6 as *natura continens fundamentum rerum omnium* (it is to be noted that *res necessaria* does not belong with the definition but merely states that *essentia* or at any rate some term translating οὐσία is indispensable in philosophical contexts). Οὐσία as the foundation of all things pertains to the primary function of substance in relation to the other categories (which is both an Aristotelian and a Middle Platonist tenet). The parallel with Philo *Mut.* 27 ff., cited above, is clear enough. Accordingly, the subsequent examples of divisions in Seneca are linked up with and based on a primary division of the categories into substance (οὐσία) and the accidents, and this link bears comparison with what is found in Alcinous and other Middle Platonist sources. Seneca omits to deal with οὐσία as distinguished from the other categories the better to concentrate on the notion of τὸ ὄν, which is at the highest level in both his Aristotelian analysis and his Platonic scala.

The question why,³⁴ in the Platonic *scala entis* that is explained after

³⁴ For the problem see Donini (1979) 152 ff., whose study in my view is *the* point of departure for the philosophical interpretation of *Epp.* 58 and 65; I agree with his verdict that the highest level of this Senecan Platonic scala constitutes an "essere come universale astrattamente logico"; his suggestion *ibid.* 155 f. that Seneca or his immediate (Stoic?) source substituted this abstraction for a reference to a 'dio più alto' beyond the Demiurge, although attractive, is in my view perhaps not good enough, because it does not account for the parallel with the top of Seneca's Aristotelian division and does not take the parallel in the *Sophist* into account. It has to be admitted, however, that Donini is right to the extent that there is also this time room at the top (or that room can be made there) for two Gods, just as in other Middle Platonist hierarchic vertical series, as e.g. in Alcinous or Numenius. Another solution has been proposed by Whittaker (1969) 191 f., and Whittaker (1975) 146 f. He argues that Seneca's source is commentary on the *Timaeus*, perhaps one composed by Eudorus. At *Tim.* 27d, Plato gives a diaeresis of being (τὸ ὄν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, ... νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν) versus becoming; for the *constitutio* of this passage see Whittaker (1973). According to Procl. *In Tim.* I p. 229.11 ff., quoted by Whittaker, the meaning of τὸ ὄν ἀεί at *Tim.* 27d6 was in dispute, the question being πότερον τὸν νοητὸν πάντα σημαίνει κόσμον ἢ τὸν δημιουργὸν ἢ τὸ παράδειγμα τοῦ παντός. Prof Whittaker (*per litt.*) points out to me that it would be "a normal scholastic procedure for dealing with the question ... to draw up or borrow a list of

the Aristotelian division, 'being' is placed on top of things as well can be answered. Undoubtedly, this too derives from the division of being into the corporeal and the incorporeal at *Soph.* 246a ff. (already mentioned above). As a matter of fact, we may assume that, so to speak, being was first put on top of a Platonic scala and only subsequently ousted substance from the highest position in the Aristotelian division. In the Platonic scala, the level of the corporeal as opposed to the incorporeal found at Plato *Soph.*, *loc. cit.*, is absent—although the incorporeal itself seems to be represented by God and the Ideas, and the corporeal by the things in nature—, but as we have noticed this level is found in the Aristotelian diaeresis, and it is also present in Seneca's Stoic diaeresis. Furthermore, note that at *Ep.* 58.16 the Platonic ontological scala is put on a par with the Aristotelian diaeresis from a formal point of view as well, i.e. is turned into a sort of division: *quomodo quaecumque sunt, in sex modos Plato partiatur*. The *scala entis*, with being as its highest genus, is in this way linked with the analysis-cum-diaeresis, and so the so-called Aristotelian methodology, which has 'being', as a substitute of substance, as the genus and principle at its highest level is made to belong with the Platonic ontology, and conversely. From what would be an orthodox Platonist point of view this multiple (five- or even six-fold) division of being is odd, for Platonic division is dichotomous.

The Aristotelian diaeresis and the Platonic scala resemble a pair of otherwise dissimilar Siamese twins which share a head. In this

meanings, or of entities to which the term might apply, and on this basis to decide what Plato had in mind". Proclus lists three alternative interpretations of the same referent (cf. the transl. of Festugière (1967) 55 ff.). I still believe that the parallel with the first three levels of being in Seneca (or Seneca's source) is not cogent. What Proclus tells us is that according to some interpreters 'eternal being' denotes the whole intelligible cosmos, i.e. both the Demiurge and the paradigm, that others said it refers to the Demiurge only, and others again that it refers to the paradigm only (cf. the sequel *ibid.* p. 230.4-5; in between, Proclus argues that neither the Demiurge nor the paradigm can be excluded from the eternal being). Whittaker is followed by Setaioli (1988) 137 ff., who apparently has not bothered to read the whole section in Proclus. Elsewhere in Proclus' commentary Setaioli finds parallels for the theory of the causes in Sen. *Ep.* 65 (also to some extent at issue in *Ep.* 58.21, the passage on the statue), *ibid.* 126 ff., 131 ff., but this does not help his argument concerned with the levels of being. It is true that at *Ep.* 65.10, without doubt at second hand, Seneca partly paraphrases and partly quotes *Tim.* 29de on the goodness of the Demiurge (Setaioli (1988) 133 ff. speaks of a 'citazione testuale' but also states that Seneca 'si sia allontanato dalla lettera'), but this only proves that this particular doctrine from the *Timaeus* was adduced in Seneca's source; on this doctrine as an isolated motif in Philo see Runia (1986) 132 ff. —It has been supposed that the disjunctive dihaeresis between being and becoming at *Tim.* 27d ff. presupposes a higher notion above both eternal being and becoming, and argued that it is hard not to think of something resembling the Stoic $\tau\iota$, but I believe that Brunschwig (1988) 62 ff. is right in affirming that Plato's words should not be pressed.

manner, Seneca's Plato and Aristotle are brought into harmony, although as to the details the respective lists are far from being equivalent. In fact, Seneca combines matters which other authors prefer to keep separate. Alcinous, for instance, treats the division of the genus which corresponds to Seneca's Aristotelian section in *Didasc.* ch. 5, i.e. in the logical part of the treatise. The metaphysics, or account of the principles (matter; the immanent forms; the Ideas; and God, or rather the two Gods) is found elsewhere in Alcinous, viz. in chs. 9-10 of the treatise, where however there is no indication of something above the First God or under the things in nature.

3.3 The Platonic Scala

The Platonic scala is not presented as a series of continuous genera and species, and it cannot be presented in this way. Some points of correspondence may however be pointed out. In the Aristotelean diaeresis you have the corporeal and the incorporeal under being; in Plato's sixfold scala the (purely) corporeal is lacking on the second level and the secondary position is occupied by God only, who certainly is not a corporeal. This God is placed above the Ideas; as has already been suggested, both God and the Ideas on the Platonic second and third levels may correspond to the incorporeal on the Aristotelian second level. The genera *animantia* and *animal*, which in Seneca's Aristotelian division are on two different levels, seem to correspond to the Ideas which in the Platonic scala are on a single level. The species of the Aristotelian genus *animal* seem to correspond (a) to these same Ideas and (b) to the (originally Aristotelian) immanent forms here ascribed to Plato.³⁵ The particulars in these species (the *singulos* mentioned at *Ep.* 58.12 which I have not yet discussed; for them see below) correspond to the items at the fifth Platonic level, which contains the things that are perceived and tangible;³⁶ but note that the immanent forms are perceived as well. Furthermore, as already suggested, the things in nature may correspond to the corporeal at the second Aristotelian level. There is nothing in the Platonic scala that corresponds to the Aristotelian sub-species below man (viz., the *nationes*, to be discussed shortly), as there is nothing in the Aristotelian division that corresponds to the (originally Stoic) quasi-beings, viz. the void and time, which in the Platonic scala occupy the bottom position.

³⁵ Precedent for this *interpretatio* could perhaps have been found in the forms that enter into and vanish out of the receptacle according to *Tim.* 50b-51a, cf. Bickel (1960) 6; for another such suggestion see Lloyd (1955-6) 59.

³⁶ Cf. *infra*, text to n. 62.

A further reason for putting being on top of the Platonic scala is that being may be considered, and in this case evidently *was* considered, to be an attribute of God and the extension of an attribute is wider than that of its subject. God is explicitly said to be the *highest* being; so being embraces not only what is below God, but also God himself. Seneca's account of the Platonic *scala entis* is ambiguous insofar as the statement *quod est ... sex modis ... a Platone dici* (*Ep.* 58.7-8) is made to correspond to *quaecumque sunt, in sex modos Plato partiatur*. A semantic account, which is in the first place concerned with the six meanings of 'being', is deceptively put on a par with an sixfold *division* (cf. *partiatur*) of *beings*. What Seneca should have pointed out is that in his Platonic division the notion of being is ambiguous or has five different referents, viz. God, the Ideas, the immanent forms, the things of ordinary experience, and quasi-things, each of which referents 'is' in a different way. What he actually does is add the notion itself both to its fivefold intension and to its fivefold extension, thus having it also mean, and refer to, itself; this is not unlike saying that because you have the number 5 made up of 5 entities, this sum *qua* entity should be added to the parts, so that 5 is actually 6. However, it is clear from the exposition at *Ep.* 58.16 that being, or the first Platonic mode, is a notional entity (*cogitabile*)³⁷—but according to a true-blue Platonist such a *cogitabile* has to exist in itself.

We should however briefly consider an argument of Hadot.³⁸ He submits that the *scala* is originally a Stoic one into which Platonic elements, viz. (a) God, (b) the Ideas, (c) the immanent forms—which, I should again point out, are scholastic-Aristotelian rather than Platonic —, and (d) the things of ordinary experience have been interpolated. According to the Stoics (for which see further below), the highest genus is the $\tau\iota$,³⁹ under which comes being, which then would be divided into the four Stoic so-called categories: (a) subject (or matter/substance), (b) quality, (c) being in a certain way, and (d) being in a certain way in relation to something. These four categories would have been equated with respectively God, the Ideas, the immanent forms, and the things of experience. But this is unconvincing. Subject or matter, for instance, can hardly be put on a par with either the Stoic or the Platonic God. Although the Stoic God is corporeal and therefore could be placed on the level in the Platonic scala which corresponds with that of the corporeal and the incorporeal in the Aristotelian analysis, he is always distinguished from matter which is the other Stoic principle (cf. e.g. *SVF* I 85).

³⁷ Cf. *supra*, Ch. V n. 15 *ad finem, infra*, text to n. 54.

³⁸ Hadot (1968) 156 ff.

³⁹ See *infra*, n. 49 and text thereto.

If an equation would be feasible, it would be between the Stoic God and the category of quality, or the third level of the Platonic scala where we find the Ideas (but also with the fourth where we find the immanent forms). The four Stoic categories are in no way related to the Platonic *scala entis*; furthermore, the connection between the all-embracing Stoic division of the $\tau\iota$ and the doctrine of the four so-called categories postulated by Hadot is a brilliant modern construct, not supported by any ancient text.⁴⁰

3.4 The Lowest Level of the Aristotelian Diaeresis

I have pointed out above that at *Ep.* 58.8-11 the Aristotelian account of species and genus which plays the part of a preliminary to the six-tiered *scala entis* attributed to Plato lacks a sixth and lowest level. This omission is more than made good in what follows (*ibid.* 12). 'Being' is the primary, original and most general genus. The other generic items that occur in an analysis are specific genera (*specialia*—the Latin word translates εἰδικός),⁴¹ i.e. stand in the relation of species to what is above them and in that of genus to what is below them. Seneca provides an illustration. 'Man' is a genus (in the analysis, 'man' was said to be a species, so it may function both as genus and as species) to the extent that it includes many things. The genus man *habet ... in se* (6) the *nationum species* such as Greeks, Romans and Parthians, and the 'colours', such as 'whites, blacks and blondes', and finally (7) the individual persons (*singulos*), such as Cato, Cicero and Lucretius which apparently are included in the atomic species 'Romans'. It is interesting that Seneca introduces the 'nations' as *specialia*, or (sub-)species, under the species 'man' which operates as their genus. The division according to the colours of their skin or hair pertains to accidents.⁴² Furthermore, it is

⁴⁰ See Rieth (1933) 90; for further references cf. Brunschwig (1988) 23 f. n. 3; still to be found at Long - Sedley (1987) 163. However, it is quite uncertain that the Stoic so-called categories are species of (corporeal) *being*; that Plot. *Enn.* VI 1 [42], and others call them γένη τοῦ ὄντος does not prove anything. One does not see why at least some among them, viz. the πῶς ἔχον and the πρὸς τί πῶς ἔχον, should not pertain to meanings (e.g. those expressed by verbal forms).

⁴¹ See *infra*, text after n. 56.

⁴² For the division of the genus man, which (as in Seneca) simultaneously is a species of animal, into nations as its sub-species cf. the parallels at Cic. *De inv.* I 32: *sed saepe eadem res alii genus, alii pars [i.e. species] est. Nam homo animalis pars [i.e. species] est, Thebani aut Troiani genus*—cf. Talamanca (1977) 82 n. 254a—, and *ibid.* I 35, where *natura* is first divided into mortal and immortal, mortal is then divided into men and beasts, and men *inter alia* are divided according to nation: *natione, Graecus an barbarus*. Sext. *M.* IX 15-7 argues that a division of men into Greeks, Egyptians, Persians and Indians is incorrect; it should be into Greeks and barbarians, and the latter in their turn should be divided into Egyptians, Persians and Indians (cf. Talamanca (1977) 88). Obviously, Seneca is not in a position to count the

important that the division now comes to a stop with what Aristotle would have called primary substances: *individuals*, or *particulars*. The fact that the genus (here, 'man') 'has them in itself' recalls Arist. *Cat.* 5.2a13 ff., where the primary substance is said to be in the secondary substance,⁴³ as the individual man is in the logical species man. But what should be emphasized is that a standard Aristotelian division always stops at the lowest species and never includes the particulars. The inclusion of the particulars in Seneca is a further symptom of Stoic influence, for according to Diog. Laërt. VII 61 the lowest element in a division is a particular: εἰδικώτατον δὲ ἐστὶν ὃ εἶδος ὃν εἶδος οὐκ ἔχει, ὥσπερ ὁ Σωκράτης.⁴⁴ We may adduce Sext. *M.* VIII 41 (not in *SVF* or

Romans among the barbarians; Mart. Cap. IV 344 has ... *hominum genus ... barbaris et Romanis genus* and counts the Greeks among the barbarians. See also Boëthius' division of the genus colour, *De divis.* 877C: *colorum dicimus alia alba, alia nigra, alia media*, which of course can easily be transposed into a division of substance according to attributes and which also shows that a definition according to substance (οὐσιώδης), i.e. according to the What it is, is also feasible in other categories than substance (cf. already e.g. Arist. *Top.* A 9.103b27 ff.: the question τί ἐστι may be put in connection with each of the categories). This is confirmed by Mar. Victor. *Lib. de defin.* pp. 7.26-8.1: *Item, cum quaero quid sit album aut nigrum, si dixerō <<album est color>>: quia color genus est ad hoc de quo quaero album vel nigrum, iam substantialis* [i.e. οὐσιώδης, cf. *supra*, n. 5] *erit definitio, quae incipit a genere et sic cetera [scil., the differentiae] conectit*. As a further parallel, one may think of the distinction of various natural ethical types according to both virtuous and vicious qualifications that are to be found within the natural species 'man' in Alex. *De fat.* 6.170.8-171.1 (one should include the sentence lost in the manuscripts of the *De fato* but preserved by Eus. *P.E.* VI ix.21, 331.13, which is omitted by Bruns, Sharples and Thillet who follow the mss. rather than Eusebius). Compare also, in the the account of diaeresis at David *Prol.* 66.8, τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν λευκοὶ οἱ δὲ μέλανες, and *Schol. in Dionys. Thr.* 132.18-19, ἀπὸ οὐσίας δὲ εἰς συμβεβηκότα (*scil.*, γίνεται ἡ διαίρεσις), ὡς ὅταν εἰπῶμεν ὅτι τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν λευκοὶ, οἱ δὲ μέλανες.


⁴³ Cf. e.g. *supra*, text to n. 12

⁴⁴ Compare Sext. *P.* II 213, ... ἡ γένος εἰς εἶδη (*scil.*, διακρίσθαι) ἢ εἶδος εἰς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον ('particulars'; cf. Talamanca (1977) 64 f., 118 f.); cf. *M.* IV 17 and *M.* X 289 ff., where the γενικός ἄνθρωπος is divided into particulars (ἐπ' εἶδους) such as Dion, Theon, Socrates and Plato. See also ps.Gal. *Philos. hist.* ch. 14, *D.G.* 607.4-5 as emended by Diels (see *infra*, App. 2 p. 329): ... εἶδος εἰς τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον. It is a safe assumption that Seneca replaced the names of famous Greeks by those of Roman thinkers. The theory at the background is originally Stoic, see Talamanca (1977) 84 ff. (his comment on the Senecan passage, *ibid.* 87 is confusing, because the correct suggestion at n. 262 contradicts what is in his text); cf. also *infra*, text to n. 58. See also Porph. *Isag.* 5.1 ff., quoted *infra*, text to n. 61; further Porphyrian instances of ἄτομα are Socrates (*ibid.* 2.18) and Socrates and Plato (*ibid.* 2.26, 5.4). Also compare Mart. Cap. IV 344, where the division goes all the way down to *Calamitum aut alium quempiam certae personae puerum* (cf. also *ibid.* 352). See also Boëth. *De divis.* 877D: *Cumque hominis dicimus partes esse Catonem, Virgilium, Ciceronem et singulos qui cum particulares sint, vim tamen totius hominis iungunt atque componunt*; note however that here the division involved is not of a species into individuals, but of a whole into parts (cf. Talamanca (1977) 94, 181 f.). The division of a species into individuals is rejected by David *Prol.* 66.26-8, because individuals are infinite in number. Further later and late parallels (apart from the passages in Hippolytus still to be discussed, see *infra*, Ch. VI 2-3) are to be found at Sopat. p. 28.3 ff. who adds the division of the εἶδος εἰς

FDS), who uses two names which are familiar from Stoic instantiations of individuals: γένη μὲν αἱ ἐνδιήκουσαι ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος κοινότητες, ὡς ἄνθρωπος ὁ διὰ τῶν κατὰ μέρος πεφοιτηκῶς ..., εἶδη δὲ αἱ καθ' ἕκαστον ιδιότητες, ὡς Δίωνος, Θέωνος, τῶν ἄλλων (cf. also *ibid.* 338, where Socrates figures as the example, just as at Diog. Laërt. VII 61). It would seem that Seneca's Aristotelian diaeresis is our earliest surviving instance of a division of a species into particulars; I have found no parallel in Cicero.

3.5 Seneca's Aristotelian Diaeresis, the Tree of Porphyry and a Division in Cicero

We may illustrate Seneca's full Aristotelian division by means of the following stemma:




ἄτομα, οἷον ἄνθρωπος εἰς Σωκράτην καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδην to Alcinous' five kinds (cf. Talamanca (1977) 76 f.); Philop. *De aet. mund.* 437.18 ff., εἶδος εἰς ἄτομα, ὡς ἄνθρωπος εἰς Σωκράτην καὶ Πλάτωνα; David *Prol.* 65.23-5, ἀπὸ δὲ εἰδῶν εἰς ἄτομα, ὡς ὅταν τὸν καθόλου ἄνθρωπον διέλωμεν εἰς Σωκράτην Πλάτωνα Ἀλκιβιάδην καὶ τοὺς λοιπούς (cf. Elias *Prol.* 36.12-4, where the same three names are found); and *Schol. in Dionys. Thr.* 132.3-4, καὶ ἀπὸ εἶδους (scil., γίνεται ἡ διαίρεσις) εἰς ἄτομα, ὡς ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς τοὺς κατὰ μέρους ἀνθρώπους, εἰς Σωκράτην καὶ Πλάτωνα; cf. also *ibid.* 363.28-29, λέγεται γὰρ εἶδος παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τὸ περιεκτικὸν ... τῶν ἀτόμων, τουτέστι τῶν προσώπων ('persons'). Christian authors sometimes substitute Peter and Paul, e.g. Basil. *De spir. sanct.* 41d (see *infra*, n. 46), Joh. Damasc. *Dialect.* ch. 6.53-5, paralleled *Cod. Oxon. Bodl. Auct.* T.1.6 ch. 7.14-5 (a text printed in Kotter (1969)); see also Richter (1964) 98 n. 234.

One should furthermore acknowledge that the highest genus, 'being', is in this passage said to be the *initium* of things; the Latin word translates ἀρχή, and the ontological aspect now clearly dominates the logical without, of course, supplanting it. If being *qua* highest genus is the *principle* of things, the things to be found below it are *beings*. By this introduction of vertical causation, the Aristotelian analysis-cum-division itself is transformed into a *scala entis*, which facilitates juxtaposition to Plato's. To the genus as *initium* or ἀρχή I shall return. We may again quote Cicero's definition of species at *Top.* 31, where the words *caput .. et quasi fontem* presumably translate the single term ἀρχή: *forma est notio cuius differentia ad caput generis et quasi fontem referri potest*. The parallel shows that the idea of the genus as a principle is scholastic. That genera can be principles in this sense is explicitly rejected by Aristotle himself, e.g. *Met.* B 3.998b14 ff. But Porphyry, who *Isag.* 1.18-2.10 discusses the 'genealogical' meanings of γένος (for which cf. Arist. *Met.* Δ 28.1024a 31 ff., I 9.1058a24 f.; we must note that Aristotle sharply distinguishes the physical, or genealogical, senses of γένος from its logical sense), affirms (*Isag.* 2.10-3) that the logical genus may have got its name because of a resemblance to these other meanings. For according to him this genus too is a sort of ἀρχή for the species which are under it, and it seems to contain the whole subordinate multitude. We may perhaps assume, however, that Porphyry here thinks of the genus as a sort of quasi-material quasi-principle; that the genus is the logical matter of the species is after all the view of Aristotle.

This is perhaps the most appropriate moment to cite one of the best parallels that are available for Seneca's Aristotelian division, viz. the tree of Porphyry at *Isag.* 4.21 ff. There are differences; at the top of the tree we do not have 'being' (τὸ ὄν) but 'substance' (οὐσία), but we have noticed above that Seneca cleverly substitutes 'being' for 'substance'. In Porphyry, moreover, there is one level more as well as one less than in Seneca. However, the other items listed are the same. Under substance we find *body*, under body the *animate* body, under the animate body the *animal*, under the animal the *rational* animal (not in Seneca), under the rational animal *man*, and under man *Socrates*, *Plato* and the other particular humans (ἡ οὐσία ἔστι μὲν καὶ αὐτὴ γένος, ὑπὸ δὲ ταύτην ἔστιν σῶμα, καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ σῶμα ἔμψυχον σῶμα, ὑφ' ὃ τὸ ζῶον, ὑπὸ δὲ τὸ ζῶον λογικὸν ζῶον, ὑφ' ὃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον Σωκράτης καὶ Πλάτων καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος ἄνθρωποι). This noteworthy parallel, found in an authoritative *Introduction* to (Aristotelian) logic the contents of which are several times said by Porphyry to derive from his predecessors in the field or from exegetical practice in general (*Isag.* 1.14 f., 5.17, 10.22, 11.4.7.18.21, 12.13), attests the tenacity of the tradition; conversely,

it follows that the roots of Porphyry's tree are quite ancient. This is immediately apparent if we compare the following diagram of the tree with that of Seneca's Aristotelian division provided a few pages back (as side-branches I have put in, between round brackets, the items in the right column obviously chopped off by Porphyry;⁴⁵ for these other branches see *Isag.* 10.13 ff.):⁴⁶




The parallel in Porphyry shows that, for all its Stoicizing and Platonizing ingredients, Seneca's Aristotelian division originally must indeed have been meant as a division according to *Aristotle*. For Porphyry's famous little treatise presents the gist of the (Middle) Platonist logical doctrines which owed more to Aristotle than to Plato.

A less good but equally interesting parallel to Seneca's division is found in Cicero's *De inventione* (a treatise from which I have already quoted some passages in the footnotes). This proves that a variety of this

⁴⁵ The well-known diagram of Pacius—cited by e.g. Tricot (1947) 19 n. 1—fails to supply the collateral branches. A fuller version is printed at Hadot (1990b) 17 n. 46.

⁴⁶ A to some extent modified version of the tree is at Basil. *De spiritali sancto*. 41cd, where the second level is omitted, both branches are mentioned for the third as well as for the fifth, and a diaeresis according to attribute has been added between ultimate species and individual (Christian proper names, moreover, have replaced the pagan, see *supra*, n. 44): οἶον, κοινὸν μὲν ὄνομα ἢ οὐσία, πᾶσιν ἐπιλεγόμενῃ καὶ ἀνύχοις καὶ ἐμψύχοις ὁμοίως. (εἰδικώτερον δὲ τὸ ζῶον· ἐπ' ἑλαττον μὲν τοῦ προτέρου λεγόμενον, ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸ θεωρούμενων. καὶ γὰρ καὶ λογικῶν αὐτῶ καὶ ἀλόγων φύσις περιέχεται. ἄλλιν (εἰδικώτερον ἐστὶ τοῦ ζώου ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τούτου ὁ ἀνὴρ ('the male'), καὶ τοῦ ἀνδρός ὁ καθ' ἕκαστον, Πέτρος ἢ Παῦλος ἢ Ἰωάννης.

division had been taken over by rhetoric already in the second cent. BCE (the *t.a.q.* of Cicero's sources) and, more importantly, that Seneca's is not without precedent. Cic. *De inv.* I 34-5 provides a rough division of *natura*, which we may translate as 'reality' and presumably put on a par with Seneca's *essentia* and *quod est*; as follows:⁴⁷



The diaeresis as cited here is less full as to its higher echelons than Seneca's, but it seems to be meant either as a taxonomic picture of the whole of reality or as a division of substance. Cicero, or rather the tradition represented by him, only reproduces what suits the rhetorical purpose; he really is interested only in the lowest level of the division, and somewhat in a hurry to get there.

3.6 The Stoic Diaeresis


We should return to Seneca's letter, where a short account of the doctrine of the supreme genus according to the Stoics, or rather to certain Stoics (*quibusdam Stoicis*), now follows. It has been believed by scholars that he alludes to a difference of opinion among the Stoics as to what is to be placed on top of the diaeresis, but it is more likely that he does not wish to reveal the names, or is not in a position to reveal them. The doctrine is announced at *Ep.* 58.13 (*Stoici volunt ..., de quo statim dicam*) and set out at 15 (... *Stoicis quibusdam videtur*); in between, Seneca illustrates part of the (Aristotelian-Platonic) diaeresis.⁴⁸ The technique is the

⁴⁷ Cf. Fuhrmann (1960) 62 f. The parallel between Seneca and Cicero has not been noticed.

⁴⁸ The texts are printed at *SVF* II 332 = *FDS* 715, Long - Sedley (1987) 27A. Brunschwig (1988) 56 ff. argues that the division of 'certain Stoics' is a heterodox one later than and different from the standard division of the anything (τὶ; cf. *infra*, n. 49), and the result of a contamination with the division according to which being is the highest item, as follows:

same as in the case of the treatment of the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle: an announcement, but first something else which is indispensable. Again, the effect of this literary or rhetorical device is that we are left with the impression that the doctrines at issue are closely related.


These Stoics differ from Seneca's Aristotle and Plato in that they put yet another genus above the genus 'being' (*quod est*), viz. the *quid*⁴⁹ or 'something' (as the traditional translation has it; 'anything', which I shall use hereafter, seems better). For they argue that "in the nature of things [i.e. under the 'anything'] you not only have such things as are, but also such as are not" (*in rerum ... natura quaedam sunt, quaedam non sunt*). The things that are not are "those which present themselves to the mind, such as Centaurs, Giants and all the other entities formed by unsound reasoning which have begun to acquire a kind of image, although it [*scil.*, an entity of this kind] has no substance" (... *quae animo succurrunt, tamquam Centauri, Gigantes et quidquid aliud falsa cogitatione formatum habere aliquam imaginem coepit, quamvis non habeat substantiam*).⁵⁰ We may again illustrate this division by means of a stemma:



Brunschwig too has to assume that Seneca's report is incomplete (the corporeals and incorporeals under being in his stemma are not in the report about what 'certain Stoics' believed). Although in Stoic contexts 'quasi-being' and 'non-being' may be synonymous, I am unable to come round to this reconstruction, because (a) the incorporeals as quasi-beings have been taken from the Platonic scala (which has 'void, time etc.') and substituted for the imaginary species etc. as non-beings which are found in Seneca's Stoic division, and (b), if 'quasi-beings' and 'non-beings' are really equivalent, one fails to see why they should be found on two different levels.

⁴⁹ τι. Cf. *SVF* II 329 = *FDS* 711 + 709 (Alex. Aphr.), 331 = *FDS* 720 (Sext.), and other texts in *FDS* II 846 ff. Note that *SVF* II 333 and 334 are confusing. On this highest genus see e.g. Rieth (1933) 90 f., Goldschmidt (1953) 13 ff., Rist (1966) 152 ff., Graeser (1972) 88 ff., Brunschwig (1988) 22 ff. The τι (the name of the manna) as πάντων γένος is also mentioned at Philo *Leg. all.* II 86 (not in *SVF* or *FDS*); most remarkably, Philo continues by saying that τὸ δὲ γενικώτατον ἐστὶν ὁ θεός. If this γενικώτατον is meant to be above the πάντων γένος, it would seem that he does not really know what he is saying; Wolfson (1947) 110 is unenlightening. But the parallel with Seneca's Platonic and Aristotelian divisions, however unclear, is tempting, and Seneca's Platonic Being above God again proves to be idiosyncratic, with an odd sort of vengeance. More about this later.

⁵⁰ The Stoic οὐσία or ὑποκείμενον, i.e. corporeal existence in the external world.



I have provided for an open space for the standard Stoic incorporeals next to the imaginary non-beings. In fact, Seneca's account is hurried and incomplete; he surprisingly omits to speak of the subsisting *non-imaginary* canonical non-beings, or incorporeals (λεκτά, void, time, place), which according to the standard Stoic doctrine are opposed to the corporeal existents. The intentional object (σημαινόμενον) 'Centaur' is presented to the mind and in this respect not different from any other such object, e.g. the σημαινόμενον 'horse'; it is only on the level of the referents that a distinction has to be pointed out, for Centaurs, unlike horses, never exist in the flesh, although the sound 'Centaur' may be uttered, just as the sound 'horse'. We may be presented with the σημαινόμενον horse whenever we see a living horse, but can never acquire the σημαινόμενον Centaur by seeing a Centaur that is alive or really there;⁵¹ the latter σημαινόμενον is formed by the understanding acting on its own. Perhaps Seneca has confused the unqualified non-existence of the individual referents of intentional objects such as 'Centaur' with the qualified non-existence, i.e. the incorporeal subsistence, of (1) those σημαινόμενα which are related to existing referents in external reality and (2) with the incorporeal but real subsistence of time, void, and place which according to Chrysippus *ap. Aët. I 16.4 (SVF II 482, FDS 724)* are τοῖς σώμασι προσεικότα. A further and not incompatible possibility is that Seneca limits himself to the Centaurs etc. for rhetorical or didactic

⁵¹ For Centaurs and the like as the standard examples of referentially empty items cf. Arist. *Phys.* Δ 1.208a30-1, τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὄν οὐδαμοῦ εἶναι· ποῦ γάρ ἐστι τραγέλαφος ἢ σφίγξ; Sext. *P. I* 162, the Dogmatists ἀνυπαρξίας παράδειγμα τὸν ἵπποκένταυρον ἡμῖν φέροντες; Lucr. V 878 ff., *sed neque Centauri fuerent* etc.; Cic. *N. D. I* 105, *nam si tantummodo [scil., the Epicurean gods] ad cogitationem valent nec habent ullam soliditatem nec eminentiam, quid interest utrum de hippocentauris* [see Pease's long and excellent note *ad loc.*, which provides a plethora of examples of this 'type of the non-ens'] *an de deo cogitemus? omnem enim talem confirmationem animi ceteri philosophi motum inanem* [κενοπάθημα according to Pease *ad loc.*; cf. also διάκενος ἔλκυσμός in *SVF II* 54] *vocant ...*; Cic. *N. D. II* 5 *quis enim hippocentaurum fuisse aut Chimaeram putat* (with Pease's notes *ad loc.*). See further Sillitti (1980). I intend to deal with the problem of the Stoic view of concepts elsewhere.

reasons, for they are of course obvious instances of items that do not exist in the external world, but occur in a conceptual way only. 'Horse' may be, or rather is, both real and conceptual; 'Centaur' is only conceptual.

Part of this Senecan Stoic doctrine, viz. the section pertaining to the things that are, may be put on a par with the Platonic-Aristotelian dialectical analysis-cum-diaeresis of being.⁵² But the assumption of another genus above what is said to be Plato's and Aristotle's highest genus constitutes a disagreement both with Seneca's Aristotle and with Seneca's Plato. Unfortunately, Seneca does not fill us in about the diaeresis of genera into species and particulars according to the Stoics.⁵³

3.7 The Platonic Scala Again

After his brief account of the Stoics Seneca reverts to the Platonic doctrine which had been announced at *Ep.* 58.8, and describes it at some length (16-22). It is not necessary to cite all the details, but some points must be briefly dwelt on. First, Seneca states that the highest genus or *quod est*—also found, as we have noticed, at the top of the Aristotelian-Platonic five- or sevenfold analysis or *scala entis* and on the second level in the Stoic division—cannot be grasped by any of the senses but is a *cogitabile*.⁵⁴ He illustrates what is meant by referring to a lower genus, man (*homo generalis*). Man in general *sub oculos non venit, sed specialis venit, ut Cicero et Cato*. For the expression cf. Quintil. VII 2.5, speaking of an individual person: *substantia eius sub oculis venit, ut non possit quaeri, an sit, ..., nec quid sit nec quale sit, sed quis sit?* It will be recalled that at Sen. *Ep.* 58.12 Cicero and Cato were among the individuals (*singulos*, equivalent to the primary substances of Aristotle's *Categories*) which are contained by the genus 'man' and presumably by one of its sub-species, viz. the Roman nation. These sub-species are not mentioned in the present passage, but it is significant that 'man' here operates as a genus (*homo generalis* meaning 'man as a genus'), which at first sight would entail that there are not only individuals but also other species underneath it. *Homo specialis* must mean the individual, and the meaning of *specialis* here is different from that at 13, where it refers to genera under a higher genus.⁵⁵ Seneca's next example of a genus as an object of thought is difficult. The *animal*, he says, is cogitated, not seen; *videtur autem species eius, equus et canis*. But the genus, or sub-species of animal, e.g. man, can only be an object of thought too, so how can the equivalent sub-

⁵² Cf. also *supra*, Exc. 3.1 and n. 27.

⁵³ For some information about this rather neglected subject see *infra*, App. 2 *ad finem*.

⁵⁴ Cf. *supra*, text to n. 37.

⁵⁵ See *supra*, text to n. 421.

species horse and dog be objects of perception? It may be suggested that Seneca made a mistake.⁵⁶ This mistake can then be explained: he mixed up the meaning of *specialis* at 16 (pertaining to the empirical individuals Cicero and Cato) with that of *specialia* at 12 (pertaining to the generic species under the higher genus). However, I do not believe that Seneca blundered; two not incompatible explanations are available.

The *first* of these is that he may have conceived this notion in a Stoic way. *Specialis* translates εἰδικός (cf. Sextus, who *M.* X 291 speaks of the γενικός ἄνθρωπος and the εἰδικός). According to Stoic usage, this term may pertain both to the species and to the empirical and perceptible individual. The εἰδικαὶ ἀρεταὶ at Sext. *M.* XI 31 (*SVF* III 75; cf. also *M.* XI 33, ἐπ' εἶδους ἀρετῶν, and for the Latin equivalent see *SVF* III 199, *speciales* [*scil.*, *virtutes*]) are the species of the genus virtue. But εἶδος and εἰδικός may also refer to the particular, see the authoritative account *ap.* Diog. Laërt. VII 61 (= *SVF* III Diog. B. 25): εἰδικώτατον δέ ἐστιν ὁ εἶδος ὃν εἶδος οὐκ ἔχει, ὥσπερ ὁ Σωκράτης (an individual person, just as Cato⁵⁷ etc.).⁵⁸ That the Stoic theory of division is involved also appears from Seneca's description of the highest or most general Aristotelian genus at *Ep.* 58.12: *illud genus ... generale, supra se nihil habet, ... omnia sub illo cadent. Ad sententiam*, this corresponds exactly with Diog. Laërt. VII 61 (= *SVF* III Diog. B. 25), γενικώτατον δέ ἐστιν ὁ γένος ὃν γένος οὐκ ἔχει. Furthermore, Seneca's remark about the individual instance (*species*) being perceptible and the genus being a universal (which can only be thought) can be precisely paralleled from a report about Chrysippus *ap.* Aët.

⁵⁶ This is the view of Donini (1979) 155. One has to concede his point that Seneca could have made things easier for us if he had provided names of individual animals. But *cave canem* does not mean 'beware! the species dog'. What may also have played a part is that the colloquial meaning of *species* in Latin is 'an appearance', 'something seen': *videtur ... species* also means 'one sees the appearance'. Hans Gottschalk points out (*per litt.*) that *equus* = the ὁ τις ἵππος of Arist. *Cat.* 5.2a13, and plausibly suggests that the change from *specialis* to *species* may be due to *variatio*. It is in my view unlikely that the text is corrupt and that we should emend *species eius* to *speci<al>e <e>ius* (an *e* could have been lost through haplography and the ensuing *special* could have become *species* through e.g. *Verschlimmbesserung*). Rather, what we have here is a blend of the Stoic jargon and the Latin vernacular, just as in Chrysippus *ap.* Cic. *De fat.* 43 (*SVF* II 974, 283.26-7), *visum obiectum* [which must be an individual instance] *imprimet illud quidem et quasi signabit in animo suam speciem* [= εἶδος], and *Ac. pr.* II (= *Luc.*) 58, *quasi ... non specie visa iudicentur*.

⁵⁷ For Socrates as the individual under and in the lowest species cf. *supra*, n. 44 and text thereto. Brunschwig (1984) 5 states that on the lowest level of the Stoic division individual and species coincide, ὁ Σωκράτης designating 'l'individu qui, à lui seul, constitue l'espèce'. This is *ben trovato*, but although according to set theory one can have a set with only one member, the set and its single member are still different entities. The individual Socrates would therefore differ from Socrates *qua species*.

⁵⁸ I note that Gummerle in the Loeb Seneca correctly translates *Ep.* 58.16 *species eius* as 'a particular animal'.

(Stobaeus only) IV 9.13 = SVF II 81, Χρύσιππος τὸ μὲν γενικὸν ἡδὺ νοητόν, τὸ δὲ εἰδικὸν καὶ προσπίπτον ἤδη⁵⁹ αἰσθητόν. This Stoic object of thought could be assimilated to the Platonic object of thought because the same term was used both times, but this is by the way. We have noticed above that the further division of the lowest species into empirical individuals is not a construction of Seneca's, but constitutes a piece of originally Stoic doctrine which can be paralleled from other sources.⁶⁰ We may confidently infer that in this Platonizing context the Stoic individual εἶδος is equivalent to the Aristotelian primary substance (οὐσία). On the other hand, one may observe that Porphyry, who uses the terminology of the Stoic definitions of the highest genus and the lowest εἶδος, carefully avoids taking εἶδος in the sense of 'particular' (he uses ἄτομον for the latter). See *Isag.* 4.16-20, ἔστιν δὲ γενικώτατον μὲν, ὑπὲρ ὃ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλο ἐπαναβεβηκὸς γένος, εἰδικώτατον δέ, μεθ' ὃ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλο ὑποβεβηκὸς εἶδος, μεταξύ δὲ τοῦ γενικωτάτου καὶ τοῦ εἰδικωτάτου ἄλλα, ἃ καὶ γένη καὶ εἶδη ἐστί τὰ αὐτά, πρὸς ἄλλο μέντοι καὶ ἄλλο λαμβανόμενα; and *ibid.* 5.1-5, ὥσπερ οὖν ἡ οὐσία, ἀνωτάτω οὖσα τῷ μηδὲν εἶναι πρὸ αὐτῆς, γένος ἦν το γενικώτατον, οὕτως καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, εἶδος ὢν μεθ' ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν εἶδος οὐδέ τι τῶν τέμνεσθαι δυναμένων εἰς εἶδη ἄλλὰ τῶν ἀτόμων (ἄτομον γὰρ Σωκράτης καὶ Πλάτων καὶ τουτὶ τὸ λευκόν), μόνον ἂν εἴη εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον εἶδος καὶ ὡς ἔφαμεν τὸ εἰδικώτατον.⁶¹

The second available explanation, which is not incompatible with the first, is that Seneca may simultaneously have thought of the (Aristotelian) immanent form attributed to Plato. For at *Ep.* 58.20-1, he compares the *idos* to a portrait. One sees that a portrait resembles e.g. Virgil.

It should be acknowledged that Seneca calls the not-immanent Forms on the third level—to be distinguished from the *idos* on the fourth—'Plato's own furniture' (*quae proprie sunt, propria Platonis supellex; Ideas vocat, Ep.* 58.18). In this way, he makes clear that such furniture is lacking in the worlds of Aristotle and the Stoics. We may compare the distinction between Plato and Aristotle at Cic. *Ac. po.* I (=

⁵⁹ Petersen emended ἤδη to ἡδύ, perhaps unnecessarily. The parallel between Seneca and the Chrysippean text has been noticed by Behrends (1976) 286 n. 93, but his interpretation is wrong (*ibid.* 286 f., "hat mit der geläufigen Einteilung der gedachten Begriffe nach Gattung und Art ... ersichtlich nichts zu tun, sondern beschreibt ... Erkenntnisstufe").

⁶⁰ See *supra*, n. 44.

⁶¹ In Boëthius' translation, 30.2-7: *quemadmodum igitur substantia, cum suprema sit eo quod nihil sit supra eam, genus est generalissimum, sic et homo cum sit species, post quam non sit alia inferior species neque aliquid eorum quae possunt dividi sed solum individuorum (individuum enim est Socrates et Plato), species erit sola et ultima species et, ut dictum est, specialissima.* Sext. *P.* I 138 puts the Platonists, the Peripatetics and the Stoics on a par: τῶν τε ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀνωτάτω γένη κατὰ τοὺς δογματικούς, τὰ δ' ἔσχατα εἶδη, τὰ δὲ γένη καὶ εἶδη.

Varro) 30, *id quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset; hanc illi* [the *veteres*] *ιδέαν appellant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus dicere*; and *ibid.* 33, *Aristoteles primus species quas paulo ante dixi labefactavit, quas mirifice Plato erat amplexatus.*

It should next be pointed out that the account of the immanent specific form, or *idos*, in Seneca's Platonic scala at 20-21 includes the (Stoic) εἶδος of the individual as well.⁶² At the end of this section Seneca speaks of the form of the particular statue which makes it a statue of someone in particular. (The familiar Aristotelian example of the form of the statue, i.e. of the statue in general—the species 'statue', as one might say—occurs in the account of the doctrine of the causes, among which *idea* and *idos*, attributed to Aristotle and Plato at *Ep.* 65.4-8, where the individual portrait is not mentioned). Before speaking of the statue, Seneca at *Ep.* 58.20-21 uses as his example a painter painting a portrait (*idos*) of an individual: Virgil, whose face is said to be the *idea* of the artistic product. Conversely, the notion of the *idea* is in the previous paragraph illustrated by Seneca's making a picture of Lucilius, an individual person (19, *volo imaginem tuam facere. Exemplar picturae te habeo*, etc.). Interestingly enough, this comparison would leave room for the Idea of an individual person which is familiar from Plotinus.⁶³ This notion is also known to Alex. *In Met.* 82.1-3, who paraphrases an argument against the assumption of Ideas from Aristotle's *De ideis*: φησὶ [*scil.*, Aristotle] δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ τῶν φθειρομένων τε καὶ ἐφθαρμένων καὶ ὅλως τῶν καθ' ἑκαστά τε καὶ φθαρτῶν ιδέας κατασκευάζειν, οἷον Σωκράτους, Πλάτωνος. If these examples indeed derive from Aristotle and have not been added by Alexander, we may assume that Aristotle introduced the Idea of a person *ex hypothesis* and for a destructive dialectical purpose only. This suggestion then was interpreted in a positive way by some Platonists. Note that according to Alcin. *Didasc.* 9.163.20-25 it is only the majority of the Platonists who exclude that Ideas of individuals (i.e. individual persons, τῶν κατὰ μέρος, οἷον Σωκράτους καὶ Πλάτωνος) exist. I believe this entails that some Platonists did accept

⁶² On *idea* and *idos* in Seneca cf. Whittaker (1990) 85 n. 63.

⁶³ See Armstrong (1977) 49 ff., Whittaker (1990) 99 n. 159. The passage from Alexander quoted next is included among the fragments of Aristotle's *De ideis* by Harlfinger *ap.* Leszl (1975) 26. Cf. also Robin (1908) 187; Wilpert (1949) 72, who *ibid.* n. 85 points out that he forgot to include the passage in his collection of fragments, and Berti (1962) 210 f. I do not believe, *pace* Goldschmidt (1953) 16 f., that at *De part. an.* A 4.644a23-5 Aristotle lists Socrates or Coriscus as instances of species; what is meant is that the individuals of the infima species do not differ as to species.

them;⁶⁴ presumably, only Ideas of persons were at issue.⁶⁵ However this may be, in the fourth position of Seneca's Platonic *scala entis* we not only find the immanent species-forms, but also the *idos* of individuals which we know much better as a Stoic notion (note that in the Platonic context it is restricted to individual persons). An Aristotelian ingredient is present in both the third and fourth positions, for Seneca uses the comparison with the statue for what is in the fourth position, and the image of the artist (which itself has been subjected to an *interpretatio platonica* because the paradigm is an *idea*) in both places.

As the lowest mode of being according to Plato Seneca mentions the quasi-beings, such as the void and time; he, or rather his source, has accommodated the Stoic incorporeals,⁶⁶ of which only two instances are provided, the λεκτὰ and place being conspicuously absent. Again, Seneca proves to be a hurried reporter. We have noted above that in the—from a Platonic point of view—heterodox division according to certain Stoics at *Ep.* 58.15, the *quid* is the highest genus, because it is above the *quod est*. Furthermore, these Stoics also split up the whole of things into such things as are and such as are not; this entails that the left column of their division could be set out according to the Platonic-Aristotelian analysis of genus and species. The things that are not (corporeal) are outside the divisible realm of 'being'. In the Platonic *scala entis* at *Ep.* 58.22 the things that are not are positioned, as quasi-beings, at the very bottom, under all the things that, variously, are. Consequently, one would now be in a position to argue, *more Antiocheo*, that the Stoic doctrine of incorporeals as quasi-beings is derived from Plato's and constitutes a perverted form of Plato's doctrine.⁶⁷ What seems possible, though it cannot be proved, is that Seneca has abridged a reference to genuine Platonic quasi-beings out of his account. In this connection,

⁶⁴ This minority may have appealed to the passage in the *Tim.* cited *infra*, Ch. VI n. 45 and text thereto. Although Alcinous seems to agree with the majority and to reject the individual or personal εἶδος, he cites the example of the individual's portrait at *Didasc.* 9.163.17-8 (this parallel proves that the artistic comparison, also familiar from Plotinus, was not invented by Seneca). Hans Gottschalk points out (*per litt.*) that the example of the individual portrait goes back to Plato *Phaed.* 73e. Cf. also *infra*, Ch. VI n. 45.


⁶⁵ To prove that you have to assume Ideas of persons Plotinus uses the image of the portrait too, but in a significantly different way: persons do not relate to the Idea man the way the many portraits of Socrates relate to Socrates (*Enn.* V 7 [18] 1).

⁶⁶ Cf. Theiler (1930) 8, Hadot (1968) 160. Brunschwig (1988) 54 f. argues that the qualification of the things in nature on the fifth level as *haec incipiunt ad nos pertinere* (*Ep.* 58.22) means that these correspond to the corporeal in Seneca's (Aristotelian) division. But the things in nature are what concerns us in view of what follows in the *Letter*, viz. the Platonic theory of flux which Seneca exploits for moral purposes (*Ep.* 58.22 ff.) and which is what his little essay really is about.


⁶⁷ See the literature cited *supra*, Ch. V n. 4, and Donini (1979) 275 ff.

one may for instance think of the division of the visible realm into (y) animals, plants etc. that are *περὶ ἡμῶς* (corresponding with the fifth level of the *scala* in Seneca) and (x) images such as shadows and reflections in mirrors and the like (*Resp.* VI 509e-510a). Such shadows play a prominent part in the parable of the cave (*Resp.* VII 515a). One may also think of the discussion of the two kinds of *εἰδωλοποιικὴ τέχνη* at *Soph.* 266a ff.

We may represent Seneca's Platonic division by means of the following diagram:



But we may also depict the five species of Being as an ordered series, in which each next species possesses less being than its predecessor. God is said to be in a pre-eminent degree (*per excellentiam esse*, 17). The Ideas are said to be in the proper sense of the term (*proprie sunt*, 18-9) and to be the patterns of all things. The immanent forms copy these patterns (20-1). The natural and perceptible things around us are not included by Plato among the things which are in the strict sense of the word (*non ... esse proprie*, 22). Void and time only have quasi-being (*quasi sunt*, 22). On the other hand, the immanent forms and so the things in nature are made after the pattern of the Ideas which ultimately depend on Being as the principle of things. Although the relation of God to both Being and the Ideas is not made clear, vertical causation is clearly at issue:



4 Conclusion

The hierarchic taxonomy of the whole of reality, stretching from being to persons, which is attributed to Aristotle is by no means genuinely Aristotelian, or rather is as un-Aristotelian as can be. Similarly, the ontological hierarchy attributed to Plato is not genuinely Plato's, but a later scholastic systematization; Being, God, the Ideas and the immanent forms can be paralleled from the Middle Platonist systems and in different ways from various passages in Plato's dialogues which were exploited by the Middle Platonists. The perceptible particulars on the fifth level of the Platonic scala can certainly be paralleled from Plato himself, and as we have seen the quasi-beings on the sixth may represent the images and shadows that make their appearance in various pages of Plato. The Platonic taxonomy provided by Seneca seems to represent an earlier systematization than the standard Middle Platonist ones that are familiar to us, and is important for this reason too.

The relations between being, lower genus, species and empirical particulars as variously set out in Alcinous (who however does not refer to the particulars), Clement (who possibly includes them) and Seneca are problematic, because the logical aspect clashes with the ontological. If one considers the highest genus of the Senecan collection, 'being', to be the highest entity of a *scala entis*, i.e. to be an existing rather than a conceptual or semantic entity, it should, because it also is the principle (*initium*, as Seneca says at *Ep.* 58.12) of empirical things, be the principle of matter as well; obviously, this raises a problem. This 'being' functions as a sort of *whole* (ὅλον) with unequal portions or parts that are discovered through division, or from which it is reached through collection. On the other hand, if one considers 'being' to be a logical entity only (γένος in the conceptual or semantic sense), you can never deduce from it the perceptible and corporeal things that exist empirically though perhaps you may deduce the concepts that refer to such individuals. Alcinous, to be sure, belongs to those who distinguish the division of the genus from that of the whole. Clement argues that, although the species is part of the genus, the division of the genus into its species should not be confused with that of the whole into its parts. Similar statements are made by Galen and Cicero. In the accounts of Alcinous and Clement these problems are not immediately visible. Their statements and distinguos however are stipulative and do not help to solve the difficulty at issue, which is particularly flagrant in the more uncouth account in Seneca, in which a logical method is turned into an account of a *scala entis*, or *entium*, inclusive of vertical causation. Furthermore, if the 'being' that, according to Seneca's account, is beyond the Platonic God is also

on the level immediately beyond the genus 'corporeal' and even is the ontological *initium* of things, it follows that the corporeal should exist no less than this God, or the *esse par excellentiam*, and that the Aristotelian-Platonic *animantia* should exist no less than the Ideas.⁶⁸ If the *animal* of the analysis-cum-division, which simultaneously is a *scala entis*, may be cavalierly associated⁶⁹ with the paradigmatic ζῷον of the *Timaeus* containing the Ideas of the living beings, the genera and species from *animal*/ζῷον downwards are endowed with existence. We shall see presently that the Middle Platonist doctrine was criticized on precisely this account by the Neopyrrhonists,⁷⁰ but at this point we should finally revert to Hippolytus' presentation of Aristotle's division of substance at *Ref.* VII 15 ff.

⁶⁸ The Stoic division of the γένος arguably could produce the same problems, but this diaeresis is explicitly said to pertain to concepts only; see Diog. Laërt. VII 60, γένος δέ ἐστι πλείονων καὶ ἀναφαιρέτων ἐννοημάτων σύλληψις, οἷον ζῷον· τοῦτο γὰρ περιείληφε τὰ κατὰ μέρος ζῷα. The meaning of the adjective ἀναφαιρέτων is not wholly clear, but note that according to Diog. Laërt. VII 61 εἶδος may denote both the species and the individual. Accordingly, the sense may be that the species cannot be 'taken away', i.e. not be reduced to one another, but must be left as they are. Cf. also Sext. *P.* II 219, quoted *infra*, text to Ch. VI n. 50, according to whom the Stoics thought of genera and species as concepts. The individual εἶδος, although possibly denoting an empirical object, must therefore be conceptual as well; it is linked up with the proper name of an individual or ὄνομα which signifies an individual quality, such as Diogenes, Socrates (Diog. Laërt. VII 58).

⁶⁹ Cf. *infra*, text to Ch. VI n. 45.

⁷⁰ See *infra*, Ch. VI 9-11.

CHAPTER SIX

ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES AND DIVISION OF SUBSTANCE ACCORDING TO *REF.* VII 15 FF.

VI 1 *The Division of Substance*

We may start with some observations about what is in *Ref.* VII 15. Hippolytus, giving the Middle Platonist *division* (διαίρεσις) of οὐσία—perhaps originally Andronican, although the ordered series is of course Aristotle's in the *Categories*—according to genus, species, and indivisible particular, says of species: ... εἶδος, ὡς ἐκεῖνος λέγει. I assume that what is meant is that Aristotle himself used the term εἶδος, not ἰδέα. In a Middle Platonist context, this would be significant, cf. e.g. Alcin. *Didasc.* 4.155.34-42 on the Ideas as distinguished from the immanent εἶδη, and Sen. *Ep.* 58.19-20 and 65.4-7 on the distinction between *idea* and *idos*. At *Ref.* I 19.2 the second of Plato's three principles is called ἰδέα. Hippolytus' source insisted that Aristotle spoke of the (logical) εἶδος. As a matter of fact, in the chapter of the *Categories* which is the ultimate source for Hippolytus' quotations concerned with subject and substance in *Ref.* VII 18, Aristotle uses εἶδος for the secondary substance. The intermediary tradition from which, as I shall try to show, Hippolytus derived his quotations from the *Categories* also paid attention to Aristotle's terminology. In the explanation at *Ref.* VII 16.1, however, Hippolytus adds the ἰδέαι which in this context may easily be mistaken for εἶδη. But this, as we shall see, is because the explanation prepares the ground for a polemical argument and is itself already coloured by polemical bias; according to the rules of ancient polemics, such sleight-of-hand is permitted.

Hippolytus further states (*Ref.* VII 15.2): καὶ ἔστι τὸ γένος ἔν(ν) ὃν πᾶσι τοῖς γεγενημένοις [*scil.*, εἶδεσι; cf., in the previous colon, ἀφ' οὗ γένους ... πάντα τὰ τῶν γεγονότων εἶδη] ἄρκουν. The genus is a sufficient cause, or ground, for the species that are derived from it. What, however, is the meaning of ἔν ὃν? There are two alternatives; the genus 'is one thing', i.e. is one, or the genus 'is one being'. As we shall see, the ambiguity is exploited by Hippolytus in what follows. That the genus, contrasting with the many things deriving from it, is said to be one is of course

certain; Hippolytus repeatedly drives home this point and exploits the contradiction that ensues because the genus is both a 'one' and a *σωρός*. However, I assume that according to the tradition on which his account depends the genus was regarded as a 'being' (*ὄν*) as well; we have seen above, in the Excursus, that according to the majority of the authorities cited by Seneca the highest genus is *τὸ ὄν* itself, and that by implication the genera 'corporeal' and 'animal' are *ὄντα* too. The source used an innocuous ambiguity, which by Hippolytus or rather in the polemical counter-tradition (for which see below) which he was able to make good use of was converted into a vicious equivocation.

VI 2 *The Division of the Genus 'Animal'*

Hippolytus (*Ref.* VII 15.2) then says that he will illustrate this theory by means of an example (*παράδειγμα*) which, as we notice, is not undilutely Aristotelian. This *παράδειγμα* follows in ch. 16; the division of the genus is exemplified by that of ζῷον, which is familiar from Alcinous, Clement, Seneca, Diogenes Laërtius on the Stoics and other similar literature. The animal in general is "not ox, not horse, not man, not god", etc.¹ He continues: ἀπὸ τούτου τοῦ ζώου αἱ πάντων τῶν κατὰ μέρος ζώων ιδέαι τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχουσι, καὶ ἔστι πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις τοῖς γεγεννημένοις ἐν (ε)ἴδεσι τοῦτο τὸ ἀν(ε)ίδεον ζῷον (ἀρχή), καὶ τῶν γεγεννημένων οὐδὲ ἓν.² Close reading discovers four items in this sentence, not three, viz. (a) the genus (ζῷον), (b) the Ideas (κατὰ μέρος ... ιδέαι), (c) the immanent forms or logical species (εἴδεσι),³ and (d) the particular living beings that 'have come into being' (πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις τοῖς γεγεννημένοις). Of what we have here, the levels (b)—(d) correspond to the third, fourth, and fifth levels of the Platonic scala at *Sen. Ep.* 58.18-22. Furthermore, the levels (a)—(b) correspond to the fourth and fifth levels of the Platonic-Aristotelian analysis at *Ep.* 58.9, whereas the level (d) corresponds to the seventh level at *Ep.* 58.12. The things (here the individual animals) that have come into being are said to be *in* the

¹ For the connection with *Ref.* I 20.2 and the *constitutio* of the text see *supra*, Ch. V n. 32 and text thereto. Cf. further Arist. *De an.* A 1.402b5 ff., εὐλαβητέον δ' ὅπως μὴ λαμβάνη πότερον εἰς ὃ λόγος αὐτῆς [*scil.*, of the soul] ἐστι, καθάπερ ζώου, ἢ καθ' ἑκάστην ἕτερον, οἷον ἵππου, κυνός, ἀνθρώπου, θεοῦ, τὸ δὲ ζῷον τὸ καθόλου ἥτοι οὐθέν ἐστιν ἢ ὕστερον. For the discussion of the final clause in the scholastic literature see *infra*, n. 61 and text thereto.

² Text as in Marcovich, two of whose supplements I have omitted. His (ἀρχή) is paralleled in what follows. However, (ἀρκοῦν) is equally possible and perhaps even to be preferred, cf. *Ref.* VII 15.2.

³ It is of course possible that in this passage ιδέα and εἶδος are coextensive; Hippolytus' captious argument also achieves its polemical purpose if they are assumed to be. Yet in the source used they seem to have been distinguished.

(various) species—as in Arist. *Cat.* 2, where the species however is a semantic or conceptual entity. But the *ιδέαι* are Platonic ideas rather than logical species, for they are said to possess reality (*ὑπόστασιν*).⁴ Note that, although Hippolytus does not explicitly say so here, the individual things that have come into being exist as well; indeed, at *Ref.* VII 17 he speaks of the *τῶν γεγενημένων ὑπόστασις*. In Hippolytus, the logical and the ontological strands have been interwoven in a way similar to that to be found in Sen. *Ep.* 58.

The genus is *ἀνείδειον*. In *Ref.* VII 18.1 (a passage further to be discussed below), *εἶδος* is used to denote both species and individual thing. In the present passage, *Ref.* VII 16.2, the *ἀνείδειον γένος* is said to be “not one [or: ‘not a single one’—*οὐδὲ ἓν*] of the things that have come into being”, that is to say to be not one of the empirical objects, or logically indivisible particular substances. Assuming that Hippolytus does not distinguish between necessary and sufficient conditions, we may infer that the individual *εἶδος* bestows individual *ὑπόστασις* (cf. *Ref.* VII 18.1). What is *ἀνείδειον*, that is to say what lacks *εἶδος*, cannot possess individual existence for this depends on ‘form’, or ‘shape’. Consequently, the amorphous genus, although being a *ἓν* or *ἓν ὄν* and so something single, cannot exist as an individual and therefore does not exist at all, as Hippolytus concludes in *Ref.* VII 17 (the argument of course turns on an equivocation).

In *Ref.* VII 16.2 he further explains what he means by the genus not being one of the things that ‘have come into being’. Man is an animal, taking its origin (*ἀρχήν*) from the genus animal, and so are, and do, horse, ox, dog, and each of the other animals. Clearly, the man and the others that have come into being here represent particulars. Accordingly, if the generic animal is not a single one of the individuals but these take their beginning therefrom all the same, the being, or existence, of the individuals that have come to be according to Aristotle (*κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλην*) turns out to be ‘from things that are not’ (*ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, *Ref.* VII 17). Yet this genus which is not and is not one “turns out to be a sort of single principle of the things that are” (*ibid.*, ... *γέγονε τῶν ὄντων μία τις ἀρχή*). It is clear that Hippolytus—or rather the source or tradition followed here—exploits the difficulty inherent in the assumption that the genus, which according to the Aristotelian orthodoxy is a

⁴ The term, as is well-known, was to become major terminus technicus in Neoplatonism; it was also used by Alexander of Lycopolis, who depends on Middle Platonist traditions (see Mansfeld (1974) 6 ff.). In view of the use of the term by Hippolytus to denote the existence of physical things that have come to be (see below, and also *infra*, Ch. VI 9-11 on Sextus), it is unlikely that in the present context it would have a Stoic rather than a Platonist connotation.

conceptual or semantic entity, i.e. a universal of a particular kind, embraces, or is shared by, all its species and their particulars. As a conceptual, or semantic, entity it does not exist the way individuals or particulars do, but only in the mind or in items which do have a meaning.⁵ But Hippolytus argues as if the genus not only is the common concept of the species and the particulars, but also in some way or other both their principle and their material (corporeal) substrate. Alex.(?) *Quaest.* II xxviii ("Ὅτι μὴ ἡ ὕλη γένος), argues at some length against this confusion, which entails that it was exploited by those who wished to criticize the nicer aspects of Platonic and Aristotelian diaeresis. This is a matter to which I shall return.

VI 3 *The Division of Substance and Genus, Continued; Individuals*

At the end of *Ref.* VII 17, Hippolytus says that he will tell us presently who is the later (Gnostic) follower of Aristotle who is the target of his polemics. In ch. 18, he goes on with his account of what he says is Aristotle's tripartite division of substance. The species (εἶδος) man, which is distinct from the other animal species, "is still an indiscriminate blend and has not yet been formed into a shape of existing [viz., individual] substance" (συγκεχυμένον δὲ ὅμως ἔτι καὶ μήπω μεμορφωμένον⁶ εἰς εἶδος οὐσίας ὑποστατῆς, *Ref.* VII 18.1). Here as well as in what follows, Hippolytus uses εἶδος to denote the individual, not the species as immediately before (I therefore this time have translated the word as 'shape'). "When by means of a name I have formed the man taken from the genus I give him the name Socrates or Diogenes or whatever individual proper name you wish, and when by means of the name I

⁵ Cf. *infra*, n. 15.

⁶ In such contexts, this appears to be a Stoic term, cf. Diog. Laërt. VII 134 = *SVF* II 299: σώματα εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς (*scil.*, God and matter) καὶ ἀμόρφους, τὰ δὲ (*scil.*, στοιχεῖα) μεμορφώσθαι. [N.B.: I read σώματα as in Diog. Laërt.; others, e.g. von Arnim at *SVF* II 299, follow Lipsius' conjecture ἀσωμάτων from the *Suda*, s.v. ἀρχή]. For qualityless Stoic matter cf. also Posid. Fr. 92 (Ar. Did. Fr. 20 D.), ἔφησε δὲ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην ἄποιον καὶ ἄμορφον εἶναι κτλ. In Hippolytus, the amorphous genus ζῷον is an ἀρχή. Cf. Alex. *De mixt.* 225.2 (*SVF* II 310), where the Stoic God gives form (μορφοῦντα) to matter and the context is very much similar to Diog. Laërt. VII 134; see esp. the sequel, *De mixt.* 225.26 f. (*SVF* II 1044), where particulars are at issue: ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γινομένων φύσει ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ εἶναι τὴν δύναμιν τὴν μορφοῦσάν τε καὶ γεννῶσαν αὐτά. Cf. also Chrysippus *ap.* Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1054A (*SVF* II 449), τὰς δὲ ποιότητας ..., οἷς ἂν ἐγγένωνται μέρεσι τῆς ὕλης, εἰδοποιεῖν [for this term cf. Alex. *De mixt.* 225.22 = *SVF* II 1044] ἕκαστα ('all individual things') καὶ σχηματίζειν. Compare also the scholastic account of form and matter according to Aristotle of Ar. Did. Fr. 3 *ap.* D.G. 448.19, ... τὸ μὲν εἰδοποιεῖ, τὸ δὲ διαμορφοῖ τὴν ὕλην. A remarkable parallel to what is in Hippolytus is found Porph. *Isag.* 15.16-8, τὰ γένη προϋποκείσθαι δεῖ καὶ διαμορφωθέντα ταῖς εἰδοποιαῖς διαφοραῖς ἀποτελεῖν τὰ εἶδη.

have grasped the man that has come into being as a shape from a genus, I call this kind of substance indivisible" (ὀνόματι μορφώσας⁷ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ληφθέντα ἄνθρωπον ὀνομάζω Σωκράτην ἢ Διογένην ἢ τι τῶν πολλῶν ὀνομάτων ἓν, καὶ ἐπειδὴν ὀνόματι καταλάβω τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶδος (ἀπὸ)⁸ γένους γεγεννημένον, ἄτομον καλῶ τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν, *Ref.* VII 18.1, continued). The style is remarkably reminiscent of the lecture-room. For this account of the individual Wendland appositely refers to *Sen. Ep.* 58. 16, on the *specialis* [*scil.*, *homo*] ... *ut Cicero et Cato*, and to *ibid.* 12, viz. to *singulos: Catonem* etc.⁹ He could have added, from *Ep.* 58.16, the sentence about the particular *species*. What is clear is that Hippolytus in *Ref.* VII 18.1 twice uses εἶδος in the Stoic sense of 'individual' or particular, which usage, as follows from the section in Seneca's letter just quoted, was incorporated in an early Middle Platonist account of the analysis of τὸ ὄν attributed to Aristotle and which, as follows from what comes next in this letter, presumably also influenced the equally early Middle Platonist account of the *scala* attributed to Plato by Seneca.¹⁰ I have also pointed out above that at the lowest level of the division attributed to Aristotle the originally Stoic individual εἶδος (*species* in Seneca's Latin) is equivalent to the Aristotelian primary substance. Hippolytus is perfectly explicit about the equivalence between this εἶδος and the individual substance according to Aristotle, here called ἄτομον as at *Cat.* 2.1b6, 5.3a35; in the next chapter, he explicitly adduces Aristotle's stipulative and descriptive definition of primary substance at *Cat.* 5. The parallel between Seneca and Hippolytus goes much deeper and therefore is far more important than Wendland supposed it to be. It is also worthwhile to consider the fact that the individual shape is formed by means of the bestowal of the proper name of an individual person:¹¹ Socrates etc., and that it is the individual person named in this way who is grasped. Giving proper names entails the bestowal of individual existence on the blurred specific εἶδος. 'Naming' apparently is here put on a par with the production of the portrait of an individual by putting the form in the matter.¹² But I do not know of any parallel in a Greek philosophical text for the tenet that the imposition of proper names creates individual particular things, or persons; the standard view—if in this context we prefer not to recall *Parm. Vorsokr.* 28B8.53 ff.—is that the name refers, or is attached to, or even expresses,

⁷ See previous note.

⁸ *Add.* Marcovich.

⁹ Marcovich omits these references.

¹⁰ See *supra*, Exc. 3.

¹¹ Cf. *supra*, Exc. n. 68.

¹² One may compare Thrasyllus' account of the τῶν εἰδῶν λόγος *ap.* Porph. *In Ptolem. Harm.* p. 12.21 ff.

something which is already there and which we have understood or perceived (a meaning, a thing, or a property etc.). Presumably Hippolytus thinks of God creating things by speaking, as in *Genesis*. The tenet adapted for this idiosyncratic purpose is originally Stoic; Hippolytus would have been less original if he had said that the individual is determined by an individual quality which can be expressed by a proper name. According to the Stoics, a proper name refers to the individual as 'individual quality': ὄνομα δέ ἐστι μέρος λόγου δηλοῦν ἰδίαν ποιότητα, οἷον Διογένης, Σωκράτης, Diog. Laërt. VII 58; note that the examples of proper names provided by Diogenes Laërtius are identical with those in Hippolytus. Whatever possesses such an individual quality may be called an εἶδος (Diog. Laërt. VII 58, quoted above, and *ibid.* 61, εἶδος ... ὥσπερ ὁ Σωκράτης). Although the term for 'to grasp' or 'to understand', *Ref.* VII 18.1 καταλάβω, 18.2 κατειλημμένον, became part of the philosophical *koine*, it originally at any rate is Stoic. The generic εἶδος man is at 18.1 said to be as yet συγκεχυμένον; this term too can best be understood if we recall that in the Stoic jargon σύγχυσις denotes a mixture of which the ingredients cannot be distinguished because they are not separate.¹³ Consequently, we may infer that the genus ζῶον, said at *Ref.* VII 16.2 to be amorphous (ἀν(ε)ίδεον),¹⁴ is presented as an

¹³ See *SVF* IV, Adler's *Index s.v.* Festugière (1932) 237 n. 4 aptly compares Plato *Resp.* 524bc, but in view of the context it is the Stoic terminology which should be considered first, the Platonic being capable of *interpretatio* as its anticipation, or (in the manner of an Antiochus) the Stoic as an imitation of a Platonic usage. Aristotle in a difficult passage pointed out to me by Keimpe Algra, *Phys.* A 1.184a21 ff., uses συγκεχυμένα for 'wholes' which are confusedly given in experience and known or perceived as to their general appearance; he compares the knowledge of such a 'whole' to that provided by a 'name' which has several meanings that have yet to be sorted out (see Ross' commentary *ad loc.*). The main difference with what is in Hippolytus is that according to the account of the latter the 'name' confers precision; furthermore, according to Arist. *loc. cit.* we should proceed upwards from such confused 'wholes' to their elements and principles, whereas according to Hippolytus we move downwards to the particulars. But the Aristotelian passage is not incompatible with what is in Hippolytus, and a later *interpretatio* of *Phys.* A 1 may have played a part in the genesis of Hippolytus' account.

¹⁴ At *Ref.* I 19.3, Plato's God is said to be ἀνείδεον; Moerschini (1972) 255 and Whittaker (1990) 96 n. 139 have not been able to provide a Middle Platonist parallel for this adjective as an attribute of the divine, and I have not found one outside Hippolytus either. However, one should certainly compare Alcin. *Didasc.* 10.165.4 ff., quoted *supra*, Exc. text to n. 7, and Clem. *Strom.* V 81.5 ff., quoted *supra*, Exc. text to n. 20, where it is said that God has no εἶδος. At Alcin. *Didasc.* 8.162.36 the adjective ἀνείδεος qualifies not God but wholly qualityless matter; so also at Ar. *Did.* Fr. 2 *ap. D.G.* 448.3, on Aristotle's doctrine; at Aët. I 9.4-5 (ps.Plutarch attributing the tenet to both Aristotle and Plato, Stobaeus to Plato only), and at Alex. *De an.* 4.1-2 (3.28-4.2, as to its vocabulary, is entirely Middle Platonist). Alex. (?) *De an. Mant.* 115.12-13 speaks of a σῶμα ἀνείδεον. In Philo, according to Mayer (1974), it occurs four times as an attribute of qualityless matter: *Conf.* 85, *Congr.* 61, *Fuga* 8, *Mut.* 135; on Middle Platonist matter in Philo see Runia (1986) 140 ff. Cf. also Plotinus, e.g. *Enn.* I 8 [51]

indiscriminate blend of species. Hippolytus' Aristotelian genus, in other words, is a sort of blurred whole containing the species as its as yet indistinguishable portions, or parts,¹⁵ and the species too is a sort of

3.14. At *Ref.* VII 28.4, Basilides' follower Saturninus is said to have made the Saviour ἀνείδεν. In Hippolytus there are accordingly two instances of the use of this attribute to qualify the divine. He does in a way treat the Aristotelian genus as a sort of material principle (cf. *infra*, n. 15), for it is said to be the original mixture—comparable to Basilides' cosmic sperma—from which the species and individuals it potentially is are separated off. On the other hand, the (Hippolytean) Aristotelian genus *qua* non-being is also put on a par with Basilides' non-existent God. Perhaps the adjective in the Plato chapter (*Ref.* I 19.3) is a Hippolytean plant; if so, he ascribed to Plato's God a Middle Platonist attribute of matter (which is perhaps originally Stoic, for Stoic matter too is entirely qualityless) and may, in order to expose Basilides as a plagiarist, have intended to ascribe it to Aristotle's God as well, then however forgetting to do as planned. Note that according to *Ref.* VII 19.7 Aristotle's God is wholly inexistent, and the Aristotelian genus according to VII 17-8 is nothing. It is however more likely that this attribution of the epithet of matter to God depends on an exegetic tradition. It may be compared to Calcidius' description of matter as hard to discover and even harder to explain in terms used by Plato in respect of the Demiurge (*In Tim.* p. 278.1-6, cf. *Tim.* 28c3-5), and with Damascius' application of the 'bastard reasoning' of *Tim.* 52b2, which in Plato pertains to place, to the discovery of the First Principle (*De princ.* I, p. 85.1-4). For these two passages see Whittaker (1989) 93. We may note that according to the Stoics both matter and God are without form (see Diog. Laërt. VII 134 = *SVF* II 299, cited *supra*, n. 6).

¹⁵ This is different from Aristotle's view according to which the genus may be considered to be the matter of the species (e.g. *Met.* Z 13.1038b12 f.; cf. Festugière (1932) 243 f., Cherniss (1944) 41 f., Lloyd (1981) 32 ff.). The interpretation of Grene (1974) is to be preferred to that of Rorty (1974). See also Porphy. *Isag.* 11.14-6, 15.6. The Aristotelian species as such cannot actually be present in a corporeally material genus, or conversely. The logical genus merely is the *logical* matter of the *logical* species, just as the *intelligible* or *conceptual* matter of the mathematical with spatial extension is the matter of the various figures or mathematical forms. The physical matter of the particular form, or of the form in the sensible particular, however, always is the proximate matter which is close enough to this form for the compound to be considered a unity. But one may understand how Aristotle's doctrine came to be interpreted in a way much resembling what we find in Hippolytus. One should keep in mind, however, that the genus can only be conceived of as a sort of matter in relation to, or in respect of, the species because both genus and matter may be considered relative, or relational, terms, and what they relate to is each time called εἶδος. Generally speaking, and strictly speaking (cf. Arist. *Cat.* 7), genus and form/species may operate as Aristotelian relatives or cases of πρὸς τι, because the species is the species of a genus and the genus the genus of a species; in the same way, the proximate matter is the matter of a particular form and the particular form the form of this matter. Each of these always implies its reciprocal correlative. The whole of Alex. (?) *Quaest.* II xxviii, 'Ὅτι μὴ ἡ ὕλη γένος, is devoted to an argument against the confusion of genus with matter, which shows that in the schools this question was a matter of debate. (Note, however, that this Alexandrian genus in some way still functions as a whole with portions or parts, II xxix 78.34-35 ... τὸ ἐν Σωκράτει ζῶον μόριον πῶς ὂν τοῦ γένους κτλ. Cf. *infra*, n. 53. It is not possible to read this statement in a nominalist way, for it is the genus in the individual as part of the individual that is concerned, not the genus as part of the definition of the species). That in scholastic discussions the genus was put on a par with matter in the corporeal sense of the word is also clear from Boëth. *De divis.* 879C, ... *genus speciebus materia est. Nam sicut aes accepta forma transit in statuam, ita genus accepta differentia transit in speciem.* For the exploitation of the similarity

blurred whole containing the individuals as its as yet indistinguishable portions, or parts. Genus and species are ones that are simultaneously many. The individual is an indistinct portion of the species, and such a portion of the species according to Hippolytus comes to be *qua* distinct individual when given shape by a proper name.

VI 4 *Echoes of the Categories; The Exegetical Tradition*

Further characterizing this individual, Hippolytus cites the stipulative definitions to be found in Arist. *Cat.* 5. He does so in a somewhat garbled and indirect form, i.e. not verbatim, and his text, unfortunately, has been overrestored from Aristotle's original by the editors of the *Ref.*¹⁶ I quote what appears to correspond to the manuscript at *Ref.* VII 18.2: ταύτην Ἀριστοτέλης πρώτην καὶ μάλιστα καὶ κυριώ(τα)τήν (οὐ)σί(α)ν καλεῖ, τή(ν) μήτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λεγομένην μήτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ οὖσαν.¹⁷ This quotation from the *Categories*, together with a few others, provides Osborne with support for her argument that Hippolytus studied the original text.¹⁸ She argues that the intelligent exegesis given by Hippolytus points in the same direction. It is however in my view certain that the quotations and the exegesis derive from the critical and exegetical literature of the first century BCE and the first and second centuries CE which was concerned with the *Categories*, and which, as appears from e.g. Clem. *Strom.* VIII, in its turn influenced at least part of the handbooks (for instance those of the *Περὶ αἰρεσέων* type, which compare the doctrines of the different schools but may also be written from the point of view of a particular school).¹⁹ We have noticed

between species as parts of a genus and parts in general as parts of a whole see also *infra*, Ch. VI 9-12.

¹⁶ Marcovich sinning more than Wendland.

¹⁷ *Cat.* 5.2a11 f. is significantly different: οὐσία δέ ἐστιν ἡ κυριώτατά τε καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένη, ἢ μήτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται μήτ' ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινί ἐστιν. Hippolytus, or rather his source, in places modifies the word-order or word-forms; he omits a few words, and he puts the whole quotation in *oratio obliqua*. Note that at *Ref.* VII 18.6, where the first part of this quotation is repeated (this time in *oratio recta*), the manuscript of Hippolytus again has πρώτη ... καὶ κυριωτάτη, not πρώτως καὶ κυριωτάτα as read by Marcovich and Wendland. This time, Aristotle's λεγομένη is not omitted after μάλιστα, which however does not entail, *pace* Marcovich, that it has to be interpolated in the earlier quotation at *Ref.* VII 18.3. For πρώτη καὶ κυριωτάτη cf. also *Ref.* VI 24.2, quoted *supra*, Ch. V n. 19, which confirms the manuscript text for VII 18.6 and 18.3. The fact that Hippolytus' version is consistently different from the Aristotelian original proves that it derives from an exegetical tradition; for other instances of this phenomenon see Whittaker (1989) *passim*.

¹⁸ Osborne (1987) 59 ff. She of course admits that it is not fully verbatim.

¹⁹ Cf. *supra*, Ch. II 2; for the literature on the *haireseis* see Mejer (1978) 60 ff., Mansfeld (1986b) 304 ff., 337, 378 f., Mansfeld (1987a) 248.

that, so far, Hippolytus' account of Aristotle's division of substance can be entirely explained with the *Aristoteles interpretatus* annexated by the majority of the Middle Platonists in mind. It would be odd if in this literature the category of substance as individual, species and genus had not been discussed and the primary substance of the *Categories* had not been documented in some way. We have seen in what way οὐσία came to be linked up with dialectical analysis-cum-division, and to what extent Seneca's early Middle Platonist sources took the individual into account. One therefore should not hesitate to adduce Plot. *Enn.* VI 1 [42]²⁰ 2.12 f., αἱ δὲ πρῶται λεγόμεναι οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰς δευτέρας τί ἂν ἔχοιεν κοινόν, ὅποτε παρὰ τῶν προτέρων ἔχουσιν αἱ δευτεραι τὸ οὐσίαι λέγεσθαι; One may add *ibid.* 3.12 f., τί ἄρα ... τὸ "ὑποκείμενον" καὶ ... μήδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ ὡς "ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ" ... ; Matters are clinched by the fact that Andronicus' pupil Boëthius, according to Simpl. *In Cat.* 78.4 ff., in his great and influential commentary on the *Categories* critically compared Aristotle's account, at *Cat.* 5, of substance as a single category (μίαν ... κατηγορίαν) with the tripartite division (διελόμενος ... εἰς τρεῖς) of substance as matter, form and the combination of both matter and form (as in the *Metaphysics*, e.g. Z 3.1029a2 ff., H 1.1042a25 ff., and elsewhere).²¹ Boëthius' interesting conclusion that the εἶδος should therefore be included in some other category, e.g. quality (for which he could have appealed to *Cat.* 5.3b13 ff., where however the secondary substance is said to signify μᾶλλον ποιόν τι, ... οὐχ ἁπλῶς δὲ ποιόν τι), or quantity, is irrelevant to the present inquiry. Note however that it can be paralleled from Boëth. *De divis.* 879B (*generis ... distributio qualitate perficitur. nam cum hominem sub animali locavero, tunc qualitate divisio facta est*), and so perhaps may even go back to Andronicus. What in our present context is more to the point is that Boëthius' argument turns on a discussion of the concepts of 'being in' something and 'being said of' something in Arist. *Cat.* 2; in his view, the *definition* of primary substance as found in *Cat.* 2 and 5 is applicable both to matter and to the compound of matter and form (Simpl. *In Cat.* 78.10 ff., ὁ Βόηθος τὸν τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας λόγον καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ τῷ συνθέτῳ ἐφαρμόττειν φησίν. ἐκατέρῳ γὰρ αὐτῶν ὑπάρχει

²⁰ For Plotinus' dependence on the earlier exegetical literature see *supra*, n. Ch. V n. 40 and text thereto. He had studied the *Categories* as well, but the problem cited in the text to the present note must have been discussed in the commentaries which he had read to him in his seminars.

²¹ Cf. Moraux (1973) 154, Gottschalk (1987) 1109. Cf. also Alex. (?) *Quaest.* II xxiv, which takes the parallel at Arist. *De an.* B 1.412a6 ff. as its starting-point. Galen knows it as well, see *De sequela* pp. 44.23-45.2 The tripartite division of the *Metaphysics* and the *De anima* is used by Nemes. *De nat. hom.* p. 26.12 ff., to explain Aristotle's view that the soul is *entelecheia* (for which see *infra*, Ch. VII 3): τὴν οὐσίαν τριχῶς λέγει [*scil.*, Arist.] κτλ.

τὸ μήτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεσθαι μήτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινὶ εἶναι). Simplicius clearly summarizes the argument; we may assume without hesitation that Boëthius quoted the relevant section of the *Metaphysics* and discussed the relevant lemmata of the *Categories* in his commentary. We therefore need not doubt that it somehow found its way from this commentary (or from a similar work) to the source(s) used by Hippolytus.

Hippolytus adds Aristotle's name; this is not more remarkable than that at Sen. *Ep.* 58.9 this name has been attached to the technical analysis of genus and species.²² Clement's account of single and propositionally connected words at *Strom.* VIII²³ 23.5-6 is a cento of several rather accurate quotations from Arist. *Cat.* 2 and 4, but in this chapter of *Strom.* VIII Clement (who as we have seen follows a secondary source, or tradition) does not mention Aristotle. The reason why Hippolytus is explicit about the Aristotelian authorship is that he wants to prove that Basilides surreptitiously took over Aristotle's theory; it is the polemical heresiologist who is committed to be precise about identities. In Seneca (*Epp.* 58 and 65), the names have been preserved for a didactic, or perhaps even ostentatious, purpose whereas Clement, in his systematic abstracts, does not need them, the only exception being the demonstration of the technique of the dialectical debate at *Strom.* VIII 10.3-8 which, using *Placita* material, cites doctrines of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics on the soul and identifies the philosophers at issue.

VI 5 *Definition and Definitions*

In his upper apparatus for *Ref.* VII 18.3-4, Wendland refers to the *Categories* but is wholly justified in pointing out that Sen. *Ep.* 58.9²⁴ is 'ähnlicher'. We may select a few important details. Explaining the expression καθ' ὑποκειμένου, Hippolytus says that the species man, horse, ox etc. are all designated by a 'common name' (κοινῷ ὀνόματι, ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι—cf. Sen. *Ep.* 58.9, *commune*), viz. ζῷον. According to the Stoic scholar Diogenes of Babylon *ap.* Diog Laërt. VII 58 = *SVF* III Diog. B. 22, the noun is a part of speech referring to a 'common' (κοινὴν) quality, e.g. 'man, horse'. Just as the instances of individuals quoted above from the same chapter in Diogenes Laërtius, the examples provided are again identical with the first two to be found in *Ref.* VII 18. Hippolytus however does not rest content with the common denomination, but adds

²² Cf. *supra*, Exc. 3.1.

²³ Cf. *supra*, Exc. 2.

²⁴ For which see *supra*, Exc. 3. Marcovich has omitted the reference.

that also the definition (ὅρος—several times in what follows in *Ref.* VII 18.4) is common to the various species. We have noticed above that among our Middle Platonist parallel sources, both Alcinous and Clement explicitly introduce the definition as the necessary link between the study of substance and the method of diaeresis, but that Seneca's account is rudimentary and incomplete.²⁵ In Hippolytus definition is also linked with substance in the account of the categories at *Ref.* I 20.2.²⁶ The parallel with Alcinous is further proof that the whole section in Hippolytus derives from an intermediary tradition.

This is also perfectly clear from the instance of a definition which is given at *Ref.* VII 18.4: ζῶον ... ἐστὶν οὐσία ἔμψυχος αἰσθητική. This is a blend of purely Aristotelian ingredients, but not to be found as such in Aristotle. It is a *scholastic* definition, which significantly enough can be precisely paralleled from the description of the dialectical debate at Clem. *Strom.* VIII 10.7 cited above (where we hear it is Aristotelian), from Sextus' critical account of division²⁷ at *P.* II 224 (where it is anonymous; cf. also *P.* II 220), and, significantly enough, from Alexander's commentary on Aristotle's *Topics*, *In Top.* 92.31-93.1 and 493.3-4 (where it is also anonymous), from the dialectical discussion of the status of the universal in Alex.(?) *Quaest.* I. xia²⁸ 21.25-26 and 22.10 (where it is again anonymous), and from a dialectical discussion at Nemes. *De nat. hom.* p. 11.3-5 (where it is said to be *the* definition of ζῶον). Compare also Themist. *In De an.* 3.25-6: ἐστὶν ὁρισμὸς τοῦ ζώου καθόλου, ὅτι οὐσία ἔμψυχος αἰσθητική.

At *Ref.* VII 18.5-6, Hippolytus accurately quotes Aristotle's descriptive definition of 'being in a subject': ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ [...] ²⁹ ὃ ἐν τινὶ μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ³⁰ ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶν. The quotation is verbatim, which in my view merely means that it derives from a source based on the critical and exegetical literature. Note that Simpl. *In Cat.* 48.1 ff. quotes—presumably from Porphyry, whose counter-argument follows—a substantial aporetic argument of Lucius (the predecessor of Nicostratus, perhaps to be dated to the mid-second century CE, perhaps earlier) concerned with the μὴ ὡς μέρος λέγεσθαι τὸ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ. Furthermore, Hippolytus' explanation employs the bipartition of the categories already found at *Ref.* I 20.1; this time, however, in

²⁵ Cf. *supra*, Exc.

²⁶ Cf. *supra*, Ch. V 2-3.

²⁷ Cf. *infra*, Ch. VI 9-11.

²⁸ Tweedale (1984) plausibly argues that this *Quaestio* is correctly ascribed to Alexander. *Quaest.* I xib has the same question as its starting-point.

²⁹ φησὶν, ἐστὶν Hippolytus; λέγω Aristotle.

³⁰ τοῦ is an indefinite pronoun (to be translated as *x*); cf. τινι.

the form αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ (substances) / συμβεβηκότα.³¹ He instances quality, referring to the other categories in general terms only; among the examples given this time, γλαυκοὶ deserves attention because it can be paralleled from ps.Archyt. *Categ.* p. 26.22 γλαυκότητα (where the context is the same: substance as 'in itself' as distinguished from the others)³² and Simpl. *In Cat.* 231.4 f., and so is a scholastic item too. Hippolytus points out that the other categories make the individual substances complete (18.6, ἐκ τούτων δὲ συμπληροῦνται τὰ ἄτομα). That the accidents 'fill up' the substance is technical language; see Busse's index to Dexipp. *In Cat.*, s.v., Kalbfleisch's index to Simpl. *In Cat.*, s.v., and especially Simpl. *In Cat.* 48.1 ff., the argument of Lucius also quoted above, where the latter speaks of the συμπληρωτικά τῆς οὐσίας: ... συμπληροὶ δὲ ... ἀπλῶς ποιότης και ποσότης κτλ. (previously, Lucius had provided concrete examples).³³

At the beginning of the next chapter (*Ref.* VII 19.1) Hippolytus rounds off his treatment of substance with the statement that it is not only divided into genus, species and indivisible, but also into matter, form and privation. This remark appositely introduces his short account of Aristotle's physics; we should interpret it as being the remnant of a fuller discussion. Boëthius, as we have seen, commenting on and interpreting Arist. *Cat.* 2 and 5, already adduced the alternative tripartite account of substance as matter, form and the compound of matter and form in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (*ap.* Simpl. *In Cat.* 78.4 ff.);³⁴ it is mirrored at ps. Archyt. *Categ.* p. 24.18 ff.³⁵ The alternative triad matter, form and privation derives from the account of change in the *Physics* (A 6-10, cf. Aët. I 3.22) and according to e.g. *Phys.* A 6.189a14 is concerned with the οὐσία; the distinction is also at issue in the *Metaphysics*, e.g. H 1, where Aristotle first speaks of matter, form and the compound of both³⁶ and then at 1042b3 ff. appends a remark on change and στέρησις, winding up the chapter with a reference to his *Physics*. Simplicius reports on objections raised by critics of Aristotle: if privation is the opposite of form and form is substance, substance has an opposite whereas, according to Aristotle in *Cat.* 5, substances do not have opposites. See *In Cat.* 107.31-108.4, with reference to the *Physics*, and 278.35-279.5, where the objection is ascribed to τινές. The same reference to the same problem is already to be found at Dexipp. *In Cat.* 52.18 ff. Consequently, also this

³¹ See *supra*, Ch. V 2-3.

³² Cf. *supra*, Ch. V 4.

³³ For its use by Plotinus see Strange (1987) 971.

³⁴ See *supra*, Ch. V n. 58.

³⁵ See Szlezák (1972) *ad loc.*, who mentions further parallels in Aristotle.

³⁶ Cited *supra*, text to n. 21.

brief section in Hippolytus' account of substance will be traditional and scholastic.

VI 6 *The Title Quoted*

There is one further item that has to be connected with the critical and exegetical literature concerned with Aristotle's *Categories*. This is found in the account of Basilides, who allegedly spoke about what Hippolytus calls homonymy (20.3-4). Hippolytus argues that this has been stolen from Aristotle, 20.5: 'Αριστοτέλης ... πρότ(ε)ρος τὸν περὶ τῶν ὁμωνύμων ἐν ταῖς Κατηγορίαις καταβέβληται λόγον. Osborne believes that this reference is part of the evidence supporting her claim that Hippolytus studied Aristotle on his own.³⁷ But it is linked with his account of the division of substance. In Alcín. *Didasc.* 5.156.32 f., the third kind of division³⁸ (the first being that of substance) is that of 'voice' into σημαίνόμενα, ὡς ὅταν ἐν καὶ ταὐτὸν ὄνομα εἰς πλείω πράγματα ἔλκηται. Cf. e.g. the parallel for the third kind of division at Boëth. *De divis.* 877 B, *est alia [scil., divisio], cum vox multa significans in significationes proprias recipit sectionem*. In Sextus' critical account of the method of division,³⁹ that of the ὄνομα εἰς σημαίνόμενα is the first kind to be mentioned (*P.* II 213; refutation of this type *ibid.* 214). At Clem. *Strom.* VIII 24 the account of the ten categories is followed by a detailed treatment of synonyms, heteronyms, homonyms etc.⁴⁰ Gal. *Plac. Hippocr. Plat.* IX 9.44 says that the dialecticians habitually use diaeresis for the division of words into their meanings. In what may be the earliest surviving post-Andronican reference to the standard ten Aristotelian categories, we find an explicit reference to homonymy; see the Aristotelian section of Ar. Did. *ap.* Stob. II p. 137.8 ff., καὶ ἄλλως δὲ πολλαχῶς διαιρεῖσθαι τάγαθά, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐν εἶναι γένος αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς δέκα λέγεσθαι κατηγορίας· ἐν ὁμωνυμία γὰρ ἐκφέρεσθαι τάγαθόν, τὰ τε τοιαῦτα πάντα ὄνομα κοινὸν ἔχειν μόνον, τὸν δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγον ἕτερον. The Peripatetic source used by Arius Didymus apparently is rather well-informed about the *Categories* or at any rate knows Andronicus' systematizing paraphrase (where systematic linkage between homonymy and categorical distinctions was provided *ad init.*), demonstrating his familiarity by applying this knowledge in an ethical context. Aristotle himself (*Eth. Eud.* A 8.1217b25 ff. and *Eth. Nic.* A 4.1096a23 ff.) had pointed out that the good is said in as many senses as being is, and listed several categories

³⁷ Osborne (1987) 56 f.

³⁸ Cf. *supra*, Exc. n. 2 and text thereto.

³⁹ See *infra*, Ch. VI 9, VI 11.

⁴⁰ Cf. *supra*, Ch. V n. 16.

according to which the good can be predicated. Arius Didymus refers to the ten categories, whereas Aristotle's lists are incomplete. Ultimately, his account derives from these Aristotelian passages, but its (Andronican?) original clearly provided a complete overview of the categories involved or was at least concerned with the assumption that all of them are.

There is consequently no reason whatever to assume that Hippolytus' source for the doctrine of homonymy is other than secondary. The coupling of the division of substance with that of words according to meanings is scholastic. It is of course noteworthy that Hippolytus only now for the first time mentions the title of the Aristotelian work from which the tenet ultimately derives. It must have been provided by his source.⁴¹

VI 7 *The Genus as Principle*

I have postponed treatment of one ingredient of Hippolytus' account, viz. his contention that the genus (ζῳον) is the ἀρχή of all (living) things, a tenet impossible to attribute to the historical Aristotle (cf. e.g. *Met.* B 3.998b14 ff.). This is not Hippolytus' own idea, but again derives from the literature adduced by him and so is another instance of the account in the *Ref.* preserving data otherwise more familiar from authors later than Hippolytus. One may however begin with two earlier parallels. To the extent that the genus *animal* in Seneca's Aristotelian analysis-cum-division (*Ep.* 58.9 and 14) is part of a *scala entis* with as its highest genus and principle (*ibid.* 12) 'being', or the *quod est*, it is itself a principle of what is below it, viz. the animal species and the individual animals, inclusive of human persons. This indeed is what Seneca explicitly affirms, *ibid.* 12: *illud genus 'quod est' ... initium [= ἀρχή] rerum est*. One may compare Cicero's definition of species at *Top.* 31: *forma est notio cuius differentia ad caput generis et quasi fontem referri potest*. This idea is often found in Neoplatonist authors,⁴² who however have given it an interpretive transcendentalist twist; Plotinus, e.g. *Enn.* VI 2 [43] 10 ff., discusses in what sense genus and principle are equivalent. An explicit parallel is at Simpl. *In Cat.* 77.16 ff.; the criticisms here answered by Simplicius are the same as those voiced in Sextus' critique of the diaeresis of genus at *P.* II 225-6.⁴³ This proves the tenacity of the scholastic arguments on either side of this issue. The scholastic use perhaps

⁴¹ Cf. *infra*, Ch. VI 8.

⁴² Cf. Theiler (1930) 7, Wurm (1973) 221 ff.

⁴³ See *infra*, text to n. 59.

derives from the other, more popular or colloquial senses of 'genus'—and from the second rather than the first—distinguished by Aristotle at *Met.* Δ 28.1024a29 ff.: γένος λέγεται τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἢ ἡ γένεσις συνεχῆς τῶν τὸ εἶδος ἐχόντων τὸ αὐτό, οἷον λέγεται ἕως ἂν ἀνθρώπων γένος ἢ ... τὸ δὲ ἀφ' οὗ ἂν ὅσι πρῶτου κινήσαντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι, οὕτω γὰρ λέγονται Ἕλληνες τὸ γένος κτλ.⁴⁴

Finally, the ζῶον as a principle containing and producing the ἰδέαι may remind us of the 'ζῶον itself' of the *Timaeus*. Note that Plato *Tim.* 30c says that this paradigm contains within itself as its *parts* (or *portions*) all the other living beings both individually—or does καθ' ἑν here refer to species?—and as to their kinds (οὗ δ' ἔστιν ἄλλα ζῶα καθ' ἑν καὶ κατὰ γένη μόρια), just as the world contains ourselves, i.e. the human beings, and the other creatures.⁴⁵

VI 8 *Cutting up the Evidence*

Hippolytus, unlike other authors of comparable overviews, does not provide anonymous quotations but gives us Aristotle's name. It is significant, however, that in *Ref.* VII 15-18 he does not refer to the title of the work from which the quotations ultimately derive although, as appears from VII 19, he knew several Aristotelian book-titles including, as is clear from the remark on homonymy at VII 20.5, that of the *Categories* ('Αριστοτέλης ... ἐν ταῖς Κατηγορίαις. Note that this is the title which is standard after Andronicus). The most likely explanation is that the source first discussed the doctrine of homonymy etc. in *Arist. Cat.* 1, referring to the book-title in this context, and then continued with the other chapters without repeating the title. Hippolytus however adduced this earlier part in a later chapter, citing the title only then, and first discussed (*Ref.* VII 15-18.4) what corresponds to *Cat.* 5—the doctrine of substance;—and then (VII 18.5-6) what corresponds to *Cat.* 2—the

⁴⁴ Cf. Porphy. *Isag.* 1.18-2.10 on the genealogical meanings of γένος. He concludes by pointing out that γένος in the logical sense may be believed to be analogous to these (2.11, καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἴσως τούτων εἰρημένον) and that the genus too is a sort of principle: καὶ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τίς ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτο [*scil.*, ὃ ὑποτάσσεται τὸ εἶδος] γένος τῶν ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος περιέχειν πᾶν τὸ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ. See *supra*, Exc. 3.5.

⁴⁵ I cannot enter into the interpretation of this difficult sentence here, but want to point out that the paradigm contains at least the idea of one individual, viz. of the cosmos itself. Procl. *In Tim.* I p. 425.16 ff. attributes to certain people and to Plotinus' pupil Amelius in particular the interpretation that Plato here distinguishes the individuals, or parts, from the more universal things (τινὲς δὲ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀντιδιαστέλλεσθαί φασι πρὸς τὰ κοινότερα· καὶ γὰρ εἶναι τὰ μὲν τῶν μερῶν, τὰ δὲ τῶν εἰδῶν παραδείγματα, καθάπερ Ἀμελίος φησι). *Ibid.* p. 429.9 ff. he cites an interpretation according to which the θρέμματα of *Tim.* 30c are all those beings in the cosmos that are nurtured by the king of what is visible (viz., the sun). See also *supra*, Exc. n. 65 and text thereto.

doctrine of inherence. Compared with Aristotle's treatise, Hippolytus' order of abstracts therefore amounts to the sequence ch. 5—ch. 2—ch. 1. What corresponds to *Cat.* 4—the list of the categories inclusive of examples—had been treated in *Ref.* I 20.1-2, and what corresponds to *Cat.* 10 had been reproduced at *Ref.* I 20.3 (the last in order to shore up the connection with Plato found in the Middle Platonist account of the latter).⁴⁶ We may observe Hippolytus using his scissors, so to speak, and cutting up the material found in his source, distributing it over his work and rearranging it to suit his polemical convenience.

VI 9 *Sextus On Division*

It is to Sextus' chapters on diacresis at *P.* II 213-28 that we should now turn,⁴⁷ because these provide a remarkable parallel to Hippolytus' account of the division of substance *qua* genus. It should first be noted that Sextus lists four kinds:⁴⁸ that of the word into meanings, that of the whole into parts, that of the genus into species and that of the species into individuals. He omits the division of the subject (e.g. the species) into accidents and that of the accidents into subjects, and interestingly enough distinguishes the division of the genus into species from that of the species into individuals. We have noticed above that although Alcinous does not refer to a division into individuals and Clement merely refers to it in an implicit way, Seneca indeed applies it.⁴⁹ But in Seneca the division of the species into individuals belongs with that of the genus into species, although the details of the former are given only subsequently. This also seems to hold for Sextus, for he does not argue against the dogmatist division into individuals in a separate section but takes it in his stride while opposing that of the genus into its species.

Describing his opponents' views, Sextus distinguishes two groups. The members of the first group hold that the genera and species are concepts (ἐννοήματα); he states that they have been sufficiently refuted by the attacks against the 'regent part' and the 'presentation' which evidently he need not repeat (note the technical terms: τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ καὶ τῆς φαντασίας, *P.* II 219). Without any doubt, the first group consists

⁴⁶ Cf. *supra*, Ch. V 2, V 5.

⁴⁷ The passage is mentioned, together with others from Sextus, by Osborne (1987) 36 ff., esp. 38, who however has omitted to study it in depth (*ibid.* 37 she argues that 'we know no direct parallel for' *Ref.* VII 16-18). Her conclusion that Hippolytus' arguments about genus and substance "resemble those of the Sceptics of his day in style and attitude" (*ibid.* 40) is good.

⁴⁸ Alcinous lists five and Clement three; see *supra*, Exc. 1, Exc. 2.

⁴⁹ Cf. *supra*, Exc. 1, 2, 3.3-7.

of the Stoics.⁵⁰ The members of the other group attribute an 'existence of their own' (ιδίαν ὑπόστασιν) to the genera and species; they are refuted at some length in what follows. Recalling Seneca's Aristotelian division of genus and species which amounts to a *scala entis*, and also remembering the division of substance in Alcinous and Clement,⁵¹ we are in a position to assume that the second group consists of Middle Platonists (that is to say, inclusive of the Middle Platonist Plato and the *Aristoteles interpretatus*).

In his refutation (*P.* II 220 ff.), Sextus first establishes that the genus of the species that belong with it is single (ἓν). If so, and if the genus *qua* 'one' is in all its species, each of these participates either in the whole genus or in part of it. But the genus cannot, as a whole that is one, be entirely contained in each of the many species. If only a part of it is in the species, man for instance will not be a living being but only part of a living being; e.g. he will be a substance but neither animate nor sensitive.⁵² Furthermore, if only participation in a part is at issue, the part will either be the same in all cases or different in each case. Participation of all species in the same part of the genus encounters the same difficulty as participation in the whole genus. On the other hand, if each of the species partakes of a different part, they will either be generically different, which conflicts with the notion of a common genus, or each genus will become infinite, being divided not only into entirely different species but also into entirely different empirical individuals. For the genus, along with its species, is actually thought of as being in the individuals. Participation of the different species in different parts of the genus is therefore self-contradictory.⁵³ This Neopyrrhonist argument certainly recalls, as Pier Luigi Donini points out to me (*per litt.*), the argument against participation at Plato *Parm.* 131a ff. Accordingly, it may be an instance of the well-known Neopyrrhonist penchant for the adaptation of earlier arguments; cf. also Sext. *P.* III 158 ff. and *M.* X 284 ff., where arguments against participation ultimately derived from the introductory section of the *Parmenides* are likewise used. Alcin. *Didasc.* 6.159.35 proves that the *Parmenides* was involved in the discussion concerning the categories, so Donini may well be right in suggesting that

⁵⁰ Cf. Bury's note *ad loc.*, also for the passages where the refutation is to be found. Note moreover that Sext. *P.* II 223 ff. (cf. *FDS* 718) includes the supporters of the Stoic highest genus, or τ. The fragment at *P.* II 219 is not in *SVF* or *FDS*.

⁵¹ See *supra*, Exc. 1-2.

⁵² For this scholastic Aristotelian definition see *supra*, text to Exc. n. 5.

⁵³ I have set out in full an argument which obviously has been epitomized by Sextus. It should be acknowledged that Sextus does not argue *in vacuo*: according to Alex. (?) *Quaest.* II xxviii 78.15 f. it is not possible that τὸ ἐν Σωκράτει ζῶον ἐν ἄλλῳ γενέσθαι τινί, whereas τὸ ἐν Σωκράτει ζῶον μοριόν πως ὄν τοῦ γένους (cf. *supra*, n. 15).

if we consider the strong resemblance between what is at Sext. *P.* II 220 ff. and Plato *Parm.* 131a ff. in the light of the hint provided by Alcinous, we may assume that Sextus' argument is connected with a Middle Platonist interpretation of this passage.

VI 10 *Sextus' Account Compared with Hippolytus'*

If we strip away the polemical garb of Sextus' exposition and consider the doctrine it develops, the resemblance with Hippolytus' account of the Aristotelian division of substance is striking. The genus is a ἅν, just as in Hippolytus. The ὑπόστασις attributed to the genera and species by Sextus' opponents corresponds to the ὑπόστασις attributed to the Ideas under the genus at *Ref.* VII 16.2. The sequence genus—species—individual person corresponds to that at *Ref.* VII 16-18. We have pointed out above that Hippolytus treats the genus as if it were a 'whole' with parts,⁵⁴ or at least that according to him the species is part of the genus⁵⁵ the way the individual is part of the species, and conversely. That the genus can be present either as a whole or as to its parts in what is below it is refuted by Sextus, who for polemical purposes apparently refuses to accept the distinction which according to the traditions represented for us by Cicero (in the *Topica*), Alcinous, Galen, Clement and Boëthius should be observed between the division of the whole and that of the genus.⁵⁶ We may on the other hand cite a few passages from Cicero's rhetorical works where the term parts is used for the species of a genus: *De orat.* I 189: *genus ... duas aut plures complectitur partes*; *Orat.* 116: *generis sive formas sive partes*; *De inv.* I 32: *... genus est quod plures partes amplectitur, ut animal. pars est quae subest generi, ut equus.* Sextus' (and Hippolytus') argument, we may infer, is not directed against a non-existent opponent.

⁵⁴ *Supra*, Ch. VI 2-3.

⁵⁵ Cf. *supra*, Exc. 2, on this doctrine in Clement. The converse of this doctrine, which plays a part in Sextus' argument, entails that the genus is a part of the species and the species a part of the individual. Sextus' opponents anticipate an argument of Plotinus. In his account of the Aristotelian categories, Plotinus adduces the doctrine, found in *Met.* Z and elsewhere, according to which the candidates for the position of substance are either the matter, or the εἶδος, or the compound. He interprets the being said of a subject, as the εἶδος is of the primary substance, as being *part* of a subject. Consequently, the εἶδος is a part of the primary substance, and the genus is a part both of the εἶδος and of the primary substance (ἐνυπάρχον ὡς μέρος, *Enn.* VI 1 [42] 3.16 ff.). The critical comparison between the doctrine of substance in the *Categories* and the discussion of the various alternatives in the *Metaphysics* is at least as early as Boëthius (see *supra*, Ch. V 2, V 4), whose solution differs from that of Plotinus. Cf. the excellent account of Strange (1987) 770 ff., who however has failed to notice that Plotinus appears to be dependent on a Middle Platonist exegesis.

⁵⁶ Cf. also *supra*, Ch. V n. 54 and text thereto; Riposati (1947) 64.

At *Ref.* VII 18.3, Hippolytus says that ox, horse, etc. do not differ *qua* living beings; Sextus points out that, absurdly, the species and the individuals would differ in precisely this respect if participation would each time turn out to be in a different part of their genus.

VI 11 *Sextus On Division, Continued, and Further Compared with Hippolytus*

In what follows (*P.* II 223 ff.), Sextus argues against the Stoic genus of the 'anything', but his main target is again the genus animal, or living being, which as we have seen is the favourite scholastic example of the Stoics, Aristotelians and Platonists.⁵⁷ I only cite the second part of his argument. If the 'anything' is assumed to be everything it contains, which is patently absurd, each of the species and each of the individuals 'in which it is' (ἐν οἷς ἐστί),⁵⁸ will have to be all things. The premise, viz. that the genus 'is' all that it contains, may be compared with the contention at *Ref.* VII 18.1 that the genus is a blend of both the species and the individuals; however, Hippolytus adds the important qualification that these contents are indistinct before they have been produced from the genus. Sextus illustrates in what way each thing would have to be all things if the genus were all things. The living being is the example provided; just as the genus itself, each species thereof will be an animate sensitive substance, 'as they [*scil.*, the dogmatists] say',⁵⁹ i.e. have the same attributes as the genus. Accordingly, if the genus is both corporeal and incorporeal etc., each species and each individual (ἐκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν καθ' ἑκαστον) will also be each of these contraries. It should be noted that precisely this old argument *con* is refuted by *Simpl. In Cat.* 77.16 ff. the better to shore up the tenet that the genus may be an ἀρχή. This late parallel eloquently attests the vitality of the conflicting traditions.⁶⁰ Alternatively, Sextus says, if the genus 'is' only part of what is in it, it will not pertain to the other species apart from these; e.g. if the 'anything' is a body only, there will be no incorporeal something, and if the living being is rational only, there will be no irrational animate being, etc. Both alternatives are equally impossible. Therefore, Sextus concludes, the genus does not exist at all (οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὅλως τὸ γένος, *ibid.* 225).

Sextus also refutes the view that the genus is potentially all things (i.e.

⁵⁷ It would seem that in the original version of the doctrine argued against by Sextus (who presumably reproduces an earlier Neopyrrhonist argument) the division of the ζῶον as highest genus was juxtaposed to that of the τι.

⁵⁸ This again presupposes the doctrine of inherence as in Plotinus, see *supra*, n. 55.

⁵⁹ Cf. *supra*, n. 55.

⁶⁰ See *supra*, text to n. 34 for a similar instance.

that it would only not-be in a qualified sense). The details need not detain us. That the genus would potentially be all things entails that the things (i.e. the species and individuals) come to be because the genus is actualized in them. According to Aristotle, whose concepts of the actual and the potential are exploited by Sextus, what is potential is not, i.e. is-not in a relative sense; it is-not-(yet)-what-it-is-to-become. We may also adduce the scholastic point about matter as the first of the three meanings of Aristotelian οὐσία at Nemes. *De nat. hom.* p. 26.12 f.: τὸ μὲν ὡς ὕλην ὑποκείμενον, ὃ καθ' ἑαυτὸ μὲν οὐδέν ἐστι, δύνάμιν δὲ ἔχει πρὸς γένεσιν. The resemblance of Sextus' analysis to Hippolytus' account of the genus as the blend of as yet indistinct species and individuals, and of the genus as not existing (although Hippolytus intends this in an absolute sense) is obvious. This makes Sextus' conclusion doubly interesting: "hence the genus [which obviously he treats as co-extensive with matter], which they pretend to divide into species, is nothing" (οὐκοῦν οὐδέν ἐστι τὸ γένος, ὃ διαίρειν εἰς τὰ εἶδη λέγουσιν, 226). For Sextus, like Hippolytus, jumps from the relative to the absolute sense of 'not being'. Porph. *Isag.* 10.22-11-6 implicitly argues against the point of view represented by these accounts of Hippolytus and Sextus and thereby attest the tenacity of the arguments on either side. He says that according to his predecessors difference is that by which the species exceeds the genus. Animal, for instance, is neither rational nor mortal; it does not possess all the contradictory differences of its species, for the same thing then will possess (ἔξει) contradictory qualifications. However, in their view it possesses all the differences of its subordinate species potentially, not actually (δυνάμει μὲν πάσας ἔχει τὰς ... διαφοράς, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ οὐδεμίαν). "Accordingly, neither does anything arise from what is not nor will contraries exist simultaneously in the same entity" (οὕτως οὔτε ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων τι γίνεται κτλ.).

The original author of Sextus' argument that the genus, i.e. animal, is not, may also have availed himself of comments on, or quotations of, an Aristotelian puzzle. At *De an.*, A 1.402b7 f. Aristotle says: τὸ δὲ ζῶον τὸ καθόλου ἦτοι οὐθέν ἐστίν ἢ ὕστερον. Alex.(?) *Quaest.* I xia,⁶¹ on universals, may be arguing *inter alia* against Neopyrrhonist criticisms, and he

⁶¹ See *supra*, n. 1, n. 28 and text thereto. Cf. also Arist. *De an.* B 3.414b20-28, and the comments of Lloyd (1962) 72 ff., whose references to the Bekker pagination have got wrong however and who has missed the phrase in *De an.* A 1. He usefully adduces *Polit.* Γ 1.1275a34 ff.; in the ordered series of *politeiai* the κοινόν is ἡ τὸ παράπαν οὐδέν ... ἢ γλίσχως. But this passage, unlike those from the *De anima*, does not seem to have been discussed by the ancient commentators. One may add a further parallel for the alternative in Aristotle: *Met.* Z 12.1038a5-6 (Aristotle is speaking about the division of ζῶον), ... τὸ γένος ἀπλῶς μὴ ἐστι παρὰ τὰ ὡς γένους εἶδη, ἢ εἰ ἐστι μὲν ὡς ὕλη δ' ἐστίν κτλ. Cf. *supra*, n. 15.

may have had Aristotelian predecessors. This short piece not only uses the by now familiar scholastic definition of ζῷον,⁶² but also has other points in common with the passages in Sextus and Hippolytus discussed in the above. The point of departure is the formula at *De an.* A 1.402b7 f. just quoted. The problem of the existence versus the non-existence of the universal genus is treated in this *quaestio* by means of a discussion of the relation of the γένος to what it is a genus of.

I do not, of course, affirm that Sextus' arguments contra the dogmatist division of the genus, along with the twice expressed corollary that the genus is nothing, or is not at all, are identical with Hippolytus' contention that the genus that is divided into species and individuals is nothing. It remains, however, true to say that what in Sextus is part of the refutation, viz. the conclusion that the genus is nothing, in Hippolytus is part of an account of genus which, although coloured by polemics, is presented as a description. One should note that for a Christian a 'nothing' from which things are derived or created is not the impossibility it would be to a Greek philosopher. Furthermore, Sextus' point that if the species and the individuals all participate in different parts of the genus they must be totally dissimilar may be capped by the argument that, if they really are totally dissimilar, they cannot participate in the one genus at all—Sextus says that in this case they would be generically different, i.e. would not participate in the genus in which they are assumed to participate—or, conversely, that the genus in no way whatsoever 'is' any of the species or individuals. That the genus 'is' not a single entity among the individuals is what Hippolytus repeatedly affirms (*Ref.* VII 16.2 [twice], 17 [three times]). The inference that he was familiar with arguments contra the division of the genus much resembling those to be found in Sextus is inescapable, although it is clear that what he offers has not been derived from this section of the *Pyrrhoneiai Hypotyposes*. Hippolytus knew other works by Sextus; he transcribes a passage from *M.* X in his own *Ref.* X, and another passage from what is now *M.* V in *Ref.* IV.⁶³ At *P.* II 219, Sextus tells us that he will set out the argument against the division of genera and species at greater length elsewhere. In what survives of his works such a discussion is not to be found. It may of course have been contained in a work or a section of a work (e.g. the original *M.* I-V)⁶⁴ now lost. Because Sextus as a rule depends on his Neopyrrhonist predecessors, the larger argument itself will have been available elsewhere too. Rather than

⁶² See *supra*, text to n. 27.

⁶³ Cf. *infra*, App. 1, p. 318, p. 319, p. 324 f.

⁶⁴ See Blomqvist (1974) 7 ff.

crediting Hippolytus with a very original interpretation of what is at *P.* II 219 ff., I would assume that he utilized an available Pyrrhonist argument (echoing that at *Plat. Parm.* 131a ff.) against the *Aristoteles interpretatus*. However, this argument may have been incorporated in a handbook used by him, especially if this was of the *Περὶ αἰρεσέων* type. His polemical mind shrewdly interpreted it in a literalist way, exploiting what in fact is a refutation as if it were a description. This reading made it possible for him to draw the parallel between Aristotle's doctrine of substance *qua* nothing and *qua* principle of the things that have come into being, and Basilides' doctrine of the *genesis*, or creation, *ex nihilo*.

VI 12 *The 'Heap'*

Up till now I have omitted to discuss the passage in *Ref.* VII 15.2 where Aristotle's genus is called a sort of 'heap' (σῶρὸς) that is as it were a mixture of many and different seeds (σπερμάτων), "from which sort of genus as from a heap all the species of the things that have come into being are separated out, as it were". Osborne recognizes that Aristotle nowhere calls the genus a heap,⁶⁵ but cites *Met.* Z 16.1040b5 ff. as a parallel. In this passage, however, the physical elements (which, we should add, constitute the matter for the homœomeric parts) are said to be mere potentialities before they are concocted, and something (i.e., a single living being, and not immediately but in the long run) comes to be a single thing from them. The parallel is not a good one. Aristotle speaks of matter not form, and there is no separating out from this matter but a complicated process of change which turns it into the stuffs living things are composed of. There is, in Aristotle, no parallel for the genus as a heap. Without doubt Hippolytus, using the material relating to Basilides, on this particular point doctored the evidence used for comparison the better to expose Basilides (I have found no parallel in the exegetical and doxographic literature for σῶρὸς meaning 'heap', and it is highly unlikely that, reinterpreting it in the process, he took the term from the passage in the *Metaphysics* quoted above). For according to Hippolytus' description of Basilides' doctrines, the non-existent cosmic *sperma* and the τῆς πανσπερμίας σῶρὸς created by the non-existent God play a central part in Basilides' cosmogony (see *Ref.* VII 21.4-5, 22.16, 23.3, 24.5, 25.6, 27.5), and this one *sperma* contains within itself the many ἰδέας of polymorphous and many-coloured and variously

⁶⁵ Osborne (1987) 45 ff. On the genus as matter in Aristotle and Hippolytus see *supra*, n. 14, n. 15, n. 61.

complex substances (οὐσιῶν, 21.5). Consequently, the σωρὸς has so to speak been interpolated from the report on Basilides into the introduction to the account of Aristotle's doctrine of substance and genus (the cento method).⁶⁶ This is how polemics were conducted in Antiquity, and of course the polemical heresiologist cannot resist the temptation to indulge in overkill; his trumpeted discovery that Basilides derives from Aristotle indeed was a sort of scoop. The point of departure is the genus *qua* potentiality in chs. 16-18, although he does not use this term but describes it as an indiscriminate blend of species and individuals.

That Hippolytus is not beyond doctoring the philosophical evidence which serves as his springboard may e.g. be proved by adducing an important parallel in the *Philosophoumena*. At *Ref.* I 2.6 (repeated IV 51.4-5 and summarized VI 23.1) the two principles of Pythagoras are said to be the Monad and the Two (ἡ δυνάς).⁶⁷ In the other extant Neopythagorean or Neopythagoreanizing accounts of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, the principles are said to be the One and the *Unlimited* Two (ἀόριστος δυνάς). Burkert has suggested that the Hippolytean formula, which posits the One and the Two as numbers, 'clearly' is 'a Gnostic interpretation'.⁶⁸ But it is a Gnosticizing interpretation. The Unlimited Two would not be useful in a proof purporting to demonstrate that the *Valentinian* system derives from the Pythagorean, so Hippolytus purposefully omitted the word 'unlimited' the better to expose Valentinus. Accordingly, the Gnosticizing interpretation of Pythagoreanism is that of Hippolytus himself. In the account of Aristotle, he falsifies his documentary evidence not by omission but by interpolation (the cento method), just as in his account of the Stoics at *Ref.* I 21.5 he interpolates the word ἀνάστασις in order to turn the Stoics into Pythagoreans who stole the doctrine of the resurrection from the Jews.⁶⁹ And at *Ref.* VII 30 he fiddles the record by interpolating the Marcionite ban on sex with women into the account of Empedocles' doctrines (see below, Ch. IX 1.3).

VI 13 *The Value of Hippolytus' Account of Aristotle's Categories*

Before we continue with the other Aristotelian doctrines set out much more briefly in *Ref.* I 20 and VII 19 (there are also a few remarks in the account of Basilides' doctrines at VII 21 ff.), a few words should

⁶⁶ Cf. Festugière (1932) 246 f., Edwards (1990) 27. For the cento method see *infra*, Chs. VIII-IX.

⁶⁷ See further *infra*, Ch. VIII 2.

⁶⁸ Burkert (1972) 60 n. 48.

⁶⁹ See Mansfeld (1983c).

be said about Osborne's contention that the exegetical and critical context of the quotations from the *Categories* in *Ref.* VII 15-19.1 is even more important for an understanding of Aristotle than these quotations themselves.⁷⁰ If the *Categories* and *Metaphysics* had been lost, a painstaking examination of Hippolytus' procedure, she argues, would have enabled us to recover a central doctrine of Aristotle. This counterfactual argument threatens to be inconclusive, for after all we do have the relevant works and are hardly in a position to conduct an unprejudiced investigation of what is in Hippolytus. She adds: "The vast majority of the secondary material included by Hippolytus is based on a *close and intelligent reading of Aristotle's text* and represents a *well-supported interpretation* of it" (italics mine).⁷¹ With this statement I find myself entirely in agreement; however, it does not, *pace* Osborne, follow either that this reading and interpretation are to be attributed to Hippolytus himself or that the account of Aristotle can be adduced as a test case which proves that also the contexts of other fragments in Hippolytus (such as those of Heraclitus and Empedocles) are indispensable for a better understanding of original works which, this time, have indeed been lost.⁷² Hippolytus' account of Aristotle's logic is interesting and of some value because the source or sources used by him had been nurtured by and was/were based on a rehash of several centuries of exegesis and criticism of the Aristotelian *Categories* and the doctrines involved by experts such as Andronicus, Eudorus, Boëthus, Athenodorus, Lucius, Nicostatus, and Sextus Empiricus and other Neopyrrhonists. In other words, his account of what he calls Aristotle's division of substance is interesting and even to some extent informative because his sources were. But his Aristotle remains an *Aristoteles interpretatus*, and the exposition as a whole is not original but at second hand.

⁷⁰ Osborne (1987) 59, 61, 65 ff.

⁷¹ Osborne (1987) 65 f. (my italics).

⁷² The quality and character of the exegesis in which the fragments of Empedocles or Heraclitus are embedded in the *Ref.* have to be tested and investigated independently. See *infra*, Ch. IX.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ARISTOTELIAN PHYSICS, THEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY AND ETHICS: THE TRADITIONS AGAIN

VII 1 *Introduction*

That Hippolytus' exposition is at second hand is not only valid with regard to his account of the logical doctrines discussed in Chs. V-VI, but also holds for what follows in *Ref.* VII 19.1-8 as well as for the extra bits embedded in the account of the doctrine of Basilides. What we find there should be put on a par with what is to be found in the later part of *Ref.* I 20, although VII 19 contains items lacking in the corresponding chapter of the *Philosophoumena*, and conversely.

The first thing now to be noted (actually, it is rather overdue) is that in *Ref.* I 20 the philosophy of Aristotle is described in the order logic, psychology, ethics, both the doctrine of the soul and the ethics being linked up with cosmological tenets. In VII 15-19.1, we have the sequence logic followed by physics including theology, then by psychology and finally by a brief remark about ethics. From a structural point of view, the two passages are similar to a degree. Treatment according to the parts of philosophy belongs with Hippolytus' overall program.¹

VII 2 *The Aristotelian Cosmology; The Soul*

We may start with the cosmology at *Ref.* VII 19.1-3. This is a tripartite one, just as the division of substance discussed in the previous chapter (*Ref.* VII 18) is tripartite. The universe consists (1) of the part from the earth to the moon, deprived of providence, not subject to government, its own nature being sufficient for it; that is to say, it is the domain of φύσις² (cf. the Aristotelian doctrine according to Atticus *Frr.* 3.85, 8.10-11). (2) The middle part stretches from the moon to the surface of the heavens, that is to say to the outer rim of the world. This section is the realm of

¹ Cf. *Ref.* I *keph.* 2, and e.g. *supra*, Ch. I 7.

² ἀρκούμενον μόνῃ τῇ φύσει τῇ ἑαυτοῦ. *Ad sententiam*, this must be equivalent to *Ref.* VII 19.4 τῶν φύσει καὶ οὐ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων. For what is below the moon nature, not providence, is the sufficient cause (ἀρκούν—cf. e.g. VII 15.2).

order, providence and government. (3) The surface (of the heavens) is a sort of fifth substance (πέμπτη τις ... οὐσία), different from all the natural elements, viz. the canonical four which make up the world, and according to Aristotle this substance is of a hypercosmic kind.

Corresponding with this tripartite division of the universe (κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν τοῦ κόσμου), according to Hippolytus, is a tripartition of philosophical theory (19.4, ὁ τῆς φιλοσοφίας διηρημένος λόγος).³ The Φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις deals with the things below the moon which are governed not by providence but by nature. The Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, a special treatise, deals with the things beyond the moon. Thirdly, there is also a special theory (λόγος)⁴ concerned with the fifth substance; this is theological (γέγονε δὲ αὐτῷ περὶ πέμπτης οὐσίας ἴδιος λόγος, ὅς ἐστιν αὐτῷ θεολογούμενος).⁵ We must note that this division is much different from the standard tripartition of philosophy into logic ethics physics with which Hippolytus shows himself to be familiar in the *Ref.*

I shall return to the book-titles in a moment. First, we should study what is in *Ref.* I 20. There is no separate cosmological section in this chapter of the *Philosophoumena*, but the snippets of cosmological theory to be found there closely fit the doctrine provided in *Ref.* VII 19. At *Ref.* I 20.4, Hippolytus speaks of a fifth body (cf. the fifth substance at VII 19.3) which is posited by Aristotle alongside the other four; it is more refined, being comparable to a sort of *pneuma* (... τῷ πέμπτῳ σώματι, ὃ ὑποτίθεται εἶναι μετὰ⁶ τῶν ἄλλων τεσσάρων, τοῦ τε πυρὸς καὶ τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ

³ For this (also doxographic) standard expression cf. e.g. Diog. Laërt. III 56, τῆς φιλοσοφίας ὁ λόγος (Plato), V 28, τὸν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγον (Aristotle), VII 39, τριμερῇ φασίν (*scil.*, the Stoics) εἶναι τὸν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγον; also Cornut. p. 15.4-5, διὰ τὸ τρία γένη σκευμάτων εἶναι δι' ὃν ὁ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγος συμπληροῦνται, and *ibid.* p. 37.15-6, τὰ τρία γένη τῶν σκευμάτων τῆς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν θεωρίας. Further Ar. Did. *ap.* Stob. II p. 39.22-4, according to whom Philo of Larissa composed a διαίρεσιν τοῦ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγου, and II p. 42.7-13, ἔστιν οὖν Εὐδώρου τοῦ Ἀλεξανδρέως ... διαίρεσις τοῦ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγου [...]. τριμεροῦς ὄντος τοῦ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγου τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ ἠθικόν, τὸ δὲ φυσικόν, τὸ δὲ λογικόν. Cf. also Philodemus on Cleanthes' views concerning philosophical theory as distinguished from poetry, *De mus.* col. 28.1 (SVF I 486), ... τοῦ (λόγου) τοῦ τῆς φιλοσοφίας κτλ.

⁴ The assumption that Hippolytus correctly refers to a third and separate treatise is in my view mistaken; the expression ἴδιος λόγος pertains to a specific theory which is a part of general philosophical theory. If one should think of a remote echo of something written by Aristotle, a distorted blend of *De philosophia*, *De cael.* A, and *Metaph.* A is the obvious candidate. Hans Gottschalk suggests (*per litt.*) that Hippolytus was thinking of the *De mundo* (but this tract is not about the fifth substance only).

⁵ The sentence which rounds off this section has a lacuna somewhere, but one should not, *pace* Marcovich, emend ὅλων to λόγων because λόγων here is equivalent to φιλοσοφίας. Wendland's text is satisfactory: τοιαύτη τις καὶ ἡ διαίρεσις τῶν ὅλων, ὡς τύπῳ περιλαβεῖν, (καὶ τῆς) κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλην φιλοσοφίας.

⁶ μετὰ *scil.* Marcovich, who also puts a hyphen before the first τοῦ and one after ἀέρος. But one may translate "of which he submits the existence along with that of

ὑδατος καὶ τοῦ ἀέρος λεπτότερον, οἷον πνεῦμα). What is below the moon is full of evils, what is beyond it not (*Ref.* I 20.6); this agrees with the doctrine of VII 19 according to which cosmic providence and government are restricted to what is beyond the moon. We also hear that the world-soul is immortal and the world eternal, a doctrine lacking in *Ref.* VII 19. A difference, at least at first glance, between the two accounts is that in the *Philosophoumena* the fifth element is said to be a very fine body (σῶμα), a sort of *pneuma*, whereas in *Ref.* VII 19 it is said to be a fifth οὐσία and a kind of hypercosmic substance; however, these versions are not mutually exclusive. Finally, at *Ref.* VII 19.7 we hear that the world is indestructible and, according to Aristotle, eternal, for it contains nothing in itself that is out of tune because it is governed by providence (*viz.*, above the moon) and nature (*viz.*, below the moon).

This tripartition of the universe, as well as the idea that there is no providence below the moon and that the world below it is full of evils, is not of course genuinely Aristotelian. That providence is only exercised beyond the moon and not below it is the view standardly attributed to Aristotle in Late Hellenistic and Early Greco-Roman literature; cf. e.g. Ar. Did. Fr. 9 D. (*D.G.* 450.16), Aët. II 3.4 and II 4.12, Atticus Fr. 3, Diog. Laërt. V 32.7 We find it in Christian authors too: Tatian *Orat. ad Graec.* ch. 2.2 Whittaker (Arist. Fr. 965 Gigon), Athenag. *Leg.* 25.2 (Arist. Fr. 796 Gigon), and Clem. *Strom.* V 89.3.⁸ Also compare the second anonymous view on providence listed at Epict. *Diss.* I 12.2.⁹ That according to Aristotle the sublunar sphere is full of evils is said at Aët. II 4.12, ἐν ᾧ ... τὰ περίγεια κηραίνεται;¹⁰ cf. also ps.Arist. *De mund.* 2.392a35, ἐπίκηρος.

Various Pythagoreanizing and Middle Platonist parallels for the tripartition exist. The earliest is in Philo *Quaest. in Gen.* IV 8:

and most natural is the passage concerning the three measures, for in reality all things are measured by three, having a beginning, middle and end. And each of these (partial) things is empty if it does not have (the others), similarly constituted. Wherefore Homer [*Il.* XV 189] not ineptly says that 'all things are divided into three'. And the Pythagoreans

the other four". I follow Wendland's *constitutio*.

⁷ Cf. Sharples (1983) 25 f., where other parallels are mentioned as well, and Moraux (1949) 33, who points out that the question of providence was central to the Stoics, not to Aristotle, and that accordingly an Aristotelian theory of providence is a construct fabricated to cater to the major interests of a later period; cf. Moraux (1986) 281 f. To fill this gap, Alexander wrote a treatise only surviving in Arabic; see the edition and translation by Ruland (1976).

⁸ Cf. Festugière (1932) 224 ff., who explains what genuinely Aristotelian doctrine has been vulgarized in this way.

⁹ Cf. Dihle (1987) 55.

¹⁰ Cf. Philo *Quod Deus* 52. For this bipartition of the cosmos as a common-place idea see also Cic. *N. D.* II 56 and the enormous quantity of parallels quoted by Pease *ad loc.* Add Plut. *De soll. animal.* 964D and *De Isid.* 370D.

assume that the triad among numbers, and the right-angled triangle among figures are the foundations of the knowledge [*~ gnosis*, maybe a mistake for *genesis*] of all things. And so, one measure is that by which the incorporeal and intelligible world was constituted. And the second measure is that by which the preceptible heaven was established in the fifth (element), attaining to a wonderful and divine essence, unaltered and unchanged in comparison with these (things below), and remaining the same. And the third measure is the way in which sublunary things were made out of the four powers, earth, water, air and fire, admitting generation and corruption.¹¹

Apuleius begins the *De deo Socratis* in the following way:¹² *Plato omnem naturam rerum, quod eius ad animalia praecipue pertineat, trifariam divisit [...]. Summum, medium et infimum fac intellegas non modo loci disclusione verum etiam naturae dignitate [...]. Ordiri tamen manifestius fuit a loci dispositione* (115). The divine heavenly bodies perform their admirably ordered movements (*ibid.* 117-121). There seems to be no commerce between gods and men, *ibid.* 128: *nulla adtrectatione nostra contaminantur*,¹³ which would entail that divine providence is not exercised in the human sphere (note that in Apuleius this gap, as is so often the case with the Middle Platonists, is bridged by the demons: *De Plat.* I 206; *De deo Socr.* 132 ff.). Finally, the world of human experience as distinguished from that of the divine is a vale of tears:¹⁴ 127, *vivacitas illic [scil., in the heavens] aeterna et indefecta ..., hic [scil., on earth] caduca et subsiciva, et ingenia illa [scil., of the gods] ad beatitudinem sublimata haec [scil., of men] ad miserias infimata*. A brief account of the tripartite universe is

¹¹ Transl. Marcus. The passage is quoted in Aucher's Latin by Staehle (1931) 25 f. He believes that it pertains to the 'Dreiteilung im Kosmos', but Philo (or his Platonizing source) has introduced the intelligible world. Staehle quotes passages from Joh. Lydus as parallels, arguing that these depend on Philo; but this is not certain. The first passage only shares the Homer quotation. I transcribe the second, *De mens.* 28.8 ff.: διὰ μὲν τοῦτο οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τριάδα μὲν ἐν ἀριθμοῖς, ἐν δὲ σχήμασι τὸ ὀρθογώνιον τρίγωνον ὑποτίθενται στοιχείον τῆς τῶν ὅλων γενέσεως. ἐν μὲν οὖν μέτρον ἐστί, καθ' ὃ συνέστη ὁ ἀσώματος καὶ νοητὸς κόσμος. δεύτερον δὲ μέτρον, καθ' ὃ ἐπάγη ὁ αἰσθητὸς οὐρανός, πέμπτην λαχὼν καὶ θειοτέραν οὐσίαν, ἀτρεπτον καὶ ἀμετάβολον. τρίτον δὲ καθ' ὃ ἐδημιουργήθη τὰ ὑπὸ σελήνην, ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων δυνάμεων, γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν ἐπιδεχόμενα. See further *infra*, n. 53 and text thereto.

¹² On this passage see the comments of Donini (1979) 160 f. and Beaujeu (1973) 203 ff. The parallel in Hippolytus has not been noticed. *divisit* = διαίρει, cf. *Ref.* VII 19.2 and 4 διηρημένος.

¹³ Note the Epicurean colouring. Atticus Fr. 3.51 ff. polemically compares the Aristotelian view of limited providence with the entirely negative doctrine of Epicurus.

¹⁴ One may compare the blend of Epicurean and Pythagorean pessimism at ps.Plato. *Axioch.* 365e-366a (where moreover a very Epicurean view of death has been fused with the Platonic doctrine of the immortality of the soul), and 366d (the wailing of the new-born infant, for which cf. Emp. *Vorsokr.* 31B118, Lucr. V 222-6, Philo *Opif.* 161). The fact that this is a Platonic dialogue proves that Platonism on occasion could even accommodate Epicurean notions. On the *Axiochus* see further Mansfeld (1985b) 155 n. 44.

found in the Middle Platonist *De fato* wrongly ascribed to Plutarch, 568E, and a similar account is at Plut. *Quaest. conv.* IX 745B.¹⁵ Atticus Fr. 8.9-17 attributes to Aristotle a tripartite division (cf. 8.16-7 ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαίρεσιν) of fate administering what is above the moon, nature governing what is below the moon, and prudence, foresight and soul being in charge of human affairs. This is based on a tripartite division of the cosmos linked with a specific variety of the doctrine concerned with providence cited above. The to some extent idiosyncratic tripartition of the cosmos found in Hippolytus therefore belongs to the *family* of which the tripartitions in Philo, Plutarch, ps.Plutarch, Atticus and Apuleius are further members.

The attribution to Aristotle of a fifth body (*Ref.* I 20), or fifth substance (VII 19), also derives from the secondary literature, where it is actually very common (it is also echoed in other authors). In the *De cael.*, the aether is a *first* body or substance. I need not rehearse the parallels here, because the material has been meticulously and thoroughly investigated by Hahm, who has also argued, quite plausibly, that there is no evidence that the doctrine of a fifth element which would simultaneously be the material substrate of souls derives from the lost *De philosophia*.¹⁶ One may add that the puzzling passage at *Tim.* 55cd, where Plato—subsequently to his discussion of the four regular solids that are constitutive of the four elements and of the fifth that is used for the whole and adorned with the constellations—suggests that some may think that there could be five worlds, was later interpreted as referring to world-regions, or rather to the four elements + the heavens, or light, or aether or the πεμπτήν οὐσίαν, ἥ τὸ κύκλῳ περιφέρεσθαι μόνη τῶν

¹⁵ Ultimately, this may or may not go back to Xenocrates, see Xenocr. Fr. 56 Heinze = 161 Isnardi Parente *ap.* Plut. *De facie* 943F-944A, Heinze (1892) 75 f., Dillon (1977) 214 f.

¹⁶ Hahm (1982). He has missed the passage at *Ref.* VII 19, and also overlooked the parallel at ps.Prob. *In Vergil. Eclog.* p. 13.1 ff.: *Aristoteles ... his quattuor elementis quintum quasi proprium aethera addit privata mole discretum. Idem Aristoteles ait non esse idem ignem et aethera, diversitatemque eorum elementorum probari ex eo, quod ignis omnia consumat, aether omnia conservet et nutrit.* A further parallel is at Philo *Abrah.* 162, where it is one of the topics of a dissension constructed *more sceptico* (which proves that the point was very familiar indeed): ... πότερον τὰ τέτταρα στοιχεῖα τῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶν ἢ φύσιν ἐξαίτερον οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ κεκλήρωται θειοτέρας καὶ οὐχὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας ἐπιλαχόντα. See also Moraux (1965) li ff. The case in favour of the *De philosophia* has been argued at length by Pépin (1964) 135 ff. and *passim*. Dumoulin (1981) 71 ff. is too speculative. Late sources attribute the doctrine that the aether is the element of souls to *Peripatetici et Critolaus* (Tert. *De an.* 5.1 = Critol. Fr. 17), or to Critolaus only (Macrobi. *In Somn. Scip.* I 14.20 = Critol. Fr. 18). Aët. I 7.21 (Stobaeus only) has it that according to Critolaus (= Fr. 16) God is a νοῦς ἀπ' αἰθέρος ἀπαθοῦς. Alfonsi (1948) 76 and Wehrli (1969) 67 argue that Critolaus follows the young Aristotle of the exoteric writings, but this is uncertain as long as we do not know what exactly was the doctrine of the *De philosophia*.

σωμάτων κατὰ φύσιν ἔστιν; see Plut. *De E* 389F-390A. Accordingly, one of the reasons why Aristotle's *first* element came to be called fifth is that in the exegetical literature and therefore also in the doxographies it was put on a par with Plato's *fifth* solid.

That the souls are parts of the supreme element is a doctrine that is originally Stoic (Diog. Laërt. VII 156 = *SVF* II 774, etc.);¹⁷ it is attributed to Aristotle e.g. in the harmonizing Antiochean account at Cic. *Ac. po.* I (= Varro) 26:¹⁸ *Quintum genus, e quo essent astra mentesque, singulare eorumque quattuor quae supra dixi dissimile Aristoteles quoddam esse rebatur.*¹⁹ Here, it should only be pointed out that in *Ref.* I 20 the fifth body is compared to a (Stoic-looking) *pneuma*²⁰ and indeed is the stuff of souls, because the souls are finally reunited with it. Actually, the cosmology at *Ref.* I 20.4 and 6 in this respect is at first glance more Stoic than that to be found at VII 19, for the doctrine attributed to Aristotle that the souls survive for some time after death²¹ only to be finally reabsorbed in the pneumatic fifth element is originally Stoic²² (no trace of this tenet in VII 19). The doctrine of the world-soul at *Ref.* I 20.6 has affinities with both Stoic²³

¹⁷ Rather perversely, the Antiochean account *ap.* Cic. *Ac. po.* I (= Varro) 39 (partly printed at *SVF* I 134) argues that Zeno in this respect modified the doctrine of his predecessors (for which see text to the next note): *De naturis autem sic sentiebat, primum ut in quattuor initiis rerum illis quintam hanc naturam ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici rebantur non adhiberet; statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam quae quidque gigneret, et mentem atque sensus.*

¹⁸ Cf. also the doctrine attributed to Aristotle at Cic. *Tusc.* I 22, and see the literature quoted *ad loc.* by Douglas (1985).

¹⁹ Arist. *De philos.* Fr. 27 Ross; attribution of this doctrine to this work doubtful, see *supra*, n. 16 (Gigon does not include it among the fragments of the *De philosophia*). Note that Cicero expresses himself in a way much resembling what is in Hippolytus. One may add that a further source for the attribution to Aristotle of a special element as the substance of souls (or of the aether as this substance) may be a contamination with Epicurean conceptions. At *Tusc.* I 22 and 41 (Arist. *De philos.* Fr. 27 Ross), Cicero calls this element *quintum genus ... vacans nomine* and the *quinta ... non nominata ... natura*; cf. Clem. Rom. *Recogn.* VIII 15 (*De philos.* Fr. 27 Ross), ἀκατονόμαστον. But Aristotle did have a name for his first element: aether. The 'element without a name' (ἀκατονόμαστον, *omnino nominis expers*) as the cause of sensation and thought is Epicurean; see Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1118DE (Epic. Fr. 314 Us.), Stobaeus and ps.Plutarch at Aët. IV 3.11 (Epic. Fr. 315 Us.), and Lucr. III 241 ff.

²⁰ For evidence of a sort of fifth element (or rather of a superior form of the element fire) in Stoic physics see e.g. *SVF* II 555; Chrysippus called this the αὐγή, e.g. *SVF* II 611 (cf. Boyancé (1936) 65 ff. and, in general, Mansfeld (1971) 111 ff.). Hippolytus' terminology is of the vulgarized kind; the term πνεῦμα suggests the post-Chrysippean Stoic *koine*.

²¹ Atticus Fr. 7.28 ff. attributes this view to others, not to Aristotle.

²² Note that according to the Stoics the reunion with the supreme element occurs only at the moment of the *ekpyrosis*. According to Cleanthes all the souls survive in this way, according to Chrysippus only those of the wise do (Diog. Laërt. VII 157 = *SVF* II 811; cf. also the other texts at *SVF* II pp. 223 ff., esp. ps.Plutarch and Theodoret at Aët. IV 7.2).

²³ For the world-soul cf. *SVF* II 532, 613, 1076 (along with Cic. *N. D.* I 39-41), and

and Platonic thought. Aristotle himself of course did not accept that a world-soul exists, but the Middle Platonists, following the account in the *Timaeus*, commonly spoke of this entity. But the fact that it is said to be immortal, just as the world is said to be eternal, points to Middle Platonism, viz. to the Aristotelizing current which professed that the world of the *Timaeus* has no beginning in time.²⁴ It should be noted that Athenag. *Leg.* 6.3 (Arist. Fr. 795 Gigon) comes close to attributing a world-soul to Aristotle, and that Clem. *Protr.* v 66.4 (Arist. Fr. 842 Gigon) actually does make this attribution. On the other hand, the fact that at *Ref.* VII 19.3 the fifth substance is said to be a kind of hypercosmic substance recalls Chrysippus' notion of the αὐγή,²⁵ for after *ekpyrosis*, when the cosmos we experience has been destroyed, everything is converted into this most refined kind of fire.²⁶ The tenet at *Ref.* VII 19.3 that the fifth substance forms the outer rim or surface (ἐπιφάνεια) of the heaven recalls the definition of the (outer) heaven as αἰθέρος τὸ ἔσχατον (*SVF* I 115) attributed to Zeno,²⁷ although Zeno does not seem to have made a clear distinction between the nature of the outer and that of the inner aether, or fire.

The assumption that the information concerned with Aristotle's cosmology to be found in these two chapters of the *Ref.* is entirely derived from a secondary source, or sources, is a very safe one. Aristotle's First Unmoved Mover, who may to a certain extent be also behind the hypercosmic fifth substance at the rim of the universe which is said to be the subject of a specific theological Aristotelian inquiry, has been converted into a physical entity, a fifth substance being God. Note, moreover, that Atticus speaks both of Aristotle's fifth body (Frr. 5.10, 6.54) and of his fifth substance (Fr. 5.12) and actually puts both terms on a par at Fr. 5.9-12.

esp. II 604 (a verbatim quotation from Chrysippus' *On Providence ap.* Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1052C). Diog. Laërt. VII 156 = *SVF* II 774 says the Stoic world-soul is indestructible (τὴν δὲ τῶν ὅλων [scil., ψυχὴν] ἀφθαρτον).

²⁴ See Baltes (1976) 82 ff.

²⁵ Cf. *supra*, n. 20.

²⁶ *SVF* II 611; other texts speak of 'aether'. See Mansfeld (1979a) 175 ff.

²⁷ Cf. ps.Arist. *De mund.* 2.392a6 ff., where the supreme God is said to inhabit 'the loftiest crest of the heavens'. At *Aët.* I 7.32 the supreme God of Aristotle is said to be an εἶδος χωριστὸν ἐπιβεβηκότα τῇ σφαίρᾳ τοῦ παντός; this sphere (an αἰθέριον σῶμα, τὸ πέμπτον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καλούμενον) is distinguished from the God. According to *Ref.* VII 19.4 the doctrine concerned with the fifth substance is the theological. The outer rim of the heavens is compared to a skin at ps.Hippocr. *De hebd.* 6 §2.1 ff. 21 ff. The firmament of course often crops up in the doxographies concerned with the Presocratics. Other possible parallels to Hippolytus' Aristotelian heavenly surface are studied by Pépin (1964) 161 ff., 164 ff. who argues that we should think of the *De philosophia* as the ultimate source (see however *supra*, n. 16 and text thereto).

In Ch. IV of this study, I have already pointed out that the theory of the elements and of providence in *Ref.* I 21, the chapter on the Stoics, is in various ways connected with the similar doctrines ascribed to Aristotle at *Ref.* I 20 and VII 19.²⁸ On the same occasion, it appeared that in one case, viz. the Stoic doctrine of providence and fate, the relation with the much later VII 19 is more obvious than that with the immediately preceding I 20. This provides further support for the assumption that the accounts of Aristotle in *Ref.* books I and VII belong together. Furthermore, the Stoic connection according to *Ref.* I 21 shores up the above argument about the presence of originally Stoic elements in the contaminated Aristotelian cosmology as described by Hippolytus.

VII 3 *The Definition of the Soul*

At *Ref.* VII 19.5, Hippolytus continues with Aristotle's psychology. He refers to the treatise *Περὶ ψυχῆς* in three books, i.e. to the work we still have. Aristotle's definition of soul, he points out, is easy to quote but very difficult to explain. The definition quoted runs: *ψυχὴ φυσικοῦ σώματος ὀργανικοῦ ἐντελέχεια*; it is repeated in exactly the same form at *Ref.* VII 24.2, and with a small change (*σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ*) at 24.1. But this definition, *pace* Osborne²⁹ and the editors of Hippolytus, has *not* been quoted from the *De anima* itself. It is a brief scholastic formula, precisely paralleled in a brief survey of *doxai* in Porphyry's³⁰ *Πρὸς Βόηθον περὶ ψυχῆς ἀρ.* Eus. *P.E.* XV 11.4, II p. 374.21-2, *πῶς ... οὐκ αἰσχροὺς ὁ ἐντελέχειαν τιθεῖς τὴν ψυχὴν λόγος σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ*, also paralleled at Alex. *In De sens.* 2.15 f., *ἐντελέχειαν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ*, and *In Top.* 144.18, *ἐντελέχεια σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ*. With *πρώτη*—qualifying *ἐντελέχεια*—Alexander has this definition at *De an.* 16.10, in the fragment from his commentary on the *De anima* at *Quaest.* II xxvii 77.7, and at Alex. (?) *De an. mant.* 104.6. This derives from Aristotle's shorter formula *De an.* B 1.412b4 f. (*εἰ δὴ τι κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς δεῖ λέγειν, εἴη ἂν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ*). The scholastic definitions at e.g. Diog. Laërt. V 32 and Aët. IV 2.6 (both ps.Plutarch and Stobaeus;³¹

²⁸ *Supra*, Ch. IV 6, IV 8.

²⁹ Osborne (1987) 39, 51.

³⁰ The *doxai* are those of Aristotle, the Stoics, the Atomists and others (for the latter no names are given, and the fourth tenet is formulated in rather general terms). I do not see why this brief a-typical survey should be attributed to Atticus; note the question-mark at Atticus Fr. 7a.

³¹ Partly echoed at ps.Plut. IV 3.1, *D.G.* 387a14-5 (no parallel in Stobaeus). The definition of the soul attributed to 'Xenarchus the Peripatetic' (of Seleucia in Cilicia, a contemporary of the emperor Augustus) 'and others of the same school' at

exactly the same formula at Theodor. *Graec. aff. cur.* V 17, and Nemes. *De nat. hom.* p. 17.4 f., quoted by Diels *ad Aët. loc. cit.*) are much fuller; here we not only have πρώτη, but also δυνάμει ζῶν ἔχοντος. A version thereof is also found at Plot. *Enn.* IV 7 [2] 8⁵.1 ff.³² Ps.Gal. *Def. med.* XIX 355.13-15 K. has the same longer definition κατὰ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη, but without πρώτη. Calcid. *In Tim.* p. 235.8-9 quotes the definition in the longer form: *anima est prima perfectio corporis naturalis organici possibilitate vitam habentis* (this is in a section in Calcidius believed to derive from Porphyry).³³ Aristotle's own wording at *De an.* B 1.412a27-28 (this chapter also is the source for the shorter formula quoted above), on which the longer form of the scholastic definition in Diogenes Laërtius, Aëtius, Theodore, Nemesius and Calcidius is based, is subtly different: ... ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἐντελέχεια ἢ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζῶν ἔχοντος· τοιοῦτον δὲ ὃ ἂν ᾖ ὀργανικόν. At *In Tim.* p. 237.2-3 Calcidius first quotes the shorter version (*entelechia animam esse corporis naturalis organici*), and then gives the argument for the longer definition *proptereaue definitioni additum: possibilitate vitam habentis* (p. 237.9). Note that Calcidius has *perfectio* (i.e. τελειότης) in the longer and 'entelechy' in the shorter version but that he is aware that the first is equivalent to the second (p. 236.6 *entelechia, id est absolutam perfectionem*). The definition as provided by Alexander (in some passages), Hippolytus and Porphyry is an abridged version of what we find in these other sources. In Macrobius' list of the divergent views on the soul Aristotle's definition has been reduced to the shortest formula possible: *Aristoteles ἐντελέχειαν*³⁴ (*In Somn. Scip.* I

Aët. IV 3.10 (Stob. 49.3, I p. 320.5-8; no parallel in ps.Plutarch) is much similar, see Moraux (1973) 207: τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τελειότητα καὶ ἐντελέχειαν καθ' ἑαυτὴν οὖσαν ἅμα καὶ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος συντεταγμένην.

³² This early treatise is the most scholastic piece in the whole of the *Enneads*. For the echoes of the *Placita* literature on the soul it contains see Dörrie (1959) 119 f., who *ibid.* 120 n. 1 points out that Plotinus gives us Aristotle's definition "in schulüblicher Formulierung ... Plotin hat den Satz ... aus dem Schulbuch; das zeigt die typische Formulierung φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ, welche, so unschön wie sie ist, Aëtios 4, 2, Doxogr. 387 ab 2, genau so bietet". Dörrie is right about the manual, but has failed to notice that the 'unschöne Formulierung' φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ is, ultimately, straight from Arist. *De an.* B 1.412b5-6.

³³ See Waszink (1962) lxxv f.

³⁴ Ms. P reads *endelichiam*, ms. C *endilichiam*, but mss. SED have *entelechia*. The text followed here is Willis' Teubneriana; Scarpa (1981) prints *endelechia*. But if one argues, as Scarpa and others have done, that this list derives from Porphyry (the *De regressu animae*; see Courcelle (1948) 232 ff.), one cannot read ἐνδελέχειαν, for Porphyry (compare the quotation from the *Adversus Boethum* given below, and see also Porph. *ap. Calc. In Tim.* p. 237.14, *entelechia, res per semel ipsa immobilis*) argued against Aristotle's definition of the soul qua entelechy etc. on the ground that the entelechy is unmoved. So he could not have used ἐνδελέχειαν, which implies perpetual motion. If one sticks to ἐνδελέχειαν in Macrobius, the list at *In Somn. Scip.* I 14.19-20 cannot derive from Porphyry but must have been taken by Macrobius from a handbook (as is argued, although not for the same reason, by Flamant

14.19). At ps.Just. *Coh.* 6-7, where various excerpts from Aëtius (for p. 31.17-25 cf. *Plac.* IV 4, IV 7, IV 2, IV 6; for p. 32.19-22 cf. *Plac.* IV 2, IV 3) have been combined so as to prove that the experts disagree among themselves, we likewise hear that Aristotle called the soul entelechy (ἐντελέχειαν αὐτὴν ὀνομάζων, p. 31.21-2). Nemesius elsewhere (*De nat. hom.* p. 26.10) expresses himself in the same way: 'Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐντελέχειαν λέγων κτλ.³⁵ Porphyry—see his biobibliography in the *Suda*—wrote a monograph with the title Πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην (περὶ) τοῦ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐντελέχειαν; from this work, perhaps identical with the Πρὸς Βόηθον περὶ ψυχῆς, one may quote the opening sentence *ap.* Eus. *P. E.* XIV 11.1, p. 374.1 ff., πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἐντελέχειαν τὴν ψυχὴν εἰπόντα καὶ ἀκίνητον κτλ. Compare also Iambl. *De an.*, *ap.* Stob. I p. 370.22-3, ἡ κατ' Ἀριστοτέλην ἀκίνητος ἐντελέχεια τῆς ψυχῆς.

Ps.Plut. *loc. cit.* and Theodor. *loc. cit.* explain that 'entelechy' means ἐνεργεία. Stob. *loc. cit.* states that it means ἐνεργεία and εἶδος. Nemes. *De nat. hom.* p. 26.16, in his substantial explanation of the Aristotelian soul *qua* entelechy, says τὸ δὲ εἶδος ἐντελέχεια (cf. also 27.2). According to

(1977) 507 ff.). See further *infra*, n. 35.

³⁵ A similar abridged definition may be assumed at Cic. *Tusc.* I 22 (Arist. *De philos.* Fr. 27 Ross = Fr. 994 Gigon; note that the latter does not include it among the fragments of the *De philosophia*): *Aristoteles ... ipsum animum ἐνδελέχειαν appellat novo nomine quasi quandam continuatam motionem et perennem*. What we have here may simply be a mistake for the difficult ἐντελέχειαν; note that at Aët. IV 2.6 ps.Plutarch twice writes ἐντελέχειαν, whereas the parallel lemma in Stobaeus the first time reads ἐνδελέχειαν. That Cicero found ἐνδελέχειαν in his source is proved by the parallel at Philo *Somn.* I 30. What he is offering by way of explanation is no more than a rather wordy rendering of the Greek term. Aristotelian scholars (for a survey of part of the discussion see Untersteiner (1963) 269 ff.) tend to overlook the fact that the passages in Cicero and Philo belong with the *Vetusta Placita* (see Diels *D.G.* 202 f., 211 f., Wendland (1897) 1074 ff.) which also is the source of the parallels in Aëtius quoted above; without exception (if one discounts the mistake in Stobaeus), these have ἐντελέχεια. Perhaps the mistake in a doxographic context then acquired a vitality of its own by acting as a catalyst for the assimilation of Aristotle's doctrine to those attributed to Plato and Xenocrates; in Macrobius *In Somn. Scip.* I 14.19 we have the following series: *Platon dixit animam essentiam se moventem, Xenocrates numerum se moventem, Aristoteles ἐντελέχειαν* (for different readings see *supra*, n. 34). In the parallel passage at Aët. IV 3.1-5, the lemmata preceding that on Aristotle (IV 3.6) collected by Diels from ps.Plutarch, Stobaeus, Theodoret and Nemesius all emphasize the perpetual or self-caused motion of the soul according to Thales, Pythagoras, Plato, Xenocrates and Alcmeon. I think that what is found at Iambl. *De an.*, *ap.* Stob. I 49, pp. 366.25-367.2 is interesting: τινὲς μὲν τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν [not Aristotle himself!] αἰθέριον σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν τίθενται· ἕτεροι δὲ τελειότητα αὐτὴν ἀφορίζονται κατ' οὐσίαν τοῦ θεοῦ σώματος, ἣν ἐνδελέχειαν [ἐντελέχειαν Wachsmuth] καλεῖ Ἀριστοτέλης ὥσπερ δὴ ἐν ἐνίοις Θεόφραστος. Festugière (1953) 183 f. n. 6, who believes that ἣν refers to τελειότητα, gives this passage a place among those believed to derive from the lost *De philosophia*. But ἣν refers to οὐσίαν; Aristotle is said to have said that the ether moves perpetually.

A different but comparable mistake seems to be behind the ἐντρέχεια ('aptitude') at Anon. *Lond.* cols. I 24 and II 9; cf. Diels (1893) xv.

Gal. *De sequela* p. 37.6-7 Aristotle's definition is εἶδος ... τοῦ σώματος ... τὴν ψυχὴν. Diog. Laërt. V 33 provides a rather long explanation which goes the same way (λέγει δ' ἐντελέχειαν ἧς ἐστὶν εἶδος τι ἀσώματον κτλ.).³⁶ One should compare Aët. I 2.2 *ap. D.G.* 275a30-31—ps.Plutarch only— ... τὸ εἶδος, ὃ καλοῦμεν ἐντελέχειαν, and Arius Didymus fr. 3 D. (*D.G.* 448.14)... τὸ εἶδος, ὃ καὶ μορφήν καλεῖ καὶ ἐντελέχειαν; *ibid.* 448.19 ff. the term ἐντελέχεια is explained. According to Alex. *De an.* 17.9-13 the soul is εἶδος, which means (or is) ἐντελέχειά τε καὶ τελειότης. At Alex.(?) *De an. Mant.* 117.20-21 the soul is the ἐντελέχεια καὶ ... εἶδος of the body. For Plotinus too, *Enn.* IV 7 [2] 8⁵.1-4, ἐντελέχεια in the Aristotelian definition of the soul is equivalent with εἶδος. Iambl. *De an., ap. Stob.* I 49, p. 363.19-20 tells us that according to τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν τινες the soul εἶδος ἐστὶ τὸ περὶ τοῖς σώμασιν. Philop. *In De an.* 9.26-7 says ἐντελέχεια δέ ἐστὶν ἡ τελειότης καὶ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου (cf. *ibid.* 9.33 ff.; 203.14-5). Behind all this is Aristotle's own statement at *De an.* B 412a9 ff., ἐστὶ ... τὸ δ' εἶδος ἐντελέχεια, καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς, τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, τὸ δ' ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν (cf. Themist. *In De an.* 3.4 ff. and Philop. *In De an.* 203.19 ff., who speak of a distinction between a first and a second entelechy).

It would therefore appear that the exegetical literature provided the gist of Arist. *De an.* B 1, viz. the longer and shorter definitions of 'soul' and the doctrine of *potentia* and *actus* in relation to the meaning of the term entelechy contained in these definitions, and that this exegesis influenced the doxographic accounts.

The definition according to Aristotle's follower Xenarchus of Seleucia (late 1st cent. BCE / early 1st cent. CE) and 'others of the same school' *ap. Stob./Aët.* IV 3.10 speaks of κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τελειότητα καὶ ἐντελέχειαν. Compare Iambl. *De an., ap. Stob.* I 49, pp. 366.26-367.2, ἑτεροὶ [*scil.*, τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν] δὲ τελειότητα αὐτὴν [*scil.*, τὴν ψυχὴν] ἀφορίζονται κατ' οὐσίαν τοῦ θείου σώματος, ἣν ἐνδελέχειαν [*sic mss.*] καλεῖ Ἀριστοτέλης. Calcid. *In Tim.* p. 235.10 explains that *perfectio*—which translates τελειότης not ἐντελέχεια and so echoes the terminology

³⁶ The explanatory passages in Nemesius and Diogenes Laërtius contain an interesting parallel (*De nat. hom.* p. 26.16-27.8—Diog. Laërt. V 34, the beginning). Both are a bit confused, but Nemesius seems to argue that both δύναμις and ἐντελέχεια have two senses (διχῶς), because the second sense of the former coincides with the first sense of the latter, a science which one has but does not use being only potentially what a science is when used. To illustrate the point he refers to the sleeping and waking conditions of the soul. Diogenes Laërtius too refers to sleeping and waking, but the text as transmitted only says τὸ δυνάμει δὲ δίττον. Moraux (1949) 38 proposed to emend to ἐντελέχεια, but one may assume that the sin of Diogenes Laërtius (or of his immediate source) is compression, and I suggest that the tradition on which Diogenes depends at one time mentioned both δύναμις and ἐντελέχεια. Moraux (1986) 287 argues that we should read τοῦτο [*scil.*, ζῶν ἔχειν] δὲ δίττον, but he has overlooked the parallel in Nemesius.

attributed to Xenarchus and others which is paralleled in Alexander, who however uses both terms interchangeably in the fragment from his commentary on the *De anima* at *Quaest. II xxvii 77.7*—refers to the form, viz. the *specialem essentiam quae est in effigie*, and illustrates this at considerable length.

Hippolytus' remark that Aristotle's psychology would require much more discussion than is feasible here (a bit more, however, is said at *Ref. VII 24.2*) in my view does not entail that he "is not simply copying from a basic hand-book" or that he would know "of a much more extensive discussion" (*scil.*, in Aristotle).³⁷ A similar disclaimer is found at the end of the brief summary of Aristotle's physics at *Diog. Laërt. V 34*, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα περὶ πολλῶν ἀπεφώνητο, ἅπερ μακρὸν ἂν εἴη καταριθμεῖσθαι. The odds are that Diogenes simply copied this statement from his source or was inspired by something similar found there. Much the same behaviour may therefore be attributed to Hippolytus, and it would follow that the source used for this section was not much more informative than *Diog. Laërt. V 32*, who (just as Calcidius) however in the next paragraph provides at least a detailed scholastic explanation of the various elements of his Aristotelian definition of the soul.

It should be pointed out that what Hippolytus adds to the definition of the soul elsewhere, viz. at *Ref. VII 24.2*, is equally scholastic: τὴν τε ψυχὴν ἔργον καὶ ἀποτελεσμα εἶναι, ὥς³⁸ φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης, φυσικοῦ σώματος ὁργανικοῦ ἐντελέχειαν. Accordingly, Hippolytus used his scissors again and reserved part of the explanation of the definition for subsequent use. Originally, this explanation perhaps pertains to the formula 'possessing life potentially' which is not part of the shorter form of the definition. One may refer to *Calcid. In Tim. p. 237.5*, *effectu et operatione* and *ibid. p. 237.8 motusque vitales exercere in agendo*, formulas found in the argument leading up to what is 'added to' the definition. Furthermore, Hippolytus' ἔργον seems to be short for ἐνεργεία. Middle Platonist parallels for the term ἀποτελεσμα in relation with soul, viz. *Alcin. Didasc. 14.170.1*, *Plut. Anim. gener. 1023C* are quoted by Whittaker; he suggests that the term may originally be Stoic.³⁹ However, in the

³⁷ As is argued by Osborne (1987) 39.

³⁸ This is how I propose to read the text (ὥς εἶναι ms.; [ὥς] Bunsen, Wendland; (τοῦ σώματος)ος Marcovich). The formula ἔργον καὶ ἀποτελεσμα is paralleled at *Porph. Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων ap. Stob. I. 49, p. 349.22* (~ *Numen. Fr. 45*; *Des Places* translates 'son acte ou son effet').

³⁹ Whittaker (1987) 115; Whittaker (1989) 85, where he points out that the soul is called the ἔργον of the Demiurge at *Plato Tim. 30b3* and suggests that *Plutarch* and *Alcinous* replace the Platonic by the Stoic term. In the *Placita*, the term means the 'effect' of a cause, see *D.G. index s.v. ἀποτελέσματα*, but I do not think that this meaning applies here.

definition according to Xenarchus quoted above, the term τελειότης plays a conspicuous part: the soul is both 'perfection according to the form' and entelechy, and both independent and conjoined with the body (Aët. IV 3.10, καθ' ἑαυτὴν οὖσαν ἅμα καὶ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος συντεταγμένην). Hippolytus therefore is anyhow in a position to explain the technical term ἐντελέχεια by means of the formula ἔργον καὶ ἀποτέλεσμα; next, it is this ἐντελέχεια rather than soul itself which is said by him to administer the body (cf. the shortest and shorter forms of the definition quoted above, according to which the soul is entelechy). For the latter as an Aristotelian doctrine cited by another Neoplatonist, Iamblichus (for Porphyry see above), compare Arist. *Protr.* Fr. 6 Ross = B 58 - 60 Düring, *ap.* Iambl. *Protr.* 7, p. 41.15-24.

Hippolytus' explanation as selectively provided here is geared to his wish to construct a parallelism of Aristotle and Basilides.

A different view is found at *Ref.* VII 22.10, where we read that Aristotle's teacher Plato ἐν Φαίδωνι⁴⁰ τὴν ψυχὴν πεποιοῖ. This merely is a thin echo of the Middle Platonist interpretation of the myth of the *Phaedrus* which already was very important to Philo and used by Christian authors such as Tatian and Clement.⁴¹ Interestingly enough, one of Alcinous' expressions for the cognitive activity of the incarnate soul is πτέρωμα ψυχῆς (*Didasc.* 4.155.33).

It should be added that there is a noteworthy correspondence, both structural and as to the subjects treated, between *Ref.* VII 19.1-6 and Diog. Laërt. V 32: God, the structure of the cosmos, providence, the four standard elements and the particular fifth, the definition of soul. At the beginning of this paragraph, Diogenes cavalierly says that Aristotle wrote a good many physical treatises; Hippolytus, as we have seen, quotes several titles. Furthermore, the treatment of Aristotle's physics in both Diogenes and Hippolytus very much resembles the picture painted

⁴⁰ So ms. and Marcovich; the Φαίδρων of Bunsen and Wendland is a modern *Verschlimmbesserung*. Hippolytus in all probability had read neither the *Phaedo* nor the *Phaedrus* but may have vaguely remembered having read somewhere that the *Phaedo* is about the soul (its second title, after all, is Περὶ ψυχῆς, see Thrasyllus' bibliography of Plato *ap.* Diog. Laërt. III 58, and esp. Diog. Laërt. III 36 as well as 37, where the dialogue is referred to by its second title only, as it is at Sext. *M.* IV 21 and X 30. Cf. already Cic. *Tusc.* I 24: *num eloquentia Platonem superare possumus? evolve diligenter eius eum librum, qui est de animo ...*). Note that Clement makes the converse mistake *Strom.* V 53.1, where he refers to *Phaedr.* 247b with the words οὕτως καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Περὶ ψυχῆς.

⁴¹ See Runia (1986) 374 and n. 34, where references to the learned literature on the motif in Middle Platonism are given. Add Orbe (1954), Daniélou (1961) 155 ff., Courcelle (1972). See also the material in Méasson (1986) 190, 203 ff., 282, 284, 388, and *passim*, and cf. Whittaker (1990) 85 n. 61.

by the anti-Aristotelian Middle Platonist philosopher Atticus,⁴² from whose remains several parallels have been quoted above.

We may safely infer that the abridged definition of the Aristotelian God as νόησις νοήσεως, originally from *Met.* Λ, which is given *Ref.* VII 19.7 and repeated 21.1, was also found by Hippolytus in his source or one of his sources, and was not quoted from the text of the *Metaphysics*. The doctrine was a rather well-known one. Galen devoted a monograph to the Unmoved Mover, *De libr. propr.* 14, *Scr. min.* II p. 123.4-5: Εἰς τὸ πρῶτον κινῶν ἀκίνητον. Against this work Alexander of Aphrodisias wrote a treatise surviving only in Arabic: *Refutation of Galen's attack on Aristotle's doctrine that everything that moves is set in motion by a mover*.⁴³

At *Ref.* VII 19.7, a disclaimer similar to that accompanying the definition of soul at 19.6 is found; the definition of God is even harder to understand than that of soul, even if one were to dwell on the subject at length.

VII 4 Aristotelian Ethics

Little needs to be said about the ethical section at *Ref.* I 20.5. According to Plato, we read here, the only good things are those of the soul (i.e. the virtues), and these are sufficient for happiness. Aristotle however introduced a τριγένεια of good things;⁴⁴ the Wise Man is not perfect as long as he lacks the good things of the body and the external good things. The good things of the body are *four*, viz. κάλλος ἰσχύς εὐαίσθησία⁴⁵ ἀρτιότης,⁴⁶ the external good things are πλοῦτος εὐγένεια

⁴² See Moraux (1983) 564 ff. The comparison of Diogenes Laërtius with Atticus, Cicero, Arius Didymus and Philo is developed by Moraux (1986) 289, who however omits to mention Hippolytus who is even closer than Diogenes to Atticus. This Late Hellenistic hand-book version of Aristotle, according to Moraux, presents, "en gros, l'aristotélisme tel qu'on le voyait avant la renaissance déclenchée par les travaux d'Andronicus"—a most welcome *retractatio* of the view expressed in Moraux (1949) 31-39. See however *infra*, Ch. VII 5, where I argue that in the later literature this Aristotle according to a pre-Andronican reception may co-exist with one according to a post-Andronican reception.

⁴³ Edited with an English translation and commentary by Rescher - Marmura (1969). See further Sharples (1987) 1188.

⁴⁴ On this commonplace tripartite division in a plurality of authors see e.g. Mutschmann (1906) xix f., Riposati (1947) 208 ff., Dillon (1977) 9, 73, 123-5, 197, 360. For the technical term τριγένεια see *infra*, n. 50 and text thereto.

⁴⁵ In the *Ref.* this word is a *hapax*; it is paralleled in the fivefold division of happiness at *Div. arist.* [21] Mu. (*ap.* Diog. Laërt. III 98-99) and in the Aristotelian/Peripatetic section of Ar. Did. *ap.* Stob. II p. 122.22 f. and p. 136.12-3, where both times we find ἰσχύς and κάλλος too; this also holds for the passage on Aristotle in his introduction, p. 56.14-5. The word εὐαίσθησία is further paralleled at Ar. Did. *ap.* Stob. II p. 125.7 and in the enumeration of the corporeal goods at Theon *ap. Rhet. graec.* II p. 110.6-7. Cic. *Ac. po.* I (= Varro) 19 provides a slightly different list that is presented as the common view of the 'ancients' (i.e. the early

δόξα⁴⁷ δύναμις εἰρήνη φιλία. Those of the soul, καθὼς καὶ Πλάτωνι ἔδοξεν, are the *four* cardinal virtues which of course are internal too.⁴⁸ Aristotle too (καὶ οὗτος, viz. just as Plato) says that evil things are the opposites of good things. This contrast between Plato and Aristotle, and this description of Aristotle's doctrine of the tripartite good,⁴⁹ are standard in

Academy and the early Peripatos) and probably derives from Antiochus; certain goods of the body are a matter of the whole, others of the parts. The former are *valetudinem vires* [i.e. ἰσχύς] *pulchritudinem* [i.e. κάλλος], the latter *sensus integros* [i.e. εὐαισθησία] *et praestantiam aliquam partium singularum, ut in pedibus celeritatem* etc. Cf. also Sextus' account of the tripartition of the goods according to the 'Academics and Peripatetics', *M.* XI 45: περὶ μὲν οὖν ψυχὴν τὰς ἀρετάς, περὶ δὲ τὸ σῶμα ὑγίειαν καὶ εὐεξίαν καὶ εὐαισθησίαν καὶ κάλλος καὶ πᾶν ὃ τῆς ὁμοίας ἐστὶν ιδέας, ἐκτὸς δὲ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος πλοῦτον πατρίδα γονεῖς τέκνα φίλους, τὰ παραπλήσια. The short list at ps. Plut. *De Hom.* 2 c.137.1 parallels the first two items in Hippolytus, the health mentioned by Sextus and the velocity mentioned by Cicero: ... τὰ τοῦ σώματος, οἷον ὑγίειαν, ἰσχύον, κάλλος, τάχος.

⁴⁶ This seems to be a Stoic term; Diog. Laërt. VII 106 (*SVF* III 127) lists it (together with life, health, force [ῥώμη], well-being, and beauty) among the corporeal things to be preferred; see further *SVF*, Adler's *Index s.v.* In the Stoic section of Ar. Did. *ap.* Stob. II p. 62.17 ff. (*SVF* III 278), ὑγίεια ἀρτιότης ἰσχύς κάλλος are virtues which are not 'arts' but 'powers' which are the result of the exercising of the four cardinal virtues.

⁴⁷ Wealth, good birth, and good reputation are mentioned among the external things to be preferred at Diog. Laërt. VII 106 (*SVF* III 127); cf. Ar. Did. *ap.* Stob. II pp. 129.15 f. and 136.14 f.; also e.g. Arist. *Rhet.* A 5.1360b20 f., and Theon *ap. Rhet. graec.* II p. 110.4 f. A similar view at Cic. *Ac. po.* I (= Varro) 21, *cetera, ... ut divitias* [i.e. πλοῦτος], *ut opes, ut gloriam* [i.e. δόξα], *ut gratiam*, and at ps.Plut. *De Hom.* 2 c. 137.1, τὰ ἐκτός, οἷον εὐγένειαν, εὐδοξίαν, πλοῦτον.

⁴⁸ For a detailed comparison of the four (cardinal) virtues of the soul with the four virtues of the body (here ὑγίεια [which fits the medical context and is, moreover, one of the Stoic corporeal things to be preferred, cf. *supra*, n. 46], ῥώμη, κάλλος, and ἀρτιότης [cf. *supra*, n. 46]) see ps.Gal. *Def. med.* XIX 383.10-384.14 K., where the doctrine is anonymous; for κάλλος and ἀρτιότης as corollaries of health see *ibid.* 382.12-383.4. Kollesch (1973) 115 ff. argues that ps.Galen's exposition is based on Stoic doctrines and cites the relevant parallel passages, but has overlooked the parallel between the goods of the soul and those of the body to be found in Hippolytus' account of Aristotle. This analogy is also found at *Div. arist.* [2] and [58] Mu. The analogy between the health/disease of the body and those of the soul are the main theme of book IV of Chrysippus' *Περὶ παθῶν*, see the texts from Galen and Origen conveniently printed at *SVF* III 471, 471a, 472, 473, 474, and the parallel account at Cic. *Tusc.* IV 28-33 (= *SVF* III 425, 279, 426, 430); for the latter see Fillion-Lahille (1984) 98 ff. From the parallels quoted *supra*, nn. 46 ff., it follows that the terminology of Hippolytus' doxography of Aristotle's ethics has in part been influenced by that of the Stoics who, of course, had adopted the originally Platonic doctrine of the four cardinal virtues which by was not taken over by Aristotle himself. For the (combined Stoic/'Aristotelian') doctrine of the four cardinal virtues cf. also Cic. *De inv.* II 159 ff. (not in *SVF*) and the list at ps.Plut. *De Hom.* 2 c. 137.1. Plut. Fr. 144 Sandbach, in a passage which according to Dillon (1977) 197 is comparable to Antiochus' view of the relation between soul and body, has two triads of virtues, viz. δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη and φρόνησις (the soul)—ἰσχύς, κάλλος and ὑγίεια (the body).

⁴⁹ Which for the most part ultimately goes back to Aristotle himself, see Moraux (1949) 19 f. and the explicit passage *Polit.* H 1.1323a21 ff.; but the detailed systematization caters to the topical interests of a later period, the question being: "en

the Late Hellenistic and Earlier Greco-Roman literature. Compare, for Aristotle's (or the Peripatetics') tripartition, Cic. *Tusc.* V 85 (Arist. Fr. 998 Gigon), and *passim*, *De fin.* III 41, 43, 48, V 12-14 (at *De inv.* II 177, *De orat.* III 116, and *De part. orat.* 38 and 74 the doctrine is anonymous; at *Ac. po.* I (= Varro) 22, it is attributed to the Peripatetics and the Stoics); Ar. Did. *ap.* Stob. II p. 124.18 ff. and elsewhere; Clem. *Strom.* II 128.5 (where we find the expression *τριγένεια τῶν ἀγαθῶν* also used by Hippolytus),⁵⁰ and Diog. Laërt. V 30.⁵¹ Sen. *Ep.* 88.5 says that those who made a Peripatetic of Homer presented him as *tria bonorum genera inducentem*. Chrysippus himself in book IV of his *Περὶ παθῶν* already referred to the Peripatetic doctrine in these terms: *κἂν γὰρ τρία, φησὶν, ἢ γένη τῶν ἀγαθῶν κτλ.* (*SVF* III 474, 2nd text, *ap.* Orig. *C. Cels.* VIII 51, a verbatim quotation). Atticus Fr. 2.9-28 unfavourably compares the Aristotelian tripartition (although he does not use this term) with Plato's doctrine that virtue alone is sufficient for happiness. The distinction between Plato and Aristotle emphasized by Atticus is therefore the same as that found in Hippolytus.

Hippolytus' account in *Ref.* VII 15 ff. and 19 again and again stresses Aristotle's fondness for tripartite divisions (substance, the cosmos, philosophical theory). To some extent, these correspond with similar divisions according to Basilides;⁵² we have noticed above, moreover, that the explicit tripartite division of the universe can be paralleled in Middle Platonist sources, and that the division of substance is likewise paralleled on a large scale. Yet the explicit analogies which according to

quoi les divers biens (*ἀγαθά*) contribuent-ils au bonheur (*εὐδαιμονία*)?" (Moraux (1986) 273; cf. also *ibid.* 277, where he points out that the explicit topic itself will be originally Stoic). See also *infra*, n. 50.

⁵⁰ This is a *hapax* in the *Ref.*; the term is paralleled at Sext. *P.* III 181 (not in *SVF*), οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς τριγένειαν μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ [*scil.*, just as the Peripatetics also mentioned by Sextus] φασιν εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν· τούτων γὰρ τὰ μὲν εἶναι περὶ ψυχὴν, ὡς τὰς ἀρετάς, τὰ δὲ ἐκτὸς ... , τὰ δὲ οὔτε περὶ ψυχὴν οὔτε ἐκτὸς Cf. also Ar. Did. *ap.* Stob. II p. 46.10 ff. (on Critolaus and his followers; Critol. Fr. 19), τὸ ἐκ τῶν τριῶν γενῶν, an expression also found at Clem. *Strom.* II xxi 129.10 (Critol. Fr. 20). Cf. also Ar. Did. *ap.* Stob. II p. 56.8, Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν ... τριάδα τῶν ἀγαθῶν κτλ. Note that the Stoic theory concerned with the three different meanings and denotations of 'good' is different from the Peripatetic doctrine referred to in the text; see Mansfeld (1989c). Sextus' use of the term *τριγένεια* (cf. also *M.* XI 46 = *SVF* III 96, *τρία .. γένη τῶν ἀγαθῶν*) in relation to the Stoics is misleading; elsewhere, he is more correct: *τριχῶς εἰπόντες*, *M.* XI 25 = *SVF* III 75; *τριχῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν φασὶ λέγεσθαι*, *P.* III 171. See also Eus. *P.E.* XI 4.1 τὴν τριγένειαν τῶν ἀγαθῶν κατ' Ἀριστοτέλην κτλ.

⁵¹ Quoted by Festugière (1932) 235 n. 3, as well as by Wendland and Marcovich *ad loc.*, who also refer to Ar. Did. *ap.* Stob. II p. 124.19 ff., p. 129.6 ff. For the varieties in the tradition see Becchi (1977) 153 ff., esp. 167 ff., who points out that the systematization as already worked out by Theophrastus clearly was used an alternative to the Stoic doctrine that virtue is the only good.

⁵² Cf. Osborne (1987) 55 f.

Hippolytus exist between the tripartition of substance, that of the cosmos and that of philosophical theory are noteworthy. One may toy with the idea that these numerological analogies are due to Hippolytus himself, for the parallels in Basilides are less explicit. So maybe what we have here points to a Pythagorean, or rather Pythagoreanizing, influence, or perhaps rather a desire on Hippolytus' part to give a more perceptible Pythagorean colouring to Aristotle. One may adduce Theo Smyrn. *Exp. rer. plat.* p. 100.13 ff., ... τριάς, ἥτις πρώτη ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ τελευτὴν ἔχει κτλ., and already Aristotle himself, *De cael.* A 1.268a10 ff., καθάπερ γὰρ φασι καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὰ πάντα τοῖς τρισὶν ὄρισται· τελευτὴ γὰρ καὶ μέσον καὶ ἀρχὴ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔχει τὸν τοῦ παντός, ταῦτα δὲ τὸν τῆς τριάδος. Plato, for his part, quotes this doctrine as an 'ancient logos', *Nom.* 715e f.⁵³

The ultimate source for the five titles quoted by Hippolytus, viz. *Categories*, *Physics*, *Metaphysics*, *Peri psyches* and *Ethics* is presumably Andronicus' *Pinaces*, about which we have some information in the bibliography of Aristotle composed by a Platonist called Ptolemy, which only survives in Arabic translations.⁵⁴ The matter-of-course way in which these to us familiar titles are quoted by Hippolytus points to post-Andronican usage; the picture to be derived from the versions of an earlier catalogue surviving in Diogenes Laërtius and ps.Hesychius is different. We have noticed above that Hippolytus presumably derived the title *Categories* from the discussion of the contents of this work he found in his source or sources.⁵⁵ What he says about the others suggests an abstract from a *catalogue raisonné*,⁵⁶ and this is exactly what Andronicus seems to have provided. From Diogenes Laërtius and the biobibliographies in the *Suda* it is clear that catalogues of works were an integral ingredient of this type of historiography. We may therefore assume that in the source at Hippolytus' disposal a catalogue of Aristotle's works was to be found, which however was more up to date than that in Diogenes Laërtius.⁵⁷

⁵³ See Saffrey - Westerink (1974) xxiii ff., where further parallels may be found.

⁵⁴ On Andronicus' edition and his *Pinaces* in five books see Moraux (1973) 60 ff., 63 ff., to be supplemented with Düring (1971) 265 ff.; for Ptolemy's *vita* see further the corrections to Düring in Plezia (1985), Hadot (1990a) 54 ff. Also see Gigon (1987) 39 ff. Ptolemy's catalogue is translated by Düring (1957) 221 ff.; commentary *ibid.* 241 ff. The parallel evidence in Hippolytus has been neglected. On the title of the *Categories* see also Gottschalk (1987b).

⁵⁵ *Supra*, Ch. VI 6.

⁵⁶ D. T. Runia (*per litt.*) suggests a *laudatio*, or collection of quotes, but *laudationes* tend to be specific rather than general.

⁵⁷ One may e.g. compare the fact that Hippolytus' account of (the Middle Platonist) Plato is more up to date than that in Diogenes.

VII 5 *The Traditions Used by Hippolytus*

Our investigation of Hippolytus' treatment of Aristotle is of considerable help in determining the nature of the sources used by him. It would appear that these were of a historical rather than a systematic nature, or if systematic not averse to historical annotation, for the doctrines at issue are in each case clearly marked as Aristotle's. On the one hand, this Aristotle had to a large extent been Platonized; his substantial agreement with Plato is explicitly mentioned several times, and as we have seen the accounts of his doctrine of the categories and of his division of substance are much indebted to the Aristotle who was interpreted by Andronicus and Boëthius and then incorporated in the standard Middle Platonist system. These logical doctrines do not seem to have been the concern of the doxographic vulgate which provided collections of physical tenets. On the other hand, a whole series of doctrines peculiar to Aristotle and not shared with Plato are also mentioned. We have seen that these other doctrines, which are to be found in several further representatives of a doxographic vulgate concerned with 'physical doctrines' and in those of doxographic traditions concerned with ethical tenets, can for the most part be paralleled in Atticus' attack against his Aristotelizing fellow Middle Platonists. Atticus, moreover, knows and states that the doctrine of the ten categories is Aristotelian, not Platonic. The picture that we may form of the tradition or combination of traditions at issue is comparable to the impression we derive from studying the book of Diogenes Laërtius, who was interested in preserving as much material as possible, even in those cases where, in our view, the various ingredients clash. In Diogenes Laërtius' *Lives*, moreover, as a rule all the parts of philosophy are duly treated. In the literature used by Hippolytus, the logical Aristotle according to the post-Andronican and Middle Platonist interpretive reception was thus presented together with the Aristotle according to a presentation that for the most part seems to derive from pre-Andronican times. Whether Hippolytus adduced one hand-book, or more than one, is immaterial; if he used more than one such source, there must have been a considerable overlap. It is likely that apart from his handbook(s) he also used a Skeptical source which criticized the Aristotelian (and Middle Platonist) division of substance. But it is not absolutely necessary to assume he did, for a handbook, especially one of the *Περὶ αἰρεσέων* type, would not only provide detailed comparisons of the various doctrines at issue but also could refer to criticisms of doctrines upheld by one philosopher, or sect, that had been formulated by representatives of another school, or

school of thought. We have noticed above that Sextus' argument may derive from a Middle Platonist discussion concerned with its predecessor in Plato's *Parmenides*.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ See *supra*, Ch. VI 9-11.

CHAPTER EIGHT

A CENTO OF CENTOS, PART 1

THE PYTHAGOREAN TRADITION AS REPRODUCED BY HIPPOLYTUS

VIII 1 *Cento and Exegesis: Irenaeus, Clement, Plutarch and Hippolytus*

VIII 1.1 *Introduction*

What constitutes a cento is probably most familiar in the shape of a piece of poetry consisting entirely, or almost entirely, of lines or parts of lines taken from famous poems (the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, or the *Aeneid*) which are strung together in such a way as to form a new poetic composition.¹ From the Hellenistic period to the eighteenth and even the

¹ For what follows see Schelkle (1954); Bouquiaux-Simon (1968) 15, 337 ff., useful also for the distinctions between cento, pastiche and parody; Tuilier (1969), edition with introduction, translation and notes of the Χρίστος πάσχων; Wilken (1976); Hunger (1978) 99 ff.; Desbordes (1979) 83 ff.; Salanitro (1981) 11 ff., also for bibliographical references; Le Boulluec (1982); Mansfeld (1985b). Adam (1906) 69 ff., "II. Capitel. Die Centone", though obsolete, is still useful; it is interesting to note that with regard to epical literature (following Eustathius) he speaks of centos where today one would discourse on 'oral composition'. A little essay on the cento is found in Ausonius' letter accompanying the *Cento nuptialis* (XVII, pp. 206 ff.), see esp. his description p. 207.27-8, *opusculum de inconexis continuum, de diversis unum, ... , de alieno nostrum*. Further, one may quote the *Suda*, s.v. κέντρων (III 1344, p. 95.23 ff.): ὁ ἐκ πολλῶν συνερραμμένος, ἐπεὶ τοιαῦτα τοῖς ὑποζυγίοις συρράπτοντες καλοῦσι κέντρωνας· ὡσαύτως καὶ λόγους διαφόρων συνειλεγμένους καὶ ἓνα σκοπὸν ἀπαρτίζοντας, οἷά ἐστι τὰ 'Ομηρόκεντρα. An interesting account is to be found at Eustath. *Comm. Hom. Il.* IV pp. 757.5-758.3, comment. on Ψ 430. Eustathius adduces the verb ἐγκεντρίζειν ('to graft'), and continues (p. 757.13 ff.): ὥσπερ ἐγκεντρίζειν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐγκεντεῖν καὶ ἐμβάλλειν φυτῷ τινι κλαδίσκον ἄλλοιου φυτοῦ, οὕτω καὶ κέντρων ῥαπτὸς μὲν, ὥπερ ὡσανεὶ παρακεντοῦνται διάφοροι χροαὶ ὑφασμάτων, γραπτὸς δέ, ὃ παρατίθενται τοιοῦτου παρακεντήματος δίκην μέρη ποιημάτων καὶ στίχων ἄλλοθεν ἄλλα, ὅποια καὶ τὰ ἐντεῦθεν κληθέντα 'Ομηρόκεντρα, τουτέστιν οἱ 'Ομηρικοὶ κέντρωνες. οἷς ὅμοιοι γέγονιντ' ἂν καὶ ἐξ ἐτέρων ποιητῶν, ἥδη δέ που καὶ ἐκ πεζολογιῶν, ὅποιοι σκαφθήσονται εἶναι οἱ μὴ γεννῶντες ῥητορείας οἰκείας, ἀλλ' ὥς εἰπεῖν, λογοσυλλεκτάδαι ὄντες καὶ δι' ὅλον σπερμολογοῦντες ἐν ἐγκωμίοις. For the botanical metaphor van der Valk *ad loc.* aptly refers to Rom 11:24, εἰ γάρ συ ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἑξεκόπης ἀγριελαίου καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἐνεκεντρίσθης εἰς καλλιέλαιον κτλ. (for κατὰ φύσιν—παρὰ φύσιν in Irenaeus cf. *infra*, n. 10). For *homocentones* see also *infra*, n. 11. The earliest certain example of a cento seems to be Aristoph. *Ran.* 1285-95 (a parody in the form of a cento, not a pastiche). An interesting piece is found at Diog. Laërt. IV 63-4, consisting of three lines (two from Homer and one from an unknown source) attributed by Favorinus to Carneades who wanted to poke fun at (παρώδησεν) a visitor called Mentor, and a one-line Homeric reply by the person addressed. We must note that

nineteenth century CE this was a highly appreciated genre.² To be successful, such a composition not only presupposes a 'poet' who is entirely familiar with his 'source' but also a public which knows its Homer, Virgil or Petrarch by heart or at least very well. Those who do not have the necessary literary sophistication are fooled and may believe the new piece really is by Virgil or by Homer, but this is more their own fault than that of the author of the cento. For the *connoisseur* it is fun to read Ausonius' *Cento nuptialis*, especially the pornographic section XVII viii, 216-7, or the *Medea* extant in two manuscripts which may be the one mentioned by Tert. *De praescr. haer.* 39.3-4,³ both of which consist of quotations from Virgil serving a totally different purpose, fun precisely because the 'old' lines or half-lines in their new order and setting are provided with other and *recherché* meanings. The tragedy *Christus patiens* that goes under the name of Gregory Nazianzen has been fabricated from bits and pieces for the most part taken from Euripides, with additions from Sophocles and Lycophron and even one line from Homer; here the pagan material is made to serve a holy purpose. Many more examples could be cited, such as the *Homero-centones* of the empress Eudocia Augusta (fifth cent. CE) and others edited by Ludwig, the

Eustathius also speaks of *prose centos* (ἐκ πεζολογιῶν). Hunger (1978) 101 points out: "Mosaikartiges Zusammensetzen ganzer Partien von Schriften aus einem oder mehreren Vorbildern—allerdings in Prosa—war in der theologischen byzantinischen Literatur nichts ungewöhnliches. Im Grunde ist hier der gesamte Katenen-Literatur ebenso zu nennen wie die verschiedenen theologischen Florilegien". But varieties of the method were used long before the Byzantine period, and these were certainly not restricted to theological literature; see further below.

For literature on anthologies (there is a distinction, for though every anthology is a cento not every cento is an anthology) see e.g. Dölger (1936) 21 ff., Barns (1950) 132 ff., Chadwick (1969). Méhat (1966) 96 ff., esp. 99 f. contains useful material but is in my view inconclusive. A very good and full survey of Greek collections of *gnomai* is Küchler (1979) 236 ff., "Die 'Gnomen des Phokylides' im Rahmen der griechischen Gnomologien". A first orientation on ancient views on interpolation is given by Grant (1957) 15 ff., 19 ff.

² Today it seems to have disappeared from the literary scene, but the cento principle has made a glorious reappearance in another form, viz. as the collage (*papiers collés*) and the (photo-)montage. Here the material chosen is in principle irrelevant and may be quite heterogeneous, but there often is a definite scheme according to which the pieces are assembled, as in the famous photomontages of John Heartfield or the three-dimensional collages (or montages) of Joseph Beuys. See Hess (1961) with interesting illustrations of three-dimensional collages made by post-war American artists, and Jürgens-Kirchhoff (1978), esp. for the pictures. This explains why Giuseppe Arcimboldo (1527-93), who painted portraits, landscapes and allegorical scenes composed of animals and fruits has today become fashionable again. For Plutarch on Arcimboldo's and Beuys' predecessors in antiquity see *Adv. Col.* 3, 1108D; 28, 1128C (*infra*, n. 23).

³ On the *Carmen nuptialis* and the letter Ausonius wrote about its composition see Desbordes (1979) 83 ff., Salanitro (1981) 44 f.

majority of those that are extant being by Christian authors both Latin and Greek.

A person composing a cento must have an 'argument' or 'plot' (ὑπόθεσις), around which to weave the materials used by him. In fact, this argument or plot and the actual choices that are made from the available material are his only personal contribution; the topic chosen may be an already existing one, as in the case of e.g. the *Christus patiens* or of the *Medea*, but need not be so.

One may also compose a cento consisting of non-poetic material (I note in passing that the prose cento, although explicitly mentioned by Eustathius, has been little studied). Such a patchwork may serve a plurality of purposes and may differ from the poetic cento in that it may explicitly mention the source, or sources, used, or at least some of them. Indeed, it is not always easy to distinguish between a cento in the proper sense of the word and a string of *laudationes* that have been collected to serve a particular purpose. One may for instance select and arrange quotations from the works of Zeno of Citium, or of Epicurus, in a tendentious way in order to prove these philosophers immoral.⁴ What one finds in such cases is not a cento in the sense of the recycling of existing materials for a new and different purpose, as it would be if one e.g. were to compose a treatise on gardening by stringing together in a sophisticated way quotations from Epicurus' works. But it is a patchwork in the sense that the medley of quotations both is, and is not, Epicurean, or Zenonian; by using existing Epicurean, or Zenonian, materials and by conveying the image that suits his polemical purpose the opponent of Zeno, or Epicurus, produces a pseudo-Zeno, or a pseudo-Epicurus, or at most a mezzo-Zeno or mezzo-Epicurus. A further variety is a string of quotations collected not from one writer or one work but from a plurality of authors, in order to illustrate, or support, a point one wishes to make. In such cases the passages (in both verse and prose) that are quoted may be entrusted with new meanings, or at least acquire meanings not intended by their original authors, and as a rule the mosaic is glued together with interpretive comments which support and expound the view of the person who has made, or adapted, the collection of quotations. A quite unsophisticated example of such a cento is ps. Justin, *De monarchia*, consisting of a string of thirty quotations from the poets and one from Plato, with brief foreword and afterword and a few interspersed comments.⁵ Another variety, again, is the string of biblical quotations, put together in order to underpin a theological point or settle an

⁴ See Mansfeld (1986b) 321 ff., 374 ff.

⁵ See Marcovich (1990) 81. But he uses the wrong term, viz. pastiche.

exegetical question. In the works of Philo of Alexandria, for instance, examples of such chains abound;⁶ what is more, in the running commentaries woven around these biblical pericopes or formulas Philo often enough subjoins quotations, or reminiscences, of sayings and ideas of Greek philosophers, most of the time without giving their names. To divulge a name is to appeal to an authority for a definite purpose, for instance to prove that it was *Heracitus* who took over an idea from Moses.⁷ The educated section of Philo's public may have known what and whom he was using, or referring to, when he went about his business without citing chapter and verse, but others may not.

It is important to point out that it is as a rule impossible to reconstruct the original work from a cento made from it, or to recover the original plot and the original intention of the original author. It would be impossible to reconstruct either the *Aeneid* from the *Medea* cento or the *Pentateuch* from Philo's catenas. However, there are also cases where a reconstruction is in part possible. Ps.Iamblichus used Anatolius' extant *Περὶ τῶν δεκάδος καὶ τῶν ἐντὸς αὐτῆς ἀριθμῶν* and Nichomachus' no longer extant *Ἀριθμητικῶν θεολογουμένων βιβλία β'* for his own *Theologoumena arithmeticae*, and "his book proves to be, essentially, a cento made up from the two older ones. What is not Anatolius is mostly quotation of Nicomachus, including his [*scil.*, Nicomachus'] own quotations. The contribution of the ... compiler ... is merely arrangement and introduction".⁸ To some extent, reconstruction of Nicomachus' lost work is feasible because it deals with the same topic (or 'plot') as the later compilation. Iamblichus' *Protrepticus*, in which scholars have found numerous fragments of Aristotle's work with the same title, certainly is to a large extent a cento. Furthermore, comparison with Porphyrius' *Vita Pythagorae* has shown that much of Iamblichus' *De vita pythagorica* consists of excerpts taken from Nicomachus' biography of Pythagoras and a similar work by Apollonius of Tyana; Porphyry and Iamblichus also used Moderatus and what, for lack of a better term, are called 'hand-books'.⁹ It is possible, at least to some extent, to reconstruct Nicomachus' lost work because its theme is the same as those of Porphyry and Iamblichus and not an entirely different one as in the case of the *Medea*

⁶ See Mansfeld (1985b) 132 ff., (1988a) 89 ff., and cf. *infra*, Ch. X 8.

⁷ See Mansfeld (1985b) 132. Philo's predecessor Aristoboulos *ap.* Eus. *PE* XIV xii mentions names because he wants to prove that Greek wisdom and culture derive from Moses, and this of course is also Philo's view.

⁸ Burkert (1972) 98; cf. also Tarán (1981) 293 ff., who argues that the compiler is a Byzantine excerptor who also used Iamblichus' lost *Theologoumena*. For a more detailed analysis see D'Ooge (1926) 83 ff., who perhaps exaggerates the extent of the excerpts from Nicomachus.

⁹ See Burkert (1972) 98 ff., also for references to the earlier literature.

made up from lines by Virgil. To put it in different terms: the author of the *Medea* imposes a different form on the Virgilian matter, whereas the form imposed by Porphyry and Iamblichus on the material used for their centos is not much different from the form(s) of their immediate sources.

VIII 1.2 Irenaeus, Clement and Hippolytus

Iren. *Adv. haeres.* I 9.3-5 argues that the use of scriptural passages by his Valentinian Gnostic opponents is to be condemned because by selecting and arranging these texts according to the pattern of their pre-conceived false system they falsify their real, i.e. original, meaning. In his view, this is not honest exegesis—to be honest, exegesis should concern itself with a continuous text and refrain from assembling what is dispersed—but comparable to the fabrication of a cento according to a pre-existing plot:¹⁰

... their [*scil.*, the Valentinians'] whole plot falls to pieces—this false dream in defence of which they trample Scripture underfoot. When they have fabricated their idiosyncratic plot, their next step is to collect phrases and words which are found in widely scattered places [*scil.*, in Scripture] and to transform these ... from what is natural to what is against nature. Their method is similar to that of those who propose whatever plots happen to be at their disposal and as their next step attempt to flesh these out from the Homeric poems. As a result, less well-versed people may well believe that Homer wrote the lines for just this plot, although this has been fleshed out only a moment ago ...

Irenaeus provides an example of such a cento, an *epyllion* of ten lines describing Heracles' descent into Hades by means of lines from both *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, lines which in the original epics occur in entirely different contexts and for the most part, as he points out, originally are

¹⁰ ... διαπέπτωκεν αὐτῶν πᾶσα ἡ ὑπόθεσις ('plot'), ἣν ψευδῶς ὀνειρώττοντες κατατρέχουσι τῶν γραφῶν ('Scripture'). ἰδίαν (γὰρ) ὑπόθεσιν ἀναπλασάμενοι, ἔπειτα λέξεις καὶ ὀνόματα ('sentences and words') σποράδην κείμενα συλλέγοντες, μεταφέρουσι ... ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἰς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν [cf. Rom 11:24, quoted *supra*, n. 1], ὅμοια ποιοῦντες τοῖς ὑποθέσεσι τὰς τυχούσας αὐτοῖς προβαλλομένοις, ἔπειτα πειρωμένοις ἐκ τῶν Ὀμηροῦ μελετᾶν αὐτάς, ὥστε τοὺς ἀπειροτέρους δοκεῖν ἐπ' ἐκείνης τῆς ἐξ ὑπογούου μεμελετημένης ὑποθέσεως Ὀμηρον τὰ ἔπη πεποιηκέναι κτλ. We must note that ὑπόθεσις not only means (1) the 'plot' or 'argument' of a play, but also [(2) *quaestio finita* and] (3) "that which is assumed in order to prove something". In Irenaeus, the third meaning is also involved. Sext. *M.* III 3-5 discusses the three meanings; I transcribe the first part (= Dicaearch. Fr. 78): καθ' ἓνα μὲν τρόπον ἡ δραματικὴ περιπέτεια, καθὼ καὶ τραγικὴν καὶ κωμικὴν ὑπόθεσιν εἶναι λέγομεν καὶ Δικαιάρχου τινὰς ὑποθέσεις τῶν Εὐριπίδου καὶ Σωφοκλέους μύθων, οὐκ ἄλλο τι καλοῦντες ὑπόθεσιν ἢ τοῦ δράματος τὴν περιπέτειαν. See also *infra*, n. 39, n. 42, and text thereto; *infra*, Ch. IX text to n. 12.

about other persons, viz. Odysseus, Priam, Menelaus and Agamemnon.¹¹

In order to refute the heretics, Irenaeus therefore has to prove two things, viz. (1) that their collections of biblical quotations are made in a selective, tendentious and devious way, and (2) that the 'plot' is indeed an already existing one. He has already proved his first point in *Adv. haeres.* I, and especially in I 8, where he provides a dense texture of instances of their highly selective use and interpretation of passages in Scripture. The introductory paragraph of this chapter (*Adv. haeres.* I 8.1) is most instructive. Irenaeus compares the method of the heretics to that of a person who, using the tesserae of a mosaic representing the portrait of a king made by a great artist, rearranges these into the ugly shape of a dog, or a fox, and deceives the ignorant by declaring that this in fact is the portrait of the king by the great artist.¹² He continues:

in the same way these (heretics), having stitched together old wives' tales [literally: 'myths'] and as their next move having torn away words and sayings and parables from whatever place they choose, are prepared to adapt God's oracular utterances to their stories [literally: 'myths'].¹³

The ὑπόθεσις mentioned at *Adv. haeres.* I 9.3 is here called a cento (συγκαττύσαντες being a technical term in this context) of old wives' tales, and here too he says that the tales, or stories, are adorned with a tissue of biblical quotations.

Irenaeus proves his second point at *Adv. haeres.* II 14 where he demonstrates to his own satisfaction that the Valentinian system as a whole and as to its details derives from the ideas of the Greek poets and philosophers, that is to say from the 'old wives' tales' mentioned at *Adv. haeres.* I 8.1. In order to achieve this aim, he constructs a cento on his

¹¹ See Wilkins (1967); this may either have been an already existing piece or one composed by Irenaeus for the occasion. What is certain is that it is not a Gnostic composition with a deep allegorical sense. A clear allusion to the composition of *homerocentones* is to be found in the concluding words of a contemporary of Irenaeus, viz. the author of the *De Homero* 2, see ps.Plut. *De Hom.* 2, c. 218.4, ἄλλοι δὲ ἑτέρας ὑποθέσεις ('plots') προθέμενοι ἀρμόζουσιν ἐπ' αὐτάς τὰ ἔπη [*scil.*, lines from the Homeric epics] μετατιθέντες καὶ συνείροντες.

¹² For the comparison with the work of an artist as paralleled in a passage of Plutarch see also *infra*, n. 23 and text thereto.

¹³ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ οὗτοι γραῶν μύθους συγκαττύσαντες, ἔπειτα ῥήματα καὶ λέξεις καὶ παραβολὰς ὅθεν καὶ ποθὲν ἀποσπῶντες, ἐφαρμόζουσιν βούλονται τοῖς μύθοις αὐτῶν τὰ λόγια τοῦ Θεοῦ. On ἐφαρμόζειν and other 'terms of reproach', as he calls them, pertaining to 'forcing' the sense of passages see the interesting references in Grant (1957) 140 f. For the rare verb συγκαττύειν see *infra*, n. 19; for its use by Hippolytus *infra*, n. 24. 'Old wives' tales' is a proverbial expression, see already Plato *Thi.* 176b7, ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ὕθλος (as opposed to the truth), but Irenaeus presumably cites 1 Tim 4:7. Clem. *Protr.* v 67.1 seems (ultimately) to depend on Plato, *loc. cit.*

own from (the secondary literature on) these poets and philosophers, the bits and pieces of which are stitched together by means of interpretive comments which rather monotonously support the thrust of his main argument.

First, at *Adv. haeres.* II 14.1, he derives the main story, or myth, of the Valentinians from a Greek comic poet,¹⁴ arguing that they have transposed the poet's cosmogony and stolen his plot, only changing the names, i.e. giving new names to what was already there.¹⁵ This story (*fabula*), we may say, is their poetic ὑπόθεσις,¹⁶ and the fact that Irenaeus still thinks in terms of a given dramatic plot which serves as the foundation, or skeleton, for a cento explains why he begins his account with a paraphrase of a passage from Aristophanes' *Birds*.¹⁷ Next, at II 14.2, he repeats his allegation that the Valentinians have assembled a cento; this time, however, he no longer speaks of a collection of supporting biblical quotations but of a patchwork which has been stitched together from bits and pieces of various philosophical provenance:¹⁸

¹⁴ unde ipsi adsumentes sibi fabulam quasi naturali dispositione commenti sunt.

¹⁵ They made it into suum argumentum, immo vero eisdem argumentis docentes, tantum immutantes nomina. These name-changes Irenaeus documents one by one. The point itself will be traditional; one is reminded of Aristotle on Plato in relation to the Pythagoreans, *Met.* A 6.987b10-13, τὴν δὲ μέθεξιν τοῦνομα μόνον μετέβαλεν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ Πυθαγόρειοι μιμήσει τὰ ὄντα φασὶν εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν, Πλάτων δὲ μεθέξει, τοῦνομα μεταβαλὼν (my italics). Compare also Antiochus on Zeno and the Stoics in relation to the Early Academy and Peripatos, e.g. Cic. *N. D.* I 16, *re concinere ... verbis discrepare* (note that Pease's note *ad loc.* is not good); *Ac. pr.* I (= Varro) 41, *De fin.* III 5 (SVF I 34). Cf. also *Tusc.* V 34 (SVF I 35) Zeno of Citium, *advena quidam et ignobilis verborum opifex, insinuassee se in antiquam philosophiam videtur*. An echo, or variety, of this view is found at Sext. *M.* XI 64 (SVF I 361), on the preferred indifferent as being equivalent to the good and ὀνόματι μόνον διαφέρων. Sen. *De const.* 3.1 cites a standard objection against the Stoic paradoxes: *sublato ... supercilio in eadem quae ceteri descenditis mutatis rerum nominibus*. See further LSJ s.v. μεταβάλλω II, and e.g. Eur. *Cycl.* 691, Plato *Phileb.* 33e, Philo *Congr.* 44, Procl. *In Remp.* II p. 130.10 f. (= Numen. Fr. 35.39-41), Simplicius *In Phys.* 979.21 ff., Philop. *In De an.* 302.9-10. For Hippolytus on name-changes see *infra*, n. 39 and text thereto; cf. also *infra*, n. 153 and text thereto.

¹⁶ That Irenaeus is able to produce a plot derived from a comic poet rather than one from tragedy or epic literature is of course an additional blow aimed at his opponents; *ils ne sont pas sérieux* (as Voltaire used to say).

¹⁷ *Av.* 690 ff. (= *Orph.* Fr. I Kern, *Vorsokr.* 1A12). We must observe that the dramatic plot provided by Irenaeus is not that of the whole play (which is what we would believe if the piece had been lost); he may have found the passage in a florilegium.

¹⁸ ... quae apud omnes qui dicuntur philosophi sunt dicta, haec congregant et quasi centonem ex multis et pessimis panniculis consarcientes, finctum superficium subtili eloquio sibi ipsi praeparaverunt, novam quidem introducentes doctrinam, propterea quod nunc nova arte substituta sit, veterem autem et inutilem, quoniam quidem de veteribus dogmatibus [the δόξαι of these philosophi] ... haec eadem subsuta sunt. The philosophical cento that follows has to some extent been analyzed by Diels *D.G.* 171 f. and linked by him with what he considers to be a bastard form of *Placita* literature. Schoedel (1959) 23 f. has proved that at *Adv. haeres.* II 28.2 Irenaeus lists a number of topics which correspond with those of chapters in ps.Plutarch/Aëtius (the majority being from the third

... those things which have been affirmed by all those ... who are called philosophers they collect; as if they were sewing together a mule's blanket from a supply of the very worst rags, they have prepared for themselves a faked exterior by means of subtle exegesis—indeed introducing a doctrine that is novel because it has been fabricated now with unheard-of ingenuity, but on the other hand one that is obsolete and useless precisely because these ingredients have been sewn together ... from obsolete doctrines.

To a large extent, the Valentinian contents scattered throughout the interpretive sections of Irenaeus' philosophical cento at II 14.2-6 are parallel to, or even the same as those of the transposed comic *fabula*. Furthermore, the Valentinian *ὑπόθεσις* as to its philosophical aspect now to an equally large extent has become a cento itself, and in Irenaeus' own mule's blanket of philosophical abstracts assembled in order to prove this allegation we indeed find a concatenation of tidbits ultimately deriving from a plurality of philosophers (including traditional choice pieces from Homer and Hesiod in their role as philosophical poets). The doctrinal *ὑπόθεσις* of the Valentinians is therefore according to Irenaeus a poetico-philosophical cento which (as we learned at *Adv. haeres.* I 9.3-5 and as is less clearly stated at II 14.2 by means of the words *subtili eloquio*), in order to disguise itself as a respectable Christian doctrine, has been covered by another cento, viz. one consisting of selected scriptural texts that have been interpreted in a perverse way.

Although he does not use the word κέντρον, Clement of Alexandria, just as Irenaeus, accuses his Gnostic opponents of composing tendentious anthologies of scriptural quotations which they select in conformity with their own presuppositions.¹⁹ At *Strom.* III 38.1 he says that they pick out and stitch together quotations (λέξεις ... συγκαττύσαντες) from biblical pericopes, interpreting them literally instead of in the appropriate allegorical—that is, Clementine—way, and *ibid.* VII 96.2-3 he states:²⁰

Though the heretics may be bold enough to avail themselves of the writings of the prophets [i.e., Scripture], they by no means use all of these to begin with, and secondly fail to use them in their perfect form

book of the *Placita*).

¹⁹ See Le Boulluec (1982) 708, who quotes the passages I reproduce and is good on the verb συγκαττεύειν. Clement may have known Irenaeus' work.

²⁰ καὶν τολμήσωσι προφητικαῖς χρήσασθαι γραφαῖς καὶ οἱ τὰς αἱρέσεις μετιόντες, πρῶτον μὲν οὐ πάσαις, ἔπειτα οὐ τελείαις οὐδὲ ὡς τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ ὕψος τῆς προφητείας ὑπαγορεύει, ἀλλ' ἐκλεγόμενοι τὰ ἀμφιβόλως εἰρημένα εἰς τὰς ἰδίας μετὰ γουσι δόξας, ὀλίγας σποράδην ἀπανθίζόμενοι φωνάς, οὐ τὸ σημαινόμενον ἀπ' αὐτῶν σκοποῦντες, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ ψιλῇ ἀποχρώμενοι τῇ λέξει. σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν οἷς προσφέρονται ῥητοῖς εὖροις ἂν αὐτοὺς ὡς τοῖς ὀνόμασι μόνοις πποσανέχουσι, τὰ σημαινόμενα ὑπαλλάττοντες κτλ. Cf. also *Strom.* VII 99.2-3, where Clement uses συγκαττύουσι.

or in such a way as the completeness and sublimity of the prophecy suggest. Quite the contrary: eclectically selecting statements that can be interpreted either way [viz., both literally and allegorically] they transfer these to their own doctrines, anthologizing only a few dispersed utterances, not heeding their [allegorical] meaning but sticking to the statement as expressed in the literal way. For in almost all their verbatim quotations you may find that they only pay attention to the words and distort their meanings ...

But as Le Boulluec has proved,²¹ Clement himself often enough interprets Scripture in the centonic manner he condemns when it is employed by the Gnostics. It all seems to be a matter of honesty and intention, or of who is right from the beginning. One may add that Clement's *Stromateis* is in fact a patchwork itself, for *Patchworks* is what this title means. It is crammed with centos, in which the concatenations of pagan, biblical and Gnostic quotations and abstracts of the most diverse provenance are glued together by means of interpretive and exegetical comments and commentaries. The *Praeparatio evangelica* of Eusebius is an equally gigantic cento, and so are the *Eclogae* and *Florilegium* of Stobaeus, though most of the time these authors, to an even more generous extent than Clement, have recorded their sources with painstaking precision. Of course Eusebius includes more text of his own than Stobaeus, but in Stobaeus too the selected pieces have been arranged according to patterns thought out in advance. In the *Eclogae physicae*, for instance, passages taken from a wide variety of sources have been inserted in a systematic framework according to a well-established sequence, as is clear from the chapter-titles. The author of the *Philosophos historia* characterizes his medley of logical and physical abstracts (the former largely from a Skeptical source, the latter for the most part from ps.Plutarch's *Placita*) as follows, ps.Plut. *Phil. hist.* 2, ap. D.G. 598.5-7: προϋθέμεθα δὲ διαλεχθῆναι περὶ τούτων οὐδὲν μὲν ἴδιον εἰρηκότες, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τοῖς προτέροις σποράδην εἰρημένα συναγαγόντες σαφῶς τε καὶ συντομῶς σπουδάσαντες περὶ τούτων διαλεχθῆναι [...].

Jerome, *Ep.* 53.7, criticizing the views of other Christians which are different from his own, wonders whether these people really believe he has never seen *Homero-centonas et Vergiliocentonas*. His analysis of their method echoes that of Irenaeus and Clement:²²

... they adapt the testimonies to their own intention, as if it were a great achievement rather than the worst kind of rhetoric to corrupt the maxims and drag resisting Scripture along according to their wish.

²¹ Le Boulluec (1982) 710 f.

²² ... *ad sensum suum incongrua aptant testimonia, quasi grande sit et non vitiosissimum dicendi genus depravare sententias et ad voluntatem suam Scripturam trahere repugnantem.*

But this analysis of one's opponent's methods is not limited to Christian authors. The Epicurean Colotes wrote a book in which he attempted to prove that the doctrines of all the other philosophers make life unlivable. At the beginning of his *Adversus Colotem*, Plutarch, who just as Clement does not use the term cento, accuses Colotes of quoting texts in a selective way and out of context, obliterating their real meaning in the process, and of putting together something new from his fragmentary material in the way of for instance an artist painting a monster:²³

Colotes detaches certain statements shorn of their real meaning and rips from their context mutilated fragments of arguments, suppressing all that confirmed them and contributed to comprehension and conviction, piecing his book together like the freaks on display in the market or depicted in a painting, as you who are of the present company are of course well aware, ... versed as you are in the writings of the ancients.

In ch. 6.1-2 of book V of the *Ref.* (this really is the first chapter of the book because chs. 1-5 are *kephalaia*), Hippolytus begins by telling us that in the four previous books he has laid out in laborious detail the views (τὰ δόξαντα) of Greeks and barbarians alike concerned with the divine and the creation of the cosmos, and then adds:²⁴

What remains is to proceed forthwith to the refutation of the heresies, (for) it is for this reason that we have expounded what has been said up to now.²⁵ The heresiarchs, *taking these (views) as their springboards and sewing them together to serve their own intention, in the manner of those who stitch old rags together, have offered the errors of the ancients as novelties to those who may be fooled*, as we shall show in what follows.

²³ Transl. Cherniss (1967), slightly modified; *Adv. Col.* 3, 1108D, ὁ δὲ Κωλώτης ὅτι φωνάς τινας ἐρήμους πραγμάτων ἀποσπῶν καὶ μέρη λόγων καὶ παραράγματα κωφὰ τοῦ βεβαιούντος καὶ συνεργούντος πρὸς νόησιν καὶ πίστιν ἔλκων ὥσπερ ἀγοράν ἢ πίνακα τεράτων συντίθῃσι τὸ βιβλίον, ἵστε δήπου παντὸς μᾶλλον ὑμεῖς ... τὰ συγγράμματα τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ χειρὸς ἔχοντες. For the type of artists concerned Cherniss *ad loc.* refers to *Adv. Col.* 28, 1123C, ἃ γὰρ οὐδεὶς σκευοποιὸς ἢ πλάστης θαυμάτων ἢ γραφεὺς δεινὸς ἐτόλμησε μῖζαι πρὸς ἀπάτην εἰκάσματα καὶ παίγνια κτλ. Cf. also *supra*, n. 12 and text thereto. For the accusation of the use of selected passages quoted out of context and then assembled Cherniss also refers to Plut. *De sera* 1, 548C, ἀθρόα .. πολλὰ καὶ κατὰ τάξιν οὐδέν, ἄλλο δὲ ἀλλαχόθεν κτλ. Westmann (1955) 91 argues that Plutarch's criticism of Colotes is not justified. For centos in Plutarch see *infra*, Ch. X 5; on his use of identical or almost identical quotations for a different purpose in different contexts see Hershbell (1971) 165 ff.

²⁴ My italics, Wendland's text: περιλείπεται τοίνυν ἐπὶ τὸν τῶν αἰρέσεων ἔλεγχον ὁρμᾶν, (οὐ) χάριν καὶ τὰ προειρημένα ἡμῖν ἐκτεθείμεθα· ἀφ' ὧν τὰς ἀφορμὰς μετασχόντες οἱ αἰρεσιάρχαι δίκην παλαιογράφων (συγ)καττύσαντες πρὸς τὸν ἴδιον νοῦν τὰ τῶν παλαιῶν σφάλματα, ὡς καινὰ παρέθεσαν τοῖς πλανᾶσθαι δυναμένοις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἀκολούθοις δεῖξομεν. At *Ref.* V 4, he says that the Sethians have stitched together (συνεκάττυσαν) their doctrine by stealing from Musaeus, Linus and Orpheus. I assume he took the term συκαττύειν from Irenaeus, see *supra*, n. 13.

²⁵ This statement is a bit odd, because as we shall see the heresy of Simon and Valentinus is derived from Pythagorean mathematics at *Ref.* IV 51. But what is at *Ref.* IV 51 anticipates the much longer accounts that are to follow.

We may take notice of the rather precise echo of what is in Irenaeus. Old rags are sewn together according to an idiosyncratic pattern, then peddled as new to the ignorant public. These rags are bits and pieces of obsolete Greek and barbarian wisdom, the novel doctrine being a mere cento ((συ)καττύσαντες, as Le Boulluec has pointed out, in this context being technical language). The word παλαιορράφος used by Hippolytus, 'stitcher of old things', is rare. It occurs only here in the *Ref.*; LSJ lists only one occurrence, in Hesychius, and offers the translation 'cobbler',²⁶ i.e. someone who sews together pieces of old leather. Hippolytus' expression πρὸς τὸν ἴδιον νοῦν is the almost exact equivalent of Jerome's *ad sensum suum*, and not much different from Clement's εἰς τὰς ἰδίας ... δόξας.

Hippolytus, in other words, accuses his opponents of manufacturing rhapsodic centos on a large scale, and of appropriating without acknowledgement from the wise men among the barbarians and especially the Greeks the obsolete raw materials they recycle and then peddle. Most of these Greeks, we may add, wrote in prose not verse, Empedocles being the most significant exception. But Hippolytus' own method is very much the same. Indeed, as will become clear from what follows, he is very good at constructing a cento himself. My hypothesis is that he had been deeply impressed by Irenaeus' analysis at *Adv. haeres.* I 9.3-5 and Irenaeus' own cento at *Adv. haeres.* II 14.1-6, but wanted to do a much better and far more thorough job than his illustrious predecessor by exposing the practices of the Gnostic centonizers on a grander scale. What is an interlude in Irenaeus has become the main objective for Hippolytus.

A word may be added on the exegesis, or interpretation, of quoted texts. In Hippolytus' day philosophical practice for the most part consisted in the study and (often creative) interpretation of selected works and passages of what were considered to be the important classics in the field, and as a rule the commentary literature was adduced on a large scale. In fact, this form of interpretation is what the study of philosophy had developed into during the previous centuries. Christian writers, too, just as Philo of Alexandria before them, had for the most part been engaged in the interpretation of texts, or parts of texts. Christian exegesis may have been influenced by this philosophical practice,²⁷ or have

²⁶ Tjitse Baarda has given me another parallel, viz. *Martyrium Marci*, PG 115, 165AB, where the word occurs twice (Marcus is having his shoe repaired).

²⁷ See Hadot (1987) 15: "... le fait que la doctrine chrétienne soit fondée sur des textes, bibliques et évangéliques, et que la théologie chrétienne soit nécessairement exégétique, ne pouvait la distinguer par rapport aux autres philosophies. Elles aussi consistaient dans l'exégèse des textes de leurs fondateurs." Young (1989), though containing an interesting discussion of Quintilian's account of correct reading and

converged with it; what matters is the overall similarity of method. When dealing with selected texts of philosophical provenance, Hippolytus was in a position to apply methods of interpretation and exegesis that were current among pagans as well as Christians and therefore perfectly legitimate. In fact, his results, forced as they may seem to us, are often hardly less so than those of his pagan philosophical contemporaries and their later successors. The exegetical principle *ex eo quod scriptum sit ad id quod non sit scriptum pervenire* (Cic. *De inv.* II 152),²⁸ often employed in juridical contexts where after all one has to apply the law as written to cases which may not perfectly tally with it, is applied by pagan philosophers and Christian writers alike. These men supply themselves with the elbow-room they need.²⁹

A mixture of cento and exegesis can therefore be a quite potent brew. Criticism of course always remained possible, but this either was not directed at the method itself but at the purpose it served or the manner in which it was applied, or, if the method itself was criticized, it was so by people who used it themselves.

A *terminus technicus* exists for the idiosyncratic and eclectic combination of quotations which is accompanied by a perverse exegesis in support of the compiler's view; that is to say, the term at issue may acquire this technical sense in certain contexts. At the beginning of his account of Simon Magus' doctrines,³⁰ Hippolytus says (*Ref.* VI 9.3): λέγει δὲ ὁ Σίμων μεταφράζων τὸν νόμον Μωυσέως ἀνοήτως καὶ κακοτέχνως. Summing up his opponent's use of Scripture, Hippolytus says (*Ref.* VI

interpretation (184 ff.), is insufficient. See also Schreckenberg (1966) and *infra*, n. 92, and *infra*, Ch. X n. 19 and text thereto. On the intentional ἀσάφεια (which, *pace* Ph. Hoffmann and I. Hadot, I prefer to translate as 'ambiguity' or 'lack of clarity' rather than 'obscurity') attributed to Aristotle's so-called acroamatic works by the late Neoplatonists commentators, a view which enabled these learned men to interpret what he said *more Neoplatonico*, see Hadot (1990a) 108 ff., 113 ff., 180. This principle of exegesis has a venerable history; it was applied by Plato to the poets (see Mansfeld (1986a) 30) and by Aristotle to the poets and the early philosophers (see Mansfeld (1986a) 19 ff., and *infra*, Ch. IX n. 2 and text thereto, and Ch. X 3).

²⁸ Young Cicero must have derived this maxim from his Greek original(s). Cf. also Quintil. VII 5.1-10.4, cited by Hadot (1987) 19 f. Pier-Luigi Donini points out (*per litt.*) that among Hippolytus' contemporaries Alexander of Aphrodisias is exceptional in that he does not make the *ex eo quod scriptum sit* etc. "un principio della sua esegesi".

²⁹ Cf. also Cic. *De inv.* II 142, *ex scripto non scriptum aliquid inducere*, cf. Marius Victor. In Cic. *Rhet.* p. 299.11-2, *ex eo quod scriptum est id quod non scriptum est colligitur*. See Hadot (1957) 209 ff. for Victorinus' beautiful formula *de lectis non lecta componere*. An interesting statement of this principle is found at Syrian. In *Met.* 11.11-13, ἃ δὲ μὴ λέγει [*scil.*, Aristotle] μὲν αὐτόθεν, ἐπόμενα δὲ ἐστὶν ἀναγκαίως οἷς τίθησι, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη λέγειν ἡμέτερον. For the exegetical practices of the Neoplatonist commentators see *supra*, n. 27, and *infra* Ch. X 2.

³⁰ For which see *infra*, Ch. VIII 2.3.

19.1): ὁ Σίμων ... τὰ Μωσέως κακοτεχνήσας εἰς ὃ ἐβούλετο μεθρημῆνευσεν. The earliest reference to this procedure is in a fragment of Heraclitus about Pythagoras (*Vorsokr.* 22B129) preserved at Diog. Laërt. VIII 6: Πυθαγόρης Μνησάρχου ἱστορίην ἤσκησεν ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πάντων· καὶ ἐκλεξάμενος ταύτας τὰς συγγραφὰς ἐποίησατο ἑαυτοῦ σοφίην πολυμαθίην κακοτεχνίην. I used to believe that the last word applies to the Pythagorean taboos, but when he had read a paper I had published on the fragment³¹ Professor Verdenius said to me that my argument could be confirmed by having κακοτεχνίη pertain to the eclectic and perverted plagiarism Pythagoras is accused of. I liked this suggestion, and having seen the parallels in Hippolytus and others am now all the more convinced that it is right.

VIII 2 *Pythagoras and his Followers*

VIII 2.1 Introduction

In this section, I propose to discuss *Ref.* I 2, IV 51.1-9 and VI 21-29.3, three interrelated passages about which some remarks have already been made in Chs. I and IV.³² I shall also refer, whenever necessary, to *Ref.* I 2-4, on the succession and *hairesis* consisting of Pythagoras—Empedocles—Heraclitus about which some remarks have already been made above.³³

Ref. I 2, the chapter about Pythagoras, is the longest in the whole *Philosophoumena*, and it is clear that special care has been lavished on its composition. Although there are important differences, it compares well with Diogenes Laërtius' *bios* of Pythagoras (VIII 1 ff.; even more so if we add the account of the *akousmata* at *Ref.* VI 27), and with the *Anonymus Photii* or Πυθαγόρου βίος excerpted by Photius at cod. 249. The reason, beyond doubt, is that for Hippolytus the philosophical tradition deriving from Pythagoras is the main source of Gnostic heresy. We are not only informed at considerable length about his life, his teacher, his travels and his doctrines, but also about his manner of teaching and about the organisation and history of the Early Pythagorean *synedria*. Part of this information is repeated in *Ref.* books IV and VI, sometimes verbatim, sometimes not, and a considerable amount of further details concerned with the doctrines are added. Consequently,

³¹ See Mansfeld (1989a), where I argue that we should accept that, according to Heraclitus, Pythagoras in an eclectic way selected passages from the writings of others, appropriated these and transformed them into his own wisdom.

³² See *supra*, Ch. I 4, IV 6. See also *infra*, Ch. VIII 2.7, Ch. VIII 2.8 *ad finem*, Ch. IX text to n. 19, Ch. IX 1.6, Ch. IX 2.2, Ch. IX 2.4 *ad finem*.

³³ See *supra*, Ch. I 4, Ch. II, Ch. IV 6.

we may infer that Hippolytus divided the material which he had collected on Pythagoras and his immediate school over *Ref.* book I and the later books. We shall presently see that this also holds for the material concerned with Empedocles and Heraclitus he collected.

VIII 2.2 The Irenaeon Model Modified: Simon and Valentinus as Followers of Pythagoras

We may take *Ref.* IV 51.1-9 first. The section on Pythagoras' arithmetics, *Ref.* IV 51.4-8, is an almost verbatim replica of I 2.5-10, but the account of his geometry which comes before it at IV 51.1-3 is *new* compared with what is in I 2. There are no other novel details, however, and nothing is now said about subjects such as Pythagoras' life, his teacher Zaratas or the organization of his early school, apart from a reference to his Egyptian connection at *Ref.* IV 51.1 which is repeated from I 2.18. The distinction between Pythagorean arithmetics and geometry introduced here by Hippolytus serves a definite purpose. The aim of this passage at the end of *Ref.* IV is to prove that the heresies of the great heresiarchs Simon and Valentinus derive from the mathematics which Pythagoras was the first to bring to Greece from Egypt. Simon is connected with Pythagorean geometry and Valentinus with Pythagorean arithmetics, and Hippolytus describes geometry *before* arithmetics because in the Gnostic succession Simon comes *before* Valentinus. In *Ref.* VI, moreover, Simon's doctrines are treated in chs. 7-20, and those of Valentinus, in chs. 21-37 of the same book, immediately follow.

The geometry involved is the well-known Platonic (or Early Academic) system of derivation which Speusippus and Xenocrates and later sources influenced by them attribute to Pythagoras: the flowing point produces the line, the line the plane and the plane the solid.³⁴ According to Hippolytus, the number of shapes that are produced in this way is infinite, and from the smallest point arises what he calls 'the nature of the great body'.³⁵ He applies this to Simon's statement "the small will be great and the great infinite", explaining the words 'the small will be

³⁴ See Burkert (1972) 23 ff., 43, 66 ff., 72, 82 (and *infra*, Ch. X n. 78); Tarán (1981) 259 f., 281 f., on Speus. Fr. 4 Lang = 28 Tarán. Numerous parallels for the theory of the principles and the system of derivation are quoted by Delatte (1922) 198 ff., but see Festugière (1945) = (1971) 380 ff. on the Early Academic precedents of Diog. Laërt. VIII 25. A number of texts have been assembled by Gaiser (1969), e.g. Nrs. 22B, 26B, 27B; see also Gaiser's comments *ibid.* 107 ff.

³⁵ ἡ τοῦ μεγάλου σώματος ὑπέστη φύσις (*Ref.* IV 51.3). I assume that the 'great body' is the cosmos, cf. *infra*, n. 96 and text thereto.

great' with the gloss 'in the manner of a point' which is grafted right in the middle of the quotation from the *Apophysis*.³⁶

The account of Pythagorean arithmetics ends with the enumeration of a hebdomad of numbers at both *Ref.* I 2.10 and IV 51.8, but with a significant small difference³⁷ emphasizing the coming to be of things from this hebdomad in the latter passage:

ὥς γίνεσθαι τοὺς πάντας ἀριθμοὺς ἑπτὰ, ἵνα ἡ τῶν γινομένων γένεσις
γένηται ἐξ ἑβδομάδος, ἥτις ἐστίν· (1) ἀριθμός, (2) μονάς, (3) δύναμις, (4)
κύβος, (5) δυναμοδύναμις, (6) δυναμόκυβος, (7) κυβόκυβος.³⁸

Hippolytus' argument (*Ref.* IV 51.9) is that Simon and Valentinus have taken precisely this hebdomad as their starting-point, merely giving *other names* to each of its seven members; that is to say, they have improvised their 'plot' (ὑπόθεσις) by imitating the Pythagorean arithmetical example.³⁹ Simon's hebdomad is said to consist of (1) Νοῦς, (2) Ἐπίνοια, (3) Ὄνομα, (4) Φωνή, (5) Λογισμός, (6) Ἐνθύμησις and (7) ὁ Ἐστὼς Στάς Στησόμενος.⁴⁰ Valentinus' hebdomad is said to consist of (1) Νοῦς, (2) Ἀλήθεια, (3) Λόγος, (4) Ζώη, (5) Ἄνθρωπος, (6) Ἐκκλησία and (7) Πατήρ.⁴¹ We may observe that these lists contain the names of the aeons and (at the end) of the ultimate principles of these two hierarchies, and that they pave the way for the full treatment of the systems involved which is to follow in *Ref.* VI.

We may further observe that Hippolytus' argument is patterned after

³⁶ The phrase (*Ref.* IV 51.3) has to be punctuated thus: καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ λέγει Σίμων οὕτως· «(τὸ μικρὸν μέγα ἔσται)», οἶονεὶ σημείων ὄν, «(τὸ δὲ μέγα ἀπέραντον)», κατακολουθῶν τῷ γεωμετρουμένῳ σημείῳ.

³⁷ I have italicized the relevant words.

³⁸ "number, monad, second power, cube (or third power), fourth power, fifth power, sixth power".

³⁹ (Immediately following the portion of the text quoted to n. 38 above): ταύτην τὴν ἑβδομάδα Σίμων καὶ Οὐαλεντίνος ὀνόμασιν ἐνδιαλλάξαντες ἑτεροτολόγησαν, ὑπόθεσιν ἑαυτοῖς ἐντεῦθεν σχεδιάσαντες. Cf. at the beginning of the chapter (*Ref.* IV 51.1): ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ σχεδὸν πᾶσα αἵρεσις διὰ τῆς ἀριθμητικῆς τέχνης ἐφεῦρεν ἑβδομάδων μέτρα καὶ αἰῶνων τινὰς προβολάς, ἄλλων ἄλλως τὴν τέχνην διασπώντων καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι μόνον διαλ(λ)ασσόντων — τούτων δὲ αὐτοῖς διδάσκαλος γίνεται Πυθαγόρας κτλ. See *supra*, n. 15 and text thereto. At *Ref.* VI 7.1, Hippolytus says that those Gnostics who came after Simon Magus continued his line of thought and only gave new names (ἐτέροις ὀνόμασιν ὅμοια τετολμηκέναι). At *Ref.* VI 20.4, he says that Valentinus took over from Simon, only substituting other names (ἄλλοις ὀνόμασι), for the first sextet on his list of seven names correspond with the six 'roots' on Simon's list of seven (all the names involved are then cited again).

⁴⁰ This is further worked out in *Ref.* VI 9 ff., see *infra*, Ch. VIII 2.3. In the present passage, Marcovich has failed to print the names with capitals.

⁴¹ This is further worked out in *Ref.* VI 29 ff.; the hebdomad is also referred to at *Ref.* VI 36.2. No capitals again in Marcovich or Wendland. I would not be surprised if Hippolytus turns out to have to some extent doctored the Valentinian material to get his hebdomad, because it appears that in Valentinianism a first ogdoad is involved (see *infra*, n. 43).

arguments employed and presumably invented by Irenaeus, who had said that the Valentinians fabricate a *ὑπόθεσις* and that their only contribution is to change the names in their *fabula* as compared with its original.⁴²

But also other aspects and details of Hippolytus' account must have been largely inspired by Irenaeus' refutation of the Valentinians. In the first place, Irenaeus argues that the whole Valentinian idea of reducing things to *numbers*⁴³ is originally *Pythagorean* (*Adv. haeres.* II 14.6):⁴⁴

That they [*scil.*, the Valentinians] wish to reduce all this to numbers is something they have taken from the Pythagoreans. For these [*scil.*, the Pythagoreans] are the first to have posited numbers as the principle of all things, and as the principle of these [*scil.*, of the numbers] the even and the odd, from which they derive the sensibilia and the intelligibilia. (They say) that the principles of subsistence are different from those of intellection and substance. From these first (principles), they say, have

⁴² See *supra*, n. 15 and text thereto, n. 39 and text thereto. On the 'Pythagorean and Platonic' *ὑπόθεσις* of Simon and Valentinus at *Ref.* VI 21-2 see below.

⁴³ This is because according to the Valentinian system as described by Irenaeus and (as it would appear, less accurately) Hippolytus there are two primary aeons on a par with or after the first principle, which are the first pair of an ogdoad of principal aeons. These produce further aeons, bringing the total up to twenty-eight. The last of these, *Sophia*, again produces two aeons, thus bringing the total up to thirty. Valentinus' followers seem to have modified this system in various ways. What is clear is that only the first two aeons in combination with the one principle beyond them to some extent may be interpreted as resembling the two principles doctrine of the Platonic *agrapha dogmata*, which in various forms was also ascribed to Pythagoras but, *pace* Krämer (1974) 238 ff., what follows can no longer be squared with the Platonic series of Ideal Numbers (which did not go beyond ten) or with the Platonic and 'Pythagorean' systems of derivation which either go no further than four or go on towards infinity. Moreover, the notion of the dyad does not seem to have played a part in Valentinianism. Irenaeus simply focuses on the undeniable fact that in the Valentinian systems numbers play an important part, and then says this is Pythagorean because in the 'Pythagorean' systems numbers play an even more important part. But the parts played are in no way the same, though the (Pythagorean) tetractys seems to be of some importance in the Valentinian system in the sense that the first ogdoad of aeons may be seen as a double tetractys. Cf. also *infra*, text to n. 136, text to n. 141.

⁴⁴ *quod autem velint in numeros transferre universum hoc a Pythagoricis acceperunt. Primum enim hi initium omnium numeros substituerunt, et initium ipsorum patrem et imparem, ex quibus et ea quae sensibilia et [in]sensata sunt subiecerunt. et altera quidem substitutionis initia esse. altera autem sensationis et substantiae: ex quibus primis omnia perfecta dicunt, quomodo statum de aeramento et de formatione. [...] Sensationis autem initia dixerunt, in quem sensus intellegens est eius quod primum adsumptum est, quaerit quoadusque defatigata ad unum et indivisibile concurrat. Et esse omnium initium et substantiam universae generationis hen, idest unum: ex hoc autem dyadem et tetradem et pentadem et reliquorum multifariam generationem. [...] unde etiam et eas quae sunt de uno coniugationes adnuntantur introducere, quae Marcus, velut sua iactans, velut novius aliquid visus est praeter reliquos adinvenisse, Pythagorae quaternationem velut genesim et matrem omnium enarrans. This passage has been missed by Burkert (1972). In the first chapters of *Adv. haeres.* book I, Irenaeus again and again emphasizes the Valentinians' fondness for numerological speculations, and this undoubtedly impressed Hippolytus as well.*

all things been made, the way a statue (is made) from bronze and form.⁴⁵ [...] They say that the principles of intellection (are as follows): the intellect has an understanding of what is supposed to be the first (principle), looks for (this) until it has exhausted itself and (then) stops at what is one and indivisible.⁴⁶

And the principle and substance of all generation is the *Hen*, that is to say the One: from this (derive) the dyad and the tetrad and the pentad and the multiple generation of the rest. [...] From this they strive to introduce their syzygies which spring from the One. Marcus⁴⁷ boasts about these as if they were his own (invention) and as if he had been able to fool us into believing that he surpasses the others in inventing something even more original, whereas his tale (in fact) is about the tetractys of Pythagoras as the *genesis* and mother of all things.

The main but highly important difference between Irenaeus and Hippolytus, as we have seen, is that the latter *adds* Simon Magus to Irenaeus' Valentinians and in this way is capable of linking the archegete of Gnosticism with the archegete of what in his view is most important Greek philosophical *diadoche* and *hairesis*. Through this stragem he provides the main argument of the *Ref.* with a new and firm backbone.

We must notice that Hippolytus by no means follows his predecessor slavishly but uses his ideas in a creative way. Certain details in Irenaeus' succinct account at *Adv. haeres.* II 14.6 correspond to what we find in Hippolytus' much longer versions, and although beyond doubt Irenaeus and Hippolytus are indebted to the same sort of sources or learned or even not so learned traditions, Hippolytus must also be indebted to Irenaeus, whose *Adv. haeres.* after all is an extant source we know he used.

⁴⁵ Note the standard scholastic Aristotelian example and terminology. I assume that Irenaeus' account somehow echoes Arist. *Met.* A 5.986a15 ff. (for such Aristotelian echoes see also *infra*, n. 46, n. 48), who says that according to the Pythagoreans number is both the matter for things and what informs their modifications and conditions.

⁴⁶ For this relation see the formula νοῦν μὲν τὸ ἓν, *De an.* A 2.404b22, in Aristotle's reference to the exegesis of Plato *Tim.* 35a ff. cited after his own *De philosophia* (Fr. 11 Ross, 3rd text). Cf. also Xenocr. Frs. 5 Heinze = 83 Isnardi Parente and 15 H. = 213 I. P. At *Met.* A 5.985b30, the section about the Pythagoreans, Aristotle says that τὸ δὲ τοιονδί (*scil.*, τῶν ἀριθμῶν πάθος) is ψυχὴ τε καὶ νοῦς. Alex. *ad loc.*, *In Met.* 39.13, explains that only νοῦς is meant and that the number in question is τὸ ἓν, but Aristotle's expression ἀριθμῶν πάθος does not support this interpretation. At Aët. I 7.18, *D.G.*, 281a10-b8, Pythagoras' Monad is identified with νοῦς ὁ θεός. At Aët. I 7.18 (both sources again) he is said to have held that that the Monad is the nature of the One, and νοῦς. At *Anon. Photii* (Phot. cod. 249, 438b = p. 237.18-19 Th.) the Monad is placed among the intelligibles. See further Burkert (1972) 23 ff., 58, 70 (attributing the identification, or strict relation, of νοῦς and One to Plato, Xenocrates and the Academic tradition generally); 40, 467 (inconsistently attributing it to the Pythagoreans). For the parallel in Hippolytus see *infra*, text to n. 88.

⁴⁷ A follower of Valentinus.

There are differences too. Irenaeus states that the even and the odd are the principles of numbers and of the rest and continues by stating that the One produces the dyad and the others. His sequence of principles in the first account, first even and then odd, is peculiar but to a surprising extent agrees with Aristotle's account of Pythagoreanism.⁴⁸ Hippolytus on the other hand does not say that the even and the odd are principles. According to his report (*Ref.* I 2.5 ff. = IV 51.4 ff.) the principle of arithmetic is number, viz. the infinite and incomprehensible *Hen* which contains the infinitely many other numbers within itself. The principle of the actual (καθ' ὑπόστασιν) numbers is the first and male Monad who generates the other numbers as a father.⁴⁹ The Dyad is second, a female number, also called even by the arithmeticians. The third is the triad, a male number, also called odd by the arithmeticians. Finally, there is the tetrad, female and even. Odd and even accordingly do play a part in Hippolytus' account as well, but it is an entirely subordinate one. The monad, dyad, triad and tetrad are the generic numbers which together according to Pythagoras form the sacred decad.⁵⁰ Hippolytus provides an adapted quotation from the famous Pythagorean oath—of which he quotes the full and more correct version elsewhere—and in this way introduces the famous “tetractys, (which is) the fount containing in itself the roots of everflowing nature”⁵¹ because all the other numbers derive from it.

Irenaeus, as we have seen, lists the one, the dyad, the tetrad and the pentad and then refers to the rest in general terms. The omission of the

⁴⁸ Arist. *Met.* A 5.986a16 ff.: ... τὸν ἀριθμὸν νομίζοντες ἀρχὴν εἶναι, ... τοῦ δὲ ἀριθμοῦ στοιχεῖα τό τε ἄρτιον καὶ περιττόν (cf. also *supra*, n. 45); see Burkert (1972) 32 f. Aristotle continues by saying that the One—being both even and odd—proceeds from both even and odd, and that number proceeds from the One. In the account of the *systoichia*, *ibid.* 986a23, the order is reversed: first odd then even. Simplicius, who knew his Aristotle well, says τὸ δὲ περιττόν καὶ ἄρτιον ἀρχάς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τίθενται (*In Phys.* 189.2), but has odd before even.

⁴⁹ Cf. *infra*, n. 75 and text thereto.

⁵⁰ Sext. *P.* II 215 (without mentioning the Pythagoreans) mentions this division of the decad as the standard one, ὅταν λέγῃ τις διαιρεῖσθαι τὴν δεκάδα εἰς μονάδα καὶ δύο καὶ τρία καὶ τέσσαρα κτλ. For material on the decad see Staehle (1931) 53 ff.

⁵¹ ... ἡ κατὰ Πυθαγόραν ἱερὰ τετρακτύς, πηγὴ ἀενάου φύσεως ῥιζώματ' ἔχουσα ἐν ἑαυτῇ. The oath as reproduced by e.g. Porphy. *Vit. Pyth.* p. 27.19-20 runs: οὐ, μὰ τὸν ἀμετέρα γενεᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτὺν / παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως ῥιζώματ' [mss.; Nauck reads ῥιζώματ' τ'] ἔχουσιν. Aët. I 3.8 and other sources (e.g. Sext. *M.* IV 2) have *πυχᾷ* instead of *γενεᾷ*. Hippolytus himself, *Ref.* VI 23.4 (cf. *infra*, n. 77 and text thereto, text to n. 95), gives the following version: ὁμνύουσι δ' οὕτως· ναὶ μὰ τὸν ἀμετέρα κεφαλᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτὺν / πηγὴν ἀενάου φύσεως ῥιζώματ' ἔχουσιν (where *κεφαλᾷ* (which is also at Stob./Aët. *ap. D.G.* 282b3) corresponds to the version at Sext. *M.* VII 94). Cf. also *infra*, text to n. 143. Exegeses of the oath concerning the tetractys are provided by e.g. Sext. *M.* IV 3-9 and VII 94-5, who in the standard exegetical manner successively explains each term involved.

triad is peculiar and may be a mistake; the addition of the pentad is equally peculiar.⁵² Of course he may have failed to understand the composite nature of the tetractys, but it is more likely that he knew that four generic numbers are involved and simply left out the triad because he associated it with the Trinity. That the sum is now twelve does not seem to have bothered him. What should at any rate be pointed out is that the formula which he provides at the end of his brief note, viz. *Pythagorae quaternionem velut genesim et matrem omnium*, corresponds *ad sententiam* to Hippolytus' κατὰ Πυθαγόραν ἱερὰ τετρακτὺς, πηγὴ ἀενάου φύσεως ῥιζώματ' ἔχουσα. For the term *quaternio* as the translation of τετρακτὺς compare Iren. *Adv. haeres.* I 1.1, *primam et primigenitam pythagoricam quaternionem, quam et radicem omnium dicunt*,⁵³ which is even closer to what Hippolytus says.

Irenaeus' remark that numbers (or the even and the odd) are the principles of both the intelligibilia and the sensibilia of course echoes the standard *interpretatio platonica* of Pythagorean number theory. We shall see that it is paralleled in Hippolytus, as is his account of intellection according to the Pythagoreans. Another important point of (at least partial) agreement is the fact that the One, although a principle, is included among the first numbers, and that the Dyad is *not* indefinite as in the Platonic and Neopythagorean accounts of the principles. Burkert, commenting on Hipp. *Ref.* I 2.5-6 = IV 51.4-5, argues that the obliteration of the difference "between the Indefinite Dyad and the number 2" is a 'Gnostic interpretation',⁵⁴ but it is a Gnosticizing interpretation due to Irenaeus' and Hippolytus' desire to find precedent in Greek philosophy for Gnostic heresy. In Valentinianism, the Dyad (or rather the pair corresponding to it) is not indefinite.

A further difference may be pointed out as well. Irenaeus only mentions the *Hen* at the beginning of the number series, whereas Hippolytus speaks of the infinite incomprehensible *Hen* as the first principle containing all the numbers within itself, and then of the Monad as the principle of the actual numbers which start with the Dyad and continue until the tetractys has been reached which is said to be the fount of all

⁵² The pentad represents either half the perfect decad (but Irenaeus does not refer to the decad) or the five senses, see Staehle (1931) 25 f., or, in early and later, Pythagoreanism, 'marriage' (2+3, i.e. first female + first male), see e.g. Burkert (1972) 33 n. 26. A long eulogy of the pentad, with many examples, is found at Plut. *De E* chs. 7-16, 387E-391E.

⁵³ Irenaeus' Greek text runs πρώτην καὶ ἀρχέγονον πυθαγορικὴν τετρακτύν, ἣν καὶ ῥίζαν [cf. ῥιζώματ'] τῶν πάντων καλοῦσιν. The two Irenaeian parallels are listed by Marcovich *ad Ref.* I 2.9.

⁵⁴ Burkert (1972) 60 n. 48. Osborne (1987) 111 f. has failed to notice that Hippolytus consistently omits the qualification 'indefinite'.

things. Accordingly, Hippolytus introduces two 'Ones', a higher and a lower one, but he is not at all clear about the relation between these two. To some extent his account recalls the system which Eudorus *ap. Simpl. In Phys.* 181.10 ff. ascribes to the Pythagoreans; here according to the 'higher account' we have (a) a One *beyond* the table of opposites and (b) according to the 'lesser account' a One also called Monad *in* this table as opposed to the Indefinite Dyad. We may however note that these two opposite principles according to Eudorus are 'one', so the distinction between the *Hen* and the Monad seems to become blurred.⁵⁵ Conversely, the *Anonymus Photii* (Phot. cod. 249, 438a = 237.18 ff. Th., in whose text the words ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δύο τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς have unfortunately dropped out) has the Pythagoreans place the Monad and the Indefinite Dyad among the intelligibilia and the one and the two among the numbers. Hippolytus' account also recalls the system of the *Pythagorean Hypomnemata* of Alexander Polyhistor *ap. Diog. Laërt.* VIII 25, where the principles are the Monad and the Indefinite Dyad, and the former produces the latter just as in Hippolytus the Monad produces the Dyad (though not the Indefinite Dyad). Numenius Fr. 52.15 ff. *ap. Calc. In Tim.* p. 297.16 ff. says that the view of 'some Pythagoreans' that *illam indeterminatam et immensam duitatem ab unica singularitate institutam* [esse] is mistaken, because according to the correct doctrine of Pythagoras God or the One and matter or the Indefinite Dyad are coeval. He seems to have taken Eudorus' analysis into account, but stands it on its head.

What is clear is that Hippolytus in the two almost identical passages cited above is more concerned with completeness than with clarity. We shall see below that in his third version of Pythagorean mathematics, at *Ref.* VI 23, he only speaks of the Monad as the principle of all things and no longer mentions the *Hen*.

VIII 2.3 Simon Magus Inspired by Pythagoras, Heraclitus and Empedocles

The heresy of Simon Magus is discussed in the first large section of *Ref.* VI, viz. at chs. 7-20. Detailed biographical information is provided as well (*Ref.* VI 7-9.2, 19-20), but the main part of the attack is devoted to a critical discussion of the *Apophysis* attributed to Simon, which Hippolytus believed really to be by Simon. The method he attributes to Simon is that ascribed by Irenaeus to the Valentinians, viz. of justifying the doctrine he has taken over from a plurality of Greek philosophers by covering up his cento of borrowed material with formulas taken from Scripture in a quite irregular and eclectic way. We may well believe

⁵⁵ See further Mansfeld (1988a) 182 ff., and *infra* Ch. X 4.

that the *Apophasis* contained numerous scriptural quotations, but should hesitate to accept that it also quoted the Greek philosophers. We may further observe that Hippolytus' presentation is biased, and that the conclusions he wishes to arrive at tend to be stated before the arguments on which they are based.

The first name mentioned is that of Heraclitus (*Ref.* VI 9.3). According to Hippolytus, Simon wrote as follows about the principle of all things:

τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα ἀποφάσεως Φωνῆς καὶ Ὀνόματος ἐξ Ἐπινοίας τῆς μεγάλης Δυνάμεως τῆς ἀπεράντου· διὸ ἔσται ἐσφραγισμένον κεκρυμμένον κεκαλυμμένον, κείμενον ἐν τῷ οἰκητηρίῳ, οὗ ἡ ρίζα τῶν ὅλων τεθεμελίωται.⁵⁶

It is generally assumed that this is the opening sentence of the *Apophasis*. It states that what one has here is a book with a 'title', and it is formulated as a *sphragis*.⁵⁷ The real 'author' of the revelation is the unbounded Power, who unburdens himself through a plurality of interconnected channels.

In order to prove that Simon's doctrine is Greek philosophy in a different guise, Hippolytus begins his account by citing a biblical quotation, or rather a mini-cento made up from two quotations one of which presumably he found in the *Apophasis*: ὁ θεὸς πῦρ φλέγον καὶ καταναλίσκον.⁵⁸ He says that Simon 'translates' Scripture in a stupid way and

⁵⁶ *Ref.* VI 9.4. I have provided the aeons with capitals and left out Marcovich's interpolations. Tr.: "This is the book of revelation of *Phone* and *Onoma* from the *Epinoia* of the great Power, the unbounded. Therefore it has to be sealed, hidden, covered, residing in the dwelling-place where the root of all things is firmly grounded". *Phone* and *Onoma* form the second Simonian syzygy, and *Epinoia* is the second aeon in the first syzygy. The great unbounded Power comes first, and the route of the oracle, or revelation, is from this Power through *Epinoia* ('thought', 'design') to *Phone* ('voice') and *Onoma* ('name', 'word'). The names of these aeons have obviously been chosen because of their relation to the 'revelation'. Hippolytus offers a few comments we need not distrust: the 'dwelling-place' represents man, and the 'root of all things' is the unbounded Power. The origin of all things is not only beyond the aeons but also concealed, and yet firmly present in man. This is good Gnostic doctrine.

⁵⁷ For name of author + title/subject cf. Hecat. *Per.* Fr. 1; Heracl. *Vorsokr.* 22B1 and the parody at *Vorsokr.* 22B129; Alcman. *Vorsokr.* 24B1; the opening paragraphs of Herodotus and Thucydides, etc.

⁵⁸ A conflation of Dt 4:24, ὁ θεὸς σου πῦρ καταναλίσκον ἐστίν (cited Hebr 12:29), and Ex 24:17, πῦρ φλέγον. The same conflation is attributed to Valentinus at *Ref.* VI 32.8. The words πῦρ φλέγον from the second verse are superimposed on πῦρ in the first verse, and καὶ is added; this technique is elsewhere used by Hippolytus himself, see *infra*, n. 121, n. 134, n. 135, text to n. 151. So perhaps he doctored the text a bit by adding φλέγον καί, as he is never happy with one word where two will suffice. What is more, if Simon, as Hippolytus affirms, ignored φλέγον καὶ καταναλίσκον instead of only καταναλίσκον, his deception is even more flagrant. On the other hand, one cannot exclude that the conflation may be traced back to Simon

applies a false exegetical technique to it (κακοτέχνως), for his interpretation of what Moses said must be false. Simon affirms that the principle of all things is (just) 'fire', whereas Moses spoke of a *burning and consuming* fire. In this way, Simon not only 'broke up' the biblical text (by using only part of it, 'God is fire', and not bothering about the rest), but also "stole from Heraclitus the obscure" (τὸν σκοτεινὸν Ἡράκλειτον συλαγωγῶν). In a not unelegant way, Hippolytus kills two birds with one stone, proving not only that Simon's use of Scripture is whimsical and eclectic, but also that the biblical citation merely serves as a cover for a well-known Greek philosophical tenet. The quotation from the beginning of the *Apophysis* reproduced above then follows. Hippolytus, a bit untypically, fails to set out the Heraclitean doctrine appropriated by Simon in detail, but of course he did not have to, for he had done so already at *Ref.* I 4.2 where he had said that according to Heraclitus "the intelligent fire ... is God" (τὸ ... πῦρ νοερὸν τὸν θεόν), which indeed is about equivalent to the doctrine attributed to Simon, viz. ὁ θεὸς πῦρ.

In what comes next there is a further allusion to Heraclitus, although his name is no longer mentioned. Hippolytus argues (*Ref.* VI 9.5-6) that Simon's fire is not one of the four ordinary elements but has a double nature, viz. a hidden and a visible one (κρυπτὸν⁵⁹—φανερὸν).⁶⁰ The hidden parts of fire are hidden in what is visible, and the visible parts of fire are produced by the hidden ones. Hippolytus adds an interpretive comment; he says that this is what Aristotle calls δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ, or Plato νοητὸν καὶ αἰσθητὸν.

In this simple way, Hippolytus produces an *interpretatio aristotelica et platonica* of the Heraclitean fire attributed to Simon, and so of Simon's Heraclitean philosophy (dressed up in biblical garb) itself.⁶¹ He also takes care to ensure that the distinction between the intelligible cosmos and that of sense-perception attributed to Simon's later successor Valentinus (who owes a special debt to Pythagoras but is also influenced by

or his followers. The Samaritan religion is a variety of Judaism, and confluences of this type are a quite normal phenomenon both in the New Testament and in early Rabbinic as well as Christian literature. For such confluences as a standard feature in Alcinoüs and other Greek authors of similar ilk see Whittaker (1989) 89 ff.

⁵⁹ Compare the word κεκρυμμένον in the quotation from the *Apophysis* reproduced above.

⁶⁰ Cf. in the Heraclitus section the opposition between ἀφανής etc. and ὁρατός and the Heraclitean proof-texts that are quoted there, *Vorsokr.* 22B54 and B56 (*Ref.* IX 9.5-6). See further *infra*, Ch. IX 2.3.

⁶¹ Osborne (1987) 222 f. argues that because the word *dynamis* is central in Simon's thought he may already have used *dynamei* in its Aristotelian sense. This is highly implausible; moreover, even Osborne does not suggest that Simon used the Platonic pair.

Empedocles and Plato) is already an ingredient in the expository exegesis of the *Apophasis*.

I skip the rest of *Ref.* VI 10 in order to proceed with VI 11 (using Wendland's text).⁶² Hippolytus says that Simon in the *Apophasis* calls the parts of fire 'perfect (and) intelligent' (τελείων νοερῶν); each of them is capable of 'speaking and thinking' (καὶ λαλεῖν καὶ διανοεῖσθαι), and of "being active in the following way, in Empedocles' words:".⁶³ Empedocles *Vorsokr.* 31B109⁶⁴ then follows: "with earth we see earth", etc. There can in my view be no doubt that it is Hippolytus who in this way accuses Simon of pilfering the ideas of a Greek philosopher. What the *Apophasis* presumably stated is that the perfect aeons deriving from the unbounded Power possess intelligence, and speak and think. We recall that the revelation comes from *Phone*, *Onoma* and *Epinoia*, and that the other aeons are called *Noûs*, *Logismos* and *Enthumesis*—*nomina loquentia*.⁶⁵ For Hippolytus, this is a sufficient motive to quote Empedocles B109 and to pursue (*Ref.* VI 12.1) with another quotation, viz. part of the last line of *Vorsokr.* 31B110.⁶⁶ Simon, he states, 'says' that all the parts of fire "possess intelligence and equal understanding".⁶⁷ Accordingly, Empedocles B109 is interpreted in the light of B110.10.

Hippolytus then discusses Simon's cosmogony (*Ref.* VI 12.1-14.5).

⁶² The majority of Marcovich's interpolations are innocuous, but his addition of (λέγει) at 216.7 is misleading, as it makes the *Apophasis* the source of the Empedocles fragment.

⁶³ Wendland's and Marcovich's comma after ἐνεργεῖν is wrong; read καὶ ἐνεργεῖν οὕτως ὥς φησιν 'Εμπεδοκλῆς. The words οὕτως ὥς φησιν 'Εμπεδοκλῆς qualify ἐνεργεῖν, and what Hippolytus affirms is that the 'parts of fire' operate in the same way as each of Empedocles' four elements and two moving principles.

⁶⁴ Also quoted by Sextus' Pythagoreanizing source, see *infra*, Ch. VIII 2.6.

⁶⁵ Cf. *supra*, n. 56 and text thereto.

⁶⁶ *Vorsokr.* 31B109 is not quoted by Hippolytus elsewhere, but the complete text of B110 is quoted in the Empedocles section, *Ref.* VII 29.26; see *infra*, Ch. IX 1.4, where I argue that according to Hippolytus Empedocles' Love as well as his Muse (or Prepon's 'just reason' and Marcion's 'middle power') are said to have 'equal understanding' (cf. next n.) because they belong with the intelligible world. Osborne (1987) 89, 223 ff. implausibly argues that the Empedocles quotations derive from the *Apophasis*.

⁶⁷ φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ γνώμην ἴσῃν. In Sext. *M.* VIII 286, B110.10 (this line only) is quoted in the form πάντα γὰρ ἴσθι φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νόματος αἰσάν. In *Ref.* VII 29.26, the last part of B110.10 according to Marcovich *in app. crit.* reads γνώματο σισ ov with a correction mark above the ι. The word γνώμα ('judgement', 'understanding') exists, see LSJ *s.v.*, with references to the tragedians; γνώματος, which can be got out of Hippolytus' text at *Ref.* VII 29.26, makes perfect sense. We may assume that at *Ref.* VI 12.1 it is paraphrased by the more prosaic γνώμην. What is more, ἴση, 'equal' or 'fair share', exists as well, see LSJ *s.v.* ἴσος II and cf. e.g. the epic formula at *Od.* ι 42 = 549, μή τίς μοι ἀτεμβόμενος κίοι ἴσης, *Il.* Λ 704 μή τίς οἱ ἀτεμβόμενος κίοι ἴσης (same position at end of hexameter). I do not know what Empedocles wrote, γνώματος ἴσῃν or νόματος αἰσάν, but it should be clear that these are *variae lectiones*. Hippolytus' reading makes even better *Empedoclean* sense.

The created world derives from the uncreated fire, from which spring six 'roots', or three pairs (syzygies) of two 'roots' each, viz. the aeons *Noûs*—*Epinoia*, *Phone*—*Onoma* and *Logismos*—*Enthymesis*. The unbounded Power is present in these six, but δυνάμει not ἐνεργείᾳ (we recall that Hippolytus introduced these Aristotelian concepts in his exegesis of Simon's doctrine of double-natured Fire). This is the 'Ἐστὼς Στὰς Στῆ-σόμενος. If this Power, though being in the other six, is made into a full likeness (*scil.*, of its original), it will be one and the same as the unbounded Power itself in substance, power, magnitude and effectiveness, but if it stays put and is not made into a full likeness, it disappears and perishes. Hippolytus⁶⁸ (*Ref.* VI 12.4) illustrates this situation using the simile of a *technē* such as grammatical, or geometrical, knowledge which is gradually lost when not practised, and entirely lost when one dies.

In *Ref.* VI 13.1, Hippolytus speaks of the six powers and the 'seventh', thus finally introducing the (according to him Pythagoreanizing) hebdomad already attributed to Simon at *Ref.* IV 51.9.⁶⁹ In what follows in the same chapter, *Noûs* and *Epinoia*, the first syzygy of aeons, are said to be heaven and earth. The *logos* quotes Is. 1:2 and according to Simon's *Apophysis* according to Hippolytus, the one who speaks these words is the ἐβδόμη δύναμις (viz., the unbounded Power himself). *Phone* and *Onoma* are sun and moon, and *Logismos* and *Enthymesis* air and water. We may assume that these identifications further strengthen the exegesis of Simon's intentions by means of Empedocles B109, which lists, in succession, earth [*~ Epinoia*], water [*~ Logismos*], aether [*~ Noûs* (?)] and fire [*~ the unbounded Power*], although there is no complete correspondence.

I must refrain from commenting on the discussion of Simon's doctrines and life that follows. At the end (*Ref.* VI 20.4) Hippolytus again points out that Valentinus' six aeons, although bearing different names, are the same as Simon's sextet.

To sum up: Hippolytus proves to his own satisfaction that the main lines of Simon's doctrine derive from various strands in Greek thought. His hebdomad of the six aeons and the unbounded Power is a travesty

⁶⁸ I say Hippolytus, because this standard Aristotelian illustration of the difference between potentiality and actuality (cf. e.g. *supra*, Ch. VII n. 36) is also found *Ref.* V 19.2. Per Luigi Donini (*per litt.*) points out that I am forced to take *technē* in προσλαβούσα ... ἡ δύναμις τέχνην as ἐνεργείαν κατὰ τέχνην. He suggests that what is ultimately behind Hippolytus' formula is the distinction between two levels of δύναμις at Arist. *De an.* B 5.417a22-b16. Hippolytus' words are confused (or confusing) because they only apply to the transition from the first level of δύναμις to the second, whereas death not only involves the loss of the *technē* but also of the first level of δύναμις.

⁶⁹ See *supra*, n. 56 and text thereto.

of the Pythagorean hebdomad of numbers. His God Fire has been stolen from Heraclitus, and the presentation of its manifestations has been influenced by Plato and Aristotle. His aeons and first principle, as elements and principles of the created world, are intelligent in the manner of the elements of Empedocles. Simon's doctrine according to Hippolytus is a cento of Greek tenets, covered up by whimsical quotations from Scripture which are interpreted by him in a perverse way. It is by no means an accident that the five Greek philosophers who have allegedly been victimized by Simon are those which constitute the Pythagorean *hairesis* which dominates the exposition in *Ref.* IV-IX. What we should add is that the Greek philosophical cento is of course Hippolytus', not Simon's. It is a worthy counterpart to the philosophical cento attributed to the Valentinians by Irenaeus.

VIII 2.4 Valentinus as a Follower of Pythagoras, Empedocles and Others

It is to the substantial account of Pythagoreanism in *Ref.* book VI 21 ff. that we should now turn. Once again, Pythagoras is said to have been the inspiration of Valentinus, but this time Hippolytus explicitly states that Pythagoreanism and Platonism *are the same philosophy*, and in this common philosophy he includes important ideas of Empedocles and Aristotle without mentioning their names; that is to say, a quotation of Empedocles followed by a substantial exegesis is incorporated anonymously, and Empedocles' name is only mentioned much later and in a different context.

At *Ref.* VI 21, we read that the ὑπόθεσις⁷⁰ of Valentinus' heresy is 'Pythagorean and Platonic'. This is explained as follows. Plato, in the *Timaeus*, did nothing but imitate Pythagoras, for Timaeus is a Pythagorean. Therefore, although the views of Pythagoras and Plato have already been set forth in the previous books, for the sake of a more detailed comparison a brief account of their main doctrines⁷¹ is indispensable. These doctrines were brought by them from Egypt to the Greeks, and it is from the Greeks that Valentinus got them, only introducing other names⁷² etc. In the next chapter (*Ref.* VI 22), Hippolytus tells us that the origin of the ὑπόθεσις⁷³ in Plato's *Timaeus* is to be sought in Egyptian wisdom—ἐκεῖθεν (*scil.*, from Egypt) γὰρ ὁ Σόλων τὴν ὅλην

⁷⁰ See *supra*, n. 10 and text thereto; *infra*, text to n. 73.

⁷¹ δι' ἐπιτομῆς τὰ κορυφαίότατα τῶν αὐτοῖς ἀρεσκομένων. That Timaeus was a Pythagorean and that Plato in the *Timaeus* followed Pythagoras was of course a cliché.

⁷² See *supra*, n. 15 and text thereto.

⁷³ See *supra*, n. 70 and text thereto.

ὑπόθεσιν περὶ τῆς (τοῦ) κόσμου γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς παλαιῶ τινι λόγῳ^{73a} καὶ προφητικῷ, ὡς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, τοὺς Ἑλληνας ἐδίδαξε κτλ. Plato's whole cosmogony and cosmology are therefore allegedly (1) Pythagorean and (2) ultimately from Egypt. To us, this seems a bit inconsistent, but Hippolytus apparently believes that Solon's Egyptian wisdom, having the same origin, is very much the same as Pythagoras' Egyptian wisdom, that it was further Pythagoreanized by Timaeus the Pythagorean, and then put into writing by Plato (for Pythagoras philosophized in an esoteric way). This clearly indicates that what is to follow derives from a Pythagoreanizing interpretation of the *Timaeus* which, we may add, as to some of its details presumably derives from the Early Academy. The Platonic cosmology has been combined with the doctrine of the principles and the system of derivation known in various forms from the so-called 'Unwritten Doctrines' and from Plato's immediate pupils.

To allow his readers to comprehend his account of Valentinus Hippolytus will first set forth those subjects on which Pythagoras philosophized in a silence (μετὰ ... σιγῆς)⁷⁴ which is famous among the Greeks (that is to say in an esoteric way only later divulged by his followers), and next demonstrate what things Valentinus took from Pythagoras and Plato and pompously attributed to Christ, to the Father of all things, and to Silence (Σιγῇ), the Companion of the Father. It is fun to see how he manages to turn Pythagorean silence into a *Vorbild* of Valentinus' *Sige*, but this is almost by the way.

VIII 2.5 Pythagorean Mathematics and Platonic, Aristotelian and Empedoclean Doctrines

In *Ref.* VII 23, Pythagorean number theory is therefore set out once again. For the most part, this section corresponds closely to *Ref.* I 2.5-10 and IV 51.4-8, but there are several significant differences:

(1), in the *first* place, as already pointed out above, the unknowable *Hen* or primary principle is no longer part of the picture in *Ref.* VI 23.1-3. We now start with the Monad which is said to be ungenerated and the father of the Dyad (once again: not of the Indefinite Dyad), while the generated Dyad is the mother of all things that have been generated. Hippolytus points out that Zaratas, Pythagoras' teacher, had already called the Monad father and the Dyad mother. The remark

^{73a} *Tim.* 22b. The use of this passage is a common apologetic *topos* from Philo and Josephus onwards, see e.g. Runia (1986) 74 ff.

⁷⁴ On the silence of the pupils and the Pythagoreans in general see *Ref.* I 2.16 and 18.

about Zaratas is an elaborated *Selbstzitat* of *Ref.* I 2.12.⁷⁵ Just as in the parallel passages in books I and IV, the other numbers (two, three, four) up to the decad then follow, and once again we are told that the decad is the perfect number from which the numbers 11 and so forth are produced.

What comes next, (2), though still derived from vulgate Platonizing Pythagoreanism or rather Pythagorizing Platonism, is now stated for the first time. Hippolytus says, *Ref.* VI 23.3, that Pythagoras generates all the corporeal solids from incorporeals (πάντα δὲ σώματα στερεὰ ἐξ ἁσωμάτων γεννᾷ), for the point is the element and principle of bodies as well as incorporeals. This is explained by means of the system of derivation: point—line—surface—solid, which as we have seen⁷⁶ is also mentioned at *Ref.* IV 51.2-3 (though not in I 2). In the earlier passage, however, there is no mention of the generation of corporeal bodies, but only of the first principles of (geometrical) shapes which, just as the principles of arithmetical numbers, can only be contemplated by reason, that is to say which are intelligible (*Ref.* IV 51.2, καὶ τοῖς σχήμασι τὰς πρώτας ἔλαβον ἀρχὰς οἰονεὶ θεωρητὰς μόνῳ τῷ λόγῳ). This time, moreover, the fourfold system of derivation leads up to the Pythagorean oath, here quoted in full (*Ref.* VI 23.4)⁷⁷ but explained in a quite novel way (23.4-5), viz. as alluding to the ‘harmony [or perhaps rather ‘proportional agreement’] of the four elements’ (ἡ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων συμφωνία). The tetractys is the principle of the “*physical* and solid bodies, just as the Monad (is the principle) of the intelligibles” (τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ στερεῶν σωμάτων ἀρχή, ὡς ἡ μονὰς τῶν νοητῶν). Both the tetractys and the Monad produce a decad, or one + two + three + four = ten. An interesting late parallel is to be found in Proclus, who distinguishes the transcendent monad from the tetrad (or decad) which is the cosmos, *In Crat.* p. 97.8 ff.: ὁ μὲν γὰρ κόσμος οἶον δεκάς τις ἐστὶν ... καὶ πάντα χωρήσας εἰς ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἐπιστρέψας εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρχὴν τῆς δεκάδος, ἥς προσεχῶς μὲν ἡ τετράς τὴν αἰτίαν περιεῖληφεν, ἐξηρημένως δ’ ἡ μονάς. For the decad as κόσμος and sun according to the Pythago-

⁷⁵ In the passage which editors cite as a parallel, Plut. *De an. procr.* 1012E (‘Baustein’ 67.3 in Dörrie (1990) 179) Zaratas says that the *Indefinite* Dyad is mother. Hippolytus remains consistent in leaving out the qualification ἀόριστος. See further *supra*, text to n. 49; *infra*, Ch. X n. 85 and text thereto, n. 127 and text thereto. Further texts concerned with Zaratas/Zarathustra as Pythagoras’ teacher are to be found in Dörrie (1990) 178 ff.

⁷⁶ See *supra*, n. 34 and text thereto.

⁷⁷ See *supra*, n. 51. For the passage deriving from Speusippus quoted below see Tarán (1981) 269 ff., who however wants to attribute too much of the wording and contents of the synopsis to Speusippus himself and so is constrained to develop a laboured interpretation of this much later *interpretatio*. Dillon (1984) even goes a bit farther.

reans see also ps.Iambl. *Theol. arithm.* p. 80.3 and 80.6-7. Furthermore, Hippolytus says (*Ref.* VI 23.3) that the demiurgic tetractys which creates the world imitates the intelligible monad in every respect (κατὰ πάντα ἐμιμήσατο ἡ τετρακτὺς τὴν νοητὴν μονάδα). This is paralleled in the same passage of Procl. *In Crat.* pp. 99.27-100.2, where Apollo, or the principle of the cosmic decad deriving from the ideal tetrad, is said to imitate its father, the transcendental One (τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα ... μιμούμενος). Compare also Procl. *In Tim.* I p. 432.19 ff., on the relation between the tetrad and the decad. Ultimately, these ideas seem to derive from Speusippus' book *Περὶ Πυθαγορικῶν ἀριθμῶν*, the second part of which dealt with the decad; a synopsis of the contents of this work and a long verbatim but rather uninformative fragment (Fr. 4 Lang = F 28 Tarán) have been preserved at ps.Iambl. *Theolog. arithm.* pp. 82.10-85.23. According to the synopsis Speusippus said that the decad is φυσικωτάτην ... καὶ τελεστικωτάτην τῶν ὄντων, οἷον εἶδός τι τοῖς κοσμοικοῖς ἀποτελέσμασι τεχνικόν, ... καὶ παράδειγμα παντελέστατον τῷ τοῦ παντός ποιητῇ θεῷ προεκκειμένην (p. 140.10-14 Tarán; my italics).

What is most interesting in Hippolytus' to us rather laboured exegesis is the reference to the four physical elements. I believe that we may safely assume that he interprets the ῥιζώματα of the Pythagorean oath as pertaining to the four elements of (Empedocles') physics. In fact, at *Ref.* VII 29.4 he quotes Empedocles *Vorsokr.* 31B6,⁷⁸ the first line of which runs τέσσαρα τῶν πάντων ῥιζώματα πρῶτον ἄκουε, and in this later chapter he explains at length what names pertain to what elements. In the oath, the tetractys is called the "fount possessing the roots of ever-flowing nature" (φύσεως). This *interpretatio pythagorica* of Empedocles' foursome and the *interpretatio empedoclea* of the (four) roots in the Pythagorean tetractys are complementary; they strengthen Hippolytus' case that Empedocles is a follower of Pythagoras and shore up his contention that the Pythagorean tetractys is thought to be the foundation of the physical world.

⁷⁸ Also quoted at *Ref.* X 7.3, in the passage taken from Sextus. On the other hand, note that Burkert (1972) 186 may well be correct in arguing that the second verse of the oath "can scarcely be older than Empedocles", a view which is the converse of the one I attribute to Hippolytus. The four elements occur again at *Ref.* VI 28.2, in the composite quotation from the *Timaeus* for which see *infra*, text to n. 134. Hippolytus' Empedocleanizing interpretation of the oath and Pythagoreanizing interpretation of the elements is probably not original. At ps.Iambl. *Theol. arithm.* p. 20.22-3 the oath is ascribed to Empedocles, which is significant enough in itself. The subsequent exegesis (23.1 ff.) begins in a different way because the 'roots' are explained as the numbers one to four etc., but at 23.19-22 the elements are introduced: ὅτι γὰρ καὶ τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, πῦρ ἀήρ ὕδωρ γῆ, καὶ αἱ τούτων δυνάμεις, θερμὸν ψυχρὸν ὑγρὸν ξηρὸν, κατὰ τὴν τετράδος φύσιν ἐν τοῖς οὐσι διατέτακται, δῆλον. If this derives from Nicomachus, we have a pre-Hippolytean parallel.

In this section of *Ref.* VI, this is the first time that an Empedoclean idea has been subjoined. There is, moreover, also a combination with the echo of a Platonic doctrine (*Tim.* 31b-32c). The συμφωνία of the elements is undoubtedly bound up with Plato's theory that the four elements are arranged according to a geometrical 'proportion' (ἀναλογία) and linked with one another in 'love' (φιλία).⁷⁹ What is more, in this passage Plato argues that the world can only be three-dimensional if there are *two* means, so that you need *four* elements which have been arranged in a proportional relation (a world consisting of three elements with only one mean would be two-dimensional). This suggests that, ultimately, Hippolytus' account of Pythagorean mathematics is dependent on an Early Academic interpretation of the *Timaeus*. We recall that at the beginning of his report, at *Ref.* VI 21, he had stated that Pythagoreanism and Platonism are one because Plato in the *Timaeus* follows Pythagoras. I shall say more about Plato as a Pythagorean later.⁸⁰

In the next chapter, *Ref.* VI 24.1, Hippolytus concludes that according to his (Platonizing) Pythagoras there are two cosmoi, the *intelligible* one, with the Monad as its principle, and that of *sense-perception* with the tetractys as its principle. The tetractys (Hippolytus omits to speak of the Monad) is in possession of the *iota*⁸¹ (or decad, 10), the perfect number. According to the Pythagoreans,⁸² he tells us, this *iota* is the "first and principal substance (πρώτη καὶ κυριωτάτη ... οὐσία)⁸³ of the intelligibles (and the perceptibles), and conceived both intelligibly and according to perception. As its accidents, it has nine incorporeal kinds which cannot be without the substance": ποιὸν καὶ ποσὸν καὶ πρὸς τι καὶ ποῦ καὶ πότε καὶ κεῖσθαι καὶ ἔχειν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν. "So the accidents of substance are nine, and if substance is added to them it obtains the perfect number, the *iota*", viz., the decad or 10. In this way an Aristotelian doctrine of primary importance is incorporated into the Pythagorean system, viz. the theory of the categories which as we have seen plays a prominent part in *Ref.* I 20 and VII 18.⁸⁴ Precedent existed in the shape of the pseudo-Archytean treatise *On the Categories*, the purpose of which is to demonstrate that Aristotle's *Categories* has been inspired by Archytas, and so to incorporate the ten categories into the Pythagorean philosophy. Hippolytus must of course have been aware of already

⁷⁹ See *supra*, n. 78 *ad finem*; *infra*, n. 98 and text thereto on δέσμος and φιλία.

⁸⁰ See *infra*, Ch. X 3-6.

⁸¹ Which Hippolytus, quoting Math 5:18 (ἰῶτα ἐν ᾗ μία κεραία κτλ.), puts on a par with the tittle, rubbing in the irony by citing Math 5:18 twice.

⁸² For this passage see also *supra*, Ch. V n. 19 and text thereto.

⁸³ This echoes the formula of Arist. *Cat.* 5.2a11 f. in the form which is typical for Hippolytus, see *supra*, Ch. VI n. 17 and text thereto.

⁸⁴ See *supra*, Ch. V 3, Ch. VI 4, and Mueller (1989) 240.

having discussed the ten categories in his Aristotle chapter (*Ref.* I 20.1-2), but for him Plato's pupil Aristotle to some extent belongs with the Pythagorean succession. We may further observe that Philo of Alexandria, speaking of the 'infinite virtues of the decad', lists and explains the ten Aristotelian categories without mentioning Aristotle's name (*Decal.* 29-31).⁸⁵ Accordingly, the decad of Aristotelian categories had been become part of Pythagoreanizing speculations long before Hippolytus. As a parallel we may point to the opusculum of Ocellus Lucanus, which performs the same task in regard to Aristotle's physics.

Hippolytus' Pythagorean system by now includes not only Plato (the *Timaeus*, with a specific although allusive reference to the elemental theory in its mathematical setting). It also has succeeded, by means of an ingenious and veiled interpretation of the word 'roots' in the Pythagorean oath, in incorporating a doctrine of Empedocles which is of fundamental importance in the latter's physics. Thirdly, it now also comprizes Aristotle's theory of substance and the other nine categories which provides a most important key to both the intelligible and the perceptible world. What we should note is that no names have been mentioned so far, apart from those of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans throughout and that of Plato at the beginning. But the philosophical cento allegedly constituting the *ὑπόθεσις* of Valentinus has become quite impressive already.

In what follows next (*Ref.* VI 24.3-6), Hippolytus turns to epistemology and discusses the two distinct cognitive faculties of human beings. The All has been divided by Pythagoras into the intelligible cosmos (deriving, as we remember, from the Monad) and the cosmos of sense-perception (deriving from the tetractys). Our reason, or rational faculty (λόγος), *derives from* the intelligible (cosmos), so that we may contemplate (*ἐποπτεύωμεν*)⁸⁶ the substance of the intelligible and incorporeal and divine entities. We also possess five senses⁸⁷ (smell, sight, hearing, taste and touch) which allow us to know what is perceptible by means of sense-perception (*δι' αἰσθήσεως*). So each of these two cosmoi is apprehended by its own organ, or *instrument*, of cognition (*γνώσεως ὄργανον*). Proof is added: sense-perception by means of whatever sense

⁸⁵ Cf. *supra*, Ch. V n. 22 and text thereto, text to Exc. n. 31. Staehle (1931) 56 f. relates this passage to Philo's lost *Περὶ ἀριθμῶν*. Philo may well have used a Pythagoreanizing source, as he does already at *Opif.* 100.

⁸⁶ Cf. e.g. Plut. *De Isid.* 382DE; Theon Smyrn. *Expos. rer. Plat.* p. 15.16-8, *ἐπόπτειαν δ' ὀνομάζει* [*scil.*, Plato] *τὴν περὶ τὰ νοητὰ καὶ τὰ ὄντως ὄντα καὶ τὰ τῶν ἰδεῶν πραγματείαν*. See further Hadot (1966) 127 ff., Mansfeld (1979a) 135 n. 19, Hadot (1990a) 42 f.

⁸⁷ For the pentad as half the decad of the tetractys and as the number of the senses see *supra*, n. 52.

cannot know any of the intelligibles, and reason cannot know the objects of sense-perception. Each particular sense deals with its specific type of objects. One has to see in order to know whether something is white, to taste in order to find out whether something is sweet, and to hear in order to establish whether something sounds pleasant or unpleasant. To discover whether a smell is good or bad we need the sense of smell, not reason. What then follows is both peculiar and interesting; Hippolytus has Pythagoras argue that the same goes for touch, for we cannot judge whether something is hard or soft, or warm or cold, by listening, because in this case touch is the only judge.

VIII 2.6 Parallels in Plato and Sextus Empiricus

For this passage, the upper apparatuses in Wendland and Marcovich fail to provide parallels from the philosophical literature. We may therefore attempt to fill this gap. Hippolytus' remark that the proper objects of touch cannot be perceived by hearing at first glance seems to be beside the point, as it appears to be unrelated to the distinction between the proper objects of reason on the one hand and those of sense-perception on the other. But we should not overhear the echoes of Plato *Thi.* 184b ff., where it is argued that the five senses are *instruments by means of* which we perceive (or rather our soul perceives) the objects of sense-perception (184d4-5, διὰ τούτων οἷον ὀργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά). In the same passage, Plato further argues that the objects of one organ of perception cannot be perceived by any of the others; one cannot hear what one sees, and conversely (184e8-185a2). Hippolytus' example, though different from Plato's (one cannot hear whether something is hard or soft, warm or cold), has the same point. Finally, Plato uses the argument concerned with the proper and particular objects of the individual senses in order to prove that those objects of knowledge which do not belong within the proper domain of each of the five senses are the territory of a different faculty, which however turns out to be not another such ὄργανον but the soul itself, which receives the reports of the senses but also reasons on its own (185a8 ff., esp. 185d). A number of these objects of the soul's cognition—which are not given in sense-perception—are listed; among these, we find ἓν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν as well as the ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περὶ τὸν (185d1-2), or number (and the principles, or main properties, of *number*. To a later Platonist, this would smack of Pythagoreanism.

We may say that Plato's argument establishes the existence of a cognitive faculty different from sense-perception by means of an analogy, viz. by first proving that each organ of sense-perception differs

from each of the others because it cannot perceive the others' objects, and then by extending this to the proper domain of the independent soul, which deals with objects over which sense-perception cannot hold sway. Hippolytus' argument is similar, but presented the other way round. He first states that the proper objects of reason and sense-perception are different, and only then adds that also the proper objects of one organ of sense-perception (touch) cannot be distinguished by a different organ (hearing). That he speaks of reason instead of soul and (unlike Plato) calls this λόγος an ὄργανον as well are merely minor differences. That he says that λόγος (his equivalent for Plato's 'soul') cannot grasp the objects of sense-perception seems a bit bizarre, but as we shall see is not unparalleled.

A further and even more articulate and detailed parallel indeed exists. Hippolytus argues that according to Pythagoras we know the incorporeal intelligibles (by which first and foremost he means the Monad and the numbers produced by the Monad) through the λόγος which derives from the intelligible cosmos. We may infer that there must be something monadic and number-like to this λόγος.⁸⁸ The physical objects of sense-perception are known by means of the five senses. The idea behind this argument is undoubtedly the venerable old view that like is known by like; our λόγος is capable of knowing the intelligibles precisely because it has its origin in the intelligible cosmos of number. We should therefore adduce the passage on the 'Pythagoreans' *ap. Sext. M. VII 92 ff.*, which is part of Sextus' discussion of truth and the criterion.

I shall paraphrase the relevant section, which apparently derives from a source or sources based, *inter alia*, on Pythagoreanizing documents or reports based on such documents:

The Pythagoreans (*M. VII 92*) say that the criterion is the λόγος; not, however, the λόγος in general but the one that is derived ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων, viz. not (only) astronomy but, in view of the context (esp. 94-100), the mathematical sciences in general. According to Philolaus,⁸⁹ this λόγος, which studies the nature of the whole (τῆς τῶν ὅλων φύσεως), has a sort of kinship thereto because like is grasped by like (ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου τὸ ὅμοιον καταλαμβάνεσθαι πέφυκεν). A quotation of Empedocles *Vorsokr. 31 B109* immediately follows; "we see earth by earth etc., Strife by Strife". Interestingly enough, Empedocles' name is not mentioned and the unwary reader is therefore in a position to

⁸⁸ See the Irenaeus text and the parallel passages cited *supra*, n. 46 and text thereto.

⁸⁹ Cf. *Vorsokr. 44A29*, where the passage is reproduced.

assume that these lines on like grasping like were composed by Philolaus. This is all the more remarkable because subsequently, at *M.* VII 115 where he paraphrases the fragment, Sextus says that Empedocles introduced six criteria of truth, viz. the efficient principles Love and Strife, and the four elements as material principles; and *ibid.* 121 he even quotes *Vorsokr.* 31B109 again, this time under Empedocles' name! What follows is that the three lines as cited at *M.* VII 92 may either have already been anonymous or already been attributed to Philolaus in Sextus' source, and this *transformation pythagoricienne* became feasible because Empedocles was considered to be a Pythagorean.⁹⁰ We may take notice of this phenomenon as an important parallel, in a source (i.e. Sextus) earlier than Hippolytus, for Hippolytus' practice of citing an Empedocles fragment not only without his name as a piece of Pythagorean doctrine (*Vorsokr.* 31B16 at *Ref.* VI 25.1, for which see below), but also under his name in the Empedocles section, viz. at *Ref.* VII 29.10.

Immediately after the Empedocles fragment, there is in Sextus a reference to Posidonius (*M.* VII 93 = Posidonius F 85):

and just as light, as Posidonius says in an exegesis of Plato's *Timaeus*, is apprehended by light-like sight and sound by air-like hearing, so also the nature of the whole (ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις) ought to be apprehended by its kinsman, reason (ὕπὸ συγγενοῦς ... τοῦ λόγου).

The first thing to be noted is that the Posidonius fragment is closely linked with the Empedocles fragment attributed to Philolaus. The second is that in his exegesis of the *Timaeus* Posidonius combines two passages that are rather far apart in the dialogue.⁹¹ The mechanism and benefits of vision are described at *Tim.* 45b2-47c4 and the benefits of hearing at 47c4-e2, but the mechanism of hearing is described much later, viz. at 67a7-c3. In some important details, Posidonius follows the *Timaeus* text rather closely, for Plato, speaking of vision, says that the pure fire inside the eye meets the external light (φῶς) as ὅμοιον πρὸς ὅμοιον (45c3-4), and calls this external light συγγενοῦς πυρὸς (45d4). Air (ἀέρας, 67b3) is the physical vehicle in the mechanism of hearing. In other respects, however, Posidonius' interpretation of the *Timaeus* is not literal, for he uses the special relationship between the proper objects of sight and hearing on the one hand and these senses themselves on

⁹⁰ See Burkert (1972) 57 n. 26, 133 n. 72, and *supra*, Ch. III n. 54, *infra*, Ch. IX 1. Cf. also *infra*, n. 99, for the parallel in Proclus.

⁹¹ The hypothesis that Posidonius was the author of a full commentary on the *Timaeus*, citing one lemma after another, is no longer popular. The present passage does not prove he did write such a commentary, although it shows that he combined lemmata which are rather far apart in the dialogue. The interpretation at any rate is systematic.

the other in order to argue for a separate organ of cognition, λόγος, which has an affinity of its own with the 'nature of the whole'. It is a safe assumption that according to Posidonius the nature of the whole is the divine *Logos* known by the *logos* in ourselves; this is not Platonism but Stoicism. Yet it is possible to pinpoint the passage Posidonius had in mind when speaking of *logos* in this way. Plato *Tim.* 46c7-e2 argues that we must distinguish the reason, or insight (νοῦν), which only the invisible soul possesses, from the perception of corporeal data, and adds that the lover of reason and knowledge must seek first for the causes of 'intelligent nature' (τῆς ἔμφορον φύσεως). For a Stoic, it is not difficult to conceive of this 'intelligent nature' in terms of his own intelligent universe, or τῶν ὅλων φύσις, permeated and ruled by *Logos*. Still, it remains odd that Posidonius in his exegesis (at least to judge from the citation in Sextus) did not follow Plato in assuming that the senses of sight and hearing provide indispensable stepping-stones for the unravelling of the secrets of nature (see *Tim.* 47a1-e2). For he argues that the proper object of knowledge belonging to human λόγος is a relative of this λόγος, just as the object belonging to light-like vision is light; these objects, viz. light and what is cognized by λόγος, are mutually exclusive. Accordingly, in his interpretation of the passages in the *Timaeus* dealing with sight and hearing Posidonius seems to have blended in *Thl.* 184b ff.,⁹² which as we have seen above argues in favour of exclusive objects for each separate sense as well as for the sixth faculty, or soul. On the other hand Plato, in the *Timaeus*, does not say that contemplating the heavens or listening to harmonies is all there is to understanding reality; the real objects of knowledge are not to be found in the physical manifestations to be perceived in the universe, and Plato of course never gave up the belief that there is in us a cognitive faculty different from sense-perception and having access to the intelligibles. However this may be, the parallel between Hippolytus' account of Pythagorean epistemology and Posidonius' exegesis of Plato's in the *Timaeus* is surprisingly neat, because both argue in favour of a distinct organ of cognition, λόγος, which knows the intelligible world (Hippo-

⁹² For "das Bestreben, Platon aus sich selbst zu erklären" see Dörrie (1957) 194 f. = Dörrie (1976) 212 f., and Dörrie (1971) 24 = Dörrie (1976) 161. See further the illuminating remarks of Runia (1986) 51 f., 55 ff., and of Whittaker (1987) 109 f. and Whittaker (1989) 89 ff. D. T. Runia points out to me that Dörrie omits to say that half of his proof-text, Stob. II pp. 49.25-50.1 τὸ δέ γε πολύφωνον τοῦ Πλάτωνος (οὐ πολύδοξον), has been supplied by Heeren. But Stob. II pp. 49-50, as an example of a standard method of exegesis of Plato, is fascinating anyway. We are of course dealing with the technique of teachers of philosophy and of authors of commentaries (cf. *supra*, n. 27). For further examples of combinations of *Tim.* and *Thl.* see Runia (1986) 163 f.

lytus' Pythagoras) or the 'nature of the whole' (Sextus' Posidonius interpreting the *Timaeus*), and both appeal to the fact that the organs of sense-perception have their proper and distinct objects in order to prove that human λόγος too must have such an object.

But the parallel goes much deeper. Sextus (or rather his source), apparently going beyond what Posidonius himself may have believed,⁹³ adds that "the principle of the existence of the whole" (ἀρχὴ τῆς τῶν ὅλων ὑποστάσεως) is *number*, ἀριθμός; this is precisely paralleled in Hippolytus. Sextus adds that the λόγος which is the judge of all things may be called *number*, for it participates in the power of number; this to some extent is also paralleled in Hippolytus (*Ref.* VI 24.3, ἔχομεν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ τὸν λόγον). The Pythagoreans, Sextus says (*M.* VII 94), intimate this in several ways. For one thing, they say that "all things resemble number"; I assume that here this famous half-line expresses the idea that number is the principle of the existence of all things. For another, they swear "the most physical⁹⁴ of oaths"; both lines of the couplet are then quoted. The fact that in this quotation the word κεφαλῆ (and not, as in other instances, ψυχῆ or γενεῆ)⁹⁵ is found perhaps suggests that the tetractys which is transmitted to the 'head' is reason, or λόγος.

In what follows in Sextus (*M.* VII 94-100) the oath and especially the tetractys are explained at length; what we have here is an account of Pythagorean mathematics which compares well with that of Hippolytus. It is particularly relevant that according to Sextus' account the ratios of the four numbers comprising the tetractys allow us to know both what is corporeal and what is incorporeal (*M.* VII 99-100). The explanation provided is not purely epistemic, but pertains to the derivation system (point line surface solid) and to the four numbers (monad etc.) that stand over each of these geometrical items. With the solid we reach the corporeal world, the pyramid (under four) being the first solid shape.

⁹³ Thus Kidd (1988) 341, who adds that *Vorsokr.* 31B109 and the *Timaeus* on 'like by like' were already discussed together by Arist. *De an.* A 2.404b8 ff. (cf. also *infra*, Ch. X n. 15). Burkert (1972) 54 ff. argues that Sext. *M.* VII 89-140 derives from a doxographic account by Posidonius; Kidd 342 f. points out some of the difficulties involved in that position. One has to grant that the account, perhaps in part deriving from Posidonius, was certainly worked over by others; on the other hand, one should not discount the possibility that he discussed views which he himself did not hold.

⁹⁴ Because it is concerned with the fount of ever-flowing *physis*.

⁹⁵ See *supra*, n. 51.

VIII 2.7 Hippolytus' Pythagorean Cento Continued; Dark Riddles

Returning to Hippolytus' report, we find that immediately after the epistemological passage he states that, in view of what has been said so far, the cosmic ordering (διακόσμησις) of the things that have come into being and are coming into being is seen to be brought about in an arithmetical way (*Ref.* VI 24.6-25.1). This is explained as follows. Starting from the monad and adding the dyads and triads and the multitudes of numbers that follow, we produce a single collection of number which is the very greatest.⁹⁶ Conversely, in an arithmetical way we bring about a separation of what has been combined, viz. by means of a sort of subtraction and going back⁹⁷ (*scil.*, to the monad) from what has been combined. In the same way, he (*scil.*, Pythagoras) says, the cosmos too is bound by an arithmetical and musical bond (δεσμῶ) by means of tightening and slackening⁹⁸ and addition and subtraction and so is always and wholly preserved without perishing (ἀεὶ καὶ διὰ παντὸς ἀδιάφθορον φυλαχθῆναι). What happens in the cosmos, we may conclude, is therefore strictly parallel to the two opposed modes of counting which have been described.

Hippolytus' last statement is rather cryptic and even ambiguous. When one starts reading the sentence, one's impression is that Hippolytus attributes a cosmic cycle to Pythagoras, 'addition and subtraction' being equivalent to a production of things from the Monad and a returning of things to the Monad respectively. But when one has reached the end one finds that the cosmos is indestructible. The fact that the cosmos has an origin but will never perish because it is 'looked after' echoes the *Timaeus*, in which the Demiurge, using mathematical methods, creates the soul and body of a cosmos which will not pass away because he does not want it to pass away. The 'musical bond' too is reminiscent of the *Timaeus*, where the geometrical proportion which binds the four elements together is called 'the most beautiful of bonds' (31c2, δεσμῶν ... κάλλιστος) which can only be severed by the Demi-

⁹⁶ ἓν τι σύστημα ... μέγιστον ἀριθμοῦ. Perhaps one should emend to μεγίστου and translate 'one collection, viz. the greatest number'; cf. *supra*, n. 35.

⁹⁷ ἀναποδισμός. The idea seems to have originated with Speusippus, who restricted its application to counting to ten and then starting all over again; cf. Burkert (1972) 72 n. 122. What we have in Hippolytus is a further development.

⁹⁸ ἐπιτάσσει καὶ ἀνέσει, a musical metaphor originally pertaining to strings and the tuning of the lyre, cf. e.g. Plato *Resp.* I 349e10-12. What we have in Hippolytus is surely an implicit reference to the tension of the World-soul at *Tim.* 34b4, cf. e.g. Runia (1986) 204 f., also for further parallels. Compare also the Timaeon echoes in Proclus' explanation of Apollo as a musician, *In Crat.* p. 99.16-18, ἡ δὲ μουσικὴ διὰ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἁρμονίας δεσμὸν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ ἔνωσιν ἐντίθησι τοῖς ὅλοις. Cf. *supra*, text to n. 79, *infra*, n. 105 *ad finem*. The Stoic *tonos* is of course also involved.

urge himself (32c1-3). The world-soul is constructed according to musical proportions which are also called 'bonds' (36a7, δεσμῶν).

In other words, in Hippolytus two basically irreconcilable ideas have been combined, viz. the idea of a cosmic cycle beginning from the Monad and ending with and at the Monad, and the idea of an organized cosmos that is actually imperishable. This amounts to an uneasy blend of (Empedocles') cosmic cycle and Plato's imperishable cosmos; in its turn, this implies that the opposed movements of the cosmic cycle are not seen as successive stages but as simultaneous events. Behind all this, there is also the intelligible cosmos which is the ultimate source of things. In fact, Hippolytus continues (*Ref.* VI 25.1) by saying that the Pythagoreans clearly state the distributive permanence (διαμονῆς) of the cosmos in the following way:

ἦ γὰρ καὶ πάρος ἦν καὶ ἔσsetαι οὐδέ ποτ' οἶω
τούτων ἀμφοτέρων κεν(ε)ώsetαι ἄspeτος αἰών

But this is not a Pythagorean couplet but a fragment of Empedocles, viz. *Vorsokr.* 31B16, here cited anonymously but subsequently quoted under Empedocles' name, that is to say in the Empedocles section at *Ref.* VII 29.10. This is the second instance of an Empedoclean idea, in this case a full poetic quotation, being grafted into the report about the doctrines of Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans.⁹⁹ An interesting parallel exists. Empedocles *Vorsokr.* 31B119 has been interpolated (without its author's name) in the account of the Naässenes at *Ref.* V 7.28, and provided with an appropriate interpretation. This text pertains to the vicissitudes and origin of the fallen soul, that is to say derives from the *Katharmoi* from which a number of lines are quoted at *Ref.* VII 29, although the present one (31B119) is not repeated there.

An exegesis of *Vorsokr.* 31B16 then follows, in its guise as an expression of Pythagorean doctrine (*Ref.* VI 25.2-4 διαμονή). First, Hippolytus—taking up the τούτων of the second line—rhetorically (or erotapocritically) asks τίνων δὲ τούτων; He immediately answers: τοῦ Νείκου καὶ τῆς Φιλίας, thereby introducing (Empedocles') moving

⁹⁹ For the parallel in Sextus see *supra*, Ch. VIII 2.6; I note in passing that Procl. *In Crat.* p. 97.23-4 quotes two lines from Empedocles (viz., *Vorsokr.* 31B121.2-3) in a Pythagoreanizing context (see *supra*, text to n. 77, *supra* n. 98, *infra* n. 138) without mentioning Empedocles' name. The second of these two lines is found only in the Proclus passage and has long been suspected, see e.g. Zuntz (1971) 202 f., Wright (1981) 279; Proclus may of course have composed a little cento of an Empedoclean line and another of unknown origin. Osborne (1987) 95-7 argues that *Ref.* VI 25.1 ff. and VII 29.10 ff. derive from a common source but has failed to see the implications of the attribution of the Empedoclean lines to the Pythagoreans in *Ref.* VI, although she points out, 96 n. 41, that according to *Ref.* I 3.3 Empedocles is a Pythagorean. For *Vorsokr.* 31B119 at *Ref.* V 7.28 see also *infra*, Ch. IX n. 72.

forces. Here we must recall what Hippolytus had said about Empedocles in the chapter devoted to him in the *Philosophoumena*, where these two efficient entities occur in the same order as at *Ref.* VI 25.2:

this man said that the principle of the all is Strife and Love, and that the intelligent fire of the Monad is God, and that all things are composed together from fire and are resolved into fire.¹⁰⁰

What is more, it is possible to read this sentence both as pertaining to a cosmic cycle and as being about a unique linear process.

There are also some remarks about Empedocles in the Heraclitus chapter of the *Philosophoumena*, where the agreement between these two Presocratics is strongly emphasized (*Ref.* I 4.2):

And what he [*scil.*, Heraclitus] said is in almost total agreement with Empedocles, for he says that Strife and Love are the principle of all things and that the intelligent fire is God and that all things come together with one another and are not at rest.¹⁰¹

It is clear that the information found in the *Philosophoumena* and the account at *Ref.* VI 25.1-4 belong together and are in total agreement. At *Ref.* I 3.3, moreover, Pythagoras is called Empedocles' διδάσκαλος for the doctrine of *metempsychosis*, and the doctrine that μονάδα ... εἶναι τὸν ... θεὸν is attributed to Pythagoras at *Ref.* I 2.2.¹⁰² Consequently, there is ample precedent in the *Philosophoumena* for linking these (Empedoclean) lines about Love and Strife with the report about Pythagoras' views about the Monad and the construction of the everlastingly circulating cosmos at *Ref.* VI 21 ff. Moreover the connection with Heraclitus who according to *Ref.* I 4.2 held virtually the same view as Empedocles helps to explain why the latter's cosmic cycle has been converted into a sort of permanent and simultaneous *va et vient* in an imperishable Pythagorean cosmos—which is a Platonic perceptible cosmos under an intelligible one at the same time. As we recall, the philosophies of Pythagoras and Plato according to Hippolytus are the same; Plato in the *Timaeus* is said to have merely followed Pythagoras, and we have seen that the stability and permanence of the Pythagorean cosmos is expressed by means of ideas and formulas which actually derive from Plato's dialogue. Heracliteanism, or at least Heraclitus' physics as interpreted in a

¹⁰⁰ (*Ref.* I 3.1) οὗτος τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν νεῖκος καὶ φιλίαν ἔφη καὶ τὸ τῆς μονάδος νοερὸν πῦρ τὸν θεόν, καὶ συνεστάναι ἐκ πυρὸς τὰ πάντα καὶ εἰς πῦρ ἀναλυθήσεσθαι. Cf. also *infra*, Ch. IX text to n. 74.

¹⁰¹ καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ σχεδὸν σύμφωνα τῷ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ ἐφθέγγετο, στάσιν καὶ φιλίαν φήσας τῶν ἀπάντων ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ πῦρ νοερὸν τὸν θεόν, συμφέρεσθαι τε τὰ πάντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ οὐχ ἑστάναι.

¹⁰² Cf. *supra*, Ch. I 4.

particular way ultimately derived from Plato's *Sophist*,¹⁰³ is therefore one of the ingredients which allows Empedocles' cosmic cycle to be amalgamated with Plato's indestructible perceptible cosmos.

We must however continue with the exegesis of Empedocles B16 provided at *Ref.* VI 25.2-4. Hippolytus argues that 'for them' (αὐτοῖς, *scil.*, the Pythagoreans) Love makes the universe indestructible and eternal, for οὐσία and the cosmos are 'one'. The meaning of οὐσία here presumably is something in the nature of 'being' or 'material substance', whereas the fact that the cosmos and οὐσία are said to be 'one' presumably stresses the unity of things through the agency of Love. Strife, on the other hand, tears it (*scil.*, the cosmos) asunder and introduces difference and attempts to turn it into a plurality by chopping it up. This activity is illustrated by two examples, viz. the division of ten thousand into thousands and hundreds and tens, and that of cutting up drachmas into obols and small κοδράντας;¹⁰⁴

and in the same way, he [*scil.*, Pythagoras] says, Strife cuts up the substance of the cosmos, changing (it)¹⁰⁵ into animals, plants and the like. According to them [*scil.*, the Pythagoreans], Strife is the Demiurge of the becoming of all the things that become. Love, on the other hand, takes provident care of the All in order to ensure its perpetuity; it brings together towards the One (or: to unity) and delivers from life what has been divided and torn away from the All, connects it with and adds it to the All, that it may be in perpetuity and will be one. Strife never stops dividing the cosmos and Love never stops assigning to the cosmos what has been divided. This, it would seem, is the distributive government of the cosmos according to Pythagoras.

¹⁰³ Cf. *supra*, Ch. III n. 54, and see further *infra*, Ch. IX, text to nn. 20, 37, 210, 211; Ch. X, text to nn. 156, 214, 215.

¹⁰⁴ κοδράντης, the Latin *quadrans*, is one quarter of an ass. The word, a *hapax* in the *Ref.*, occurs at Matth 5:26.

¹⁰⁵ Wendland and Marcovich read οὕτω τὸ νεῖκος τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ κόσμου, φησί, τέμνει εἰς ζῶα, φυτὰ, μέταλλα [ms. μετ' ἄλλα] καὶ τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια. I find it hard to explain these 'metals' in the present context, and suggest that we emend to μεταλλά(ττον) and punctuate as follows: τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ κόσμου, φησί, τέμνει, εἰς ζῶα, φυτὰ μεταλλά(ττον) καὶ τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια. The allusion is to the transmigrations of souls, which themselves are fragments (*Ref.* VI 24.3 ἀπεσπασμένα) of the one substance of the cosmos. For the verb in connection with *metempsychosis* cf. *Ref.* I 3.3 and VII 29 17-8, where its meaning at *Vorsokr.* 31B115.8 is explained. See further *infra*, Ch. IX 1.3. However, D. T. Runia points out to me that a parallel for the triad plants/animals/metals exists according to a Stoic doctrine cited by Origen (see the texts collected at *SVF* II 988-989), metals being things without life that move (*SVF* II p. 287.38-40). He argues that this is connected with the *tonos* idea for which see *supra*, n. 98. Pier Luigi Donini points out (*per litt.*) that the conjecture makes sense in that τέμνει ... μεταλλά(ττον) corresponds to κατακερματίζας τέμνει. He adds that one may leave out the comma after ζῶα and translate "<<divide cambiando in animali piante e altre cose a queste simile>> (cioè arbusti, erbe)". A further possibility according to him (cf. Runia's suggestion) is that Hippolytus is not thinking of transmigration but of the transformation of the original substance into plants, animals etc.

Virtually the same exegesis of Empedocles B16 is found in the Empedocles section at *Ref.* VII 29.10-12. I shall return to it in Chapter IX when analyzing this subsequent discussion, but wish to point out already that the later passage should be seen in the light of the present one in its Pythagorean (and especially Platonizing) context.

The most important ingredient of the presentation as found here is that a theory which Hippolytus *knows* to be Empedoclean (see *Ref.* I 3-4 and VII 29) is now offered as Pythagorean. Still, it has to be pointed out that the fit is in some respects a rather loose one. In the preceding section, the Monad or One itself produces cosmic diversity (two, three, the tetractys etc.), whereas in the subsequent (Empedoclean) section this diversity is produced by a principle which is different from the Love which is the unifying element in the cosmos. On the other hand, Hippolytus had also already referred to a version of the Platonic theory of the two principles, attributed to Zaratas, who said that the Monad is the father and the Dyad (not the Indefinite one) the mother of all things. It would therefore seem that the Platonic-and-Pythagorean second principle, which as we have seen has been carefully shorn of its indeterminacy by Hippolytus, has made its come-back with a vengeance in the shape of (Empedoclean) Strife. But the Greek word for (Empedoclean) Strife is not feminine; presumably this did not bother Hippolytus, who has already said that the Monad—in spite of its grammatical gender in Greek—produces the Dyad ‘in the way of a father’ (καὶ τῆς μὲν δυάδος πατέρα φησὶν εἶναι τὴν μονάδα, *Ref.* VI 23.1).¹⁰⁶ However, the permanent activity of (Empedoclean) Love and Strife and the fact that Love ensures the unlimited duration of the one cosmos agree with what has been said about its indestructibility in the passage immediately preceding the (Empedocles) quotation at *Ref.* VI 24.7-25.1. Finally, the opposed but simultaneous activities of Love and Strife take up the idea of the tightening and slackening found in this same passage. The ‘addition’ there mentioned in a typological way prefigures the division brought about by Strife, as the ‘subtraction’ prefigures the unification performed by Love.

The next section (*Ref.* VI 25.4-26) I have already briefly discussed elsewhere.¹⁰⁷ Here Plato’s name is mentioned twice; on the first occasion, he is explicitly said to have been Pythagoras’ pupil. For the first

¹⁰⁶ Cf. *Ref.* I 2.6, μονὰς ἄρσιν γεννῶσα πατρικῶς πάντας τοὺς ἄλλους ἀριθμούς = IV 51.4, μονὰς ἄρσιν γεννῶσα πατρικῶς τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας ἀριθμούς. We may recall that according to the Pythagoreans the odd numbers are male and the even numbers female. But Procl. *In Tim.* I p. 316.16 ff. speaks not only of a πατρικὴ μονὰς but also of a πατρικὴ τετράς and a πατρικὴ δεκάς.

¹⁰⁷ Mansfeld (1985b) 136 f.

time, Empedocles' name is mentioned: ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πυθαγορίζων λέγει (Ref. VI 26.2). A Pythagorean *akousma* is quoted at Ref. VI 26.1, which has been interpolated from Heraclitus *Vorsokr.* 22B94. In my view, this implies that Hippolytus' source put the Pythagorean *akousmata*, or *symbola*, on a par with Heraclitus' enigmatic statements. Support for this assumption is forthcoming from the next chapter, Ref. VI 27, which contains a fair number of Pythagorean *akousmata* each of which is provided with an exegesis. This account is introduced in the following way (Ref. VI 27.1):

But as we have begun to mention the things darkly said by Pythagoras to his pupils by means of veiled *symbola*, we must also briefly set forth the others, because the heresiarchs too have undertaken to communicate in such a way by means of veiled *symbola*—not their own, but claiming their share of the Pythagorean pronouncements.¹⁰⁸

'Things darkly said', σκοτεινῶς ... λεγόμενα—this sounds as allusion to the famous *epitheton ornans* of Heraclitus ὁ σκοτεινός.¹⁰⁹ We should recall that Timon of Phlius *ap.* Diog. Laërt. IX 6 (Fr. 43 D.; *Vorsokr.* 22A1, I p. 141.4) calls Heraclitus an αἰνικτής. 'Darkness' is already characteristic of Pythagoras at Cic. *De rep.* I 16 (*obscuritate Pythagorae*).¹¹⁰ Ps. Heracl. *Hom. probl.* 24 defends Homer's veiled way of expressing important philosophical truths by pointing to Heraclitus and Empedocles as parallels. 'Dark Heraclitus', he says, theologizes διὰ συμβόλων;¹¹¹ note that this term is normally used for the Pythagorean riddles.¹¹² Empedocles too, he says, imitates τὴν Ὀμηρικὴν ἀλληγορίαν.¹¹³ Ps.(?)Plut. *De lib. ed.* ch. 17, 12D, at the beginning of his lists of *akousmata* says that Pythagoras' moral injunctions were given by means of αἰνίγματα.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁸ ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ σκοτεινῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Πυθαγόρου λεγόμενα πρὸς τοὺς μαθητὰς δι' ὑποσυμβόλων ἐνή(γ)μεθα λέγειν, δοκεῖ καὶ τῶν ἐτέρων ὑπομνησθῆναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τοὺς αἰρεσιάρχας τοιοῦτῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ ἐπικεχειρηκέναι ὁμιλεῖν δι' ὑποσυμβόλων, καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἰδίῳ, ἀλλὰ Πυθαγορείῳ πλεονεκτήσαντες λόγων.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Ref. IX 2, 8.1-2, 10.10, where the *epitheton* not only occurs with Heraclitus' name but also independently. For Ref. VI 9.3 see *supra*, text after n. 58.

¹¹⁰ The whole passage deserves to be read, because it contains a short biography making Plato a Pythagorean.

¹¹¹ *Vorsokr.* 22B62 and 49a are quoted as illustrations. See also Grant (1957) 10.

¹¹² See Burkert (1972) 166 ff.

¹¹³ *Vorsokr.* 31B6.2-3 is quoted as an illustration; see *infra*, Ch. IX n. 17.

¹¹⁴ Numen. Fr. 24.57 ff., where Plato, following Socrates (i.e. the spurious *Second Letter*, cf. *infra*, text to n. 149) is said to be a Pythagorean philosopher, says that he wrote ἐπικρυψάμενος ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ δηλᾶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ δηλᾶ. For further evidence that "parler δι' αἰνιγμάτων signifie parler *more Pythagoreo*" see Saffrey - Westerink (1974) xxi ff.; on the terms *ainigma* and *symbolon* see also Grant (1957) 120 f., 136 f. Cf. further *infra*, text to n. 148. See also Hadot (1990a) 114 ff., who convincingly argues (*ibid.*, 121) that Clement's view, *Strom.* V 56.1 ff., that all the philosophical school hide their true doctrines behind symbolical expressions must derive from the practice of the Alexandrian Jewish exegetes of the Aristoboulos type.

Plut. *De Isid.* 354EF mentions Pythagoras among the wise men who where taught by Egyptian priests, and says that out of admiration for these Egyptians he ἀπεμιμήσατο τὸ συμβολικὸν αὐτῶν καὶ μυστηριώδεις, ἀναμείξας αἰνίγμασι τὰ δόγματα· τῶν γὰρ καλουμένων ἱερογλυφικῶν γραμμάτων οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει τὰ πολλὰ τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν παραγγελμάτων (a few *akousmata* are then cited by way of example). Porph. *Vit. Pyth.* 41 at the beginning of his list of *akousmata* says that Pythagoras ἔλεγε δέ τινα καὶ μυστικῶ τρόπῳ συμβολικῶς. The alternative designation of the *akousmata* as σύμβολα, found in all our sources, was as a rule interpreted as pertaining to their deeper meaning.¹¹⁵ The word ὑποσυμβόλων, which occurs twice at *Ref.* VI 27.1 but nowhere else in this work, is rare. LSJ list only one occurrence, Plut. *Quaest. conv.* V 673A, which is about the riddles ordinary people take up as an after-dinner game.¹¹⁶ The message Hippolytus conveys by using this term is that the meanings of the enigmatic Pythagorean *akousmata* are hidden, just as those, presumably, of the pronouncements of dark Heraclitus. This hint is important for the evaluation of the exegeses of the Heraclitean fragments provided by Hippolytus in the Heraclitus chapters at *Ref.* IX 8 ff., for which see below, Ch. IX 2; where you have darkness, you have exegetical elbow room. We may presumably assume that Hippolytus is not original in linking Heraclitus with Pythagoras because both express themselves in riddles, but that he depends on a tradition which appealed to him.

VIII 2.8 Riddles Concerned with Transmigration and the Good Life

Ref. VI 25.4-26 is about the soul. Hippolytus first says that Pythagoras says that the stars are pieces that have broken off from the sun;¹¹⁷ this by way of introducing the doctrine that the souls of the living beings have

¹¹⁵ See Burkert (1972) 166 f., 174 f., who points out that the beginnings of the allegorical method of interpretation of the *akousmata* can be dated before Plato because Anaximander the younger already wrote a Συμβόλων Πυθαγορείων ἐξήγησις. In the first cent. BCE, the Pythagorean Androcydes wrote a Περὶ Πυθαγορικῶν συμβόλων in which he seems to have said that a *symbolon* is an αἰνίγμα (*ap. Spengel, Rhet. graec.* III pp. 193.31-194.8, where a couple of Androcydean explanations are provided). Cf. also Hadot (1990a) 113 ff.

¹¹⁶ αἰνίγματα καὶ γρίφους καὶ θέσεις ὀνομάτων ἐν ἀριθμοῖς ὑποσύμβολα προβάλλοντες. The conjecture ὑποσυμβόλοις is not necessary.

¹¹⁷ ἀπορρωγάδας τοῦ ἡλίου. This isolated statement should be connected with *Ref.* VI 28, for which see below, Ch. VIII 2.9. The only and very imperfect parallel for this 'breaking away' I can think of is the view ascribed to Anaximander *ap. ps.Plut. Strom.* 2, 579.14-7 (*Vorsokr.* 12A10): a ball of fire grows round the air enveloping the earth, ἥστινος ἀπορραγείσης ... ὑποστῆναι τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας. This tenet is formulated by Hippolytus as follows, *Ref.* I 6.4: τὰ δὲ ἄστρα γίνεσθαι κύκλον πυρός, ἀποκριθέντα τοῦ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον πυρός.

come down from the stars. Apart from the parallels from Plato, Cicero, Pliny and Macrobius listed by Marcovich, among which the most important is Plato *Tim.* 41d, we may quote Macrobius. *In Somn. Scip.* I 14.20, p. 59.4: *Heraclitus physicus scintillam stellaris essentiae* [*scil., animam esse*], and ps.Just. *Coh.* 7 p. 32.21, ἄλλοι δέ τινες δύναμιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄστρον ῥέουσιν (*scil., τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι*).^{117a} Hippolytus then says that these souls are mortal when in the body and so to speak buried there as in a tomb,¹¹⁸ but that they rise again (ἀνίστασθαι) and become immortal when cut loose from it.¹¹⁹ This is why Plato, following Pythagoras, said that philosophy is the "separation of the soul from the body".¹²⁰

Plato also learned from what Pythagoras taught δι' αἰνιγμάτων, viz. from the following statement: "on departing from your own [home? country?] for a voyage, don't look back, or else the Erinnyes, the help-mates of Dike, will be after you".¹²¹ Hippolytus explains that the 'own' is the body, the 'Erinnyes' the passions¹²² and that departing for a voyage

^{117a} Pier Luigi Donini points out that a similar hypothesis is advanced in a difficult passage by Alex.(?) *Quaest.* II 3 p. 48.22 ff.

¹¹⁸ That the body is a tomb is Pythagorean doctrine quoted Plato *Gorg.* 493a and *Crat.* 400c; cf. also Philol. *Vorsokr.* 44B14 ap. Clem. *Strom.* III 17, perhaps spurious; Philo *Quaest. in Gen.* I 70, etc.

¹¹⁹ This paradoxical view of mortality and immortality recalls the first part of Heracl. *Vorsokr.* 22B62 and Cic. *Tusc.* I 75; see my (1985b) 136, and *infra*, Ch. X 8.

¹²⁰ *Phaed.* 64e-65a etc. The Platonic formula is applied to dying in the famous Stoic syllogisms conveniently accessible at *SVF* II 604 and 790 (Chrysippus)

¹²¹ ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας ἐὰν ἀποδημῆς, μὴ ἐπιστρέφου· εἰ δὲ μή, Ἑριννύες Δίκης ἐπίκουροί σε μετελεύσονται. A conflation of the Pythagorean *akousma* ἀποδημῶν τῆς οἰκίας μὴ ἐπιστρέφου· Ἑριννύες γὰρ μετέρχονται (*ap. Iamblichus. Protr.* p. 107.14-5) and Heracl. *Vorsokr.* 22B94, Ἥλιος γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα· εἰ δὲ μή, Ἑριννύες μιν Δίκης ἐπίκουροί ἐξευρήσουσιν (a text used by Plutarch, see *infra*, text after Ch. X n. 137a). The word that is common to both texts is Ἑριννύες, so Ἑριννύες Δίκης ἐπίκουροι was superimposed upon Ἑριννύες; for the same technique see *supra*, n. 58, *infra*, n. 134 and text thereto, n. 135, text to n. 151, and for the method itself Whittaker (1989) 90 ff. This conflation was feasible because dark Heraclitus was considered to be a riddling Pythagorean. The actual result is a bit bizarre, for the Erinnyes can hardly be simultaneously the passions and the helpmates of Justice. In the *akousma* and the Heraclitus fragment, I have italicized the words found in Hippolytus' mini-cento. Marcovich in *app. crit.* suggests that we should read οἰκ(ε)ίας in Iamblichus (apparently also at p. 114.29), but it is far more likely that Hippolytus, or whoever first composed this text, hearing or remembering οἰκίας, believed this was spelt οἰκείας and substituted the synonym ἰδίας. Against the emendation of Iamblichus, *loc. cit.*, is also the fact that (ps.?) Plut. *De lib. educ.* 12F (ἐπὶ τοὺς ὄρους ἐλθόντας), Diog. Laërt. (VIII 18, εἰς ἀποδημίαν βαδίζοντα) and Porph. (*Vit. Pyth.* 42, ἀποδημοῦντα) imply that the traveller leaves his home, or country. Iamblichus' 'home' is an alternative for 'country' (in his exegesis, *Protr.* p. 115.9-10, he says ἀποδημία γὰρ μετὰστασις τόπου).

¹²² A remarkable allegory for which I have not been able to find a parallel. The Erinnyes are the avengers of bloodshed, so the passions concerned may be those pertaining to the shedding of the blood of humans and animals (Pythagorean vegetarianism). But this seems inapposite at the moment of death. The prohibition concerned with the prolongation of life (or rather the desire to go on living) is

means getting out of the body. At such a time, μή αὐτοῦ ἀντιποιοῦ, i.e. don't remain attached to yourself (evidently αὐτοῦ takes up ἰδίης). For if you do, the passions will lock you up again in another body.

Hippolytus' interpretation is sufficiently clear. Caring about the body, or about the life one has lead and is unwilling or not ready to leave behind, entails that the soul does not become free and so has to be incarnated again. Similar explanations are given by the parallel sources.¹²³ Ps.(?)Plutarch says that on reaching the boundary of life one should not lose heart. Diogenes Laërtius says that those who are dying should not desire to go on living or be attracted by the ἡδοναὶ of life (pleasure, we know, is a passion). Iambl. *Protr.* 21 pp. 114.29-115.18 is longer, and much closer to Hippolytus. He argues that Pythagoras means that we should philosophize and 'practise death'; traveling away from home is a change of place, and "death is the separation of the soul from the body". That the quotation from Plato cited by Hippolytus occurs (anonymously) in the same context in Iamblichus can hardly be an accident. Iamblichus adds that one should abstain from corporeal activities. However, he says that 'Erinnys' means 'remorse'.

Hippolytus, as far as I can see, is the only author to connect this *akousma* with transmigration. He says that 'they', *scil.*, the Pythagoreans (or perhaps rather Pythagoras and Plato) accept the *metensomatosi*s of souls, as 'Pythagorizing Empedocles' says as well. This point about Empedocles to all purposes implies a backward reference to *Ref.* I 3.2-3,¹²⁴ a passage which may safely be seen as a preparation for the present passage (and for the Empedocles chapters in book IX):

Most of all he [*scil.*, Empedocles] agrees with *metensomatosi*s, in the following words

"already I have been a boy and a maiden,
a bush and a bird and a fish jumping up from the sea".¹²⁵

He said that all the souls find their changing abodes in all the animals (πάντα τὰ ζῷα). Indeed, his teacher Pythagoras said that he had been

however commensurate with the Marcionite ban on procreation which Hippolytus attributes to his Pythagoreanizing Empedocles (see *infra*, Ch. IX 1.3). Bertram van Winden suggests that the passion involved are those of the ἐπιθυμητικὸν and the θυμοειδές, as at Greg. Nyss. *De anim. et resurr.*, P.G. 46, 49B, 53D-56A. Pier Luigi Donini plausibly suggests that, because Iamblichus says that the Erinyes represent remorse and because the Stoic Wise man is immune to remorse (*SVF* III 548), this feeling may represent the passions in general.

¹²³ In the passages quoted *supra*, n. 121.

¹²⁴ I note that at *Ref.* I 4 transmigration is not attributed to Heraclitus; see further *infra*, Ch. IX 2.4.

¹²⁵ *Vorsokr.* 31B117. Also cited Tert. *De an.* 31.1 (*thamnus et piscis fui*), who *ibid.* 31.1-2 finds this view of *metensomatosi*s ridiculous. See further Waszink (1947) *ad loc.*, 384 ff., who also discusses citations and echoes in other Christian authors.

the Euphorbos who had gone to war against Troy, claiming to recognize his shield.¹²⁶

At *Ref.* VI 26.2-3, Hippolytus repeats this point, this time subjoining specific Platonic ideas:¹²⁷

For the pleasure-loving souls, he [*scil.*, Pythagoras] says, as Plato affirms, if they find themselves in man's passion and fail to practise philosophy, have to return again to a human body after a round trip through all the animals and plants (διὰ πάντων ζώων καὶ φυτῶν). And if it practises philosophy three times in the same way, (the soul) returns to its companion star, and if it does not, it (goes) again to the same (animals and plants).

The emphasis on the philosophical life and the reference to love of pleasure recalls Iamblichus exegesis of the *akousma* which has been cited above.¹²⁸ The Platonic elements are a cento of passages from the *Phaedrus* and *Timaeus*. The soul of the philosopher who three times in succession has chosen the philosophical life departs from this world for ever and returns to its original abode, whereas the others have to go back and may even have to live the life of an animal, is from *Phaedr.* 248a-249b. The soul of the just man which returns to the dwelling-place in its companion star (τοῦ συννόμου ... ἄστρου), whereas the others have to come back in the shape of women and later even of animals, is from *Tim.* 42b.¹²⁹ But the transmigration into plants ascribed to Plato is un-Platonic; it clearly is based on the 'bush' in the Empedoclean fragment quoted *Ref.* I 3.2, although it is not attributed to Empedocles in this earlier passage otherwise than by means of the poetic quotation, and the quotation itself is not repeated by Hippolytus on a later occasion.

At the end of the chapter, Hippolytus closes the circle by repeating the point about the *akousma* and its interpretation: the soul becomes mortal when vanquished by the Erinnyes, i.e. the passions, and immortal when it gets away from them.

The next chapter, *Ref.* VI 27,—the first paragraph, about Pythagoras' 'dark' statements, has been translated above—quotes a number of Pythagorean *akousmata*, each of which is accompanied by an exegesis (as is the rule in such collections).¹³⁰ Some of these are quite innocuous, but

¹²⁶ This story (which derives from Heraclides of Pontus, cf. Fr. 89 *ap.* Diog. Laërt. VIII 4) in support of *metempsychosis* is also told—with more names of previous incarnations—at *Ref.* I 2.11, where however no reference to the shield is found; a further sign that Hippolytus may divide his material over the individual chapters.

¹²⁷ See also Wendland's and Marcovich's upper apparatuses.

¹²⁸ See Wendland *ad loc.*, who points out: "Die Deutungen Iamblichs und Hippolyts gehen auf einer Quelle zurück".

¹²⁹ For *Platon ex Platone* see *supra*, n. 92.

¹³⁰ A parallel collection in a Christian author is Clem. *Strom.* V 27-31.2, who provides an elaborate exegesis of a few *akousmata*. On this passage see e.g. Hadot

others, that is to say the interpretations of a number of others, pursue the topic of the *akousma* about 'going away' and its exegesis found in *Ref.* VI 26. The first item, τὸν σπρωματοδέσμον δῆσον, is explained in a rather trivial way in the majority of the parallel passages. Hippolytus however says that it means that one should be prepared for death at all times and so always in full possession of the (Pythagorean) doctrines. Iamblichus' exegesis, *De vit. pyth.* 21 p. 122.22 ff., is also less trivial; he says that one should purify oneself from what is corporeal in order to be ready for the clear light of philosophy. I skip several innocuous *akousmata* and explanations in order to continue with ἀπὸ δίφρου μὴ ἔσθιε.¹³¹ That one should 'not eat from a stool' is interpreted as an injunction not to make one's living as a craftsman, so as not to be the slave of the corruptible body and to be able to conduct one's life according to rational precepts (ἀπὸ λόγων). To our surprise, the last *akousma* to be quoted, κυάμους μὴ ἔσθιε, is interpreted in an unexciting rationalist way resembling one of the alternatives proposed by Aristotle (*On the Pythagoreans*, Fr. 195 Rose, *Vorsokr.* 58C3) *ap.* Diog. Laërt. VIII 34: do not take upon yourself a function in the city, for at the time these were distributed by lot. To our surprise, because at *Ref.* I 2.14-15 a very different and elaborate interpretation of the taboo is attributed to Pythagoras' teacher Zaratas. Perhaps, however, this is another instance of Hippolytus sharing out his material over the various books of the *Ref.*, for the exegesis ascribed to Zaratas is not without parallels. In the collections of *akousmata*-cum-explanations that have been preserved, to relatives of which Hippolytus is undoubtedly indebted, alternative interpretations of the individual dark sayings are often found side by side.

VIII 2.9 A Composite Pythagorean Cosmology

In the next chapter, *Ref.* VI 28, we encounter a strange and difficult cosmology. The Demiurge of all things, according to the Pythagorean doctrine (φησὶν ὁ Πυθαγόρειος λόγος), is the *sun*, the 'great arithmetician and geometer'. "This is firmly established in the whole cosmos, as the soul in the bodies, as Plato says; for sun, soul are fire, and the earth is body".¹³² Plato said no such thing, however; the sun as a sort of

(1990) 133 ff., also for further references.

¹³¹ This is a rare one, only paralleled at Plut. *Quaest. rom.* 290E (with ἀπὸ) and *De Isid.* 354F (with ἐπὶ); no exegesis provided. The interpretation preserved by Hippolytus (which agrees with Iamblichus' exegesis of the *akousma* about the bed-clothes) is therefore unique; it also proves that the ἐπὶ introduced by the editors of Plutarch's *Quaest. rom.* is a *Verschlimmbesserung*.

¹³² καὶ ἐστηρίχθαι τοῦτον ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κόσμῳ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι ψυχὴν, ὡς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων· πῦρ γάρ ἐστι ἥλιος, ψυχὴ, σῶμα δὲ ἡ γῆ (Marcovich's and Wend-

world-soul is a later Stoicizing *interpretatio*, cf. e.g. Cic. *De rep.* VI 17, on the sun, the *dux et princeps*, as *mens mundi*, and Plin. *Nat. hist.* II iv 13, on the sun as *mundi totius animum ac planius mentem*. We have to recall that at the beginning of his account of the soul (and of the concomitant Pythagorean ethics), Hippolytus has affirmed that the stars have broken away from the sun, and the souls come down from the stars.¹³³ This, we may now infer, anticipated the account in *Ref.* VI 28 where the sun is said to be the Demiurge of all things.

At *Ref.* VI 28.2, a composite quotation from the *Timaeus* follows. The snippet *Tim.* 32b3-4, *πυρός τε καὶ γῆς ὕδωρ ἀέρα τε ὁ θεὸς ἐν μέσῳ θείς* has been absorbed into *Tim.* 31b5-8, *χωρισθὲν δὲ πυρὸς οὐδὲν ἄν ποτε ὁρατὸν γένοιτο οὐδὲ ἀπτὸν ἄνευ τινὸς στερεοῦ, στερεὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ γῆς· ὅθεν ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς τὸ τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχόμενος συνιστάναι σῶμα ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησεν*. In these two passages, I have underlined the words that are identical; the grafting of *ἀέρα τε ὁ θεὸς ἐν μέσῳ θείς* occurred right after the identical formula *πυρός (τε) καὶ γῆς* found in both original texts.¹³⁴ I have italicized the Platonic words which are quoted verbatim; Hippolytus forgot to insert *ὕδωρ* (or the word was lost in transmission), he said *θέμενος* not *θείς* and abridged the last part.¹³⁵ We may note that the formula *ὁ θεὸς* occurs in both original texts; this undoubtedly helped the abridgement *ad finem*. We also must observe that the title of Plato's dialogue is not mentioned here, but have to remember that at the beginning of his account of the 'Pythagorean and Platonic philosophy' Hippolytus has emphatically stated that Plato reproduces Pythagoras' doctrines in the *Timaeus* (*Ref.* VI 21.1).

Hippolytus then explains in what way the sun "arithmeticalizes and geometrizes the cosmos", and first says that the cosmos we are talking about now is (not the intelligible but) the one and only cosmos which is perceptible (*ὁ αἰσθητὸς εἷς*). The sun divided it into twelve portions, to which the names of the signs of the Zodiac are given. Each of these is

land's interpolations are *Verschlimmbesserungen*). For a similar pseudo-reference see *infra*, Ch. X text to n. 229. The analogy (cf. Cic. *Nat. deor.* II 40-1 = *SVF* I 504) seems to go back to Cleanthes; the sun (e.g. *Aët.* II 23.5 = *SVF* I 501, 1st text) and the soul (e.g. *SVF* I 519) as fiery, the sun as the *hegemonikon* of the cosmos (*SVF* I 499). See further below.

¹³³ Cf. *supra*, text to n. 117, *infra*, nn. 137-138 and text thereto, text to n. 139.

¹³⁴ For other instances of this technique see *supra*, n. 58, n. 121, *infra*, n. 135, text to n. 151.

¹³⁵ Hippolytus writes: *χωρισθὲν δὲ πυρὸς οὐδὲν ἄν ποτε ὁρατὸν γένοιτο οὐδὲ ἀπτὸν ἄνευ τινὸς στερεοῦ, στερεὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ γῆς· ὅθεν ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς ἡ ἀέρα τε ὁ θεὸς ἐν μέσῳ θέμενος ἢ τὸ τοῦ παντὸς ἐδημιούργησε σῶμα*. I have put the inserted phrase between vertical lines; what is not in Plato has been underlined. Marcovich should have indicated that Hippolytus' *τὸ τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα* is from the *Timaeus* passage too. For this method see *supra*, n. 58, n. 121, n. 134, *infra*, text to n. 151. For the four elements see also *supra*, text to n. 78.

divided into thirty further portions (i.e. degrees); these are the days of the month. Each degree is divided into sixty minutes (λεπτά), and these in their turn into even finer parts. The sun never stops doing this. On the one hand, from these divided sections he gathers the year together and on the other, by severing and dividing what lies together, he produces the great immortal cosmos.

An attempt should be made to unveil the strands of this fabric. The arithmetical and geometrical collecting, or gathering, and dividing performed by the sun as Demiurge, producing time and the imperishable cosmos should be compared to the musical slackenings and tightenings and with the arithmetical additions and subtractions producing the eternal cosmos described at *Ref.* VI 24.7-25.1, and explained in (Empedoclean) terms at VI 25.2-4. The part about the twelve segments of the Zodiac, the three hundred sixty days and the minutes presumably is a *Selbstzitat* from *Ref.* V 13.3-4, the 'Chaldaean' doctrine which has been excerpted from *Sext. M.* V 5. The only reason it has been inserted here is that Hippolytus, performing a *tour de force*, wishes to establish a correspondence between the *twelve* signs of the Zodiac and the *twelve* aeons of Valentinus, and between the *thirty* degrees (of each segment) and the *thirty* aeons of Valentinus (see *Ref.* VI 34.3)—a correspondence which, needless to say, is entirely superficial.¹³⁶

The compounded citation from the *Timaeus* is also helpful; from the Hippolytean context, it is clear that Plato's Demiurge (ὁ θεός) has become the sun; this interpretive view is rather common among the Middle Platonists.^{136a} Conversely, this Pythagorean demiurgic sun performs some of the actions of Plato's Demiurge by creating what is visible and what offers resistance, viz. fire and earth, and by fabricating the body of the cosmos by putting air between fire and earth. The cosmos made by the sun is the εἶς cosmos that is perceptible; this, too, echoes the *Timaeus*, for in the section from which Hippolytus' quotation derives, and indeed in this quotation itself, the perceptible qualities of the cosmic body compounded of fire etc. are stressed. Immediately before, at *Tim.* 32ab, Plato emphasizes that our cosmos is εἶς. The creation of (the parts of) time is an updated calque of *Tim.* 38b-39d. Here the sun plays a conspicuous part, for according to Plato (*Tim.* 39bc) the Demiurge kindled a light in the second circle—we call it 'sun'—, that it might fill the heavens with its brightness, and that all living beings for

¹³⁶ See *supra*, n. 43, and *infra*, n. 145 and text thereto. I note that Anatolius *ap. ps.Iambl. Theol. arithm.* p. 6.1-4 states that there is a community (κοινωνία) between the monad and the sun, because the computation of its name gives 361 (*sic*), i.e. the number of degrees of the Zodiac.

^{136a} See Donini (1980), 333-57, Pt. I: "Sole Demiurgo in Galeno e Numenio".

whom it was meet might possess *number* (39b6, μετάσχοι ... ἀριθμοῦ). In this way, day and night, and the month and the year came into being. Consequently, Hippolytus' demiurgic sun shares certain traits with the created sun of the *Timaeus*. Plato *Tim.* 40c describes the earth as the δημιουργὸν νυκτός τε καὶ ἡμέρας—a formula which by Alcin. *Didasc.* 7.161.22-5 is applied to the sun for reasons which we may now understand.^{136b}

However, I believe that also another Platonic passage is at issue. In the *Republic*, the sun performs the same functions in the visible cosmos as the Idea of the Good performs in the sphere of the Ideas, and Plato says that in our world the sun not only makes that we may see the things around us, but is also the cause of their becoming, growing and being sustained (*Resp.* VI 509b).¹³⁷ My hypothesis, accordingly, is that in an exegesis of the *Timaeus* to which Hippolytus is ultimately indebted the passage on the sun at *Tim.* 39bc was further elucidated by an appeal to *Resp.* VI 509b. If we think of the context in Hippolytus, which emphasizes the role of the sun in the visible world and where a different principle, the Monad, is mentioned in connection with the intelligible world, the reference to the above-cited passage in the *Republic*, which speaks of a different principle for each realm although these principles (the Idea of the Good, often interpreted later as being equivalent to the One, and the sun) stand to one another in an analogous relation, becomes even more apt.

But Stoic strands haven been woven in as well into Hippolytus' fabric. That the sun is fire and that the soul is fire are well-known pieces of Stoic doctrine. That the sun lords it over the world the way the soul lords it over the body also looks Stoic; Cleanthes, at any rate, is reported to have said that the regent part of the cosmos is in the sun (see Stob./Aët. II 4.16 and the other passages printed at *SVF* I 499-500). Ar. Did. Fr. 29 D. (*SVF* I 499) says that according to Cleanthes the most important

^{136b} This application is noted by Whittaker (1989) 81 and Whittaker (1990) 94 n. 124.

¹³⁷ Marcovich *ad loc.* refers to *Corp. Herm.* XIV 5, ὁ δημιουργός, λέγω δὴ ὁ ἥλιος, ... εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα ἔλκων καὶ ἀπὸ ἑαυτοῦ πάντα διδοὺς πᾶσι, καὶ τὸ φῶς ἀφθονὸν χαρίζεται. One may also adduce *Corp. Herm.* V 3 and Festugière *ad loc.* These passages too will ultimately be dependent on those in Plato, with a Stoic admixture. It is instructive to compare Proclus' first *Hymn*, to the Sun, and the many parallels cited by Vogt (1957) 47 ff. For Apollo combined with the sun in the role of a demiurge unifying the cosmos see Procl. *In Crat.* pp. 97.8-100.7 (cf. the sun as cosmos and decad according to the Pythagoreans at ps.Iambl. *Theolog. arithm.* p. 80.2 ff.). For the solar theology see e.g. Nilsson (1961) 273, 510. Much material (also from various Pythagorean, Platonic and Stoic philosophical sources) is to be found at Buffière (1956) 187 ff. and at Boyancé (1936) 65 ff., 121 ff., who however tends to call Pythagorean what seems in fact to be an *interpretatio stoica* of the *Timaeus*.

contribution to the administration of things is the sun's, because it (*inter alia*, no doubt) creates the day and the year and the other parts of time. Furthermore, Plutarch tells us that at the *ekpyrosis* the moon and all the other stars are (re)united with the sun¹³⁸—a view which is complementary to that attributed to Pythagoras at *Ref.* VI 25.4 where, as we have seen, the stars are said to have broken away from the sun (and the souls to have descended from the stars).¹³⁹ But the complementary doctrine is nowhere attributed to Cleanthes. However this may be, the strange cosmology of *Ref.* VI 28 is best explained as bound up with a somewhat idiosyncratic exegesis of the *Timaeus*, which is supplemented and blended with ideas expressed by Plato elsewhere, with Pythagorean themes, but also with Stoic and Middle Platonist notions. In this context, we may adduce Cornut. *Epidrome* c. 32, on Apollo, a rather long chapter which contains a number of ideas that are parallel to what is found in Hippolytus. Apollo is the sun (p. 65.1-2). In his quality as a destructive agent he is linked up with the destruction, *more stoico*, of the organized cosmos; indeed, his name is perhaps to be derived ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπλοῦν καὶ λύειν τὸ συνεστὸς τῆς οὐσίας (p. 66.7-8). But he is also represented as a 'musician' (p. 67.17 ff.), who among other things is responsible for τὴν τῶν χρόνων πρὸς ἀλλήλους συμμετρίαν (p. 67.20-1). Von Arnim does not hesitate to print this passage among the fragments of Cleanthes (*SVF* I 503), but this is by the way. It is anyway clear that the sun according to Cornutus has to do with the cosmic cycle, with the reduction of things to their original simplicity, and with the organized temporal sequences in the cosmos.

Finally, we must recall the doctrines attributed by Hippolytus to Pythagoras' teacher 'Zaratas the Chaldaean' at *Ref.* I 2.12-13. There are two causes of the things that are, a Father and a Mother, corresponding to light and darkness. The parts of light are the hot, dry, light and fast; those of darkness the cold, wet, heavy and slow; these (elemental

¹³⁸ It does not seem to have been noticed that this idea is found as an instance of Homer's 'mystical wisdom' at ps.Heracl. *Hom. probl.* 53.3-4, i.e. in the form of an allegorical interpretation of Homer (and we know that the Stoics were fond of finding their own philosophy in the poets by means of the allegorical approach): ἐνίοις μὲν οὖν ἀρέσκει τὴν τῶν ἐπὶ πλανήτων ἀστέρων ἐν ἐνὶ ζῳδίῳ σύνοδον ὑφ' Ὁμήρου διὰ τούτων [*scil.*, the lines quoted in *Hom. probl.* 52, about the battles of the gods among themselves] δὴ λεχθεῖσαν· φθορὰ δὲ παντελής [*scil.*, the Stoic *ekpyrosis*], ὅταν τοῦτο γένηται. Σύνχυσιν [*Stoic terminus technicus* for the most perfect blend, in which the ingredients lose their original identity] οὖν τοῦ παντὸς ὑπαινίττεται [*scil.*, Homer], συνάγων εἰς ἓν Ἀπόλλωνα, τουτέστιν ἥλιον, καὶ Ἀρτεμιν, ἣν φαμὲν εἶναι σελήνην, τὸν τε τῆς Ἀφροδίτης καὶ Ἄρεος ἔτι δὲ καὶ Ἑρμοῦ καὶ Διὸς ἀστέρα. Note that ps.Heraclitus fails to name the seventh planet and that he prefers a different allegorical explanation, provided at *Hom. probl.* 54.

¹³⁹ See *supra*, text to n. 117, text to n. 133.

qualities) are the ingredients of the cosmos. The cosmos is a 'musical harmony', which is why the sun performs its harmonious revolution (διὸ καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν περίοδον ἑναρμόνιον). The fact that the sun plays a part in Zaratas' physics may have suggested to Hippolytus (or rather to Hippolytus' source for the information about the relation between Pythagoras and Zaratas) to have it also perform an important function in Pythagoras' system.

VIII 2.10 Valentinus' Use of Pythagoras-cum-Plato

The heretical system of Valentinus (and Heracleon and Ptolemaeus) is discussed in *Ref.* VI 29-37¹⁴⁰ (the systems of other followers come next, VI 38 ff.). Again and again, Hippolytus rubs in the fact that Valentinianism is nothing but Pythagoreanism in disguise. Valentinus and his whole school are pupils of 'Pythagoras and Plato', and their teachings are 'arithmetical' (*Ref.* VI 29.1). Hippolytus shows little interest in those Valentinians who do not like the 'Father' to be single and give him *Sige* as a companion, and says that he prefers to stick to what he believes to be orthodox Valentinianism. Here the Father—ἵν' ἡ παντά-
πασι καθαρὸν τὸ δόγμα τοῦ Ὁυαλεντίνου Πυθαγορικόν—is ungenerated, 'unfemale', without need of anything, without companion and single. He is a Monad generating the dyad *Noûs* and *Aletheia* out of Love, and then *Logos* and *Zoë*. *Noûs* and *Aletheia* generate a τέλειον ἀριθμόν, αἰῶνας δέκα. This amounts to a tiresome attempt to ascribe the Pythagorad decad to Valentinus; the first larger number of aeons which are generated, a total of ten,¹⁴¹ is *more pythagoreo* called 'perfect' (*Ref.* VI 29.8). An echo of a famous Anaxagorean motto is found at *Ref.* VI 30; in the Father, 'all things were together' (πάντα ὁμοῦ VI 30.8, cf. I 8.1), but this reminiscence may be a coincidence.

At *Ref.* VI 32.7-9, Hippolytus tells us that according to Valentinus the substance of the soul is fiery (πυρώδης, φησίν, ἡ ψυχικὴ οὐσία, 32.7). The nature of this fire is twofold (διπλῇ); it is both mortal and immortal, and mortal if it is made equal to matter, i.e. to the material passions. A noteworthy parallel to the properties of fire according to Simon described earlier.¹⁴² At *Ref.* VI 34.1 he tells us that according to Valentinus the aeon *Sophia*, or demiurgic soul, is a "tetractys, a source possessing the roots of ever-flowing nature".¹⁴³ We may safely assume that

¹⁴⁰ Several chunks of *Ref.* VI has been transcribed from Irenaeus, see Wendland's and Marcovich's apparatuses *ad loc.*, and *infra*, App. 1.

¹⁴¹ See *supra*, n. 43.

¹⁴² See *supra*, Ch. VIII 2.3.

¹⁴³ Cf. *supra*, n. 51 and text thereto.

this ascription, already found (*mutatis mutandis*) in Irenaeus,¹⁴⁴ is Hippolytus' own contribution imitated from Irenaeus, and that Valentinus did not quote the Pythagorean oath. In the same chapter, the groups of eight, ten, twelve, thirty and thirty-two aeons are put on a par with what are called the divisions of the cosmos according to the Pythagoreans (*Ref.* VI 34.3, ὥς ... οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ διεῖλον).¹⁴⁵

VIII 2.11 Valentinus and ps.Plato's *Second Letter*

In *Ref.* VI 36.2, Hippolytus tells us that according to Valentinus the doctrine concerned with the Father and the aeons is a 'vast mystery' (μέγα ... μυστήριον). In the next chapter, *Ref.* VI 37, he concludes that the Valentinian *hairesis* has been sufficiently outlined insofar as it is Pythagorean (ἀνταρκῶς τὴν Ὀυαλεντίνου αἵρεσιν Πυθαγόρειαν οὖσαν ὑποτετυπῶσθαι). He wishes to conclude by adding a few *minutiae*.¹⁴⁶ Plato, setting forth the *mysteries* concerned with the All (περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἐκτιθέμενος μυστήρια), is cited in an almost uninterrupted series of verbatim quotations from the spurious *Second Letter*, viz. 312c-313a and 314ac *ap. Ref.* VI 37.2-5. This document has been proved to be a Pythagorean falsification.¹⁴⁷ The enigmatic triad of principles looks Pythagorean; at 312d7 it is said that one can only speak of the 'First' δι' αἰνιγμῶν,¹⁴⁸ and at 314a3-4 these teachings are even called ἀκούσματα. However, the *Second Letter* quickly established itself as evidence proving that Plato followed Pythagoras. It is a document which, *mutatis mutandis*, is to be compared to Ocellus Lucanus *On the Universe* and to ps.Archyta's *On the Categories*.

We should note that Hippolytus writes out an elegant cento of choice extracts, not all of which are given in the order which they occupy in the original document, and that (as is only to be expected) in some cases he provides *lectiones* which differ from the standard text or introduces changes in word-order which, however, do not affect the meaning. But what is more important is that as far as I know Hippolytus' quotations are far more generous than those of other authors (the much

¹⁴⁴ See *supra*, n. 53 and text thereto.

¹⁴⁵ See *supra*, text to n. 136.

¹⁴⁶ See *infra*, text to n. 154.

¹⁴⁷ See Saffrey - Westerink (1974) xx ff., who provide a good overview of the evidence and the relevant secondary literature, but have failed to notice that the extracts in Hippolytus are the most copious. See now also Marksches (1991) 387 f., 413 ff., also for further references; but he fails to acknowledge the importance of the Pythagorean term ἀκούσματα, and his attempt to identify the triad of the 'first', the 'second' and the 'third' of the *Letter* with the Middle Platonist triad God/Ideas/matter (414, 431 f.) is unfortunate, cf. *infra*, n. 154.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. *supra*, n. 114 and text thereto.

later Proclus excepted) who quote from or refer to this *Letter*.¹⁴⁹ In a way this is of course typical of the method of Hippolytus, who prefers to hand his reader generous excerpts from which they are allowed to draw the conclusions he wants them to draw. Brief quotations from the final sections of the *Letter* are found in Christian authors such as Justin, Athenagoras and Clement; we need not doubt that it was important to the Middle Platonists, although only Apul. *Apol.* 64 and Numenius Fr. 24.51 ff. clearly allude to it. Numenius Fr. 24.57 ff. adds that Plato philosophizes the Pythagorean way and knew that Pythagoras was Socrates' source of inspiration; he emphasizes the 'hidden' character of the Pythagorean doctrines of Socrates and Plato (Fr. 24.54 and 24.60 ff.),^{149a} thus providing an excellent parallel to the idea found in Hippolytus and others that Plato uses enigmatic formulas. Plotinus, for his part, believed the *Letter* to be of fundamental importance.¹⁵⁰ As to the sequence of his citations, Hippolytus first quotes 312d7-e4, φραστέον ... τὰ τρίτα, and then adds 313a1-2, τοῦ δὲ ... ἡ ψυχὴ *before* 312e5-313a1, μαθεῖν ... ἱκανῶς ἔχει. Then he jumps to 314ac, four excerpts from which follow. This grafting is typically Hippolytean;¹⁵¹ 313a2 ἡ ψυχὴ is superimposed upon 312e4 ψυχὴ, and he replaces the Platonic ὁρέγεται by ἐπιζητεῖ.¹⁵² The sentence 314b3-5 is paraphrased, not quoted. In this mysterious and much-vexed passage, ps.Plato, as we have noticed, says that we have to speak δι' αἰνιγμῶν, 'through riddles'. We may recall that Hippolytus had argued that Valentinus' teacher Pythagoras, too, spoke in riddles, and that Valentinus loved to do the same; in fact, the passage about the riddles is the *first* Hippolytus quotes from the *Letter*. Ps.Plato then continues: "Upon the king of all do all things turn; he is the end of all things and the cause of all good. Things of the second order turn upon the second, and those of the third order upon the third". Hippoly-

149 See the upper apparatuses in Wendland and in Moore-Blunt's Teubneriana of Plato's *Letters* (1985), and *supra*, n. 114. See further Dörrie (1970) 217 ff. = (1976) 390 ff., esp. 393 ff. on Apul. *Apol.* 64, Athenag. *Leg.* 23.3, Iust. *Apol.* 1 60.7, Clem. *Strom.* V 103.1 and the Hippolytus passage; and Saffrey - Westerink (1974) xxv ff., who add further evidence.

149a See Frede (1987c) 1044-5.

150 See Dörrie (1970) 396 ff., Saffrey - Westerink (1974) xliii ff. For Plotinus' use of it see *infra*, Ch. X text to n. 207.

151 See *supra*, n. 58, n. 121, n. 134, n. 135.

152 Ps.Plato 312e4-313a2 reads ἡ οὖν ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ περὶ αὐτὰ ὁρέγεται μαθεῖν ποῖ' ἅττα ἐστίν, βλέπουσα εἰς τὰ αὐτῆς συγγενῆ, ὧν οὐδὲν ἱκανῶς ἔχει. τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως περί καὶ ὧν εἶπον, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ἡ ψυχὴ φησιν. Hipp. *Ref.* VI 37.3 reads τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως περί (καὶ) ὧν εἶπον, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπιζητεῖ μαθεῖν ὅποια ἅττα ἐστὶ, βλέπουσα εἰς τὰ ἐαυτῆς συγγενῆ, ὧν οὐδὲν ἱκανῶς ἔχει. I have picked out in small caps the word introduced by Hippolytus in order to forge the new link, underlined the words on which the amalgamation hinges and italicized those in ps.Plato cited verbatim by Hippolytus.

tus argues that Valentinus came across this *Letter* and made the following substitutions¹⁵³ (*Ref.* VI 37.5, ὑπεστήσατο): the king of all things became Father and *Bythos* and the source of all the aeons; the things of the second order became the aeons inside the *Horos* (boundary) surrounding them; and the things of the third order became the whole arrangement outside the *Pleroma* and the *Horos*.¹⁵⁴ Valentinus makes this clear by minute hints in a psalm (quoted *Ref.* VI 37.7), starting, Hippolytus says, not from above but from below. But in this psalm one can only find echoes of the enigmatic passage in the *Second Letter* if one really wants to ...

I believe we should conclude that Hippolytus had read (maybe in Clement or Athenagoras, or even in the Greek original on which the Apuleius passage is based) about the mysterious three levels in the *Second Letter*, which was often referred to in the second-century literature anyway. It seemed a splendid idea to charge Valentinus with following the Pythagorean Plato also in this respect, so he looked up the original document, even quoting more from *Ep.* II than was necessary for his polemical purpose (he only needed the passage about the riddles, the king, and the first, second and third things). Of course it was far more easy to consult this after all quite brief and at first blush easy piece than to make a serious study of Aristotle's introductory logical or his

¹⁵³ Name-changes again, see *supra*, n. 15. Krämer (1964) 251 believes—on Hippolytus' authority—that Valentinus really appealed to the *Second Letter*; he is followed by Saffrey - Westerink (1974) xxxvii. This cannot of course be excluded, but Hippolytus' testimony alone is not enough establish that he did and in fact makes one more inclined to assume that he did not.

¹⁵⁴ Marksches (1991) 429 ff.—see also *supra*, n. 147—points out: "Interessanterweise löst Hippolyt das platonische Rätsel aber nun gar nicht auf, sondern fügt sofort die Deutung an [viz., the application to Valentinus]. ... Offenbar setzt Hippolyt voraus, daß man aus seinem Platonreferat mühelos [*sic*] in die Lage gesetzt wurde, den Text zu deuten. Und in der Tat beginnt sein Platonreferat im ersten Buch [*Ref.* I 19.1] mit dem Satz, der als Lösung hier einzulesen wäre: Πλάτων ἀρχὰς εἶναι τοῦ παντός θεὸν καὶ ὕλην καὶ παράδειγμα". This interpretation is wrong. First, there is no evidence that the riddle in the *Letter* was adduced by any Middle Platonist as textual support for the trinitarian triad God/Ideas/matter. Secondly, Hippolytus' interpretation (according to which ps.Plato's 'third' corresponds to Valentinus' ἔξω τοῦ "Ὁποῦ καὶ τοῦ Πληρώματος διατάγην ... πᾶσαν) is not concerned with matter, but with the whole ordered world or cosmos outside the *Pleroma*. Thirdly, in his exegesis of Valentinus' hymn Hippolytus lists three inter-related entities outside the *Pleroma*, viz. matter, the Demiurge and the outer *Sophia* (*Ref.* VI 36.8), and not just matter. In the fourth place, if Hippolytus had really wanted to remind his readers of what he had said at *Ref.* I 19.1 he would undoubtedly have done so (compare the backward references at *Ref.* VI 20.2, VII 29.3 and IX 8.2), and all the more so because the interpretation Marksches wishes to attribute to him is unique. In the fifth place, Hippolytus in *Ref.* VI is concerned with Pythagoreanism and with Plato as a Pythagorean as antecedents of Valentinus, not with the more Platonic Middle Platonist Plato of *Ref.* I 19 (see *supra*, Introduction and Ch. IV).

metaphysical works and the commentary literature that came along with these. As we have seen, compact second-hand information on the contents and interpretation of Aristotle's works was readily available, so in this case there was no need to study the works themselves and the original commentaries.¹⁵⁵ But a quick look at the popular *Second Letter* was something even a busy cleric could afford.

¹⁵⁵ See above, Chs. V-VII, where I argue that when writing on Aristotle Hippolytus was entirely dependent on secondary literature.

CHAPTER NINE

A CENTO OF CENTOS, PART 2 THE PYTHAGOREAN TRADITION, CONTINUED: EMPEDOCLES AND HERACLITUS

IX 1. *Empedocles*

IX 1.1 Introduction

The fullest treatment of Empedocles in the *Ref.*, one that in fact is *desertis verbis* devoted to *Empedocles*, is found at VII 29-31. In these chapters, Empedocles is said to be the philosopher plagiarized by the important heresiarch Marcion; Hippolytus does not reveal that Marcion is a Christian theologian with an important Gnostic strain but treats him as just another Gnostic. At *Ref.* VII 29.1 and elsewhere, Marcion is said to have introduced two Gods, a good one and an evil one, but this appears to be a not entirely correct rendering of Marcion's thought.¹ Long before him, Empedocles according to Hippolytus had done the same thing, his doctrine being that there are two causes of the All, viz. evil Strife and good Love. Again, this is not what Empedocles said himself, but an interpretation which ultimately goes back to Aristotle, who clearly states that what he offers is indeed an *exegesis*.²

¹ An account of Marcion's doctrines is given at Osborne (1987) 99 ff., who argues that Hippolytus' picture is correct. But Marcion's doctrine is subtler than Hippolytus makes it out to be—see e.g. Hershbell (1973) 105 ff., Rudolph (1977) 334 ff.—for he distinguished between the God of the *Old Testament*, the Demiurge lording it in a just but hard and unrelenting way over his unhappy creation, and the new and strange God who lives beyond the Demiurge (and unknown to him) in his own heaven. It is this other, incomprehensible God who is wholly good and who sends down his own Son, and it is he who has revealed the *New Testament*. Therefore one cannot say that Marcion's Demiurge is an evil God, however much he may be inferior to the transcendental good God. Hippolytus has adjusted Marcion's system to some extent in order to make it more like the Empedoclean system he presents and to which according to his argument it may be traced back. We must also observe that the 'third power' introduced by Marcion following Empedocles according to *Ref.* VII 29.25 is the 'middle power' (VII 31.6), that is to say the Son sent down by the unfathomably good God, and not the 'just reason' in between the two other Gods, an innovation of Prepon's (*Ref.* VII 31.1-4) which is read back by Hippolytus into Marcion's middle power by means of an appeal to the same Empedoclean proof-text, see *infra*, Ch. IX 1.4. We may already note that the idea of a 'just God' is attributed by Hippolytus to Heraclitus (*Ref.* IX 9.1), see *infra*, Ch. IX 2.1.

² *Met.* A 4 985a4-9 (= *Vorsokr.* 31A39, I p. 290.33 ff.): εἰ γάρ τις ἀκολουθοίη καὶ

if one follows up and appreciates the utterances of Empedocles with a view to their real meaning and not to his halting language, he will find that Love is the cause of what is good and Strife of what is evil. So if one were to affirm that in a way Empedocles means, and is the first to do so, that Evil and Good are principles [*scil.*, in physics], he would presumably be right ...

Hippolytus adds that he has explained Empedocles' views of the management of the cosmos before (viz., at *Ref.* I 3),³ but that with regard to the detailed confrontation with the heresy of the κλεψίλογος (viz. Marcion) they will have to be set forth once again. His exegesis of Empedocles, as we shall see, is by no means entirely original. To our taste, it more often than not is rather forced, but we should remember that the allegorical interpretation of the poets in antiquity as a rule is quite fantastic or even bizarre, and furthermore that Empedocles was considered to be a Pythagorean by Hippolytus, and not by Hippolytus alone. 'Dark' Pythagoras, he had explained in a previous book, spoke in riddles, and riddles have to be explained (see above, Ch. VIII 2.7-8).

IX 1.2 Physics: Empedocles On the Elements and Principles, and On the Cosmos

Empedocles according to Hippolytus (*Ref.* VII 29.4 ff.) says that the elements from which the cosmos is formed are six.⁴ Two of these are material (ὕλικά), viz. earth and water.⁵ Two further ones are 'instruments' (ὄργανα) through which the material elements are arranged and modified, viz. fire and air. The final pair are those who fashion and demiurgize matter, viz. Strife and Love. As evidence Empedocles

λαμβάνοι πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ᾧ ψελλίζεται λέγων 'Εμπεδοκλῆς, εὐρήσει τὴν μὲν φιλίαν αἰτίαν οὖσαν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὸ δὲ νεῖκος τῶν κακῶν, ὥστ' εἴ τις φαίη τρόπον τινὰ καὶ λέγειν καὶ πρῶτον λέγειν τὸ κακὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχὰς 'Εμπεδοκλέα, τάχ' ἂν λέγοι καλῶς κτλ. Compare Zeller (1920) 964, "indessen verhehlt er selbst nicht, daß dies nur eine Folgerung ist, die unser Philosoph [*scil.*, Empedocles] nicht ausdrücklich gezogen hat". Cf. *supra*, Ch. VIII n. 27. For Empedoclean Love as the good principle see also Arist. *Met.* A 10.1075b2, N 4.1091b11 (for the context see *ibid.* 1091a30-1, and *infra*, Ch. X text to n. 91). See Hershbell (1973) 110 f., who does not mention the parallel in Plutarch for which see *infra* Ch. X, text to n. 138.

³ And at *Ref.* VI 25.1-4, although Empedocles' name is not mentioned there and his views are incorporated into those of the Pythagoreans; see *supra*, Ch. VIII 2.5.

⁴ This is one among the standard doxographic views of Empedocles, see e.g. Sext. *M.* X 317 (= Hipp. *Ref.* X 7.5); we may observe that Hippolytus here does not distinguish between the four mortal gods, which may be said to be elements in the proper sense of the word, and the two immortal principles, a distinction he does make in the sequel. For doxographic lists of elements arranged according to number see Mansfeld (1990a) 3157 ff.

⁵ Cf. ps.Heracl. *Hom. probl.* 22.14: δύο μὲν γὰρ ὑλικά φασιν [*scil.*, the philosophers in general] εἶναι, γῆν τε καὶ ὕδωρ (cf. also *ibid.* 23.8).

(*Vorsokr.* 31B6) is cited, on *Zeus, Hera, Aidoneus* and *Nestis*, with a lacuna in the second line).⁶ This fragment, we may note, only mentions—in an allusive way—the four material elements, *not* Strife and Love. This is all the more remarkable because in the exegesis which immediately follows (*Ref.* VI 29.5-7) all six partners are mentioned. This omission (insofar as the evidence cited here by Hippolytus is concerned) is presumably to be explained by the fact that he had not only already mentioned Strife and Love twice, viz. in the Empedocles chapter at *Ref.* I 3 and in the Pythagoras section at VI 25.1-4, but also that in the passage taken from Sextus at *Ref.* X 7.4-5 the fragment Empedocles B6.1, mentioning the four roots, is followed by⁷ B17.19-20, which is about Strife and Love. In the first of these lines, B17.19 *ap.* *Ref.* X 7.5, Strife is called οὐλόμενον, and this *epitheton ornans* is already given to Strife at *Ref.* VII 29.9, 306.35 M.

There are two further possibilities, which moreover are not incompatible. (1) We may assume that when preparing the final draft of the Empedocles chapters in *Ref.* VII Hippolytus had the quotations in *Ref.* X (and so the οὐλόμενον in B17.19) in mind; in fact, it is hardly possible to read an ancient source dealing with Empedocles without coming across verbatim quotations dealing with the four elements and the two moving principles.⁸ A rough draft of *Ref.* book X, including the whole Sextan excerpt, will already have been prepared. Furthermore, Empedocles B6 is quoted in a plurality of sources, and an exegesis of the divine names seems to have been *de rigueur*, as it is found for instance

⁶ Marcovich's (αἰθήρ) is probably to be preferred for Hippolytus (though perhaps not for Empedocles), cf. *infra*, n. 13 and text thereto. But it is entirely possible that the word was omitted right from the start, because in Hippolytus the verbatim quotes have as a rule been interwoven with the main text (and such, indeed, was the habit of the ancients). It does not matter in such cases whether or not a line scans. Cf. *infra*, n. 30, n. 32, n. 34, n. 41, and text to these notes.

⁷ ὅταν δὲ προσθῇ is how these lines are introduced there. The brief exegesis is also much similar; four material principles, two that are said to be δραστηρίους.

⁸ There are exceptions. Ps.Heracl. *Hom. probl.* 49.2-3 allegorizes the city of peace and the city of war on the shield of Achilles as intimations of Empedocles' two moving factors without providing a literal quotation, but says that the latter ἅμα ... τοῖς τέτταρσι στοιχείοις κατὰ τὴν φυσικὴν θεωρίαν [cf. *Hom. probl.* 24, where *Vorsokr.* 31B6.2-3 are quoted and explained] παραδέδωκε τὸ Νεῖκος καὶ τὴν Φιλίαν. We may observe that, just as in Hippolytus, the four elements are immediately associated with the two moving principles, and in view of the point of his argument against Marcion Hippolytus is much more concerned with Strife and Love than ps.Heraclitus. Finally, at *Hom. probl.* 69.8 ps.Heraclitus allegorizes Ares and Aphrodite as Empedoclean Strife and Love (cf. Buffière (1956) 168 ff.), again without providing an Empedoclean proof-text. Ps.Plut. *De hom.* 2 c. 99, who quotes *Vorsokr.* 31B17.7-8 (the activities of *Philotes* and *Neikos*) does not mention the names of the four elements, but in his exegesis of these two lines says that the Empedocles calls τὴν ἔνωσην τῶν στοιχείων Φιλίαν ..., Νεῖκος δὲ τὴν ἐναντίωσιν.

even in ps.Plut. (~Aët.) *Plac.* I 3.20.⁹ Finally, a fourth line (found in Stobaeus immediately after B6—Stobaeus, that is to say, is quoting four continuous lines) may have dropped out by accident in the course of transmission or omitted by oversight when the quotation was copied out for Hippolytus. This fourth line runs τῶν δὲ συνερχομένων ἐξ ἔσχατον ἵστατο νεῖκος (*Vorsokr.* 31B36—but here νεῖκος is not called οὐλόμεινον).¹⁰ However, lines were often stitched on to other lines (the cento technique again),¹¹ so one cannot be sure. But if *Vorsokr.* B36 really belongs with B6, references to (the results of the activities) of Love, viz. συνερχομένων, and to Strife (Νεῖκος) would occur in the immediate vicinity of those to the four elemental divinities. A second possibility, (2), is that in the source used by Hippolytus a brief passage on the two principles was included, giving their names and most characteristic epitheta. We may compare Plut. *De Isid.* 370D (incompletely printed as *Vorsokr.* 31B18), where the two moving principles are distinguished as

⁹ Verbatim quotations are rare in the *Placita*. There is no corresponding lemma in Stobaeus, who however at *Ecl. Phys.* I 10.11^a quotes *Vorsokr.* 31B6 immediately followed by the line printed as a *monostichos* (*Vorsokr.* 31B36) by Diels-Kranz and other editors. The second half of 31B36 is quoted by Arist. *Met.* B 4.1000b1 ff. (see *infra*, Ch. X n. 9), while the first half, τῶν δὲ συνερχομένων, has only been preserved in Stob., *loc. cit.* At *Ecl. phys.* I 10.11^b an exegesis follows which is in part different from that in ps.Plutarch/Aëtius. This explains why Stobaeus omitted Empedocles from the extracts from Aëtius I 3 which follow in the same chapter of the *Ecl. phys.* In the exegesis provided by Aëtius, Zeus is 'boiling and aether' (cf. ps.Heracl. *Hom. probl.* 23.5-6), Hera air, Aidoneus earth and Nestis water. In Stobaeus—in part from an unknown source; the second half is analogous to ps.Plut. *De Hom.* 2 cc. 99-100 and contains the same two quotations, viz. *Vorsokr.* 31B17.7-8 and *Il.* XIV 201-2 + 205—Hera is earth and Aidoneus air (cf. e.g. ps.Heracl. *Hom. probl.* 23.9, 24.1), and this explanation of Hera and Aidoneus is also found in the (very short) exegesis in Diog. Laërt. VIII 76, who quotes only B6.2-3 and after the brief exegesis adds 31B17.7-8 (lines which, as we saw, also occur in Stobaeus and ps.Plut. *De Hom.* 2). Ps.Heracl. *Hom. probl.* 24.6-7 quotes B6.2-3, just as Diogenes Laërtius, and provides the same brief exegesis. Hippolytus' exegesis is therefore the same as that of ps.Heraclitus, Diogenes Laërtius and Stobaeus' source; accordingly, it does not derive from the *Placita*. I find the separation of B36 from B6 preferred by the editors of Empedocles' fragments not unexceptionable (Diels is followed by all the others). For the two rival ancient traditions pertaining to the identifications of the divine names see Diels *D.G.* 88 ff., Buffière (1956) 96 ff., Bollack (1969b) 169 ff., Wright (1981) 165 f. See further *infra*, n. 14 and text thereto.

¹⁰ It would make eminent sense that Strife is out whenever the four Gods come together. Also note that at *Vorsokr.* 31B6.1 the four divine elements are still at the stage of being 'roots'—that is to say, they have not yet combined to form individual things.

¹¹ An example which comes to mind is Parmenides *Vorsokr.* 28B7.2-B8.2 which *ap. Sext. M.* VII 111 ff. follows immediately after 28B1. For *Il.* XIV 201-2 + 205 as a continuous series of lines at Stob. *Ecl. Phys.* I 10.11^a and ps.Plut. *De Hom.* 2 cc. 99-100 see *supra*, n. 8. Procl. *In Tim.* II p. 69.20 ff. provides a cento of Parmenides *Vorsokr.* 28B8.43-44a + Empedocles *Vorsokr.* 31B27.4b, mentioning Parmenides' name before the poetic lines and that of Empedocles after them.

good and evil and Strife is said to be οὐλόμενον. I shall return to this matter below, in Ch. X 5.1.

Hippolytus adds (*Ref.* VII 29.7) that this sextet forms the whole ὑπόθεσις which holds the cosmos together. For the meaning of such a 'plot' see above.¹² Accordingly, it is the Empedoclean dramatic plot and argument, inclusive of its roles and players, which is said to have been taken over by thieving Marcion. Of the four divine names, *Zeus* represents fire (τὸ πῦρ),¹³ life-giving *Hera* the earth which 'brings' (produces) the grain and other fruit that are needed for life (ἡ φέρουσα τοὺς πρὸς τὸν βίον καρπούς),¹⁴ *Aidoneus* is air because it is the only thing we do not see although through it we see all other things, and *Nestis* is water, for only this (element) is the 'vehicle of sustenance' for all that is fed, whereas of itself it cannot feed what is fed.¹⁵ If water were able to provide sustenance, animals would never have to go hungry because there is a surfeit of water in the cosmos.¹⁶ Hippolytus' source, explaining

¹² See *supra*, Ch. VIII n. 10 and text thereto.

¹³ Cf. *Ref.* VII 29.20, πῦρ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ αἰθήρ.

¹⁴ The Empedoclean expression γαῖα φερέσβιος is found at Hes. *Theog.* 693 and at *h. Apoll.* 341. In the Homeric hymn Εἰς γῆν μητέρα πάντων 9 we have the expression ἄρουρα φερέσβιος, and at *h. Dem.* 450 we read φερέσβιον οὐθαρά ἀρούρης. See further Richardson (1974) 298. But the poetic expression φερέσβιος ... γῆ is also found in a late document, ps.Arist. *De mund.* 2.391b13 (this passage is about heaven and earth, not about the elements); cf. also *ibid.* 5.397a24 ff. on the fruits of the earth. "Ἡρα as αἰθήρ is the standard Stoic etymology (see Adler's *Index*, s.v.) but not, in itself, sufficient to prove that the branch of the tradition characterized by this identification is Stoic, for it is already suggested as an alternative at Plato *Crat.* 404c2-4.

¹⁵ At *Ref.* VII 29.5 (τροφῆς) αἴτιον γινόμενον is a dittography for (τροφῆς) αἴτιον γινόμενον at 29.6; the first occurrence of αἴτιον γινόμενον should in my view be athetised. Read: μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο ὄχημα τροφῆς [αἴτιον γινόμενον] πᾶσι τοῖς τρεφομένοις. The expression ὄχημα τροφῆς was presumably coined by Erasistratus, who stated that in our bodies τὸ ὑγρὸν transports the food-stuffs, see Plut. *Quaest. conv.* VI 3, 690A, and VII 1, 698D (Erasistr. Fr. 114); *pace* Marcovich, there is no need to put the expression between quotation marks in Hippolytus' text.

¹⁶ That water cannot nourish animals is *not* a Stoic idea; according to Stoic doctrine the living heavenly bodies are sustained by liquid exhalations from the sea and rivers (e.g. *SVF* I 501). Accordingly, this etymologizing explanation (for that is what it is) of *Nestis* can hardly be Stoic. The identification of *Hera* as earth is *not* Stoic either (see *supra*, n. 14). We may further observe that according to Hippolytus' exegesis *Hera* (earth) and *Nestis* (water) are material elements (ὕλικά), that *Zeus* (fire) and *Aidoneus* (air) are 'instruments' (ὄργανα), and that *Hera* and *Nestis* are female, *Zeus* and *Aidoneus* male. The two male divinities are instrumental in processing the two female ones. The distinction between fire and air as active principles on the one hand and earth and water as passive on the other is Stoic, see Nemes. *De nat. hom.* p. 52.18-20, λέγουσι δὲ οἱ Στωικοὶ τῶν στοιχείων τὰ μὲν εἶναι δραστικά, τὰ δὲ παθητικά. δραστικά μὲν ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ, παθητικά δὲ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ (= *SVF* II 418; Hershbell (1973) 112 n. 38a refers to *SVF* II 439, a less good parallel). That the cosmos is mostly water I can only parallel by thinking of Thales and Hippo, for according to Empedocles the elements are 'equal' (*Vorsokr.* 31B17.27); on the other hand, according to a difficult and probably confused lemma at *Aët.* I 5.2 (*Vorsokr.* 31A47) Empedocles said that the cosmos is only a small part of the all, the

the meanings of *Hera* and *Aidoneus*, uses notions for which neither Platonic nor Stoic precedents can be found, at least to my knowledge. But the exegesis of the divine names in *Vorsokr.* 31B6 provided by him is one of the two available standard ones, and it is paralleled in such late sources as Diogenes Laërtius (a near-contemporary), the—presumably somewhat earlier—ps.Heraclitus,¹⁷ and the much later Stobaeus who however excerpted a source which may be earlier than Hippolytus.

In what follows (*Ref.* VII 29.8-12), the results of the activities of Strife and Love and these activities themselves are described in very much the same way as at VI 25.2-4, and *Vorsokr.* 31B16 (about Strife and Love as eternal players) is quoted for the second time. In fact, the present passage, though longer, is in part an almost verbatim replica of the earlier one.¹⁸ Furthermore, it is anticipated at *Ref.* I 3.1 in the same way as its companion passage in book VI.¹⁹ Not surprisingly, it shares with its twin the same (to us awkward) blend of (Empedoclean) cosmic cycle and (Platonic) everlasting cosmos.²⁰ I add a brief paraphrase and some comments.

Love is peace, concord and affection, and strives to bring unity and perfection to the cosmos. Strife always tears the One to pieces and produces ἐξ ἑνὸς πολλά. Strife is the cause of the whole creation, i.e. the world as we know it, and Empedocles calls it 'accursed' (οὐλόμενον),²¹ that is to say destructive (ὀλέθριον), because its aim is to prevent this created and fragmented world from ever becoming one again. It is the

rest being ἀργὴν ὕλην. Hippolytus' remark (*Ref.* VII 29.7) ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ [viz., the material elements], ἐξ ὧν τὰ γινόμενα recall Xenoph. *Vorsokr.* 21B33, πάντες γὰρ γαίης τε καὶ ὕδατος ἐκγενόμεσθα. This line is quoted *Ref.* X 7.2, in the passage transcribed from Sextus. It would seem that the exegesis of Empedocles *Vorsokr.* 31B6, quoted by Hippolytus, is a medley of ideas of various provenance, and that an earlier interpretation (according to which *Hera* = earth, which after all is what the *epitheton ornans* implies if we think of early epic poetry) was later slightly Stoicized. I therefore assume that *Hera* = earth for Empedocles himself, who at the beginning of 31B6.2 would have mentioned the time-honoured pair heaven-and-earth.

¹⁷ At *Hom. probl.* 24, where *Vorsokr.* 31B6.2-3 are quoted and explained, as we have noticed, ps.Heraclitus mentions both Heraclitus, who speaks through 'symbols', and Empedocles, as imitators of Homer's veiled way of expressing important philosophical ideas; see *supra*, text to Ch. VIII n. 111.

¹⁸ Osborne (1987) 95 f. argues that these passages have a common source; cf. also Burkert (1975) 141: "Zudem ist ein Stück des Empedoklesabschnitts bereits in das Pythagoraskapitel aufgenommen, teils im gleichen Wortlaut, teils um weniger ausführlicher; so fassen wir in doppelter Brechung die Vorlage ...". But the assumption that Hippolytus used the same material twice (as in the case of the account of Pythagorean arithmetics at *Ref.* I 2.5-10, IV 51.4-8 and VI 23.1-5, cf. *supra*, Ch. VIII 2.1-2) is simpler.

¹⁹ See *supra*, Ch. VIII 2.5; *infra*, IX 1.6.

²⁰ See *supra*, Ch. VIII 2.7; *infra*, n. 37, and *infra*, Ch. X text to n. 156.

²¹ *Vorsokr.* 31B17.19; see *supra*, text to n. 8.

Demiurge and maker of all things that have become, whereas Love induces the departure from the world of these things, and works for drastic change and brings about the final return²² of everything to the One. Empedocles says that Strife and Love are ἀγέννητα καὶ ἀρχὴν τοῦ γενέσθαι μηδέποτε εἰληφότα, and as his proof-text quotes *Vorsokr.* 31B16 (already quoted at *Ref.* VI 25.1), followed by the same erotapocritical question.

The passage on the elements which comes next (*Ref.* VII 29.10 τὸ <δὲ> πῦρ—12 κατανοοῦμεν) is in part new compared with what is at VI 25. That is to say, the activities of Love and Strife are described in the same way and often in the same words as in the earlier passage, but Hippolytus explicitly and for the first time says that fire, earth, air <and water>²³ die and live again (θνήσκοντα καὶ ἀναβιοῦντα, 306.48-9). What he means is that they die when Love reunites them; the πᾶν under the reign of Love, as he says, is organized μονοτρόπως καὶ μονοειδῶς. They live again when Strife creates plurality, that is to say fire, water, earth, air, the animals and plants (ζῷα καὶ φυτὰ)²⁴ that come to be out of them and the parts of the cosmos (μέρη τοῦ κόσμου) that we know.

This is a description, in a very brief compass, of Empedocles' cosmic cycle, not of a Platonic everlasting world.²⁵ That the Sphere is broken up by Strife into the four elemental masses with which we are familiar is what Empedocles said. But for the most part Hippolytus' analysis is an hyperinterpretation. In Empedocles, the four elements, albeit moving and divisible, are as eternal as the two moving forces. Only compounds (both the Sphere and the individual animals and plants) 'die', i.e. are resolved into their immortal ingredients, or 'are born', i.e. come together from their immortal ingredients. The four elements die and are born *per accidens* only. Hippolytus has them disappear entirely when the ultimate One has been achieved by Love, whereas Empedocles implies that there is a perfect blend of the four elements in the Sphere.²⁶

²² This resembles a Christianized version of the Stoic *ekpyrosis*, see *infra*, Ch. X n. 240.

²³ Wendland and Marcovich, following the Göttingen edition, insert (καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ) after τὸ πῦρ καί, but in view of Hippolytus' previous exegesis of the fragment it may be better to have water as the last of the series. However, if in view of 307.1 M. (where water indeed comes second) one wants to follow the suggestion of the earlier editors, one should read τὸ πῦρ καὶ (τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ) τὸ κτλ.: *saut du même au même*. Note that at *Vorsokr.* 31B17.18 the sequence is fire, water, earth, air. I know that this is an unimportant question.

²⁴ Cf. *Ref.* VI 25.3 νεῖκος ... τέμνει εἰς ζῷα, φυτὰ κτλ.

²⁵ Osborne (1987) 108 ff. argues that Hippolytus attributes no more than a cosmic cycle to Empedocles, but see *infra*, Ch. IX 1.2.

²⁶ *Vorsokr.* 31B27; Aristotle regularly speaks of the Sphere as τὸ μῖγμα, e.g. *Met.* A

Furthermore, in Empedocles it is not Strife who acts as a Demiurge in fashioning animals and plants, but Love, the unifying force which slowly begins recombining the elements entirely separated by Strife.²⁷ The idea of an accursed and destructive Demiurge responsible for the created world as a whole, inclusive of animals and plants, is the result of an *interpretatio paulisper gnostica* in which the demiurgic activities of Empedocles' two moving forces have been telescoped and attributed to Strife alone.²⁸ Although in an earlier paper I followed Frickel's suggestion that this *interpretatio* of Empedocles is to be attributed to (a follower of) Marcion,²⁹ I am now convinced that Hippolytus is responsible. He has 'Marcionized' Empedocles the better to prove that Marcion's demiurgic God is a calque of Empedocles' evil Strife. This, again, entails that the quotation and exegesis of Empedocles *Vorsokr.* 31B16 at *Ref.* VI 25.1-4 (where, as we recall, these views are attributed not to Empedocles but to οἱ Πυθαγορικοί) are a prelude to the Empedocles chapters in *Ref.* VII. In the earlier, shorter and 'Pythagorean' version Strife in its role as the Demiurge of plants and animals is a bit redundant; its proper place is in the context of the argument against Marcion, where its role as the punisher of incarnated souls (which of course is also relevant in its earlier Pythagorean context) may receive proper emphasis.

Hippolytus (*Ref.* VII 29.13-4) adds a comment on the shape of the cosmos (τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ιδέας) when it has been 'put into order' (κοσμουμένη) by Love, and therefore quotes Empedocles *Vorsokr.* 31B29. The last of these three lines no longer scans in Hippolytus' version, but this is because the quotation has been integrated into the text.³⁰ Editors sin by restoring a hexameter. What matters to Hippolytus is that the cosmos made one by Love has the form of a sphere which is equal to itself;

2.1069b21 f. But expressions such as *Met.* B 4.1000b11-2 ἡ φιλότης ... συνάγουσα εἰς τὸ ἐν φθείρει τὰ ἄλλα are capable of being misunderstood, viz. as applying not to the compounds but to the elements.

²⁷ *Vorsokr.* 31B35, B84, B86, B87, B33, B95, B98, B59, B73, B75, B74, B66 etc.

²⁸ In Empedocles, Strife separates the elemental masses, creating the cosmos which is not yet peopled with living things; see *Vorsokr.* A32, B30, B31, A37, B37, A49, B53, *Arist. De Cael.* B 13.295a29 f.

²⁹ Mansfeld (1981) 288 ff.

³⁰ It runs ἀλλὰ σφαῖρος ἦν καὶ ἵσος ἐστὶν αὐτῷ, and so is a blend of poetic quotation and prose paraphrase. A good parallel to Hippolytus' treatment of the Empedoclean bits and pieces which are imbedded in his running commentary is provided by the rather extensive account consisting of quotation-cum-exegesis of Empedoclean fragments (or rather fragments of fragments) in Asclep. *In Met.* 197.5-199.11. Asclepius' editor, Hayduck, wisely refrained from separating the quoted lines or half-lines or even single words from the main body of the text by other means than inverted commas. But Vitelli in his edition of Philoponus at *In Phys.*, 24.20-21 indents a poetic quotation also found in Asclepius (cf. *infra*, n. 33). For integrated quotations see also *supra*, n. 6, *infra*, n. 32, n. 34, n. 41.

this is the most beautiful (κάλλιστον) shape available, whereas Strife, the cause of τῆς τῶν³¹ κατὰ μέρος διακοσμήσεως, tears these individuals away from the perfect shape and thus creates plurality.

The passage about the shape of the (ideal) cosmos brings this remarkable account of Empedocles' physics to a preliminary conclusion (the subject is taken up again at *Ref.* VII 29.23-5). We may note in passing that the more important topics involved are treated in a sequence much resembling that found in the *Placita* literature: the four elements (Aët. I 3), the gods (Aët. I 7), the way the cosmos comes about (Aët. I 4), whether the cosmos is one (Aët. I 5, cf. II 1), and the shape of the cosmos (Aët. II 2).

IX 1.3 Ethics and Psychology: Empedocles On the Soul

In what comes next, *Ref.* VII 29.14 καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν—22, Hippolytus discusses Empedocles' views about the transmigrations of the soul and their implications, and does so against the backdrop of the previously sketched cosmology. However, the cosmic cycle is now so to speak allegorized as a sort of two worlds theory, comprising an intelligible and, by implication, a sensible world. Because of the numerous verbatim quotations contained in this section, some among which are extant only here, his source (unlike the source for *Ref.* I 3, although this contains a verbatim couplet as well) is universally considered to be a good one—a qualification on which I shall have more to say.

Hippolytus begins as follows:

and this is what Empedocles says about his own coming to be: "I too am" one of these, "a fugitive from God and a wanderer",³² giving the name of 'God' to the One and its Oneness, in which he found himself before he was torn away by Strife and came to be among the many beings according to the cosmic arrangement of Strife.

³¹ [τῶν] Marcovich, *non recte*. Strife is the maker of animals and plants as well.

³² This line (*Vorsokr.* 31B115.13) too has been overrestored by Hippolytus' editors in order to make it scan and have it conform to quotations in other sources, especially Plutarch. I follow the ms. (so also Osborne (1987) 114): τῶν ἐγὼ εἰμί, φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης; another combination of prose paraphrase and poetic quotation, see *supra*. n. 6. n. 30, *infra*, n. 34, n. 41. In Asclepius and Philoponus, the first words of the quotation, viz. ὥς καὶ ἐγὼ δεῦρ' εἰμί have also been adapted to the context, which just as in Hippolytus deals with the descent of the soul, although they seem to be willing to provide a hexameter (in these two cases we should perhaps read εἰμι and translate "just as I have come hither and am here"), whereas Hierocles omits this part of the line (see *infra*, n. 33). We may further note that one line from the same context is not found here, viz. *Vorsokr.* 31B119. But Hippolytus knew it, and he interpolates it (without its author's name) in the Homeric cento-cum-exegesis in the account of the Naässenes at *Ref.* V 7.30, cf. *supra*, Ch. VIII n. 99 and text thereto, *infra*, n. 72.

The quotation of the Empedoclean line (which is the beginning of a whole series accompanied by exegesis) in its Hippolytean form is perfectly situated in its setting. Immediately before speaking of what Empedocles says about his 'birth' or coming to be, Hippolytus has mentioned the splendid shape of the Sphere, from which Strife tears away things and so creates the 'many'. What according to Hippolytus Empedocles says is that he in person is one of these many fragments of the Sphere. In his exegesis of the line he says that the 'God' from which Empedocles has been banished is the One in which he was before Strife tore him away and he came to be among the many things in the world as organized by Strife. Accordingly, the exegesis of *Vorsokr.* 31B115.13 is linked up with 31B29 and its concomitant cosmological interpretation as set out immediately before.

Hippolytus continues by quoting the part of the next line also surviving in other sources, 31B115.14:³³ "because", he says, 'I placed my trust in raving Strife'—raving and disordered and unstable Strife being Empedocles' formula for the Demiurge of our present cosmos". He explains what is at issue by means of a combination of quotation and exegesis. I translate this passage in full in order to show to what extent the quotations are part of a continuous discourse much resembling the rambling style of a sermon inclusive of emphasis by means of repetition. One should note, however, that the difference with standard pagan forms of exegesis of quoted texts followed by explanations of single items (see for instance the allegorical explanation of the cento consisting of Parmenides *Vorsokr.* 28B1 + B 7 + a modified form of B 8.1b-2a *ap. Sext. M.* VII 111-4) is minimal (*Ref.* VII 29.15-21):

For this [*scil.*, being torn away from the One] is the punishment and destiny of the *souls* [my italics], which Strife tears away from the One and demiurgizes and fashions, (Empedocles) indicating as follows how this occurred:³⁴ [16] "and whoever sins by breaking the oath he swore /

³³ Here Hippolytus' editors are undoubtedly right in writing *veíkei* and assuming a *saut du même au même*. Plotinus, using the same sort of material as Hippolytus, or rather Hippolytus' source (see *infra*, Ch. X 6), connects the main elements of *Vorsokr.* 31B115.13 and 14 and writes, *Enn.* IV 8 [6] 1.17-20 [also quoted *Vorsokr.* I, p. 357.10 ff.]: 'Εμπεδοκλῆς τε εἰπὼν ἀμαρτανούσαις νόμον εἶναι ταῖς ψυχαῖς πεσεῖν ἐνταῦθα, καὶ αὐτὸς φυγὰς θεόθεν γενόμενος ἤκειν πίσυνος μαινομένῳ veíkei. Line 13 and the halfline 14 together are quoted by Hierocl. *In Carm. aur.* 24, p. 98.11-12, but the quotation begins with *φυγὰς*; Asclep. *In Met.* 197.20-1 (whose text however reads *veíkei αἰθομένῳ*, see *infra*, Ch. X n. 30 and text thereto), and Philop. *In Phys.* 24.20-1 quote both lines. We do not know what came after *πίσυνος*.

³⁴ The word *τρόπος* does not pertain to the way Empedocles expresses himself, but to the manner in which the coming into being of the soul(s) is caused. Sinning and perjury are caused by putting one's trust in Strife rather than Love, and banishment from the Sphere is the punishment that ensues. In the next quotation, 31B115.4-5, the first line is again incomplete (cf. *supra*, n. 6. n. 30, n. 32, *infra*,

the divine beings who have been given age-long life",³⁵—'divine beings' being his name for the souls, 'age-long' because they are immortal and live for long ages—[17] "they wander three times ten thousand seasons, far from the blessed ones"³⁶—'blessed ones' being his name for those who have been brought together by Love from the many to the unity of the intelligible cosmos³⁷—so these,³⁸ he says, 'wander' and "are being born all the time as all sorts of shapes of mortals, exchanging the rugged paths of life for one another".³⁹ He means that the 'rugged paths of life' are the transitions of the souls into the bodies and (the) changes of condition. [18] This is what he says: "exchanging the rugged paths of life for one another", for the souls exchange one body for another, as they are transferred by Strife⁴⁰ and punished and not allowed to remain oriented towards the One. On the contrary, the souls are punished with every sort of punishment by Strife, as they are transferred from body to body; indeed, he says, [19] "the aetherial force drives the souls away to the sea, the sea throws them up upon the floor of the soil, the earth into the rays of the brilliant sun, who casts them into the eddies of the aether; each in its turn accepts (them) from the other, but all loathe (them)".⁴¹ [20] This is the punishment meted out by the Demiurge, in the manner of a smith changing the condition of iron and dipping it out of the fire into the water. For the 'aether' is (the) fire from which the Demiurge transfers the souls into the sea. 'Soil' is the earth; hence he (further) means: from water to earth, from earth to air. This is what he says: [21] "the earth into the rays of the brilliant sun, who casts them into the

n. 41); one should resist the temptation to fill in the lacuna and keep the unpoetic ὄς καί, although the emendation of δαιμόνιοι τε in the next line is inevitable in view of Hippolytus' exegesis. I think Marcovich is right in assuming that Hippolytus wrote ἀμαρτήσας. Cf. also *infra*, Ch. X n. 199. Finally, because the lines and/or parts of lines have been integrated into the continuous Hippolytean text, I also believe that we should keep μὲν in 31B115.6, although the emendation ἀλλάσθαι seems inevitable because of Hippolytus' exegesis.

³⁵ *Vorsokr.* 31B115.4-5 (for the echo in Aëtius see *infra*, Ch. X text to n. 78). It has been suspected that B115.4 is not by Empedocles, but the argument *con* is weaker than that *pro*, see e.g. Hershbell (1973) 191 ff., Wright (1981) 273.

³⁶ *Vorsokr.* 31B115.6.

³⁷ Osborne (1987) 109 claims that this is the only time Hippolytus speaks of the intelligible world in the Empedocles section. This is not strictly true, because the point is repeated at *Ref.* VII 31.3 (as an idea Marcion stole from Empedocles). She further argues, 112, that Hippolytus' Empedocles speaks of 'an' not 'the' intelligible world. I find this captious; at VII 31.3 Hippolytus speaks (a) of the cosmos of Strife, which can only be our present world of which there is only one; and (b) of that of Love as ἕτερον νοητόν. The use of the word ἕτερον implies that there are no more than two cosmosi; if the 'other cosmos' is intelligible, there can only be one intelligible cosmos (cf. also Hershbell (1973) 110). For the Pythagorean-Platonic context see *supra*, Ch. VIII 2.4.

³⁸ *Scil.*, those who were once blessed in being united in Love but now are punished for trusting in Strife.

³⁹ *Vorsokr.* 31B115.7-8.

⁴⁰ *Scil.*, from one body to another.

⁴¹ *Vorsokr.* 31B115.9-12. In line 9, ἐχθονός is correctly bracketed by editors as a dittography; in other respects, Hippolytus' text of this line as in Wendland is to be preferred, but it should not be printed as poetry; cf. *supra*, n. 6, n. 30, n. 32, n. 34.

eddies of the aether; each in its turn accepts (them) from the other, but all loathe (them)".

The fashioning of the ensouled living beings that are found in the various elemental parts of the universe is in this way shown (a) to be work of demiurgic but nevertheless accursed Strife alone, and (b) to be an unending series of migrations of the souls of these beings from and to their respective bodies, whether human or animal. We may notice that the plants mentioned in the cosmological section seem to have been forgotten.

Taking his cue from the word 'loathe' in the last line quoted, Hippolytus then turns to the works of Love (*Ref.* VII 29.21, 309.104). The hated souls (hated, that is to say, by the elements), which are cruelly tested and punished in our present world, are according to Empedocles brought together by Love. Love is good, and she is sorry for the souls' laments as well as for the disorderly and evil fabric of Strife. Love wants to take them out of this world in piecemeal fashion and to make them equal to the One (τῷ ἐνί). Love spares no effort to make all things return to Oneness under its direction.

According to Hippolytus, who now omits to quote proof-texts, Empedocles drew two moral conclusions from his analysis of the sorry and fragmented condition of things in this world under Strife (*Ref.* VII 29.22). On the one hand he forbade the consumption of ensouled beings, because their bodies are the dwellings of souls that are being punished. On the other he proscribed sex with women⁴² because this leads to procreation (i.e., presumably, the fabrication of further such dwellings), and therefore amounts to collaborating with Strife and combatting the works of Love. It is hard to believe that his source contained no verbatim fragments concerned with the first taboo, which of course may safely be ascribed to the historical Empedocles because of a number of sometimes extensive quotations which are extant in other authors.⁴³ The second prohibition is a rather odd one. It contradicts the views of the historical Empedocles which may be deduced from the description of the works of Love preserved in his own hexameters and attested by the ancient *testimonia*,⁴⁴ and no other ancient source except

⁴² Osborne (1987) 123 naively believes that all sexual relations are banned and combines this with a generous view of incest. Her interpretation of Hippolytus' account of Empedocles doctrine of the soul has been appositely criticized by Mueller (1989) 246 ff.

⁴³ *Vorsokr.* 31B128 (Theophr. *ap.* Porph.), B136 (Sext.), B137 (Sext.), B138 (Arist.), B143 (Theon Smyrn.), B144 (Plut.).

⁴⁴ *Vorsokr.* 31A72, B66, B64 (in its Plutarchan context). The demiurgic activity of Love culminates in the creation of living beings that are capable of procreation, cf. also the texts cited *supra*, n. 27. See further Hershbell (1973) 106 ff., with whom I

Hippolytus ascribes it to Empedocles.⁴⁵ It would seem that here he simply could not resist the temptation. Marcion, who as Hippolytus argues is nothing but an Empedocles in Gnostic disguise, according to Clement proscribed sex with women because this helps to fill (συμπληροῦν)⁴⁶ the world created by the evil Demiurge (who, as we recall, according to Hippolytus has been modelled after Empedocles' Strife). At *Ref.* VII 30.3, Hippolytus ascribes both a ban on marriage and procreation as well as abstinence from meat to Marcion, adding: "you secretly teach Empedocles' *Katharmoi*".⁴⁷ His wording in this passage is interesting and characteristic; in order to describe Marcion's views on abstinence, he quotes 1 Tim 4:3 altering the first word (κωλύόντων in the original) in order to adapt the quotation to his context, and *interpolates* the word τεκνοῦν, addressing Marcion as follows: κωλύεις γαμεῖν, τεκνοῦν, ἀπέχεσθαι βρωμάτων κτλ.⁴⁸ Accordingly, the *link between* vegetarianism and celibacy is already to be found in this passage in the *New Testament*, which Hippolytus quotes at even greater length at *Ref.* VIII 20.2. There is no objection to ascribing it to Marcion. But one must by all means refuse to ascribe it to the historical Empedocles; Hippolytus at *Ref.* VII 29.22 *interpolates* the associated ban on procreation the better to Marcionize Empedocles. I suspect that this also explains why he abstained from quoting lines concerned with, say, the banning of chili con carne. No verbatim Empedoclean evidence pertaining to the ban on procreation being available, he cleverly omitted to shore up the first taboo with such proof-texts as were at hand, and did so in order to make both ascriptions equally credible.⁴⁹ A routine objection against Gnostic

find myself in complete agreement.

⁴⁵ It is nevertheless ascribed to the historical Empedocles by O'Brien (1981) 15 f., 93 ff., and Osborne (1987) 123. But the point is not so much that "no direct quotation on this subject has been preserved" (Osborne, *loc. cit.*) but that none has been preserved *by Hippolytus*.

⁴⁶ See Clem. *Strom.* III 12.1 ff. At *Ref.* VII 28.7 (i.e. immediately before the Empedocles section) Hippolytus, echoing Iren. *Adv. haeres.* I 24.2, says that Saturnilus forbade both procreation and the consumption of ensouled beings. On Gnostic abstinence see e.g. Rudolph (1977) 265 f. See further Mansfeld (1981) 289 n. 70 and (1985d) 186.

⁴⁷ Cf. *infra*, text to n. 63.

⁴⁸ I have italicized the words which correspond verbatim with 1 Tim 4:3. The persons cited in this letter look like Gnostic predecessors of Marcion, but one may perhaps also think of priests and *mystai* of Isis, cf. Plut. *De Isid.* 351F, βρωμάτων πολλῶν καὶ ἀφροδισίων ἀποχαῖς (my italics; but here the prohibition only holds for certain periods that are important from a religious point of view, see Griffiths (1970) 261). It would seem that at 1 Tim 4:3 βρωμάτων means 'meat' (Encratism).

⁴⁹ Clem. *Strom.* III 14.5 and 22, in the wider context of his account of Marcion, quotes a considerable number of poetic lines bewailing the human condition and even recommending that one should not have children. One may feel confident that he would have quoted an Empedoclean line forbidding procreation had one been available, for at *Strom.* III 14.2 he quotes no less than four other Empedoclean

ascetism in this way secured a foothold in Empedocles. The absence of proof-texts, we may add, is all the more remarkable because in the *synkrisis* between Marcion and Empedocles in *Ref.* VII 30 the banning of meat and of sex with women receives special emphasis in the last paragraph.⁵⁰

Taking his cue, again by association, from this brief passage on morals, Hippolytus (*Ref.* VII 29.23-25 φιλοσοφεῖται) winds up his account of Empedocles by pointing out that there is a ‘greatest law’—both a moral and a physical one, one supposes—governing the organisation of the whole cosmic process (νόμον μέγιστον τῆς τοῦ παντὸς διοικήσεως), and as his proof-text quotes *Vorsokr.* 31B115.1-2 which he explains in his customary fashion, simultaneously availing himself of this opportunity to summarize the previous account:

“an oracle of Necessity exists, accepted by the (unanimous) ancient vote of the Gods, / everlasting, sealed with oaths allowing no exception”.⁵¹ “Necessity” is his appellation for the change from One to many for which Strife is responsible and that of many to One for which Love is responsible. The ‘Gods’, as I said, are the four mortal ones, fire, water, earth, air on the one hand and the two immortal ones, Strife and Love, unborn, always at war with one another, on the other. And Strife commits injustice throughout and covets more than its due and tears things away that belong to Love and allots them to itself, whereas Love, which is good and favours unity, always and everywhere calls back the things that have been torn away and tortured and punished by the Demiurge in the created world, and leads them towards (the One) and creates Unity. This, dear reader, is the origin of the cosmos and its passing away and its organization, composed from good and evil, in the philosophy of Empedocles.

IX 1.4 The Hippolytean Appendix: Empedocles On the Third Power

This is not all. An appendix follows (*Ref.* VII 29.25-26), in which Hippolytus states, in the briefest possible way, that Empedocles speaks of a ‘third power’ (καὶνὸν τὴν τρίτην τινὰ δύναμιν),⁵² viz. besides Hate and Love, and as his proof-text quotes the long fragment *Vorsokr.* 31B110, ten lines extant only here, although the last line is also cited by Sextus (in a

lines, viz. *Vorsokr.* 31B118, B125 and B124.

⁵⁰ See *infra*, text to n. 64.

⁵¹ *Vorsokr.* B115.1-2.

⁵² Though in minuscule the sign for ν is easily confused with that for η, Osborne (1989) 130 is right that καὶ νο(η)τήν is an editorial *Verschlimmbesserung* and in linking this passage with that about Prepon’s innovation, but draws the wrong conclusions from her observation, viz. that according to Hippolytus Empedocles himself to some extent already deviated from his own pure system by introducing something ‘new’ (cf. Mueller (1989) 244 n. 17).

different form) and by Hippolytus himself elsewhere.⁵³ “He also says that a new third power exists, which you may be able to understand from the following (lines), speaking thus:” (the ten lines then follow). There is a difficulty here, for at first sight there seems to be no possible way of recognizing such a third divinity anywhere in the text as quoted, which deals with mental training and taking appropriate care in moral matters, also in actual life.⁵⁴ Students of Empedocles who have been puzzled by this incongruity have not sufficiently exploited the fact that the third power is also discussed at *Ref.* VII 31, and that this later discussion is anticipated here. At *Ref.* VII 31 Hippolytus says that in his own time Marcion’s follower Prepon introduced an innovation (καινό-τερόν τι, 31.1), viz. a third and ‘just’ principle intermediary between good and evil. But even this innovation does not protect Prepon (and so the whole Marcionite heresy) from the charge of having robbed Empedocles. Empedocles’ doctrine of Strife and Love is then again briefly summarized, but Hippolytus now adds that according to him there is something which is a μέσον ... τῶν διαφόρων ἀρχῶν δίκαιον λόγον, which combines what has been divided by Strife and is the ally of Love. “... Empedocles addresses this intermediary power as ‘Muse’ and calls upon it to help him in his struggle, in the following words” (*Vorsokr.* 31B131 follows, comprising four lines which are extant only here). Hippolytus then says that already Marcion himself was inspired by these Empedoclean lines when he denied that the Saviour has been born and argued that having come down from above and being μέσον κακοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ, or a μεσότης, he cannot partake of evil (*Ref.* VII 31.4-6). So Hippolytus finds precedent for Prepon’s innovation in the system of Marcion himself, which explains why he said at *Ref.* VII 29.25 that Empedocles himself already introduced the ‘new’ third power, to which different names are then given by his Gnostic followers. It has seemed, and indeed is, an exegetical *tour de force* that Marcion’s μεσότης and Prepon’s δίκαιος λόγος are recognized by Hippolytus in the Muse invoked by Empedocles at *Vorsokr.* 31B131, even if at B131.4 an ἀγαθὸς λόγος is mentioned.

But this daring exegesis can be explained. The notion of an intermediary power, or powers, is a rather wide-spread one. The Middle Platonists acknowledge and even need their existence, and so for instance does Valentinus’ follower Ptolemaeus in his *Letter to Flora*, who 7.4-7

⁵³ Cf. *supra*, Ch. VIII 2.3 and *ibid.*, n. 68 and text thereto. For a possible echo of B110.1-5 at Aët. I 7.28 (*Vorsokr.* 31A32) see *infra*, Ch. X n. 68.

⁵⁴ See e.g. Long (1966) 268: “Hippolytus’ introduction gives no help at all on its interpretation”. But Hippolytus presumably thinks of Memory (Mnemosyne) which together with the Muse(s) assists the good power; see below.

speaks of a power, viz. the Demiurge of the cosmos, in the middle (μέσος) between God (ὁ τέλειος Θεὸς ἀγαθός) and his adversary (κακός τε καὶ πονηρός), who therefore deserves 'the name intermediary' (τὸ τῆς μεσότητος ὄνομα), and who is neither good nor evil but 'just' (δίκαιος), although less just than God. Varro, *Antiq. rer. divin.* Fr. 250 Cardauns *ap.* August. *De civ. Dei* VII 14, tells us that the etymology of *Mercurius* (Hermes) is *medius currens* ..., *quod sermo currat inter homines medius*. What we have here is an explanation of Hermes as (the) λόγος, as already at Plato *Crat.* 407e5 ff. and then at e.g. Plut. *De Isid.* 54, 373B, who like other Platonists interprets the λόγος as an intermediary force between gods and men.⁵⁵ Numenius Fr. 57 *ap.* Lyd. *De mens.* iv 80 held Hermes to be τὸν προχωρητικὸν λόγον. From λόγος to Muse is not a very big step; it is made by ps.Heraclitus, whom one should no longer call a Stoic, *Hom. probl.* 55: Hermes here is the λόγος ... τῶν ἔνδον ἐν ἡμῖν παθῶν and opposed to Leto, etymologized as Λητώ, who in her turn is contrasted with Mnemosyne, the mother of the Muses or τὰς προστατίδας λόγου θεάς. The same contrast is found in a treatise to be dated to the second half of the second century CE, viz. ps.Plut. *De hom.* 2 c. 102.3, Hermes opposed to Leto ὅτι ὁ μὲν λόγος αἰεὶ ζητεῖ καὶ μέμνηται, ἡ δὲ λήθη τοῦτῳ ἐστὶν ἐναντία. A similar account is found in Cornutus, which shows that these views were shared by a first century CE Stoic. The rather long chapter on Hermes (ch. 16) is mostly about Hermes as the λόγος. He moreover is a sort of intermediary force between gods and men (p. 20.18-20, τυγχάνει δὲ ὁ Ἑρμῆς ὁ λόγος ὧν, ὃν ἀπέστειλαν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐξ οὐρανοῦ οἱ θεοί), but also, as in Varro, among men (p. 21.1-3 he is called διάκτορος ... ἀπὸ τοῦ διάγειν τὰ νοήματα ἡμῶν εἰς τὰς τῶν πλησίον ψυχάς). He is their ἄγγελος because we learn the will (βούλημα) of the gods from what is evident through the concepts we possess κατὰ τὸν λόγον (p. 22.1-3); more details could be quoted.

Furthermore, at *Crat.* 406a3-5 Plato etymologizes the name of the Muses and the word *mousike* from μῶσθαι, and states that it derives from τῆς ζητήσεώς τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας (cf. also Cornut. p. 14.7-8, which shows

⁵⁵ See further Turcan (1975) 18 ff., also for references to the evidence for the religious syncretism of Hermes, Helios, Apollo and Mithras. Turcan however does not refer to the present passage in Hippolytus. See also *infra*, Ch. X n. 128 and text thereto, and *ibid.* text to n. 130 for Plutarch's Middle Platonist identification of Mithras as the μεσίτης or 'umpire' (intermediary power); also *ibid.* text to n. 162 for the Muses as the allies of the good principle in the speech of 'Ammonius'. For the intermediary powers in Philo and their Platonic antecedents see Billings (1919) 26 ff. For Apuleius on the intermediary powers see *supra*, Ch. VII text after n. 13, and cf. Apul., *Apol.* 64.1, on Mercurius as *deus iste superum et inferum commeator* (cf. also *Metam.* XI 11.1). At *Ref.* VII 30.6 Marcovich, following Bunsen's appeal to Gal 3:20, unnecessarily emends to μεσίτης. For the Valentinian μεσότης see the comments of Quispel (1949) 96 f.

that this explanation was adopted by some Stoics, and *ibid.*, p. 23.8-9—in the ch. on Hermes—θεωρίας καὶ ζητήσεως γέννημα εἶναι τὸν λόγον). At *Epidr.* ch. 14, on the Muses, Cornutus says that if (as there are according to some) there are three Muses only, these correspond to the three parts of philosophy; if two, (this derives) ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν τε καὶ πράττειν τὰ δέοντα ἐπιβάλλειω ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν δυσὶ τούτοις συνίστασθαι τὸ πεπαιδεῦσθαι (p. 15.5-8). At *De E* ch. 21, 394A Plutarch has Ammonius tell us that the Muses and Mnemosyne (Memory) are the allies of the good God. Iamblichus, *Letter to Dexippus On Dialectic*, ap. Stob. II 2.5, pp. 18.14 ff., apparently depends on these views when, defending the usefulness of dialectic, he points out that ὁ λόγιος Ἑρμῆς is said to have born an emblem of dialectic in his hands, viz. two snakes looking at one another, and that the oldest of the Muses, Calliopea, gave us τὴν ἄπαιστον ἀσφάλειαν τοῦ λόγου καὶ ἀνέλεγκτον.

Accordingly, a matrix for Hippolytus' interpretation of the Empedoclean texts can be indicated, *Vorsokr.* 31B131 addressing the Muse and 31B110 being, *inter alia*, about remembering and preserving what one should know and about knowing how to behave. This is linked up by him with the doctrine of transmigration.

A late but excellent parallel to this role of the Muses in relation to the salvation of the soul exists, viz. Proclus' third *Hymn*, dedicated to the Muses. Here the Muses are said to assist the souls, "roving in the depth of earthly life" (III 3, ψυχὰς κατὰ βένθος ἀλωομένας βιότοιον), to escape from forgetfulness and to return "in a pure state to their companion star" (III 7, καθαρὰς δὲ μολεῖν ποτὶ σύννομον ἄστρον).⁵⁶ They are asked to help the poet himself, III 15: "draw my soul, roving all about, to the holy light". The formulas ψυχὰς ... ἀλωομένας and ψυχὴν παναλήμονα, as indeed the whole context in which they occur, certainly recall the Empedoclean description of the fallen *daimon* as φυχὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης (*Vorsokr.* 31B115.13)—a half-line from a very well-known couplet Proclus knew.⁵⁷ We are dealing here with a Pythagorean, or Neopythagorean, trait, which has become part of the Middle and Later Platonist tradition. According to Porphyry, Pythagoras took refuge in the temple of the Muse and there ended his life by fasting (*Vit. Pyth.* 57,

⁵⁶ *Tim.* 42b4, cf. *supra*, Ch. VIII text to n. 129.

⁵⁷ Cf. *infra*, Ch. X n. 44 and text thereto. This instance of an item of Middle Platonist doctrine reappearing in Proclus may be added to those studied by Whittaker (1987b). Vogt (1957) 65 ff. has not seen the Empedoclean parallel or that at *Plut. De E* 21, 394A, but cites an impressive number of others. Goulet (1981) 175 ff., who is good on the influence of the (Neo-)Pythagorean ideal of the philosopher in Later Platonism, seems to be mistaken (*ibid.* 179) when pointing out that the Muses are involved in the story of Apollonius of Tyana's death in a temple, Philostr. *Vit. App.* VIII 30, for the text merely mentions a βοὴν ... ἄδουσῶν παρθένων.

καταφυγόντα ἐπὶ τὸ Μουσῶν ἱερόν). Accordingly, this is the appropriate place to help the soul leave the body. The pieces of this puzzle fit together.

Because Prepon is his contemporary, we may be reasonably certain that Hippolytus really wanted to find precedent for his innovation (already prefigured in Marcion) in Empedocles. But there is also another observation to be made. The four lines of *Vorsokr.* 31B131 contain nothing that supports Hippolytus' claim that Empedocles called upon the Muse (or 'just reason') to *help him in the struggle against evil Strife*, in the lines as quoted he only asks for assistance in divulging in his poetry the "good account concerned with the blessed gods". It is only in *Vorsokr.* 31B110, quoted two chapters previously, that advice on how to conduct the struggle against Strife is offered, and that a warning as to what will happen if one fails to follow this advice may be found. The proper place for the four lines of B131 is at *Ref.* VII 29.26. My hypothesis is that we should consider B131 + B110 as a continuous whole. It is easy to explain why B131 has been omitted at *Ref.* VII 29.26, viz. through *saut du même au même*, the first words of both B131 and B110 being εἰ γάρ. The mistake is therefore best explained as due to an accident of transmission. Instead of quoting the whole text on the second occasion as well, Hippolytus only repeated the first four lines; after all, the doctrine of Prepon, however novel, in his view was anticipated by that of Marcion. The reason why he provided the whole text already at the earlier occasion is the fact that the bare mentioning of a third power as ascribed to Marcion at *Ref.* VII 29.25 would already suggest benevolent forces (here: the Muse and Mnemosyne) between the two principles.

I believe that *Vorsokr.* 31B131 + B110 as a continuous fragment makes excellent sense *for Empedocles* as well.⁵⁸ Here, I wish to confine myself to a reading of B131 + B110 through the eyes of Hippolytus, which of course amounts to the construction of an *interpretatio gnostica* which he himself, remarkably enough, fails to provide. At *Ref.* VII 31.3, summarizing Empedocles' position, he speaks of the world dominated by Strife on the one hand and of the *intelligible* world (ἔτερον νοητόν, *scil.*, κόσμον) dominated by Love on the other. At *Ref.* VII 31.3-4, gradually blending in his interpretation of B131, he says that the Empedoclean Muse, or Prepon's 'just reason' called 'middle power' by Marcion (VII 31.6),

⁵⁸ σφε (B110.1) can be singular, meaning 'him' or 'it' (referring to a masculine noun). The antecedent is ἀγαθὸν λόγον (B131.4); this fits the guess of Long (1966) 269 that "σφε [which he still considers to be a plural form] ... means something like 'my teaching' or 'true statements about the world'". B131 addresses the Muse; in B110 she replies through the poet's mouth. A similar sort of dialogue between poet and Muse is found in *Vorsokr.* 31B3. I see no difficulty in attributing B110 to the *Katharmoi*.

“combines what has been severed by Strife and brings it into harmony with the One according to Love”. It “fights side by side with Love” (τὸν τῇ φιλίας συναγωνιζόμενον)—viz., against Strife; and Empedocles “calls in its help in his own struggle” (αὐτῷ συναγωνιζεσθαι παρακαλεῖ)—cf. Empedocles B131.3, *παρίστασο* (‘please help’). Consequently, the ‘just reason’ assists the souls to return to the intelligible world.

If next we turn to Empedocles B110, we may propose the following reading, best given in the form of a creative paraphrase of the fragment: If you actively contemplate (B110.2, *ἐποπτεύ(σ)ης*)⁵⁹ them with unde-filed thoughts, that is to say the ‘just reason’ and Love representing the intelligible world, they [i.e., presumably, ‘just reason’ and Love and not the elements which Empedocles really seems to be talking about] will help you eternally (B110.3, *δι’ αἰῶνος παρέσσονται*),⁶⁰ that is to say in the world of sense-perception created by Strife. Further benefits will be forthcoming, for they will elevate each person⁶¹ who deserves this reward to the position from which he originally came, viz. in the intel-ligible world. But if you reach out for the countless miseries which prevent men from thinking properly (B110.6-7), that is to say if you go on committing such deeds as eating meat and making love to women, they will leave you alone as time takes its course and not take you with them (B110.8). For they long to reach their own origin (B110.9), the intelligible world were they belong and from which the middle power has come down. For you should know that all (parts of the intelligible world, i.e. inclusive of ‘just reason’) possess knowledge and equal understanding (B110.10).⁶²

If we assume that B110 was intended to follow B131 in *Ref.* VII 29, and if the above attempt to provide an *interpretatio more Hippolyteo* is cor-rect, B110 also functions as a last summary of Hippolytus’ whole pre-vious account of Empedocles: the struggle between Love and Strife, the opposition between the intelligible world and that of sense-perception, the fall and cycle of the soul, moral prescriptions, and ultimate rewards.

IX 1.5 Marcion’s Use of Empedocles according to Hippolytus. The Empedoclean Cento.

That Marcion surreptitiously stole his ideas from Empedocles is set

⁵⁹ Cf. *supra*, Ch. VIII n. 86 and text thereto.

⁶⁰ *παρέσσονται* by association taking up B 131.3, *παρίστασο*.

⁶¹ *ἐκάστον* and *ἐκάστω* in B110.4-5 interpreted as masculine.

⁶² This interpretation is consistent with the interpretation of the same line attributed to Simon Magus at *Ref.* VI 12.1, see *supra*, Ch. VIII 2.3, n. 64 and text thereto.

forth in *Ref.* VII 30. Hippolytus says that he has not been found out up till now (μέχρι νῦν λανθάνειν, 311.6), as clear an indication as one could wish that this piece of detection is an original contribution of Hippolytus. The points of resemblance are briefly indicated. The introduction of the evil Demiurge of the cosmos equals teaching the Church the doctrines of Empedocles. Marcion speaks of a good God who dissolves the creations of the Demiurge. This is the gospel of Empedoclean Love. Marcion forbids marriage and the begetting of offspring, and prescribes abstention from meat, which amounts to teaching the doctrines of Empedocles' *Katharmoi*.⁶³

For indeed, hereby following in his footsteps all the way, you teach your disciples to decline meat, that they may avoid eating a body left as a remnant by a soul which has been punished by the Demiurge. Following the doctrines of Empedocles, you dissolve the marriages that God has united, that the work of Love may be preserved as an undivided One, for according to Empedocles marriage divides the One and creates plurality, as we have demonstrated.

In this chapter, Hippolytus' treatment of the Empedoclean-and-Marcionite cosmology is quite succinct; most space is taken up by indignant words concerned with the ban on meat because the bodies of animals are the places where fallen souls reside, and the forbidding of marriage and procreation.⁶⁴ We must note that the title *Katharmoi* is cited on account of these moral prescriptions only, and not in relation to the cosmology of Love and Strife. This, I believe, is as it should be, for applying the rules concerned with ascetism indeed produces the purifications which are indispensable to prepare the fallen soul for its return to the perfect world of Love.

This may be the proper place to formulate an observation concerning Osborne's hypothesis that we have to accept Hippolytus' presentation of Empedocles at face value.⁶⁵ She argues that because Hippolytus does not distinguish between two epics, viz. one with the traditional (and of course later) title *On Nature*, and another entitled *Purifications* dealing with the vicissitudes of the soul and moral topics,⁶⁶ we should accept that Empedocles wrote a single epic.⁶⁷ In other words, because Hippo-

⁶³ *Ref.* VII 30.4. Cf. *supra*, text to n. 47.

⁶⁴ Cf. *supra*, Ch. IX 1.3.

⁶⁵ Osborne (1987) 108 ff., Osborne (1987a) 34 ff.

⁶⁶ But as we have seen the title *Καθαρμοὶ* is cited by Hippolytus in connection with the moral prescriptions only.

⁶⁷ This in spite of the fact that Diog. Laërt. VIII 77, at the end of the *bios* (*Vorsokr.* 31A1), explicitly distinguishes between two epics together numbering 5000 lines: Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ φύσεως αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ Καθαρμοὶ εἰς ἔπη τείνουσι πεντακισχίλια, and that our sources on a number of occasions attribute quotations to (specific books of) either work. There is nothing odd about this; Hesiod also wrote two epics, and in a way

lytus fails to make any such distinction in quoting verbatim fragments, the attempts of Diels and other editors to distinguish groups of fragments from one another and to assign these to the respective epics are futile in her view.⁶⁸

What she chooses to ignore is that Hippolytus has an axe to grind. He wishes to expose Marcion and his followers for having plagiarized Empedocles. In the Marcionite systems, the condition and expectations of the incarnated soul are inextricably linked with the condition of a cosmos created by a Demiurge who does not even know that a superior God exists, or that the latter by sending down his Son intends to deliver the souls from their miserable condition. Accordingly, Hippolytus has the strongest of all possible motives to present Empedocles' doctrine in a form which may serve as a paradigm for the heresy he wants to refute, and to quote and present fragments without taking their position in the original epics into account. What he provides is a *cento* of Empedoclean quotations (accompanied by appropriate exegetical comments) which has been tailored to fit the system of Marcion. He simply has him say what he wants him to say, in accordance with a pattern, or 'plot' (ὕποθεσις), that has already been established. The Hippolytean evidence consequently allows no inference as to whether or not Empedocles wrote one epic rather than two. Furthermore, one may assume that Hippolytus in this case did not even deliberately doctor the evidence concerned with the distinction between the two poems, because the

the *Theogony* (dealing with mythical cosmology) is analogous to the *On Nature* and the *Works and Days* (dealing with moral issues) with the *Purifications*. The most likely hypothesis still is that the so-called *Περὶ φύσεως* numbered 3000 lines and consisted of three scrolls, and the *Καθαρμοὶ* 2000 lines, i.e. consisted of two scrolls. Tzetz. *Chil.* VIII 514 (cf. *Vorsokr.*, ad 31B134) speaks of a third book of the work on physics (τῷ τρίτῳ ... τῶν Φυσικῶν). Herodian. *Περὶ καθολικῆς προσωδίας* 7^r, p. 26 Hunger, quotes two lines to be found ἐν β' *Καθαρμῶν* (see Hunger (1967) 1 ff., Wright (1981) 298), whereas Diog. Laërt. VIII 54 quoting *Vorsokr.* 31B112.1-2a states Empedocles said this *ἐναρχόμενος* τῶν *Καθαρμῶν*, i.e. puts this in book I. This is solid evidence. Plut. *De exil.* 607C, quoting a number of lines from *Vorsokr.* 31B115, states that Empedocles said this ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς φιλοσοφίας προαναφανήσας—this has been explained by Burkert (1975) 143: "Für Plutarch sind die *Katharmoi* des Empedokles der "Anfang seiner Philosophie" ..., während die hellenistische Ausgabe das Naturgedicht vorangestellt hatte" (also note that in later Greek φιλοσοφία often means 'ethics'). The lacuna, or corrupt text, in the *Suda*, s.v. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς (*Vorsokr.* 31A2, I p. 282.33-4; that this derives from Lobon is a mere guess) has been restored *ad probabilem sententiam* by Zunz (1971) 237; we may observe that the bibliographical notices in the *Suda* are often confused and lacunose. The argument in favour of a single Empedoclean epic with alternative titles of Osborne (1987a) 24 f., 28 f. is specious. There is no lacuna in Diog. Laërt. VIII 77, but there is a lacuna entirely analogous to that supposed to be in the *Suda* at Diog. Laërt. X 29, *ubi vide*.

⁶⁸ One may add that in order to reconstruct the one epic, Osborne (1987) 120 ff., 125 ff. adduces evidence not preserved Hippolytus and so produces an (augmented Hippolytean) cento of her own devising.

interpretatio according to which the cosmology is immediately relevant to the fate of the soul, and conversely, must be earlier. O'Brien has proved that a blending of texts from the physical poem and the *Katharmoi* is standard among the Neoplatonic commentators of Aristotle, and indicates partial anticipations in Plutarch and Hippolytus.⁶⁹ But more evidence may be cited, which shows that Hippolytus—as is only to be expected—follows rather than sets a trend.⁷⁰ I shall return to this question in Ch. X below.

IX 1.6 Refutatio I 3-4 Compared

Looking back again⁷¹ at the brief Empedocles(-and-Heraclitus) section in the *Philosophoumena*, we cannot but conclude that it belongs with the Empedocles chapters in *Ref.* VI and especially VII. For the most part, *Ref.* I 3 anticipates the far more extensive account at VII 29, and its structure, first cosmology, then the fate of the soul, is remarkably parallel. What is more, exactly the same structure is to be found in the brief doctrinal note at the end of the *bios* of Empedocles at Diog. Laërt. VIII 76-77. To be sure, Diogenes gives more detailed information on the cosmology (including quotations of *Vorsokr.* 31B6.2-3 [we have noticed above that Hippolytus quotes the fragment twice in later passages of the *Ref.*] and B17.6-8) than is found at *Ref.* I 3, but he provides exactly the same information on transmigration, quoting precisely the same couplet and introducing his quotation with the words καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν παντοῖα εἶδη ζώων καὶ φυτῶν ἐνδύεσθαι· φησὶ γοῦν (B117 follows). The most important difference between Diogenes' and Hippolytus' short accounts is that the latter has been infused with a new spirit in that it scrupulously follows the line of the chapters on Pythagoras in the *Philosophoumena* and the later books of the *Ref.*

Some points at *Ref.* I 3 however are not paralleled in the later passage in *Ref.* VII. It is not immediately clear to what extent the opening remark, concerned with the numerous δαίμονες which 'come back' or 'hang around' (ἀναστρέφονται) and take care of things on earth is

⁶⁹ O'Brien (1981) 73 ff., 93 ff., 101 ff. For the *interpretatio neoplatonica* in relation to the intelligible cosmos and that of sense-perception see also O'Brien (1969) 99 f., Hershbell (1973) 109.

⁷⁰ In Ch. V and the Exc. above, we have noticed again and again that in some cases Hippolytus is our earliest source for interpretations of Aristotle which can only be paralleled in the late commentators, and assumed that this proves he depends on earlier exegetical traditions. This also obtains in the present case.

⁷¹ See also *supra*, Ch. VIII 2.4. It is universally assumed that Hippolytus' sources for the account in *Ref.* VII were different from and superior to that used for I 3 (also e.g. by Burkert (1975) 141: "weitere, reichhaltigere Quellen").

matched in the later books.⁷² At *Ref.* VII 29.16, as we have seen, Hippolytus explains that δαίμονες is Empedocles' name for 'souls', but the sort of providential role attributed to them at I 3.1 does not seem to fit the sorry situation these find themselves in according to the later account. And in *Ref.* I 3 *metensomatosis* is described *after* the cosmology, just as in VII 29; the structural parallel is of course highly important, but seems to run counter to the identification of the δαίμονες at the *beginning* of the chapter with the fallen souls. Rather, we may perhaps understand these happier *daimones* as a confused anticipation of the account of the 'just reason' and middle power of Prepon and Marcion.

The account of the cosmology at *Ref.* I 3.1 agrees with that in the later books. Strife and Love are the 'principle'⁷³ of the All'. "The God is the intelligent fire of the Monad, and all things come together from fire and will be resolved into fire".⁷⁴ What is described here, although the wording is to some extent different from what we find in the later books, is in fact a cosmic cycle from and to a One. An explicit reference to the distinction between the intelligible world and that of sense-perception however is absent. The Stoic formula νοερὸν πῦρ has been employed in order to emphasize the agreement with Heraclitus, who according to *Ref.* I 4.2 said πῦρ νοερὸν τὸν θεόν.⁷⁵ But this is not the only reason. We have already seen that at *Ref.* VI 9.3 ff. fire as principle is attributed to Simon Magus, who is said to have stolen this idea from Heraclitus. We have also noticed that at *Ref.* VI 11-12.1 the parts of Simonian fire which are in this world are said to be νοερῶν according to Simon in the *Apophysis* (216.4), which provides Hippolytus with the

⁷² Hershbell (1973) 102 f. argues that though possibly historically correct it corresponds to exactly nothing in Empedocles, but see *Vorsokr.* 31B146. O'Brien (1969) 90, 96 n. 3 suggests that purified *daimones* are meant who are living in more or less celestial regions. My impression is that Hippolytus referred to these beings in a separate paragraph to keep them away from the account of transmigration and its later development as the description of the vicissitudes of the fallen soul he needed for the *démasqué* of Marcion. We should remember that later these souls are said to be 'blessed' as long as they remain inside the Sphere. Furthermore, the care-taking *daimones* inevitably remind one of the Middle Platonist mediators between the intelligible world and that of sense-perception; see Dillon (1977) 46 f., who points out that in the Middle Platonist systems an ambiguity is involved, viz. between a 'dynamic' view of souls traveling up and down and a 'static' one of middle beings that are permanent. Donini (1982) 122 f. discusses this ambiguity as found in Plutarch. Finally, one may note that Empedocles *Vorsokr.* 31B119 (without its author's name) has been interpolated in the account of the Naässenes at *Ref.* V 7.30, and interpreted there as referring to those who descend from τοῦ μακαρίου ἀνωθεν ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἀρχανθρώπου ἢ Ἀδάμαντος.

⁷³ The singular is singular; perhaps we should emend to τὰς ... ἀρχάς.

⁷⁴ For the Greek text see *supra*, Ch. VIII n. 100.

⁷⁵ See *supra*, Ch. II 2, Ch. IV n. 6.

opportunity to introduce Empedocles' name, to quote *Vorsokr.* 31B109 and B110.10 and to interpret Simon's views in Empedoclean terms.⁷⁶

The account of *metensomatosis* at *Ref.* I 3.2, though far shorter, agrees perfectly with what is the Empedocles sections in books VI and VII. We must observe, however, that the two Empedoclean lines that are quoted (*Vorsokr.* 31B117) are not repeated in the later books. On the other hand, we may note the key term μεταλλάττειν in πάσας εἰς πάντα τὰ ζῶα μεταλλάττειν εἶπε [*scil.*, Empedocles] τὰς ψυχάς, and compare *Vorsokr.* 31B115.8 (with μεταλλάσσοντα as Empedocles' own term) as quoted at *Ref.* VII 29.17 and explained *ibid.* VII 29.17-8 (esp. 309.87, μεταλλάσσουσι).⁷⁷ It is amusing to see that the source of the account in *Ref.* VII is universally called good because of its verbatim quotations (some among which, after all, are paralleled in other authors), whereas the source of I 3 is called bad in spite of its verbatim quotation (paralleled in other authors).

Finally, the doctrine attributed at *Ref.* I 4.3 to both Heraclitus and Empedocles that the world below the moon is evil and that beyond the moon good⁷⁸ may likewise be seen in the light of the subsequent account of Empedocles. These two sections of the world clearly prefigure the later distinction between the intelligible world and that of sense-perception. Our world, *more Empedocleo-Heracliteo-Gnostico*, is a bad world.

IX 2 *Heraclitus*

IX 2.1 Introduction

Heraclitus according to Hippolytus is the inspiration and victim of the heresiarch Noëtus, who by the way (from the point of view of the *logos*-theology first formulated by Justin and accepted by Hippolytus) is an *old-fashioned* Christian, not a Gnostic. In the second century CE, the view that Jesus is God which has become Man still was a widely accepted theological doctrine, and it is not at all odd that Noëtus (as simple Christians still do) did not find this difficult. By attributing Gnosticizing views to Heraclitus and then arguing that Noëtus follows the Ephesian, Hippolytus maliciously turns Noëtus into a Gnostic as well. On the other hand, because Noëtus is a *Christian* Hippolytus attributes to Heraclitus ideas concerned with the Resurrection and the Day of Judgement which from a Christian point of view are unobjectionable. The cento of

⁷⁶ See *supra*, Ch. VIII 2.3.

⁷⁷ See *supra*, Ch. VIII n. 105.

⁷⁸ For the vulgate Aristotelian origin of this notion see *supra*, Ch. VII n. 10 and text thereto. Cf. also Hershbell (1973) 103.

quotation-cum-exegesis has been *carefully tailored* to create a picture of Heraclitus' views which suits Hippolytus' particular polemical convenience. For this reason, his (partly unoriginal) interpretations of Heraclitus are of no use for a better understanding of the Ephesian's own thought.

Although as he says the doctrines of Heraclitus have been set out before (viz. at *Ref.* I 4), Hippolytus states (*Ref.* IX 8.2) that he has to repeat this performance in view of a detailed comparison. The representatives of the heresy of Noëtus who are Hippolytus' contemporaries do not know that they are pupils of Heraclitus not Christus—once again a clear indication that the discovery that Noëtus plagiarized Heraclitus is Hippolytus' own and original contribution.

In *Ref.* IX 9.1, Hippolytus outlines the gist of Heraclitus' philosophy:

Heraclitus says that the All is (1) divided—undivided, (2) born—unborn, (3) mortal—immortal, (4) reason (*logos*)—eternity, (5) Father—Son, (6) God—just.⁷⁹

It is important to note that this phrase is a pastiche of the first half of *Vorsokr.* 22B67, which as we shall see is crucially important in Hippolytus' account: "God: day night, winter summer, war peace, satiety hunger". But what should be emphasized is, first, that not all the items on the list at *Ref.* IX 9.1 are pairs of opposites that, in Heraclitean terms, are 'one', and secondly, that not all of these pairs are on the same level. Scholars have tended to overlook this basic fact, which has made the search in *Ref.* IX 9-10 for passages corresponding to each singular pair, or item, more difficult than it should have been. Thirdly, one pair of opposites, viz. 'visible—invisible', which is illustrated at some length in what follows, is lacking in the list at the beginning of *Ref.* IX 9. The simplest solution is to assume that the pair <ὄρατον ἀόρατον> has been lost through *homoioteleuton*.⁸⁰ The first three pairs, "divisible—indivisible, born—unborn, mortal—immortal" resemble Heraclitean, or Heraclitean-inspired, opposites. But as we shall see there is no opposition

⁷⁹ ... τὸ πᾶν διαιρετὸν ἀδιαίρετον, γενητὸν ἀγένητον, θνητὸν ἀθάνατον, λόγον αἰῶνα, πατέρα υἱόν, θεὸν δίκαιον. Reinhardt (1962) 63 ff., though affirming (without providing proof) that the "Quelle des Hippolyt ist ein mit Sicherheit nicht zu bestimmender Gnostiker", is still fundamental for the analysis of *Ref.* IX 9-10. Osborne (1987) 132 ff. correctly points out that Hippolytus' main concerns in *Ref.* IX 9-10 are epistemology and identity of opposites but suggests that the ultimate intermediate source is Aenesidemus; Noëtus' doctrines are discussed *ibid.* 134 ff. Her overall interpretation of the Hippolytean exegesis in the Heraclitus chapters has been aptly criticized by Barnes (1988) 337 ff. and Mueller (1989) 247 ff.

⁸⁰ E.g. θνητὸν ἀθάν(ατον, ὄρατον ἀόρ)ατον. That this is lacking at the beginning was pointed out by Reinhardt (1962) 64. If we add it, the paired terms are brought up to seven, a number for which Hippolytus has a peculiar affection, see *supra*, Ch. VIII 2.2 on the hebdomads of Simon and Valentinus.

between 'reason' and 'eternity'. The pair 'Father' and 'Son' is Christian rather than Heraclitean, and in fact is the only item on the list that really matters in the *synkrisis* of Heraclitus and Noëtus. Finally, there is no opposition whatever between 'God' and 'just'; in fact, we had better translate '(the) just God', a formula representing an *interpretatio gnostica* of the God of the *Old Testament*.⁸¹ This Gnostic idea is brazenly attributed to Heraclitus himself, although it is not substantiated with Heraclitean proof-texts and plays no part whatever in the refutation of Noëtus and the Noëtians, or of poor Pope Callistus. Its introduction merely helps to create a much-needed anti-Gnostic atmosphere, even though, if one holds (as Noëtus and Callistus did) that the Father and Son are one and the same, one hardly is in a position to demote the Father as the by now obsolete just God of the old dispensation. But the inconsistency in his report produced by interpolating the 'just God' does not seem to have bothered Hippolytus.

IX 2.2 The Epistemic Issue

We may further observe that the list of pairs as formulated in the first paragraph is not substantiated in a systematic way in what follows. In the series of quoted proof-texts accompanied by exegesis⁸² which hang on to the outline given at the outset, Hippolytus starts with what for lack of a better formula we may call Heraclitus' epistemic position (*Ref.* IX 9.1-3). By means of the term λόγος and the formula 'is always' this corresponds with the fourth pair on the list, viz. reason (*logos*)—eternity, but also includes a reference to the first pair of opposites, viz. 'divided—undivided', by means of the formulas διαφερόμενον ἕωυτῷ ὁμολογέει, ἁρμονίῃ and διαιρέων:

"Listening not to me but to the doctrine it is wise to agree that all things are one",⁸³ Heraclitus says. And that everybody fails to know this or to

⁸¹ This is an idea of Marcion rather than Noëtus, see *supra*, n. 1, and so in a way even links up the Heraclitus chapters with the Empedocles chapters (Hippolytus dumping at *Ref.* IX 9 what he was prevented from saying at VII 29 ff. because of the extremely dualistic picture of Empedocles provided there). In what follows, there is nothing which corresponds to it, *pace* Reinhardt (1962) 64, who finds the 'just God' in the passage on the Last Judgement but who is in any case right in stating that the two terms are not opposites (so also Marcovich (1966) 259). Osborne (1987) 145 f. argues that not only opposites but 'all differences' are at issue, but her attempts to find passages corresponding to each single item (e.g. 145 n. 35) are not convincing.

⁸² In *Ref.* IX 9, the exegesis for the most part comes before the proof-text and is introduced no less than six times (if we include 344.18 M.) with the formula ὅτι δὲ ἐστὶν which does not occur in the next chapter. Reinhardt (1962) 63 points out "der Gattung nach erinnert das Kapitel [viz., *Ref.* IX 9] an die Art gelehrter Exegesen".

⁸³ *Vorsokr.* 22B50 (extant in Hippolytus only). I accept the correction εἰ[δε]ναί for

agree, he criticizes as follows: "They do not understand how a thing differing from itself is in agreement (διαφερόμενον ἑωυτῷ ὁμολογέει)—a harmony (ἁρμονίῃ) catching up with itself, like that of the bow and lyre".⁸⁴

That the All is always (ἔστιν αἰεὶ) reason (*logos*), and one [viz., *logos*] which is omnipresent, he expresses as follows: "Although this reason (*logos*) always is (ἔόντος αἰεὶ), men fail to understand it, both before they hear it and once they have heard it. For although all things occur in accordance with this reason (*logos*), they are like the untried when they try such words and realities as I set forth, dividing (διαίρειν) according to nature and explaining how they are".⁸⁵

Looking back to *Ref.* I 4.1, we may observe that it provides an important parallel (neglected by scholars) which likewise occupies a prominent position at the beginning of the account:

Heraclitus ... wept about all things, because he understood the ignorance of life as a whole and of all men, and pitied the life of mortals. Accordingly, he affirmed that he knew all things himself, and (that) the other men (know) nothing.

In this chapter of the *Philosophoumena*, the cliché of 'weeping' Heraclitus is turned into a proto-Gnostic idea. We may compare Clement, *Strom.* III 14.1,⁸⁶ Ἡράκλειτος ... κακίζων φαίνεται τὴν γένεσιν, and further recall that the true Gnostic, as distinguished from ordinary mortals, is the man who knows. This theme of human ignorance is strongly emphasized at *Ref.* IX 9.1-3 and implemented there by no less than three quotations of which the first two should not only be read in the light of the last, but also with regard to the outline at the beginning of the chapter. People are criticized for not understanding how the various aspects of the All belong with one another, and especially for not heeding the reason (*logos*, Heraclitus B1) which is such a highly important part of things. That λόγος and αἰὼν in fact according to Hippolytus are not to be

Hippolytus, cf. Marcovich *ad loc.* for the same mistake elsewhere in the ms. tradition of the *Ref.* But although λόγον presumably is what Heraclitus wrote, I believe that Hippolytus wrote δόγματος. For δόγμα as his term for the doctrine of a philosopher, a heretic, or both see e.g. *Ref.* I 3.1 (Empedocles), I 20.3 (Aristotle), VI 29.3 (Pythagoras—Valentinus), VIII 17.2 (Socrates—Plato—Hermogenes), IX 14.1 (Elchasaï—Pythagoras), and especially IX 7.1 and 11.2 (Noëtus' follower Cleomenes), IX 13.4 (Callistus) and X 27.4 (Noëtus).

⁸⁴ *Vorsokr.* 22B51. For Plutarch's use of this fragment see *infra*, Ch. X 5.2.

⁸⁵ The first part of *Vorsokr.* 22B1. I have not inserted (ἐκαστον), and (borrowing a few happy formulas from Kahn's translation (1979), as I shall also do in the fragments that follow in this Ch. and in the next) give an un-Heraclitean rendering which fits Hippolytus' argument. I assume that Hippolytus took διαίρειν to refer to the method of division.

⁸⁶ In the context of the argument against Marcion, see *supra*, n. 46, and Reinhardt (1962) 45. Burkert (1975) 141 states a form of the *opinio communis* when arguing that for his later account Hippolytus "weitere, reichhaltigere Quellen herangezogen (hat), für Heraklit vielleicht sogar sein originelles Buch ...".

understood as opposites, as we have already pointed out above, also follows from what is said at *Ref.* IX 9.3, where the theme of human ignorance in Heraclitus B51 is further developed by means of a quotation of the first part of B1, which is introduced by the words ὅτι δὲ λόγος ἐστὶν αἰεὶ τὸ πᾶν καὶ διὰ παντὸς ὄν. The *logos* which is the All, in other words, is *eternal*.

Hippolytus continues (*Ref.* IX 9.4) with the fifth pair on his list, 'Father-Son', beginning with the Son who is found by him in what Heraclitus calls the 'child'. The All is a 'child' (παῖς) which throughout eternity is the eternal (δι' αἰῶνος αἰώνιος) king of all things. This is illustrated by quoting "Eternity is a playing child, moving the pieces in the game; kingship belongs to a child".⁸⁷ We may notice that the motif of the αἰών (eternity), already at issue before, here is a feature of both exegesis and quotation, and that the fact that the child is a king already anticipates the notion of a Father who is a king too. The section on the Father immediately follows and includes the second pair of opposites, viz. born—unborn, from the list at the beginning of the chapter:

That the Father of all things that have come into being is born—unborn, creation—Demiurge, we hear from his own lips: "War is the father of all and king of all, and some he has made gods, others men, some free and other slaves".⁸⁸

The idea that God is both Father and Son, and so both unborn and born, is later ascribed to Noëtus and Pope Callistus.⁸⁹ It is a bit difficult to see how Hippolytus got this out of his proof-text; perhaps he thought it was intimated by the words "some he has made gods, others men", 'gods' and 'men' being opposites which are 'one'. Presumably, the pair 'gods—men' also hints at the third pair of opposites in the list at the beginning of the chapter, viz. 'mortal—immortal'. But it is even more difficult to guess how he got the idea that God is both creation and Creator from this proof-text, which as we have seen is of capital importance in the argument against Noëtus. I have no solution to offer apart from the suggestion that the Son as God-born-from-woman has been created by the unborn God-Father, or Demiurge-Creator, and that, there only being one God (the Son-Father), this idea of the identity of the Creator and one of his creations is extended to comprise the whole of creation. We may already note now that at the end of his exposition of Heraclitus' doctrines Hippolytus finds the thought that God is both

⁸⁷ *Vorsokr.* 22B52. I have translated αἰών in accordance with Hippolytus' exegesis.

⁸⁸ *Vorsokr.* 22B53 (the fragment is also used by Plutarch, cf. *infra*, Ch. X text to n. 137).

⁸⁹ *Ref.* IX 10.8, IX 12.16-7. For the pivotal position of this Monarchian doctrine in Hippolytus' account of Heraclitus see Marcovich (1966) 256 ff.

creation and Creator in *Vorsokr.* 22B67;⁹⁰ probably he already has in mind what he is going to demonstrate later. On the other hand, further information may have been lost in the lacuna which editors suppose to exist after the first ὅτι δέ ἐστιν at 344.18 M. Attempts to fill the gap do not provide anything new, so perhaps we should put ὅτι δέ ... λύρης between square brackets, assuming that the formula at the beginning is a dittography of 344.18 *ad finem* and that the secretary by mistake added the wrong proof-text (which had already been quoted before, 344.6-7, and after all begins with the same word, viz. ἁρμονίη, as the new one given at 345.20). But this is far from certain, given the fact that Hippolytus loves to repeat a quote for better emphasis. What is at any rate certain is that Hippolytus felt in a position to look for the deeper sense of the Heraclitean riddles (cf. above, Chapter VIII 2.7-8), as others had done before him, and that in the case of his exegetical labours the sky is the limit.

IX 2.3 'Invisible—Visible'; The Unity of Opposites

In the final paragraphs of this chapter, the contents of which so to speak spill over into the next (*Ref.* IX 9.5-10.1), Hippolytus is concerned with the pair 'invisible—visible' which as we have noted does not appear on the list at its beginning. The epistemic theme of *Ref.* IX 9.1-3 is also involved, though in a different way:

And that he [*scil.*, the Father] is hidden invisible unknown to men, he states in the following (words): "Hidden harmony (is) better than apparent (harmony)";⁹¹ he praises and in his admiration puts the unknown and invisible part of his power before what becomes known.

And that he is visible to men and not impossible to discover, he states in the following (words): "All things of which (there is) seeing hearing learning, these I prefer"⁹² he says, that is to say the visible to the invisible. This may be understood more easily from such words of his as the following: [6] "Men are deceived in the knowledge of the apparent in the same way as Homer, who still was the wisest among all the Greeks. For children killing lice deceived him, saying: what we have seen and taken we leave behind, what we have neither seen nor taken we carry away".⁹³

[10.1] Accordingly, Heraclitus puts the apparent things on a par with the hidden and (equally) honours them, on the assumption that the apparent and the hidden are undisputably one (ἐν τι ... ὁμολογουμένως ὑπάρχον). For "Hidden harmony", he says, is "better than apparent",

⁹⁰ See *infra*, text to n. 111.

⁹¹ *Vorsokr.* 22B54; also quoted by Plutarch, cf. *infra* Ch. X text to n. 154.

⁹² *Vorsokr.* 22B55.

⁹³ *Vorsokr.* 22B56. Hippolytus presumably means that Homer was conned into looking for a deeper meaning.

and “all things which (provide) seeing hearing learning”, that is to say the organs [*scil.*, of perception], “these”, he says, “I prefer”, not preferring the hidden.

With characteristic repetitiousness, that is to say by twice quoting and twice explaining his two key proof-texts, Hippolytus rubs in the fact that Heraclitus has it both ways. What is noteworthy is that though the invisible and unknowable ‘Father’ has taken over the role played by the *logos* at the beginning of *Ref.* IX 9, he nevertheless is visible and knowable as well, and honoured as to those of his manifestations which are perceptible to us.

Apart from the general theme of the *unity of the opposites* (ἐν τι ... ὁμολογουμένως ὑπάρχον), which is clearly pertinent to Noëtus’ view that the Father and the Son are one, it is not immediately obvious in what way this account of the hidden and the apparent is applicable to Hippolytus’ present target, although the Son as incarnated is of course visible. For when the world was young the Father too used to appear to men. But one could of course say that both Father and Son are both visible and invisible. Perhaps Hippolytus originally intended this section to play a part in his account of Simon Magus, whom he accuses of plagiarizing Heraclitus’ doctrine of fire as the principle, stating that this fire has a double nature, viz. a hidden and an apparent one (*Ref.* VI 9.3, 5-8).⁹⁴ At any rate, the polar pair hidden—apparent is equally prominent in the report about Simon.

What follows in *Ref.* IX 10.2-5, viz. quotations of *Vorsokr.* 22B57-61 with exegetical comments, consists of various exemplifications of the unity of opposites. There is no particular need to translate this section or to discuss it in full. Two points demand our attention. The opposites that are one include moral terms, viz. ‘evil—good’ (illustrated by the fragment about the doctors, B58) and ‘impure—pure’ (illustrated by the fragment about sea-water, B61). Secondly, the Heraclitean fragment about Hesiod (B57), ‘the teacher of the multitude’, includes a remark about his reputation as one of whom people know that he knows most things though in fact he is ignorant; this links up with the epistemic theme already discussed above, but is not included in Hippolytus’ exegesis of the fragment.

IX 2.4 Christianized Stoic Themes, Heraclitean Physics

The final section of the account of Heraclitus doctrines (*Ref.* IX 10.6-7) takes the third pair of opposites in the list at the beginning of *Ref.* IX.9,

⁹⁴ See *supra*, Ch. VIII 2.3.

viz. 'mortal—immortal', as its springboard. Furthermore, two specifically Christian themes are blended in and attributed to Heraclitus, viz. the Resurrection of the flesh which is commanded by God, and the Last Judgement over which He presides.⁹⁵

Hippolytus paraphrases *Vorsokr.* 22B62 = Fr. 47 (a) M. ("immortals mortal, mortals immortal, living the death of them, dying the life of them"), a fragment which in its full form is extant only here, with the introductory words λέγει δὲ ὁμολογουμένως τὸ ἀθάνατον εἶναι θνητὸν καὶ τὸ θνητὸν ἀθάνατον, but surprisingly enough fails to provide an exegesis of this text. We know, however, that in other authors the fragment is explained as pertaining to the vicissitudes of the soul,⁹⁶ which to some extent helps to understand why Hippolytus is in a position to go on with the *interpretatio christiana* of two further fragments which deal with events in which according to a Christian point of view the soul is directly involved. We should however keep in mind that it is not the fate of the soul which is at the forefront of Hippolytus' concerns in the Heraclitus section of *Ref.* IX, but the nature of God as mortal—immortal. This agrees with the fact that at *Ref.* I 4 *metensomatosis* is not ascribed to Heraclitus, although at I 3 it is ascribed to Empedocles (who in this respect, as in others, is said to have followed Pythagoras), with whom as we recall Heraclitus according to Hippolytus on the other hand agrees in most things (*Ref.* I 4.2). Hippolytus' Heraclitus, the source of Noëtus, inevitably has to be more of a proto-Christian than Hippolytus' Empedocles. The Heraclitean oxymoron concerned with 'mortal' and 'immortal' may perhaps, *more Hippolyteio*, be interpreted as suggesting the death of the flesh which rises again and is thereby rendered immortal in the end. It is at any rate most significant that at *Ref.* I 3.1 the doctrine (of the Stoics and of the Stoicized Heraclitus) that all things consist of fire and are to be resolved again into fire is ascribed to Empedocles, and that the Stoics are said to have adopted this idea and to be waiting for the ἐκπύρωσις.⁹⁷ In *Ref.* I 21 the Resurrection of the flesh and ἐκπύρωσις as a 'purification' are ascribed to the Stoics—a combination of an *interpretatio pythagorica* of the Stoic doctrine of eternal recurrence as pertaining to the individual person, which, as a next step, is christianized and interpreted as applying to the Resurrection of the flesh, and of an *interpretatio christiana* of the Stoic ἐκπύρωσις as pertaining to the Last Judgement. Elsewhere,⁹⁸ I have argued that the idea of the Resurrection (ἀνάστασις) has

⁹⁵ See Reinhardt (1962) 63 ff.; Mansfeld (1983b), (1983c).

⁹⁶ For an incomplete study of the use of and allusions to B62 elsewhere cf. Pépin (1971) 34 ff., Mansfeld (1985b) 132 ff, and see further *infra*, Ch. X 8.

⁹⁷ See *supra*, Ch. IV 5, *infra*, text to n. 108.

⁹⁸ Mansfeld (1983c) 222 ff. For the doctoring of the account of the Jewish sects

been interpolated in the account of the Stoics by Hippolytus. He also interpolated the ἀνάστασις in the account of the Essenes and the Pharisees transcribed from Flavius Josephus at *Ref.* IX 27-9, and ascribed the ἐκπύρωσις to them as well. Indeed, the Jews are said to believe in ἐκπύρωσις (*Ref.* IX 30.8), and Pythagoras and the Stoics are said to have derived their doctrines from the Essenes via the Egyptians (*Ref.* IX 27.3). 'Pythagoras and the Stoics' via the Egyptians—this must mean that Pythagoras got these Jewish ideas from the Egyptians and passed them on to the Stoics, via (the Stoicized) Heraclitus, needless to say.

Hippolytus did not invent this interpretation. Clem. *Strom.* V 9.4 and 103.6-105.1 already ascribed both the Resurrection and the Final Conflagration to Heraclitus and the Stoics respectively.⁹⁹ Tatian *Or.* 3.1-2 ascribed them to the Stoics, but *ibid.* 6.1 rejected the Stoic idea of eternal recurrence, thus providing what seems to be the earliest extant testimony of the Christianizing interpretation of both these Stoic themes.¹⁰⁰ Heraclitus' riddles could be interpreted in a Christian way and then used for exegetical or apologetical purposes, and this indeed had become a tradition. Justin *Ap.* 1 20.3 points out that it is generally assumed (by the pagans, presumably) that the Christian doctrine of a final purification by fire is a version of the Stoic ἐκπύρωσις.¹⁰¹ For the importance Hippolytus attaches to the Resurrection and the 'judgement through fire' from a dogmatic point of view see *Ref.* IX 30.7-8. The Resurrection takes place at the time of the Last Judgement, so ἀνάστασις and ἐκπύρωσις to some degree belong together.

Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that Heraclitus *Vorsokr.* 22B63 is explained as pertaining to the Resurrection of the flesh and to God as its cause (*Ref.* IX 10.6).¹⁰² In Hippolytus' view, Heraclitus is a proto-Stoic—an idea he of course found in the traditions inspired by the Stoic interpretations of Heraclitus and in the Christian authors influenced by these traditions. The Final Judgment of the cosmos and of all that it contains by means of fire (τοῦ κόσμου κρίσιν καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ διὰ πυρός) is discovered in B64, B65 and especially B66, "fire will come upon and judge all things and overtake them".¹⁰³ The mention of

derived from Flavius Josephus see Koschorke (1975) 22 ff. The *ekpyrosis* as *katharsis* is Christian, Paul I Cor 3:13. See also *infra*, Ch. X 7.

⁹⁹ Mansfeld (1983c) 226 f., and *infra*, Ch. X 7.

¹⁰⁰ Mansfeld (1983c) 227 ff.; cf. *infra*, Ch. X n. 240 and text thereto.

¹⁰¹ Mansfeld (1983c) 221.

¹⁰² See Mansfeld (1983b) 197 ff.

¹⁰³ Mansfeld (1983b) 198 f. Reinhardt (1962) 65 ff. argues that this is not a genuine fragment of Heraclitus but Hippolytus' paraphrase of what comes before, φησὶν meaning 'er meint' (Osborne (1987) 171 n. 109 in vain invokes 'the presence of *phesi*'), but this athetesis has not found favour. One suspects however that Reinhardt may well be right; his argument at any rate is based on a clear view of the aims

fire in this fragment (if it is a genuine one) allows him to bring in Heraclitus' physics and the ἐκπύρωσις he now explicitly attributes to the Ephesian, although he had not done so at *Ref.* I 4. According to Hippolytus, this fire is 'intelligent'¹⁰⁴ and the cause of the administration of all things (διοικήσεως τῶν ὅλων): "Thunderbolt steers all things here" (B64);¹⁰⁵ in the context of his his exegesis, he glosses οἰακίζει as κατευθύνει and κεραυνὸς as τὸ πῦρ ... τὸ αἰώνιον.¹⁰⁶ We may observe that the attribution of the epitheton αἰώνιον to this fire recalls the theme of the αἰὼν and of eternity in general from *Ref.* IX 9. Hippolytus now also introduces cosmogony/cosmology and the destruction of the cosmos, adding that Heraclitus calls this fire 'want and satiety',¹⁰⁷ 'want' according to him being his term for the cosmic ordering (διακόμησις) and 'satiety' for the ἐκπύρωσις.¹⁰⁸ Hippolytus winds up this account by submitting (*Ref.* IX 10.8) that Heraclitus in a final 'summarizing statement'¹⁰⁹ (ἐν ... τούτῳ τῷ κεφαλαίῳ) formulated not only his own idea (viz., that concerned with the identity of opposites) but also that of the heretical sect of Noëtus:

For he [*scil.*, Heraclitus] states as follows that the Demiurge himself is the created world and becomes the maker of himself: "God: day night, winter summer, war peace, satiety hunger"—all the opposites, that is what he means—"changes in the manner of <fire, or: oil>; when (this) is mingled with perfumes, it is named according to the pleasant (perception) of each (of these)".¹¹⁰

and mannerisms of Clement and Hippolytus.

¹⁰⁴ φρόνιμον. It is not certain whether this epitheton is quoted from a fragment of which the rest has been omitted. We should at any rate compare *Ref.* VI 11-12.1, where the parts of Heraclitean fire taken over according to Hippolytus by Simon Magus are called νοερῶν, which is explained in explicitly Empedoclean terms as meaning that they φρόνησιν ἔχειν (*Vorsokr.* 31B110.10), cf. *supra*, Ch. VIII 2.3. The odds are that φρόνιμον is Heraclitean (as was forcefully argued by Reinhardt (1962) 69), because at *Ref.* I 4—overlooked by Reinhardt—Hippolytus has the Stoicizing formula πῦρ νοερόν.

¹⁰⁵ *Vorsokr.* 22B64.

¹⁰⁶ The standard method of explaining a definition, a lemma, etc. word by word; cf. e.g. *supra*, in Ch. IX 1.3, the entirely similar exegesis of individual terms in the Empedocles lemmata.

¹⁰⁷ *Vorsokr.* 22B65. On this fragment in others see *infra*, Ch. X 7.

¹⁰⁸ See *supra*, text to n. 97.

¹⁰⁹ Marcovich (1966) 255 argues that κεφάλαιον "probably means 'chapter' or 'section' of some Alexandrian anthology with Stoic explanations" (cf. also Marcovich (1986) 39), Osborne (1987) 190 that it means 'summary', while Barnes (1988) 343 suggests that it means short section or excerpt. But I assume that the word here simply means 'main point'.

¹¹⁰ *Vorsokr.* 22B67. The supplement (πῦρ) or the palaeographically less likely but *ad sententiam* better (ἔλαιον) seems inevitable.

We have noted above that the theme of this *finale* is already an issue in the exegesis of another fragment.¹¹¹

We must observe that this account of fire and *ekpyrosis* agrees with what is found at *Ref.* I 3-4 where, as has been pointed out several times already, Empedocles and Heraclitus are explicitly put on a par and the latter is said to agree with the former in almost everything. Fire and *ekpyrosis* are attributed to Empedocles at *Ref.* I 3.1, the Stoics who took over the idea merely introducing the term. Monadic fire as the God is ascribed to Empedocles at I 3.1, intelligent fire as the God to Heraclitus at I 4.2. In *Ref.* IX 9-10, *logos*, God and fire are put on the same level. *Ref.* I 4 and IX 9-10 are also parallel from a structural point of view: first epistemology, then cosmology and theology. The formula συμφέρεσθαί τε τὰ πάντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ οὐχ ἑστάναι (*Ref.* I 4, 63.6-7 M.) moreover may be understood in terms of the account of the unity of opposites at IX 9-10. These parallels provide further proof that the accounts of Empedocles and Heraclitus in the *Philosophoumena* and in the later books belong together.¹¹²

The two accounts are also parallel in a negative way, viz. because neither ascribes the doctrine of the transmigration of souls to Heraclitus. Here at least Hippolytus is consistent. Heraclitus is followed by Noëtus, a *Christian* who believed in the Resurrection of the flesh not in the transmigration of souls. Accordingly, Hippolytus credits Heraclitus with the doctrine of ἀνάστασις but (cautiously, it would seem) avoids interpolating a reference to his account of the Stoics at *Ref.* I 21, to whom he had ascribed both the belief in the transmigration of souls and the doctrine of ἀνάστασις. He knows what he is doing. The doctrine of the transmigration of souls was indispensable for the refutation of Valentinus, a follower of both Pythagoras and Empedocles (*Ref.* VI 25.4-26.3), and of Marcion, a follower of Empedocles (*Ref.* VII 29.14-25), but would have been counter-suggestive in the argument against Noëtus.

IX 2.5 The Heracliteanism of the Noëtians

The Heraclitean element in the doctrine of Noëtus and his followers is described at *Ref.* IX 10.9-10. According to Hippolytus these men argue that the Demiurge and the Father are one and the same. They add that this divinity consented to appear to the just men of the old days, although he is invisible, for he is invisible when not seen. We have noticed above that these ideas can only be found in Heraclitus by means

¹¹¹ *Supra*, text to n. 90.

¹¹² Cf. *supra*, Ch. VIII 2.8, IX 1.6, IX 2.2, *infra* Ch. X 6.

of an interpretive *tour the force*. Furthermore, terms which we know to be derived from Middle Platonist theology were also employed by the Noëtians according to Hippolytus. They said that God is 'uncontained' (ἀχώρητος) when he wishes to be so, but is 'contained' when he is contained;¹¹³ on the same grounds, he is both ἀκράτητος and κρατητός. This terminology is not found in the account of Heraclitus' doctrines, but the two pairs that come next, viz. 'unborn—<born>' and 'immortal—mortal', as we have noticed, are found there although the former only figures in an exegesis and the latter, though corresponding to a Heraclitean formula, is interpreted in an original and theological way.

In the next section, *Ref.* IX 10.10 ὅτι δὲ καὶ ... 12, Hippolytus finally becomes more specific about Noëtus' and Cleomenes' doctrines, explaining that they held the Father and the Son to be the same, that God as Son comes forth from himself as Father, that 'Father' and 'Son' are merely different names which refer to moments in time, that the Father shows himself to mortals as a Son born from a Virgin and allows himself to be crucified and to rise again on the third day (Patripassianism), being in this way both dying and undying. In the following chapters (*Ref.* IX 11 ff.) he describes at some length and in an even rather emotional way to what extent this heresy was adopted by his cherished enemy Pope Callistus. But these chapters are of no concern to us here, apart from the fact that the foundation for the immoral views and practices (rightly or wrongly) attributed to Callistus may in Hippolytus' view have been prefigured by the unity of evil and good¹¹⁴ and impure and pure which according to him is strongly advocated by Heraclitus.

¹¹³ See Schoedel (1972).

¹¹⁴ Cf. Osborne (1987) 164 ff.

CHAPTER TEN

HIPPOLYTUS' ACCOUNT OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEOPYTHAGOREAN- MIDDLE PLATONIST AND LATER TRADITIONS

X 1 *Introduction*

The Pythagorean succession and *hairesis* consisting of Pythagoras/Plato, Empedocles and Heraclitus was not invented by Hippolytus. Although an enormous amount of literature has perished, what survives is sufficient to place Hippolytus' account in its historical context. In his turn, Hippolytus illuminates an interpretive tradition which otherwise is extant only in bits and pieces.

The succession Pythagoras—Empedocles—Heraclitus (insofar as distinguished from the *hairesis*, or school of thought) as presented in the *Philosophoumena* seems to depend on two constraints. Although our other sources as a rule date Heraclitus before Empedocles, Hippolytus in his *diadoche* inverted this sequence. He seems to have done so on two grounds. First, for chronological reasons the heresy of (Empedocles' followers) Marcion and Prepon had to be treated before that of (Heraclitus' followers) Noëtus and Callistus in the detailed *synkriseis* in the later books of the *Ref.* Secondly, the tradition that Empedocles is a Pythagorean, as we have seen, is of respectable antiquity and wide-spread. Accordingly, it must have seemed a reasonable approach to have Empedocles follow Pythagoras and only then add Heraclitus, who (although not elsewhere defined as a Pythagorean) is by other authors often linked with Empedocles and Pythagoras on systematic grounds. Empedocles, in other words, is a pivotal figure, because on the one hand he has been connected with Pythagoras and on the other with Heraclitus (and so with the Stoics too). The reasons which made this happen were systematic, but a systematic connection was easily convertible into a *hairesis* and even a *diadoche*. Such differences as exist between these three figures could be accommodated in the context of such a *hairesis* and/or *diadoche*, as long as a sufficient amount of linkage and so of continuity could be made plausible.

Probably the most important systematic link between Pythagoras, Empedocles and Heraclitus which we find in other sources concerns

the doctrines on the *soul* as representing the human microcosm. However, Hippolytus also emphasizes links which have to do with the macrocosm and with metaphysics, and these too can occasionally be paralleled. What we should keep in mind, moreover, is that the microcosm is part of the macrocosm and that the dramatic experiences of the soul take place against the backdrop of the macrocosmic and even metaphysical stage.

Though unable to parallel Hippolytus' account of the Pythagorean/Platonic tradition as a whole, we shall proceed on the working-hypothesis that it is quite unlikely that he is responsible for the combination of the pieces (or groups of pieces) of the puzzle which are found in a plurality of sources, from Philo of Alexandria via Plotinus to the late Neoplatonist commentators on Aristotle. Furthermore, if significant information is found in both these late Neoplatonists and in Hippolytus, we may be certain that they depend on a common interpretive tradition, because one may exclude that the late pagan commentators, or even the Christian Philoponus, depend on the heresiographer. We may also exclude the possibility that Plotinus, who extensively wrote against the Gnostics, accusing them of having plagiarized Plato and added many unwarranted novelties, would have consulted Irenaeus or Hippolytus.

The selection and combination of great names from the distant past which is such a noteworthy feature of Hippolytus' account (Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics) is significant from both a historical and a systematic point of view. The names and doctrines of these six philosophers and philosophies are what matter most for the reconstructionist Platonist current in systematic philosophy which began in the first century BCE and was to dominate the world of thought from the third century CE to the end of Antiquity. Although references to selected views of Xenophanes, Parmenides, Anaxagoras and others are also found, it has to be acknowledged that up to and including Plotinus among the Presocratics only Pythagoras, Empedocles and Heraclitus continued to be discussed as living presences and not merely being displayed as fossils; Plotinus moreover includes selected ideas of Parmenides and Anaxagoras. Such doctrines of Aristotle and (to a lesser extent) the Stoics as were found indispensable were integrated in the majority of the Platonist and Neoplatonist systems. The majority of the Presocratics as a rule were of antiquarian interest only, or taken for a free ride in the context of a *laudatio*, or merely present in an anodine way in the systematic context of a skeptically-oriented discussion. This is indeed clear from the *Ref.* itself which also in the first and third of these three respects faithfully mirrors the attitudes of the times.

It is only in Plotinus and especially in the late *Commentaries* on Aristotle that some of the main doctrines (e.g. those which are concerned with the principles) of those Presocratics which were deemed important are subjected to a metaphysical Neoplatonic interpretation. The reason for the neglect of for instance Anaximander, Anaximenes, Archelaus, Leucippus and Democritus outside the learned commentaries which have to explain the lemmata of their texts is that they either have nothing to offer on the soul or that most of what they do say on other subjects, the principles excepted, is incapable of being interpreted in a creative way or is simply not interesting enough to figure as the matter for new forms of thought or interpretation. Their physics and meteorology were useless. Among the late commentators, as is well known, the conscientious commentator Simplicius is the only one to provide detailed and generous information on a number of these early thinkers, and he alone does not always adapt them to his own philosophical convenience.

It is of course true that a commentary tradition exists and that each extant late commentator on Aristotle to a considerable extent depends on his predecessors, the works of many among whom are lost to us apart from quotations or references in surviving works. There are also cases where it is practically certain that an earlier commentary is followed although no references are provided.¹ The commentators are often concerned with the same issues and may provide the same or similar answers (some examples will be given in what follows). But there are also interesting differences in the treatment of some of these time-honoured questions, as we shall presently see.

X 2 *Empedocles/Pythagoras in the Late Neoplatonist Commentators*

X 2.1 Introduction

Because Empedocles, as I have pointed out, is the crucial link in this cluster of concatenations, the best way of exploring the traditions concerned with the various forms of the cento is to look for passages where his ideas are connected with either those of Pythagoras/Plato, or of Heraclitus, or both. Important work on the Neoplatonist interpretation of Empedocles has been done by O'Brien, who has argued that Syrianus, Proclus, Asclepius, Philoponus and Simplicius provide a systematic exegesis of selected lines, according to which the doctrine of the soul from the *Katharmoi* has been integrated in the (metaphysically interpreted)

¹ See Dillon (1990) 12 and n. 15.

physics of the poem *On Nature*, and conversely.² But O'Brien's exposition suffers from two drawbacks. On the one hand, he provides a systematic stew of passages taken from a plurality of authors without paying much attention to the differences that obtain between the individual accounts. On the other, he has overemphasized the role of the (Empedoclean) soul as Demiurge in the Neoplatonist interpretations. In fact, it is not at all clear that the (Empedoclean) soul has this function in any of the texts he discusses. Those introducing a Demiurge have Empedocles' *Strife* perform this role, not the soul, and those which speak of the soul as well (or, omitting the Demiurge, of the soul only) are concerned either with the 'ups and downs' of the souls of humans, or with epistemology. However, I have no quarrel with O'Brien's contention that in these exegetical passages the lines and ideas which are quoted from the *Katharmoi* have become integrated in the universe of the poem *On Nature*.

For reasons of convenience, we may therefore start with the late commentators on Aristotle, including Syrianus (who however does not mention the doctrine of the soul from the *Katharmoi*). In these authors, the account of Empedocles which in Hippolytus has been cut up and distributed over two different books of the *Ref.* forms a systematic whole. It is of course true, or so I have argued, that in Hippolytus part of the subsequent account of Empedocles (in *Ref.* VII) is anticipated in the earlier section on Pythagoras (in *Ref.* VI),³ and that the treatment in book VII is coloured by the metaphysics of the passage in book VI.⁴ But the Platonic/Pythagorean metaphysics concerned with the intelligible world and that of sense-perception is less prominent in *Ref.* VII than in *Ref.* VI, whereas the Empedoclean account of the vicissitudes of the soul is found in *Ref.* VII only.

X 2.2 Syrianus

The earliest of the lot, Syrianus,⁵ at *In Met.* 11.6 ff. provides an

² O'Brien (1981) 66 ff., 73 ff., 101 ff.; on Hippolytus *ibid.* 14 ff., 93 ff. A most useful list of ancient quotations of and references to *Vorsokr.* 31B115 is found *ibid.* 111 ff. He has neglected the Pythagoreanizing aspects, which of course he was entitled to do in the context of a study whose main (and attained) objective is to prove that Empedocles wrote two different epics. For the late commentators on Aristotle in general and chronological questions see Sorabji (1987).

³ See *supra*, Ch. VIII 2.5-7.

⁴ See *supra*, Ch. IX 1.2-3.

⁵ Note that his *Commentary* (or what is left of it) only deals with *Met.* B, Γ, M and N. O'Brien (1981) 80 ff. provides a French translation and an important interpretation of the relevant passages. His occasional lack of concern for chronology is illustrated by his remark, *ibid.* 80, that "Syrianus ... reprend l'interprétation que l'on trouve chez Proclus". Proclus (410-485) was a pupil of Syrianus († ca. 437 CE).

interesting comment on Arist. *Met.* B 1.996a4-9,⁶ a passage in which the Pythagoreans, Plato and Empedocles are mentioned together (to a (Neo)Platonist commentator of Aristotle, this combination *in Aristotle* must have been most encouraging). Syrianus first summarizes his Neoplatonist metaphysics: there is a first Being (ὄν), which produces the intelligibilia and is the cause of all beings. In a way it is coordinate with these and so not devoid of plurality (πλήθους). Accordingly, a ὑπερούσιον ἐν which is ineffable but may be called 'One' has to be postulated beyond Being; this is the cause of the unity of all beings. Syrianus then says that the *Pythagoreans* placed the One as well as Being before all other things, the former as the cause of unification and of all that is good (τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων) for all beings, the latter as the cause of being and as the principle of the other Forms. It is clear that these Pythagoreans have been Platonized and that he seems to believe that it is superfluous to mention Plato now, although the latter's name occurs in the Aristotelian lemma and Syrianus himself mentions it later on. He then continues with *Empedocles* (*In Met.* 11.28-36):⁷

I believe that Empedocles too posited his 'Love' as none other than the One, although not the (One) which is not coordinated with all the other entities, but the one with which the Indefinite Dyad is coordinated, which (Dyad) he calls 'Strife'. From these (two principles) he derives the primary Being, and all the intelligibles, and the cosmos of sense-perception. For if Love according to this philosopher is the cause of the unification of the Sphere, which [viz., the Sphere] we put in the rank of primary Being, and Strife is the cause of multiplication and differentiation and fertile processions, Love must surely be associated with the One, and Strife with the Dyad. For how could Empedocles, a Pythagorean, afford to reject the Orphic or the Pythagorean principles?

In a preliminary way, we may note that Syrianus puts Empedocles' Love on a par with Pythagorean Being (which is lower than the Neoplatonist ineffable One because it is coordinated with the rest). Pythagorean Being is the cause of all that is good, so Empedoclean Love must be

⁶ "Further, there is the question which is hardest of all and most perplexing, whether unity and being, as the Pythagoreans and Plato said, are not attributes of something else but are the substance of existing things, or this is not the case, but the substratum of something else,—as Empedocles says, love; as someone else says, fire; while one says water and one air" (tr. Barnes). Cf. *infra*, text to n. 16.

⁷ δοκεῖ δέ μοι μηδ' Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἄλλο τι τὴν Φιλίαν ὑποτίθεσθαι ἢ τὸ ἐν, πλὴν οὐ τὸ πᾶσιν ἀσύντακτον, ἀλλ' ὃ συντάττεται ἢ ἀόριστος δυνάς, ἣν Νεῖκος ἐκεῖνος προσαγορεύει, ἀφ' ὧν δὴ τό τε πρῶτως ὄν ὑφίστησι καὶ τὰ νοητὰ πάντα καὶ τὸν αἰσθητὸν διάκοσμον· εἰ γὰρ ἐνώσεως μὲν τῷ σφαίρῳ, ὃν κατὰ τὸ πρῶτως ὄν τάττομεν, ἡ Φιλία γίγνεται κατὰ τὸν φιλόσοφον τοῦτον αἰτία, πολλαπλασιασμοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐτερότητας καὶ γονίμων προόδων τὸ Νεῖκος αἷτιον, πῶς οὐκ κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἐν ἡ Φιλία, κατὰ δὲ τὴν δυνάδα τὸ Νεῖκος παρείληπται; ἐπεὶ καὶ Πυθαγόρειος ὢν Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πῶς ἂν τὰς Ὀρφικὰς ἢ τὰς Πυθαγορείους ἀρχὰς ἠθέτησεν; For this and the next passage in Syrianus see also Sheppard (1982) 8 f.

the cause of all that is good as well. What Syrianus does not say (although Aristotle himself had done so)⁸ is that Empedoclean Strife is the cause of *evil*; this is because he puts it on a par with the (as he believes Pythagorean) Indefinite Dyad which, because it is already operative on the intelligible level and above all because the sensible cosmos as a whole is good, cannot be the cause of evil in the context of this *interpretatio neoplatonica*. The problem involved is glossed over.

In a subsequent passage (*In Met.* 42.35-43.28), commenting on the lemma *Met.* B 4.1000a19-22 but anticipating the Empedoclean lines⁹ as quoted and discussed by Aristotle himself at *Met.* B 1000a22-b15, Syrianus insists again on Empedocles' Pythagoreanism. He argues that Aristotle's criticism of the operations of Love and Strife is unjustified, because Empedocles, just as the other Pythagoreans, was familiar with the distinction between intelligible and sensible substances (*In Met.* 43.8-9, ὥσπερ τοὺς ἄλλους Πυθαγορείους οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸν εἶδέναι τὰς μὲν νοητὰς οὐσίας τὰς δὲ αἰσθητάς). Just as Parmenides and Pythagoras, he refrained from speaking in an explicit way about the ultimate and ineffable cause,¹⁰ but just as the Pythagoreans he posited two principles, Love and Strife, below the highest One—principles the Pythagoreans called Monad and Indefinite Dyad. The intelligible and the sensible cosmos derive from these two principles. In Empedocles' poetry, the name for the intelligible world is 'Sphere'; Love dominates the Sphere or intelligible cosmos, uniting the incorporeal and divine essences, and Strife dominates in the sensible cosmos. However, although each principle has its own main territory, each is present in that of the other because both ultimately depend on the supreme principle which Empedocles designates with the formula 'fullness of time' (τελειότητα χρόνου).¹¹ Orpheus too, he adds, called the supreme principle Χρόνος. The 'oath' (ὄρκος)¹² is a sort of boundary of the others, and the 'fullness'

⁸ See *supra*, Ch. IX n. 2 and text thereto. Syrianus' commentary on *Met.* A (if it ever existed) is no longer extant, see *supra*, n. 5.

⁹ *Vorsokr.* 31B21.6-12a (note that the beginning of B21.6, ἐκ τούτων γάρ, has been paraphrased in prose as ἐξ ὧν, words which Jaeger should not have printed as poetry in the O.C.T. *Metaphysics*); the half-line B36 (cf. *supra*, Ch. IX n. 9 and text thereto); B 109 (the second half of B109.2 is omitted in Jaeger's O.C.T. edition but printed in the text of Ross); and B30 (cf. *infra*, n. 11, n. 12), which in Aristotle begins with ἄλλ' ὅτε δὴ (said by Diels - Kranz to be a 'gute Variante') instead of αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ as in Simplicius' quotation of the three lines, *In Phys.* 1184.14 (cf. *infra*, n. 53). Embedded quotations again.

¹⁰ He says that Empedocles called it 'fullness of time' (see below).

¹¹ Cf. *Vorsokr.* 31B30.2, τελειομένοιο χρόνοιο (lines B30.2-3 are quoted by Syrianus on the same page, i.e. in his exegesis of the next lemma, *In Met.* 43.34 and 37, from Aristotle, who *Met.* B 4.1000b14 ff. quotes the three lines of B30, cf. *supra*, n. 9).

¹² Cf. *Vorsokr.* 31B30.3, ὄρκου (see *supra*, n. 11).

which emanates from the supreme principle imposes just restraints on the powers and dominations of Love and Strife.

In the next passage of the *Commentary* (*In Met.* 43.30-44.29), commenting on the lemma *Met.* B 4.1000b14 (= *Vorsokr.* 31B30.1) but also taking the other Aristotelian quotations¹³ into account, this exegesis is continued. Strife is called 'large' by Empedocles¹⁴ in a metaphorical sense, just as the Dyad is called Indefinite by the Pythagoreans, because it is the cause of the emanation and coming into being and plurality etc. for all things. Syrianus then provides an explanation of B30.2-3, according to which the two principles are co-eternal; each has its own territory and its own contribution to make (this in fact is how ἀμοιβαῖος in his view is to be explained). Next, Aristotle is criticized for arguing (*Met.* B 4.1000b2 ff.) that Empedocles' God, viz. the Sphere, is "less wise than all the others, because he does not know (all of them); for he has in him no Strife, and knowledge is of like by like" (Aristotle quotes Empedocles B109, which refers to knowing Strife by Strife, to prove this subtle point).¹⁵ Syrianus (*In Met.* 44.9 ff.) points out that Empedocles cannot have made the intelligible God as stupid as that, and that Strife is indeed *in* this God because of the unification and the fact that all things are made the same. Turning the tables on Aristotle, he adds that also Aristotle's own first God (viz., the First Unmoved Mover) who only knows himself would be inferior to humans, who may contemplate whatever they like.

In a later part of the *Commentary*, viz. a section of his comments on the lemma *Met.* N 5.1092a21 ff., Syrianus opposes another Aristotelian criticism of Empedocles.¹⁶ This passage too deserves to be quoted (*In Met.* 187.19-27):¹⁷

¹³ Cf. *supra*, n. 9.

¹⁴ *Vorsokr.* 31B30.1, μέγα νεῖκος.

¹⁵ See *supra*, n. 9. The same point (ἀφρονέστατον εἶναι τὸν θεὸν κτλ.) is made at *De an.* A 5.410b4 ff. (cf. *infra*, n. 23 and text thereto for Alexander's and Philoponus' comments), where however no proof-text is cited. But the three lines of *Vorsokr.* 31B109 had already been quoted at *De an.* A 2.404b11 ff. (cf. *infra*, n. 47 and text thereto for Philoponus' comments), the passage where Aristotle's next reference concerned with the doctrine that like knows like is to the *Timaeus* (cf. *supra*, Ch. VIII n. 93 and text thereto).

¹⁶ 1092b1-2, ... φθείρει ... τὸ νεῖκος τὸ μῖγμα [viz., the Sphere]· καίτοι γε οὐκ ἔδει ...

¹⁷ ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δικαίως ἐπιτετίμηται νῦν, ... , ὥς τὸ μῖγμα φθείρων διὰ τοῦ Νείκου· οὐτε γὰρ τὸ Νεῖκος φθαρτικὸν (αὐτὸ γοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ κοσμοποιεῖν) οὐθ' ὁ Σφαῖρός ποτε διαλύεται παρ' αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ τις τῶν ῥημάτων ἐχόμενος τῶν προβεβλημένων τῆς ὅλης αὐτοῦ θεολογίας ἀρίσταιτο τῆς διανοίας τάνδρος, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ μὲν Νεῖκος αὐτῷ πλήθους καὶ ἑτερότητας γεννητικόν, ἡ δὲ Φιλία ταυτότητας καὶ ἐνώσεως· διὸ καὶ κρατεῖ μὲν ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς, ἃ δὴ Σφαῖρον ὠνόμασεν, ἡ Φιλία, ἐν δὲ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὸ Νεῖκος· ἐκατέρωθι μὲν γὰρ ἐν καὶ πλήθος, ἀλλ' οὐ μὲν τὸ ἐν οὐ δὲ τὸ πλήθος ἐπικρατεῖ.

But the present criticism [*scil.*, by Aristotle] of Empedocles ... , that he destroys the mixture [*viz.*, the Sphere] through Strife, is not justified. For neither is Strife destructive (as a matter of fact, it is the creator of the cosmos!), nor is the Sphere ever dissolved according to him—unless one sticks to the words as propounded literally and prefers to keep aloof from the real intention of the man's whole theology. No; for him Strife is what produces plurality and diversity, Love (what produces) identity and unification. Therefore, Love reigns among the intelligibles, to which he has given the name 'Sphere', and Strife among the objects of sense-perception. Unity and plurality are found on either side [*viz.*, both in the intelligible and in the sensible cosmos], and neither unity nor plurality prevails (absolutely).

In Syrianus' interpretation of Empedocles, we recognize the main ingredients of the exegesis of the cosmology which is provided by Hippolytus: the distinction between the intelligible world (or 'Sphere') and the world of sense-perception, the contrary functions of uniting Love and dividing Strife, Strife's demiurgic role, and Empedocles' relation with Pythagoreanism.¹⁸

But we should also advert to the differences. Syrianus knows that if one interprets Empedocles literally (the way Aristotle did), one has to conclude that he speaks of a cosmic cycle and of a One that is periodically destroyed. But one has to grasp the real and deeper, that is to say (Neo)-Platonic meaning hidden in and underneath Empedocles' utterances.¹⁹ This interpretive problem which, as we have seen, is glossed over in Hippolytus' account where the physical cyclical interpretation in a way peacefully coexists with the metaphysical Platonic exegesis, is made explicit by Syrianus. An even more important difference is that Syrianus *denies* that Strife is *evil*, for Strife not only brings about plurality in the intelligible world, but also creates the (sensible) cosmos, and the cosmos, we may add, is good. So Strife, he says, cannot be destructive. Hippolytus, on the other hand, emphasizes that according to Empedocles Strife, the Demiurge of the sensible cosmos, is evil and that the world is bad. It would seem that Syrianus knows and rejects the interpretation of Empedocles' Strife as an evil principle, although he does not elaborate this point. Finally, he does not mention the soul and its role, or fate.²⁰

¹⁸ See *supra*, Ch. VIII 2-7, Ch. IX 2.

¹⁹ See also O'Brien (1981) 81 ff. For this exegetical principle as formulated by e.g. Clement see *supra*, Ch. VIII n. 20 and text thereto, and cf. also *supra*, Ch. VIII n. 27, n. 92. Aristotle himself, of course, had already said that one should attend to what Empedocles really means and not to his unclear expressions (*Met.* A 4.985a4-5). We shall also encounter it in Plotinus, see *infra*, Ch. X 6.

²⁰ O'Brien (1981) 105 ff. attempts to prove that Syrianus may have known about *Vorsokr.* 31B115 and its interpretation. This is plausible enough, but the important

It is interesting to contrast his comments with those of Alexander of Aphrodisias.²¹ Alexander's exegesis of *Met.* A 4.984b32 ff.,²² *In Met.* 33.13 ff., is merely a brief paraphrase of Aristotle's words. That Aristotle said that Empedocles' Strife is an evil principle does not bother him. His comments on *Met.* B 4.1000a19 ff. are much longer (*In Met.* 219.15-221.19), but show no familiarity whatever with the type of exegesis provided by Syrianus, and his Empedocles is not a Pythagorean. The interpretive problems concerned with the Empedoclean lines about Love, Strife and the Sphere quoted by Aristotle, and with Aristotle's criticisms, are dealt with in a conscientious way, but he does not look for deeper meanings. Yet a number of *aporiai* treated by Alexander are also discussed by Syrianus, for instance that concerned with the 'dumb God' (Alex. *In Met.* 220.17 ff.).²³ The solution concerned with the latter *aporia* proposed by Alexander is different from that of Syrianus; he suggests that it is much to be preferred to have no knowledge of what is bad. What we may conclude from this rapid comparison is (1) that most of the *aporiai* discussed by Syrianus are tralatitious, and (2) that although the check-list of problems may hold good, the answers may change. In the centuries between Alexander and Syrianus, the comments on Aristotle's comments on Empedocles in the *Commentaries* retained their overall structure, but they became infused with a novel interpretive spirit.

fact remains that he does not refer to it, and has Strife as Demiurge instead. I have been unable to find the "allusion au fr. 115" which Proclus according to O'Brien *ibid.* 80 (cf. also *ibid.* 88) makes "au début de son commentaire sur le *Timée*". At *In Tim.* I p. 18.3 Proclus in passing mentions ὁ ἐκεῖ Σφαῖρος [the Sphere, we may recall, is treated in the *On Nature*], without mentioning the soul etc. In the other passage quoted in support by O'Brien (1981) 80, viz. *In Tim.* II p. 69.24 ff., he says that Empedocles speaks of two Spheres, a perceptible one in which Strife reigns, and an intelligible one held together by Aphrodite, the former being a 'likeness' of the latter. These are the bare bones of Syrianus' interpretation (if we are prepared to overlook the fact that Proclus speaks of two Spheres not one). Not a word about the soul; what is more, not a word about Strife as Demiurge of the visible world either. I may add that Proclus perhaps alludes to this role at *In Tim.* II p. 18.6-7, ἡ γὰρ ἑτερότης καὶ τὸ ἀπειρον καὶ τὸ Ἐμπεδόκλειον Νεῖκος τοῖς γενετοῖς προσήκει πράγμασι.

²¹ The genuine part of Alexander *In Met.* is restricted to books A-Δ. See now Sorabji - Sharples (1989) 1 ff.

²² See *supra*, Ch. IX n. 2 and text thereto. We do not have Syrianus' exegesis of this passage (cf. *supra*, n. 8).

²³ For the same issue in the *De an.* see *supra*, n. 15. Philoponus, in his comments on the latter passage at *In De an.* 182.11-14, accepts Alexander's solution (presumably citing the latter's lost *Commentary* on the *De an.*, cf. *infra*, n. 46): καλῶς δὲ ἐπεσημειώσατο ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος ὡς ἡ ἐπιχείρησις αὕτη ἐνδοξός ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἀφρονέστερος ὁ θεὸς τῶν χειρόνων οὐκ ἔχων ἀντίληψιν· κρεῖττον γὰρ αὐτὸν τῶν ἀμειμόνων μόνων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἀνεννόητον δὲ εἶναι τῶν χειρόνων.

X 2.3 Asclepius

Very much the same interpretation as in Syrianus is found in Asclepius' *Commentary on the Metaphysics*.²⁴ Asclepius, however, is much more explicit on the question of *evil* than Syrianus; this may result from the fact that he also comments on *Met. A* 4.984b32 (ff.), where as we have seen Aristotle says that for Empedocles Strife is the principle of evil. Arguing against Aristotle he states, *In Met.* 30.2-30,²⁵ that Empedocles is a Pythagorean and that the Pythagoreans posited separate principles for what is good and for what is bad, viz. for the Ideas on the one hand and for matter on the other. But Empedocles spoke περικεκαλυμμένως (*In Met.* 30.9), and the Pythagoreans said what they said συμβολικῶς (*In Met.* 30.16). In other words, Asclepius too reproaches Aristotle for sticking to the literal interpretation. Referring to Plato (viz., to the famous *Wanderzitat Tht.* 176a), he points out that evil is not a principle but something which inevitably accompanies what is good and moreover is only found here below. Calling to his aid an argument which is familiar from discussions concerned with the problem of theodicy, he points out that what is not good for the individual is good for the whole of things. Finally, Empedocles says that Strife is the cause of the existence of the cosmos, and the cosmos is *not* evil. Accordingly, he did *not* propound two autonomous principles, one of the good and the other of evil.²⁶ Interestingly enough, in what follows (*In Met.* 30.32-31.14) Asclepius explains the same lemma in the manner of Alexander, merely expounding what Aristotle says. An instance of the peaceful coexistence of traditional exposition and critical as well as creative exegesis.

We may observe that Asclepius is much more emphatic than Syrianus in rejecting the view that Strife is an autonomous evil principle, and may note that his traditional Platonic (and Stoic) solution to the problem of evil is less radically Neoplatonist than Syrianus', or at any rate less metaphysical. But a later passage in his *Commentary* (*In Met.* 197.5 ff.), where he deals with Aristotle's critical account of Empedocles in *Met. B* 4—the passage also discussed by Syrianus—he shows that he is familiar with the Neoplatonist *interpretatio* which puts Love and Strife

²⁴ Note that this *Commentary* (or what is left of it) only deals with *Met.* A-Z. The relevant passages from the explanation of *Met. B* 4 are translated and discussed by O'Brien (1981) 85 f., 102 f.

²⁵ Because it is irrelevant in the context of the two poems issue, this passage is not discussed by O'Brien.

²⁶ Asclep. *In Met.* 30.25-7: ἔπειτα εἰ τὸ Νεῖκος, (ὥς) φησιν Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, αἴτιον τῷ κόσμῳ τοῦ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ κόσμος οὐ κακόν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ' ὑποτίθεται ἀρχὰς δύο, μίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ μίαν τοῦ κακοῦ.

on a par with the Pythagorean Monad and (Indefinite) Dyad.²⁷ He summarizes Aristotle's criticisms, and as a last point mentions the question of the ultimate cause of motion, in view of the fact that Empedocles puts the Monad higher than the Dyad.²⁸ This, we should observe, is the Pythagorean terminology again, the Monad representing (the Sphere of) Love, the Dyad Strife; clearly, in this Neoplatonist exegesis Love is understood as the cause of rest not motion (as it was already understood by Eudem. Fr. 110 *ap. Simpl. In Phys.* 1183.28 ff.).

Asclepius' reaction is that it is well-known that Empedocles speaks *allegorically*.²⁹ Neither the Sphere nor the sensible cosmos will ever perish; those of Empedocles' remarks which suggest that this will be the case in reality pertain to τὴν ἄνοδον καὶ τὴν κάθοδον τῆς ψυχῆς (*In Met.* 197.20). To support this claim, Asclepius quotes *Vorsokr.* 31B115.13-4, with a significant *varia lectio*, viz. αἰθομένῳ in the last line.³⁰ What we should notice is that the pattern is precisely the same as Hippolytus' at *Ref.* VII 29.13-5 and 17:³¹ the distinction between the two cosmoi, and then the quotation of B115.13-4. Asclepius continues by pointing out—as Syrianus too had done—that there is already distinction (and so a presence of Strife) in the Sphere because there are πολλὰ νοητά, although this plurality is hidden by the miraculous unification. There is unification in the sensible world too, but here division predominates.

Asclepius' next point (*In Met.* 197.29 ff.) is important. He argues that Strife is the cause of the coming to be of all things except the Sphere, and that all things, those that are and those that will be,³² have sprung from it (ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐβλάστησαν); as his proof-text he quotes *Vorsokr.* 31B21.10-13a (from Aristotle!): "trees have sprung and men and women, and wild animals and birds, and fishes sustained by water, and long-living gods".³³ Love's role in the formation of living things, which is such an extremely important ingredient of Empedocles' doctrine,³⁴ is entirely left out; what is more, Asclepius forgets what he has said a

²⁷ Cf. *In Met.* 198.25-6, for which see *infra*, text to n. 36. I assume that in Asclepius Dyad is short for Indefinite Dyad, cf. *supra*, text after n. 14.

²⁸ *In Met.* 197.14-5, ἐπειδὴ πρὸ τῆς δυνάδου εἶναι τὴν μονάδα (ὑποτίθεται) ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς.

²⁹ *In Met.* 197.17-8, λέγομεν οὖν ὃ πολλάκις εἴρηται, ὅτι πάντα ταῦτα συμβολικῶς ἔλεγεν ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς.

³⁰ See *supra*, Ch. IX n. 32, n. 33.

³¹ See *supra*, Ch. IX 1.2-3.

³² This paraphrases *Vorsokr.* 31B21.9, a line quoted by Aristotle.

³³ According to the Empedocles fragment as quoted more fully by Simpl. *In Phys.* 159.13 ff., the trees etc. spring from the elements. Asclepius has failed to check the original text of the poem.

³⁴ See *supra*, Ch. IX n. 44.

moment before, viz. that Love to some extent is present in the sensible world too ...

In his commentary on the next lemma (*Met.* B 4.1000b3 at *In Met.* 198.8-14) he briefly deals with the traditional issue already discussed by Alexander and Syrianus, viz. that Empedocles' God would be more stupid than others. His solution is different: the God does not need to have the elements and principles present as transcendent entities, but as (lower) productive entities, and that is how he knows them, not as 'likes'.³⁵

In his exegesis of the next two lemmata (*Met.* B 4.1000b9 at *In Met.* 198.16-23; 1000b14 at *In Met.* 198.25-199.11) Asclepius briefly attends to several issues. He repeats his view (which he believes to be Aristotelian) that Strife πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀπογεννᾷ. Furthermore, he points out that the Monad is the cause of the unification and connection of all things, and the Dyad of their emanation.³⁶ He adds that Pythagoras, as well as Parmenides and Empedocles who are Pythagoreans, called the cause of both unification and emanation 'time'. We have already encountered this interpretation in Syrianus.³⁷ Another Empedoclean name, he continues, for this supreme principle is 'oath';³⁸ he then paraphrases *Vorsokr.* 31B30.1-2,³⁹ quotes B30.3 (all from Aristotle!), and gives an interpretation of ἀμοιβαῖος which very much resembles that of Syrianus. The 'change' does not entail a succession but is an 'exchange' or compensation, and the Dyad (viz., Strife) passes on to things in the world the illumination (ἐλλαμψιν, *In Met.* 199.4) it receives from the One. Pure Neoplatonist metaphysics again and, we must note, not a word about the soul. Strife's goodness in this way receives undeniable emphasis, and we may understand why Asclepius in his earlier quotation of *Vorsokr.* 31B115.13-4 has the *varia lectio* αἰθομένῳ in the last line: 'blazing Strife', as distinguished from 'accursed Strife', is not evil, and αἰθομένῳ paves the way for the use of the term ἐλλαμψις. Perhaps the association with one of the etymologies of αἰθήρ plays a role here as well. Yet the exegesis of the cosmic cycle (or the succession Love—Strife—Love etc.) as in reality being about the descent and ascent of the soul as mentioned in the context of this quotation seems to have been forgotten in the later part of the exegesis. The surprising fact, indeed, is that the quotation-cum-interpretation of *Vorsokr.* 31B115.13-4 at *In Met.* 197.17-21, though

³⁵ *In Met.* 198.12-14, φαμέν οὖν ὅτι ἐκεῖνος ὡς ἐξηρημένα οὐ δεῖται ταῦτα ἔχειν, ἵνα οὕτως αὐτὰ γνῶ, ἀλλ' ὡς παρακτικὰ· οὕτως αὐτὰ γινώσκει, οὐχ ὡς ὅμοια.

³⁶ Cf. *supra*, text to n. 27.

³⁷ Cf. *supra*, n. 11 and text thereto.

³⁸ So also Syrianus, cf. *supra*, n. 12 and text thereto.

³⁹ Another instance of the adaptation of a poetic quotation to a prose context.

not strictly speaking a *Fremdkörper*, is not really indispensable to the Neoplatonic exegesis provided by Asclepius. We have seen above that Syrianus actually saw no need to quote these lines. The cosmic cycle according to the literal interpretation is converted into a hierarchic Neoplatonist metaphysics, and the relation between the lower and the higher worlds can be accounted for without appealing to the vicissitudes of the soul.

Asclepius' knowledge of Empedocles is entirely derivative. *Vorsokr.* 31B115.13-4 excepted, his verbatim quotations are all quoted from Aristotle. His entire exegesis depends on the *Commentary* tradition connected with Aristotle (Alexander, Syrianus and presumably a few Neoplatonist predecessors of Syrianus). What is new compared with Syrianus is (1) the greater emphasis on the role of Strife, or the Dyad, as the *good* Demiurge of living things and indeed of all the things that are perceived by the senses, and (2) the quotation and exegesis of *Vorsokr.* 31B115.13-4. We have noticed that the latter is paralleled in Hippolytus and the former in Syrianus, whereas Hippolytus, unlike Syrianus and Asclepius, emphasized the evilness and autonomy of Strife.

X 2.4 Philoponus

A short version of the Neoplatonist interpretation of Empedocles is also found in Philoponus, but in an entirely different context, viz. in the explanation and exemplification of Aristotle's brief but fundamental division of the principles according to number at *Phys. A* 2.184b15 ff.⁴⁰ Philoponus in this passage tells us more than is really necessary for the purpose of explaining that, when Aristotle said that there were those who posited a finite plurality of moving elements, he was thinking of Empedocles' four elements, and Love and Strife. He adds a further comment which is concerned with Empedocles' system (*In Phys.* 24.3-22).⁴¹ It is apparent that he wishes to provide a succinct account of Empedocles' doctrine at the beginning of his *Commentary* (as he does with regard to a number of other philosophers alluded to or mentioned in Aristotle's division). As to its metaphysical frame-work, the passage

⁴⁰ See Mansfeld (1986a) 7 ff., (1989b) 138 ff., and (1989b) 144 f. on Philoponus' version of the division.

⁴¹ Translated and commented upon by O'Brien (1981) 84 f.; I do not believe that "Philopon interprète l'alternance des deux mondes ... comme étant en réalité un récit de la *descente* de l'âme telle que la décrit le fr. 115" (my italics). Simplicius too, in the same context (*In Phys.* 25.19-26.4), explains Empedocles' system, but there is a world of difference, Philoponus' account being up-to-date from a Neoplatonist point of view. For the Neoplatonist interpretation elsewhere in Simplicius see *infra*, X 2.5.

agrees with the comments of Syrianus and Asclepius, but there is a highly significant shift of emphasis. The movements of the soul, absent in Syrianus and marginal in Asclepius, are important in Philoponus' account, but he does not speak of the transcendental origin of the soul or of its returning to the place whence it came, but interprets its ups and downs in an epistemological way, that is to say as the activities of contrasting cognitive faculties.

Philoponus points out that Empedocles posited two cosmoi, viz. (1) that of sense-perception consisting of the four elements, and (2) the Sphere, that is to say the intelligible cosmos. Empedocles, he adds, used the name Sphere because the intelligible cosmos is turned towards itself and closer to the One.⁴² Empedocles says that these change into one another, for when Love dominates in an absolute way the elements change into the Sphere, and when Strife dominates in an absolute way the Sphere changes into the elements. But this, Philoponus says, is not what Empedocles *means*; he does not mean that the cosmoi change into one another, but that our soul goes from one of these to the other, and conversely.⁴³ There are two faculties in our soul, viz. one producing difference and the other sameness (ἐτεροποιὸς καὶ ταῦτοποιὸς δύναμις). Referring to Plato (viz., *Tim.* 37bc), he argues that when the soul's activity is that of the first faculty, which Plato calls 'the circle of the Same', it is in contact with the intelligibles—and Empedocles called this faculty 'Love' because love is a unifying power. Further, he argues that when its activity is that of the second faculty, which Plato calls 'the circle of the Different' and Empedocles 'Strife', it is turned towards the objects of sense-perception. Accordingly, the intentional change of the soul in respect of the sensible and the intelligible world is called by Empedocles 'change of cosmoi':

This is why he spoke the following well-known words (πολυθρόλητον) about the soul: "thus I too am here, a fugitive from God and a wanderer, trusting in raving Strife",⁴⁴ that is to say having been persuaded by the

⁴² This One must be the ineffable first principle also mentioned by Syrianus and Asclepius. Cf. e.g. Philop. *In De an.* 73.31 where this is stated more clearly.

⁴³ *In Phys.* 24.10-11, τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας εἰς τοὺς κόσμους τούτους σημαίνων μεταβολήν.

⁴⁴ *Vorsokr.* 31B115.13-4 again, cf. *supra*, text to n. 30, and *supra*, Ch. IX n. 32, n. 33. Substantially the same interpretation pertaining to sense-perception is twice given by Proclus (see however *infra*, text to n. 51). The first is at *In Tim.* p. II 116.5-117.2, where *Vorsokr.* 31B2.2 is quoted (as being by Empedocles) at p. 116.23 and connected with a reminiscence of B115.13 at p. 116.24-25, φυγάσι θεόθεν (for a partial parallel in Plutarch see *infra*, text to n. 173). The second is at *In Parm.* p. 723.15-724.13. Here Proclus discusses the views of three Pythagoreans (Pythagoreans according to him), viz. Parmenides, Timaeus and Empedocles. Parmenides said Being is one but also accepted plurality on this level and not only on that of the objects of sense-perception which he treated ἐν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν, which just as that of another

difference-producing psychic faculty.

The interpretation of *Vorsokr.* 31B115.13-4 as given here is quite different from that later provided by Asclepius. Philoponus clearly provides an *interpretatio* of another *interpretatio*. The soul's voyages down and up in a literal sense, that is say from and to the intelligible cosmos as formulated by Asclepius and long before Asclepius by Hippolytus (or rather Hippolytus' source), have been converted into the opposed psychic faculties dealing with contrasting objects of cognition. We must further point out that there is no mention of Strife as the Demiurge of our world in this passage. At *In Phys.* 229.3-5 however Philoponus states that 'Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὸ Νεῖκος καὶ τὴν Φιλίαν εἰδοποιοῦς αἰτίας τῶν ὄντων ἔλεγεν· ἀλλ' οὖν εἰδοποιεῖσθαι δι' αὐτῶν τὸν τε Σφαῖρον διὰ τῆς Φιλίας καὶ τὸν κόσμον τοῦτον διὰ τοῦ Νείκου'.⁴⁵ Here we have Strife in its role as Demiurge of the visible world, just as in Syrianus and later in Asclepius, but the problems involved are passed over in silence.⁴⁶

A longer but not substantially different version of the epistemic interpretation provided at *In Phys.* 24.3-22 is found at Philoponus *In De an.* 73.21-74.29, which deals with Aristotle's comment on *Vorsokr.* 31B109 ('we know earth by earth' etc.).⁴⁷ Here Philoponus begins by saying that Empedocles, being a Pythagorean, expresses his thought in the *allegorical* way typical of the Pythagoreans.⁴⁸ We have seen above that this view is a common one among the late Neoplatonist commentators;

Pythagorean, Timaeus (cf. Plato *Tim.* 28a), is his designation of τὰ αἰσθητά. Later, the same view was upheld by another Pythagorean, Empedocles, who called all that is intelligible and united by the name of Σφαῖρος; "but the many, being fugitives from the unification and the Monad of Beings (φυγάδες ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνώσεως ὄντες καὶ τῆς τῶν ὄντων Μονάδος), being driven towards plurality because their life is partitioned and divided, (driven to) pluriform opinions, to undetermined presentations, to affective sense-perceptions, to materialist desires" etc. However, one may detect a more standard (and hitherto undetected) reminiscence of the Empedoclean fallen soul at Procl. *Hymn.* III 15, see *supra*, Ch. IX text to n. 57.

⁴⁵ This passage is not mentioned by O'Brien (1981); cf. also Philop. *In De an.* 74.6 cited below.

⁴⁶ I add a further reference. At *In Phys.* 94.8-11 Philoponus provides a literal exegesis of Empedocles' cosmic cycle which, he says, goes on *in infinitum*. This remark, which is strangely at odds with the interpretation provided at *In Phys.* 24.3-22, presumably echoes an earlier commentary, maybe Alexander's (for which see Sharples (1987) 1186).

⁴⁷ For the lemma see *supra*, n. 15. The passage is cited by O'Brien (1981) e.g. 85, but not discussed *in extenso*.

⁴⁸ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἐπειδὴ Πυθαγόρειος ἦν ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, συμβολικὴ δ' ἦν ἡ τῶν Πυθαγορείων διδασκαλία, καὶ αὐτὸς συμβολικῶς περὶ τούτων ἔλεγε κτλ. For Empedocles as a Pythagorean see also Philop. *In De an.* 140.6-9, where the famous lines of *Vorsokr.* 31B117 describing the migrations of the soul are quoted (cited for the same reason by Hipp. *Ref.* I 3.2) and the doctrine is called 'odd'; the reference to Empedocles is not in the lemma of Aristotle here explained by Philoponus.

Philoponus uses it to justify his own particular exegesis of B109. He argues that earth, water, air and fire are not physically present in the soul (and that, as a matter of fact, Aristotle himself never argued that horses etc. are physically present in the understanding), but as thoughts, or concepts.⁴⁹ Love and Strife, too, should be understood in a cognitive sense: Love is the faculty producing an upward and Strife the one producing a downward motion (ἀναγωγὸν δύνάμιν καὶ καταγωγόν). Love pertains to what is unified, viz. the intelligibles, Strife to the objects of sense-perception. Philoponus then again quotes *Vorsokr.* 31B115.13-4, and again adduces the circles of the soul in the *Timaeus*. He adds a reference to what he calls the better and the worse horse in the *Phaedrus* (246b ff.) but interestingly enough fails to mention the charioteer, and states that this is Plato's 'enigmatic' way (αἰνιττόμενος)⁵⁰ of referring to the ἀναγωγοὺς and καταγωγοὺς δυνάμεις of the soul (*In De an.* 74.3). Love and Strife according to Empedocles are efficient causes of all things, because in all things there is sameness and difference. But Love is more dominant among the intelligibles, and Strife among the objects of sense-perception.

The fact that even the myth of the *Phaedrus* is subjected to an allegorical interpretation which abolishes the literal ascent and descent of the soul and replaces these by the exercising of two different cognitive activities directed towards the intelligible world 'above' or to the sensible world here below is further proof that Philoponus' interpretation of *Vorsokr.* 31B115.13-4 has nothing to do with the voyages of the soul dear to the Pythagoreans and the common run of Platonists. This is as it should be. Philoponus is a Christian, and unlike his pagan colleagues cannot afford to promote a belief in transmigration, or in the incarnation of a pre-existing soul. His Empedocles is a Platonist (the two-worlds doctrine), but a Pythagorean only insofar as he speaks in riddles that call for explanations. Accordingly, his exegesis of the two lines from the *Katharmoi* is a Christianized version of a Platonist and Neoplatonist exegesis. However, he may have been inspired by Proclus, whose allusions to these lines (or at least to the 'fugitive from God') are part of an epistemic account related to the two worlds-theory. But Proclus' expresses himself in such general terms that one cannot exclude that he still conceived of the descent of the soul in a literal way, whereas Philoponus explicitly excludes this idea.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Cf. Simpl. *In Phys.* 1123.26-8, ὑπέθετο γὰρ οὗτος [*sic*, Empedocles] τὸν τε νοητὸν καὶ τὸν αἰσθητὸν κόσμον ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων τῶν τεττάρων συνεστῶτας, τὸν μὲν παραδειγματικῶς δηλονότι τὸν δὲ εἰκονικῶς.

⁵⁰ Cf. *supra*, Ch. VIII n. 114 and text thereto.

⁵¹ Cf. *supra*, n. 44, and *supra*, Ch. IX text to n. 57.

X 2.5 Simplicius

Simplicius too subscribes to the exegesis according to which the Empedoclean world of Love is the intelligible and that of Strife the sensible cosmos, although Strife is also present in the intelligible and Love in the sensible cosmos.⁵² He knows about the interpretation according to which Strife is the Demiurge of the sensible cosmos only, and rejects it (*In Phys.* 31.31-32.1, οὐχ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι Φιλία μὲν μόνη κατ' Ἐμπεδοκλέα τὸν νοητὸν ἐποίησε κόσμον, Νεῖκος δὲ μόνον τὸν αἰσθητὸν, ἀλλ' ἄμφω πανταχοῦ οἰκείως θεωρεῖ). Yet he acknowledges that Strife is the power which bears the greatest responsibility for the sensible cosmos (*In Phys.* 1124.2-3, τὸ δὲ αἰσθητοῦ [*scil.*, κόσμου ποιητικὸν αἵτιόν ἐστιν] τὸ Νεῖκος ... , διὰ τῆς διακρίσεως τὸν κόσμον τοῦτον ποιοῦν). He points out again and again that Aristotle took Empedocles *au pied de la lettre*, and that this is what one should not do.

However, his interpretation of 'change', that is to say of the cosmic cycle, is different from that of his colleagues. He does not speak of the descent of the soul in the manner of Asclepius, or of the soul and cognition in the manner of Philoponus, but argues that the movement from one cosmos to the other has to be explained in terms of the Neoplatonist doctrine of procession and 'return'—an exegesis that is valid both at the metaphysical/physical and at the psychological/cognitive level (*In Phys.* 1186.30-35).⁵³

⁵² E.g. *In Phys.* 31.18-32.3, 34.4-7, 160.22-27, 1123.25-1124.11. See further O'Brien (1969) 26 ff.; O'Brien (1981) 42 f. Note that Simplicius allows for alternations between Love and Strife in the sensible cosmos *In Phys.* 34.5-8, 1124.7-9.

⁵³ This is the conclusion of the commentary on the lemmata *Phys.* Θ 1.252a5 (ff.) and 252a19 (ff.) at *In Phys.* 1183.21-1186.35, where Simplicius discusses Aristotle's critical comments on the change from the cosmos to the Sphere and conversely. He quotes an interesting concatenation of lines in the comment on the first lemma, viz. *Vorsokr.* 31B27.1, B27.3-4 and B31 from Eudemos' *Physics* (Eudem. Fr. 110, including Eudemos' interpretation of these lines in reaction to Aristotle's criticism), B17.29, ἐν δὲ μέρει κρατέουσι περιπλομένοιο χρόνοιο (a *Selbstzitat* from his own excerpts of the *On Nature*, cf. *In Phys.* 157.25 ff., which quotes the whole of B17 except B17.9 inserted by Diels-Kranz), B 115.1-2 (from a doxography, I presume; see *infra*, text to n. 75) and B30 (from his own excerpts of the *On Nature* again, see *supra*, n. 9; Aristotle, who also quotes the three lines, has a different beginning; Syrian. *In Met.* 43.34 and 37 quotes the second and third lines but omits the first, and Asclep. *In Met.* 198.33-35 paraphrases the first two lines and only quotes the third). At *In Phys.* 1185.19, in the comment on the second Aristotelian lemma, Simplicius quotes *Vorsokr.* 31B26.1, ἐν δὲ μέρει κρατέουσι περιπλομένοιο κύκλωιο, which except for the last word is identical with B17.29; this line too, another *Selbstzitat*, ultimately derives from his own excerpts of the *On Nature*, cf. *In Phys.* 33.18 ff, where the whole fragment is quoted (and *ibid.* 160.16 f., for the first two lines); only the last part of this fragment is known from another source as well, viz. Aristotle. It goes without saying that in the context of Simplicius' discussion *Vorsokr.* 31B26.1 is a perfect stand-in for B17.29, although the quotation of the former instead of the latter may be a mere slip.

It has often been said [viz., by me] that both Empedocles and Anaxagoras affirmed that the intelligible cosmos is unified and the sensible diversified. Both (these cosmoi) being eternal, they understood the temporal change as demonstrating [1] their hierarchy and the coming to be of the sensible (cosmos) from the intelligible, but [2] Empedocles included (καί) the being turned of the sensible (cosmos) toward the intelligible as well.⁵⁴

A few pages earlier, Simplicius has quoted a number of lines from the *On Nature*, the first four of which are cited from Eudemus and the fifth is a *Selbstzitat*—from memory, presumably. Two lines from the *Katharmoi* follow, viz. *Vorsokr.* B115.1-2, which I believe to have been quoted from a doxography; and the last three lines quoted, from the *On nature* again, derive from Simplicius own excerpts from this epic.⁵⁵ In our context, only the second part of this series of quotations and comments is relevant. Simplicius argues (*In Phys.* 1184.5-6) that there is no difference between saying that change and movement are ‘natural’ and that they occur ‘of necessity’. Now Aristotle had criticized Empedocles at *Met.* B 4.1000b13 and b16-17 because no other cause (αἴτιον) for the change from Love to Strife, and vice versa, was offered by him than “that this is how it went according to nature”, and because according to Empedocles “change is necessary but no cause thereof is made clear” (οὕτως πέφυκεν ὥς ἀναγκαῖον μὲν ὄν μεταβάλλειν, αἰτίαν δὲ τῆς ἀνάγκης οὐδεμίαν δηλοῖ).⁵⁶ At *Phys.* Θ 1.252a9, i.e. in the passage explained by Simplicius, Aristotle again says that according to Empedocles change occurs ἐξ ἀνάγκης, which obviously he means in a critical sense. Simplicius, answering this challenge and in his usual manner trying to find a testimonium for Aristotle’s every word, first points out that the idea that change and movement are natural is what Empedocles seems to state at (B17.29) ἐν δὲ μέρει κρατέουσι περιπλομένοιο χρόνοιο. That he makes Necessity *the cause* of what happens, he adds, is clear from the words “Necessity exists, something (which is) an ancient seal of the Gods / eternal, sealed with broad oaths”.⁵⁷ For, Simplicius goes on, it is

⁵⁴ εἴρηται δὲ πολλάκις, ὅτι καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ἡνωμένον μὲν τὸν νοητὸν ἔλεγον κόσμον, διακεκριμένον δὲ τὸν αἰσθητόν. ἀμφοῖν δὲ αἰεὶ ὄντων τὴν κατὰ χρόνον μεταβολὴν εἰς ἐνδειξιν ἐλάμβανον τῆς τάξεως αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ γενέσεως ἀπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ καὶ τῆς τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν ἐπιστροφῆς.

⁵⁵ See *supra*, n. 53.

⁵⁶ Cf. O’Brien (1981) 74, who however seems to overlook the fact that Aristotle does not complain about the absence of the idea of necessity, but of that of its causal explanation.

⁵⁷ B115.1-2, ἔστιν Ἀνάγκη, χρῆμα θεῶν σφρήγισμα παλαιόν, / αἰδίων πλατέεσσι κατέσφρηγισμένον ὅρκοις. Our other sources for these two lines, viz. Plutarch, Hippolytus and Porphyry (whose quotation begins at θεῶν but who paraphrases Ἀνάγκη as εἰμαρμένη and νόμος, *ap.* Stob. II p. 169.3-5; cf. Theodoret’s abstracts from the *Plac.*,

through this 'Necessity' and those 'oaths' that Love and Strife dominate by turns. And this is also what Empedocles says on occasion of the dominance of Strife (B30 is then quoted, which in its last lines speaks of the time of exchange fixed for both of them by a broad oath). In other words, Simplicius manages to take the sting out of Aristotle's criticism that no cause of Necessity is given by proclaiming that Necessity itself is the cause of change. At *In Phys.* 465.12-13, he somewhat cavalierly puts Empedocles' Love, Strife and Necessity on a par with Anaxagoras' Intellect as efficient-and-final cause, but at *In Phys.* 197.11-13 he is clear about the hierarchy involved, placing the elemental forces under Love and Strife and the latter under the Monad of Necessity (μονάδα τὴν τῆς Ἀνάγκης).

In the context of Simplicius' Neoplatonist exegesis, this can only mean that the symmetrical and eternal relations between the intelligible and the sensible cosmos are necessary and natural and not something to be critical about. *Vorsokr.* B115.1-2 in this context has nothing to do with the descent of the soul, or with the soul as Demiurge; the fragment is interpreted in terms of a metaphysico-physical law. It is, presumably, not an accident that the only extant Empedoclean lines which mention broad oaths are B30.3 and B115.2, and Simplicius' motive clearly is to interpret these lines through one another. Doubtless, he would have quoted further and perhaps even better evidence on Ἀνάγκη from the *On Nature* which he studied and excerpted with such diligence if anything on the subject could have been found there. In other words: the oaths which in their original context in B115 pertain to trust in Strife and its fatal consequences for the *daimon*, or soul, are applied by Simplicius (interpreting *Empedoclem ex Empedocle*) to the alternation between Love and Strife,⁵⁸ which as a next step has to be interpreted in

viz. on the Atomists, *Graec. aff. cur.* VI 13: ἀνάγκην καλοῦντες τὴν εἰμαρμένην, and *ibid.* on Heraclitus: ἀνάγκην δὲ τὴν εἰμαρμένην καὶ οὗτος ὠνόμασεν—cf. *infra*, n. 61 *ad finem*) all have ψήφισμα not σφρήγισμα in the first line. Simplicius' *varia lectio* is obviously caused by anticipation of κατεσφρηγισμένον in the next line (cf. O'Brien (1981) 74 n. 2). Ἀνάγκη instead of Ἀνάγκης (which is in Plutarch) may be a corruption, as it probably is in Hippolytus; on the other hand, the formula 'Necessity exists' fits Simplicius' argument against Aristotle perfectly.

⁵⁸ For the parallels in Aëtius see *infra*, Ch. X 3. O'Brien (1981) 73 ff. argues that Simplicius' quotation of B115.1-2 is to be put on a par with that of B115.13-4 by his colleagues, or rather that lines from this fragment were used for the interpretation of the physical poem. The latter is a point of view one may share, as long as the important differences are kept in mind and there is no argument from one end of the fragment to the other. It is at any rate clear that Simplicius does not replace B115.13-4 by B115.1-2 as if the contents of each couplet were very much the same; on the contrary, B115.13-14 does not fit the interpretation pertaining to the symmetrical relations between the intelligible and the sensible cosmos he provides.

metaphysical Neoplatonist terms. It has however to be acknowledged that Simplicius' view of Necessity and his interpretation of the 'oath' are parallel to the interpretation of 'time' and the 'oath' as names for a transcendental principle provided by Syrianus and Asclepius. At *In Phys.* 197.9-13, as we have noticed, Simplicius even says in a rather off-hand way that the Monad of Necessity transcends the opposition between Love and Strife.⁵⁹ This interpretive grid was already available to him.

Finally, one may quote an interesting passage in which Empedocles' Love and Strife are put on a par with the Pythagorean principles odd and even, *In Phys.* 189.2-3, τὸ δὲ περιττὸν καὶ ἄρτιον ἀρχὰς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τίθενται, ὥσπερ τὸ Νεῖκος καὶ τὴν Φιλίαν μετὰ τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς.

X 3 *Empedocles, Pythagoras and Some Others in the Placita; Precedents in Aristotle*

O'Brien and others (among whom Zeller) have pointed out that Simplicius' interpretation of Empedocles 'Necessity' is paralleled to some extent at Aët. *Plac.* I 26.1.⁶⁰ It is important to point out that the lemma, though lacking in Theodoret, is found in both our other main sources for Aëtius' *Placita*, viz. both in ps.Plut. *Plac.* I 26 (884F) and Stob. *Ecl. phys.* I 4.7^c, and so may safely be attributed to Aëtius. This means that a safe date can be put to it, or at least a *terminus ante quem*, for Aëtius cannot be later than ca. 100 CE. It is the first lemma of the chapter περὶ οὐσίας ἀνάγκης (which comes after the chapter περὶ ἀνάγκης, viz. Aët. I 25).⁶¹

⁵⁹ See O'Brien (1981) 88.

⁶⁰ O'Brien (1981) 81, 88; *ibid.* 114 he affirms that it is not certain whether this passage (and the other relevant passage, Aët. I 7.28) pertain to *Vorsokr.* 31B115, but see *infra*, text to n. 70. Zeller (1920) 969 n. 2 is still worth consulting; cf. also Guthrie (1965) 163. We have a discrepancy between Diels' reconstruction and Mau's Teubneriana, where Aët. I 26.1 is the *second* lemma of ps.Plut. I 26.

⁶¹ Stob. *Ecl. phys.* I 4.7 fails to make this distinction (ch. I 4 is about ἀνάγκη); this explains why he has abridged the lemma, leaving out the words οὐσίαν ἀνάγκης (no such abridgement however at Aët. I 28.1, where the formula οὐσίαν εἰμαρμένης is in both sources). We may note that ps.Plutarch next has two chapters on εἰμαρμένη where the same distinction is made: *Plac.* I 27 περὶ εἰμαρμένης, and I 28 περὶ οὐσίας εἰμαρμένης. I note in passing that the author of the Middle Platonist tract *De fato* distinguishes between the ἐνέργεια and οὐσία of εἰμαρμένη (ps.Plut. 568B ff.). Again, Stobaeus fails to make this distinction at *Ecl. phys.* I 5.15 (ch. I 5 is about εἰμαρμένη). The distinction between ἀνάγκη and εἰμαρμένη is found in both ps.Plutarch and Stobaeus, but both these sources at Aët. I 27.1 say that for Heraclitus εἰμαρμένη is equivalent to ἀνάγκη, whereas Stobaeus/Aët. I 25.4 affirms this in respect of Leucippus as well. Theodoret, who at *Graec. aff. cur.* VI 13-15 provides an abstract from the Aëtian section corresponding to ps.Plut. *Plac.* I 25 + 27 + 28, argues that ἀνάγκη is an earlier term for εἰμαρμένη (cf. *supra*, n. 57). I cannot now deal with the questions concerned with the relation of these chapters to the *Vetusta placita* or perhaps even earlier collections, but note in passing that what looks like

Empedocles (says) that the substance/essence of Necessity (is) the cause which uses the principles and the elements.⁶²

This *testimonium*, as usual, is tantalizingly brief. For lack of a better term, I have translated οὐσίαν as 'substance/essence'; "the cause which uses the principles and elements" being the answer Empedocles is supposed to give when asked τί ἐστὶν ἀνάγκη.⁶³ It is not certain—but in view of the sequence plausible—that the principles (which can only be Love and Strife) are prior to, i.e. in a sense above, the (four) elements. Something which uses something else differs therefrom. There can therefore be no doubt that Necessity is defined as being a principle beyond the other two principles; the lemma implies a hierarchic structure. Perhaps Aëtius sees Necessity as a sort of demiurgic force.

Another lemma in the *Plac.* is also important in our context, viz. Aët. I 7.28 (*Vorsokr.* 31A32). This passage has unfortunately been transmitted—and in a garbled form at that—by Stobaeus alone (*Ecl. phys.* I 1.29b), but there are no grounds to reject attribution to Aëtius.⁶⁴ In the transmission of the text, Empedocles' name-label⁶⁵ and presumably a few more words have been lost at the beginning, I assume through *saut du même au même*, so that the lemma was coalesced with the previous lemma.⁶⁶ The title of the chapter in ps.Plutarch is τίς ἐστὶν ὁ θεός, and a plurality of different answers have been listed.

I translate the lemma, which I have tried to restore *ad probabilem sententiam* (Aët. I 7.28):⁶⁷

an abstract from a predecessor of Aëtius is found at Cic. *De fat.* 38-9 (on this passage see Mansfeld (1988b) 194, and *infra*, text to n. 73. I now believe that both Alexander and Cicero are ultimately dependent on skeptically structured doxographies).

⁶² Aët. I 26.1, ps.Plutarch's version (*Vorsokr.* 31A45): 'Εμπεδοκλῆς οὐσίαν Ἀνάγκης αἰτίαν χρηστικὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν στοιχείων.

⁶³ For this type of question see Mansfeld (1990a) 3193 ff., 3205 ff., (1991a) 70 ff.

⁶⁴ A number of other lemmata in this section of Stobaeus are paralleled in ps. Plut. *Plac.* I 7, among which not only a couple of short ones at the beginning, but also several rather long ones at the end, i.e. those pertaining to Plato (longer in Stobaeus), Aristotle (longer in ps.Plutarch), the Stoics and Epicurus, all of which at Stob. *Ecl. phys.* I 1.29b come after the Empedocles lemma.

⁶⁵ As Heeren already saw, see Diels *D.G. ad loc.*

⁶⁶ Wachsmuth supplies (Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὸν σφαῖρον καὶ) τὸ ἓν, Diels (in the text of *Vorsokr.* 31A32) (Ἐμπεδοκλῆς σφαιροειδὲς καὶ αἰδίων καὶ ἀκίνητον τὸ ἓν). In view of what follows, I suggest (τὸ ἓν. ἢ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ) τὸ ἓν, "(Empedocles (says that) the elements and the principles) and the One (scil., are gods)". For this supplement cf. also Aët. I 26.1 (see *supra*, n. 62 and text thereto) and I 3.20 (ps.Plutarch only): four στοιχεῖα, two ἀρχικαὶ δυνάμεις, viz. Love and Strife; the one unifying, the other dividing. *Vorsokr.* 31B6 is then quoted and explained, see *supra*, Ch. IX n. 9 and text thereto. Pier Luigi Donini (*per litt.*) suggests that (τὸ ἓν. ἢ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ) is sufficient.

⁶⁷ (For the beginning see *supra*, n. 66) ... καὶ τὸ μὲν ἓν τὴν Ἀνάγκην, ὅλην δὲ αὐτῇς τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, εἶδη δὲ τὸ Νεῖκος καὶ τὴν Φιλίαν. λέγει δὲ καὶ τὰ

(Empedocles (says that) the elements and the principles) and the One (are gods). The One is the Necessity, and its [*scil.*, Necessity's] matter are the four elements, (its) forms Strife and Love. He also says that the elements (are) gods, and that their mixture, the (Sphere), (is a God). And (the cosmos) will be resolved unto (his) uniform (entity). And he believes that the souls (are) divine, and divine also those pure (humans) which in a pure way share in them.⁶⁸

The interesting picture provided here differs to some extent from that found at Aët. I 26.1. In the first place, it is a list of a variety of answers⁶⁹ Empedocles is supposed to have given to the standard question 'who is the God?' In the second place, Necessity here, though still lawlike, is not a principle beyond Strife and Love. Rather, it is the totality of things with as its forms (εἶδη) Strife and Love and as its matter (ύλη) the four elements. Although Necessity is said to be the One, this One is not different from the whole of things. Next, (not only Strife and Love but) the four elements too are said to be gods (cf. Aët. I 3.20). If the emendation I have proposed is correct, the Sphere or mixture of the elements is said to be a God as well (it also is according to Diels' supplement). A comment is added in Aëtius: the cosmos will be resolved unto the uniform entity, viz. the Sphere (still supposing my emendation to be correct, but the others that have been proposed are *ad sententiam* equivalent). That this entity is uniform can only mean that it has one form (εἶδος) only, viz. Love. The picture that emerges is a version of the cosmic cycle into which the terms 'the One' and 'Necessity' have been interpolated, the former being an *interpretamentum*, the latter going back to something Empedocles really said. We may compare Stob./Aët. II 4.8, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὸν κόσμον γίνεσθαι καὶ *add.* Sturz) φθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀντεπικράτειαν τοῦ Νείκου καὶ τῆς Φιλίας.

To put it somewhat differently: as to its matter (i.e. the four elements)

στοιχεῖα θεοὺς καὶ τὸ μίγμα τούτων, τὸν [κόσμον] (Σφαῖρον). καὶ πρὸς τ(οῦτο τὸν κόσμον) ἀναλυθήσεται τὸ μονοειδές. καὶ θείας μὲν οἶται (τὰς) ψυχάς, θείους δὲ καὶ τοὺς μετέχοντας αὐτῶν καθαρῶς καθαρώς. The *crux* προσταν(α)λυθησεται has been dealt with in various ways; Diels for instance proposed πρὸς τούτοις τὸν Σφαῖρον, εἰς ὃν πάντα ταῦτ') ἀναλυθήσεται. I do not understand why the obviously odd τὸ μίγμα τούτων, τὸν κόσμον has not been suspected; those who want to preserve κόσμον here should add (τὸν νοητόν) and accept part of Diels' supplement, viz. (εἰς ὃ πάντα ταῦτα) ἀναλυθήσεται. The result would still be difficult. —I add here that Plut. *De an. procr.* 1026A f. is not a good parallel to Aët. I 7.28, for in that passage Love and Strife are not on the same level as Necessity alone, but identified with (Platonic) Necessity as already reasonable, see *infra*, n. 152 and text thereto.

⁶⁸ Presumably, in the divine elements and in Love. I suspect that this last remark is an echo of *Vorsokr.* 31B110.1-5, for which see *supra*, Ch. IX, text to n. 59, n. 60 and text thereto. For θείους cf. also B132.1, ὁλβιος ὅς *θειῶν* πραπίδων ἐκτέτατο πλοῦτον.

⁶⁹ For similar doxographic lists see e.g. Aët. I 7.30. 32. 33, Cic. *N. D.* I 33-35.

the whole of things, or Necessity = the One, has two forms, viz. Love on the one hand—and when it has this form the elements are a mixture (called Sphere)—and Strife on the other (and when it has this form the elements are separate and our cosmos has come into being). Accordingly, Necessity is the name for the lawlike alternations between Love and Strife as the forms of matter, or for the course the cosmic cycle inevitably follows. It is not a very big step to elevate this Necessity to the status of a principle, or cause, beyond Love and Strife, as at Aët. I 26.1; because it is identical with the One, the latter would automatically be transcendentalized as well.

Though the lawlike alternations between Love and Strife, as we have noticed above, are a feature of the *On Nature* (Vorsokr. 31B17.27-29; B30, referring to the oath), Necessity only occurs in the *Katharmoi* (B115.1-2, where it is connected with a different sort of oaths). Both at Aët. I 26.1 and at I 7.28, the Necessity of the *Katharmoi* has been grafted into the physics of the *On Nature*, just as in Simplicius.⁷⁰ This is un-Aristotelian, for Aristotle, as we have also noticed, criticized Empedocles precisely because he *failed* to provide a proper explanation for the alternations between Love and Strife.⁷¹

These two Aëtian passages are quite early pieces of evidence for the interpretation of Empedocles' physics by means of an idea derived from the other poem, and they are not only important because of their date, but also because of the fact that they represent an *opinio communis* that found its expression in Aëtius, whose doxography was widely used. It is even possible to date this *opinio* more than a century earlier. Cic. *De fat.* 38-39 provides a short overview of what he calls *duae sententiae ... veterum philosophorum* concerned with fate. A diaphonic structure of this kind is familiar from the *Placita* literature,⁷² and I suppose that Cicero's account—as so many other so-called doxographic passages in his philosophical works—must in some way or other be traced back to a predecessor of Aëtius (in the present case, of a section corresponding to Aët. I 25-29).⁷³ In our context, only a small part of what Cicero reports is of interest, viz. *una [scil., sententia] eorum, qui censerent omnia ita fieri, ut id fatum vim necessitatis adferret, in qua sententia Democritus Heraclitus Empedocles Aristoteles fuit*. This interesting part is what is said about Empedocles' view of 'necessity' as what directs the course of events in an

⁷⁰ See *supra*, text to n. 58.

⁷¹ Cf. O'Brien (1981) 61 f., 81, and *supra*, n. 56 and text thereto.

⁷² See Runia (1989) *passim*, Mansfeld (1989e) 313 ff., Mansfeld (1990a) *passim*, and on Cicero *ibid.* 3122 ff., 3207 f.

⁷³ See *supra*, n. 61. The string of name-labels in asyndeton as in Cicero is very characteristic of the *Placita* literature.

entirely deterministic way. What Cicero tells us is even closer to Simplicius' view than what is found in the two Aëtian passages.

There is also a further reason for believing that *Vorsokr.* 31B115.1-2 is indeed the ultimate source for the Necessity that has been grafted into the Empedoclean physics, for Simplicius found nothing in the *On Nature* to help him in his argument against Aristotle's criticism and so had to fall back on B115.1-2—which, significantly enough, is his only quote from the other poem.⁷⁴ We moreover now seem to have found Simplicius' source for these lines, viz. the more extensive earlier version of the *Plac.* which we may safely suppose to have existed and where presumably they were quoted.⁷⁵

But we have not done yet with Aët. I 7.28, for this lemma also offers further evidence that the *Katharmoi* were adduced and excerpted. As its last two items, it lists the tenets that the souls are divine and that those humans who share καθαροὺς καθαρῶς in 'them'⁷⁶ are divine too. Is it too daring to assume that this *polyptoton* is a reminiscence of the title? That the souls are divine is the doctrine of the *Katharmoi*, or at any rate corresponds to the later interpretation of this doctrine, cf. e.g. Hipp. *Ref.* VII 29.16 (exegesis of *Vorsokr.* 31B115.5), δαίμονας τὰς ψυχὰς λέγων.⁷⁷ Daemons are lower divinities, *numina*. However, it is Necessity not the soul which is adduced to explain the roles of and alternations between Love and Strife. Finally, there is no mention of, or even allusion to, a distinction between an intelligible and a sensible cosmos at Aët. I 26.1 and 7.28.

We may now turn to two remarkable passages on Pythagoras in the *Placita*, which for the sake of convenience I shall refer to as A[a] and A[b].⁷⁸ The first is also to be found in the chapter 'Who is the God?' (in

⁷⁴ See *supra*, text to n. 57.

⁷⁵ O'Brien (1981) 76 suggests that 'peut-être quelque anthologie' is Simplicius' source. But such an anthology would of necessity have been systematic, explaining *Empedoclem ex Empedocle* and so quoting *Vorsokr.* B115.1-2 next to B30. This presupposes a previous systematic interpretive grid. The hypothesis of a more generous version of the *Plac.*-lemma we do have, viz. a mini-cento of quotation and exegesis in the manner of e.g. Aët. I 3.20, is a much simpler one.

⁷⁶ For what this probably means see *supra*, n. 68.

⁷⁷ See *supra*, Ch. IX n. 35 and text thereto.

⁷⁸ See Burkert (1972) 57 f., who partly translates and briefly discusses these passages and affirms that in the *Plac.* the lemmata with the name-label Pythagoras (as distinguished from those bearing the name-label Pythagoreans) ultimately derive from the interpretation of Pythagorean doctrines in Platonic terms by Plato's early pupils and their later followers (for which see *supra*, Ch. VIII n. 34). However, views attributed by Aristotle to the Pythagoreans in general may in the *Plac.* be attributed to individual Pythagoreans (Philolaus, Hicetas, Ecphantus; see Mansfeld (1991a) 94 ff., and one cannot exclude (partial) Aristotelian influence on all lemmata which bear the name-label Pythagoras.

both ps.Plutarch and Stobaeus), A[a] = Aët. I 7.18:⁷⁹

Pythagoras (said) that of the principles⁸⁰ the Monad (is) God and the good, (the Monad) which is the nature of the One, (and) Intellect itself; and (he said) that the Indefinite Dyad (is) a Divinity and the evil, (the Dyad) to which material plurality pertains || and also the visible world.

Substantially the same doctrine is attributed to Pythagoras in Aëtius' chapter on the *archai* (in both ps.Plutarch and Stobaeus, *D.G.* 281a6-12 ~ b4-10), A[b] = Aët. I 3.8, 281a6/b4 ff.:⁸¹

Again, (Pythagoras puts) the Monad and the Indefinite Dyad among the principles. Of these principles the first pertains to the creative and formal/eidetic cause, i.e. the God Intellect, and the other to what is passible and material, (viz.) the visible cosmos.

If we consider these two testimonies together, as I believe we may, a picture emerges which combines the dualism of a two-worlds theory with that of an opposition between good and evil principles. A sensible cosmos exists, viz. a world of plurality deriving as to its passibility and materiality from the second principle, or Indefinite Dyad, which is a Lower Divinity and an evil one. If the final clause only surviving in the mss. of ps.Plutarch's text for Aët. I 7.18 is accepted, as in my view it should be, the idea that the visible world is *evil* insofar as it derives from the principle of plurality is even formulated *disertis verbis*. The first principle, the Monad, is God, who is good and the efficient as well formal/eidetic cause. This God is also called Intellect, which I believe implies that this monadic Intellect is equivalent to an intelligible cosmos, for it is not only an efficient cause, but an 'eidetic' one as well, that is to say that it imposes forms on matter, and to be able to do so it should contain them (they are not mentioned as a third principle). I

⁷⁹ Πυθαγόρας τῶν ἀρχῶν τὴν Μονάδα θεὸν καὶ τἀγαθόν, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ἐνὸς φύσις, αὐτὸς ὁ Νοῦς· τὴν δ' Ἀόριστον Δυάδα δαίμονα καὶ τὸ κακόν, περὶ ἣν ἐστὶ τὸ ὕλικόν πληθος. The mss. of ps.Plutarch add ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁρατὸς ὁ κόσμος (not found in Eusebius' abstract) which Diels believed to be an interpolation (from Aët. I 3.8, 281a11-12/b10?) already, as he points out, read by ps.Galen. The clause is also in the Arabic translation, where the more correct ὁ ὁρατὸς κόσμος seems to be presupposed. In view of the confirmation in the *Arabus* and the parallel in Aët. I 3.8, I believe that text of the mss. of ps.Plutarch should be accepted; Eusebius and Stobaeus also make other slips. The text is partly quoted (τὴν δ' ... πληθος) by Waszink (who by mistake writes πάθος not πληθος) following Leemans, *ad Calc. In Tim.* p. 298.12 (Numen. Fr. 52; see further *infra*, Ch. X 5.3). The alternative translation "and also the visible cosmos is a god" is less likely.

⁸⁰ Cf. Aët. I 3.8, *D.G.* 281a6-8 ~ b4-7; see *infra*, n. 81.

⁸¹ πάλιν δὲ τὴν Μονάδα καὶ τὴν Ἀόριστον Δυάδα ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς· σπεύδει δὲ αὐτῶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον καὶ εἰδικόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ Νοῦς ὁ θεός, ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ παθητικόν τε καὶ ὕλικόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρατὸς κόσμος. For the monad/Intellect, which they compared to the One, as the view of 'the Pythagoreans' see Anatolius *ap.* ps.lambl. *Theol. arith.* 6.4-5.

assume that it would be otiose to explain in detail that to a large extent the ideas found in A[b] can ultimately be traced back to the *Timaeus*, or rather to Theophrastus' interpretation of the dialogue. For Theophr. *Phys. op.* Fr. 9 *ap.* Simplic. *In Phys.* 26.7-13 argued that Plato posited *two* principles, viz. τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὡς ὕλην, ὃ προσαγορεύει πανδεχές, τὸ δὲ ὡς αἴτιον καὶ κινεῖν, ὃ περιάπτει τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δυνάμει. Two principles, not three, as later in standard Middle Platonism; that is to say passive matter, or the material cause, on the one hand and on the other, as the formal-cum-efficient cause, the Ideas and the Demiurge which have been coalesced. Theophrastus clearly identified the Demiurge of the *Timaeus* with the Good of the *Republic*.⁸² This interpretation of the *Timaeus* has been merged with an Early Academic interpretation of the two principles of the so-called *Agrapha dogmata* which in the *Placita* is attributed to Xenocrates (Aët. I 7.30 = Xenocr. Fr. 15 Heinze, 213 Isnardi Parente), Aët. I 7.30:⁸³

Xenocrates ... (said) that the *Monad* and the *Dyad*⁸⁴ (are) Gods, the first, as male, having the position of a father and reigning in heaven, which (Monad) he calls Zeus and Odd and *Intellect*, which in his view is the First God; the second, as female, in the manner of the mother of the gods, which leads the portion under the heaven and in his view is the Soul of the All. [...] The above is what he took from Plato, with modifications [my italics].

One cannot exclude that what we have here is a *Xenocrates interpretatus*. But in our context this hardly matters. What does matter is that this Xenocratean Monad is said to be an Intellect, just as the Pythagorean Monad at A[b], and that the second principle to which it is said to be superior dominates the world below the heavens. What is also important in our context is that this Xenocratean Monad is said to be male and a sort of Father; in an earlier Chapter, we have seen that Hippolytus attributes the idea of a male Monad acting in the manner of a Father to Pythagoras, who would have got this from Zaratas (*Ref.* VI 23.1-2).⁸⁵

In the same chapter of Aëtius, the notion that God is an Intellect is also attributed to Plato; this Intellect or Separate Form is totally distinct

⁸² For the Demiurge as good see *Tim.* 29e, for the Idea of the Good as the highest principle *Resp.* 508e-509b.

⁸³ Ξενοκράτης ... τὴν Μονάδα καὶ τὴν Δυάδα θεούς, τὴν μὲν ὡς ἄρρενα πατὴρ ἔχουσαν τάξιν ἐν οὐρανῷ βασιλεύουσαν, ἥντινα προσαγορεύει καὶ Ζῆνα καὶ περιττὸν καὶ Νοῦν, ὅστις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρῶτος θεός· τὴν δ' ὡς θήλειαν, μητὴρ θεῶν δίκην, τῆς ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν λήξεως ἡγουμένην, ἥτις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός. [...] τὰ πρότερα παρὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος μεταπέφρακεν.

⁸⁴ Whether this is short for Indefinite Dyad, or whether Xenocrates put the ideas in the Divine Intellect are disputed questions; for the scholarly dispute see Isnardi Parente (1981) 400 ff., Baltes (1988) 43 ff., Dillon (1986).

⁸⁵ See *supra*, Ch. VIII text to n. 49, text to n. 75; *infra*, n. 127.

from matter; and the intelligible cosmos (and the Forms?) which are the exemplars of the visible cosmos are his offspring.⁸⁶

What is the origin of, or motive behind, the dualistic interpretation of Pythagoras in terms of good and evil principles at Aët. I 7.18? We have seen above that O'Brien's suggestion, viz. that 'Ανάγκη at Aët. I 26.1 fills a gap which according to Aristotle's criticisms exists in Empedocles' doctrine as to the alternations between Love and Strife, is the best explanation available.⁸⁷ An analogous suggestion may be made in the present case. At *Met.* A 4.985a4-9,⁸⁸ Aristotle explicitly argues that Empedocles' Love has to be interpreted as a good and Strife as an evil principle, and he repeats this at *Met.* A 10.1075b1 ff. At *Met.* A 7.1072b28-34, he argues that Speusippus⁸⁹ and the Pythagoreans are wrong in failing to make τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον a first principle (Aristotle's own first principle, as we know, being what is Best). This is a question he returns to at *Met.* N 4.1091a29 ff., where he is concerned with the relation of the elements and principles (terms which here seem to be equivalent) to τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλόν. He discusses a plurality of views, among which those of the half-mythical Pherecydes, and the Magoi,⁹⁰ according to whom the first generating agent is τὸ ἄριστον, and of the later philosophers Empedocles and Anaxagoras, the former positing Love as the element and the second Intellect as the principle (1091b9-13).⁹¹ But there are problems attached to this question. If one assumes that the generating, or most important, principle is good it would follow that "the other element/principle, whether this be plurality or the unequal, i.e. the great-and-small⁹², is evil in itself" (καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον στοιχείον, εἶτε πλῆθος ὃν εἶτε τὸ ἄνισον καὶ μέγα καὶ μικρόν, τὸ κακὸν αὐτό, 1091b31-32). In Aristotle's view, this is untenable. We may note that he does not now say that Empedocles' other principle is evil,⁹³ and he does not say

⁸⁶ Aët. I 7.31 (text as in Stobaeus), Πλάτων δὲ [δὲ *om.* ps.Plut.] τὸ 'Εν, τὸ μονοφυές, τὸ μοναδικόν, τὸ ὄντως ὄν, τάγαθόν· πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα [ps.Plut. ταῦτα] τῶν ὀνομάτων εἰς τὸν Νοῦν σπεύδει. Νοῦς οὖν ὁ θεός, χωριστὸν εἶδος κτλ.

⁸⁷ Cf. *supra*, n. 71 and text thereto.

⁸⁸ See *supra*, Ch. IX n. 2 and text thereto; for what follows cf. Cherniss (1935) 235, Cherniss (1944) 102 f.

⁸⁹ Fr. B42a Tarán.

⁹⁰ According to Diog. Laërt. I 8, Aristotle said in the first book of his *On Philosophy* (Arist. *De philos.* Fr. 6 Ross, 1st text) that according to the Magoi there are δύο ... ἀρχάς, ἀγαθὸν δαίμονα καὶ κακὸν δαίμονα κτλ. Part of the vast literature on this fragment is discussed by Untersteiner (1963) 81 ff. For parallels see *supra*, n. 79 and text thereto, *infra*, text to n. 111, text to n. 122, text to n. 123 and text to n. 158.

⁹¹ See Tarán (1981) 344 f.

⁹² Plurality' is Speusippus' other principle (cf. Tarán (1981) 324 f.), and 'the great-and-small' is one of Aristotle's names for the Indefinite Dyad (e.g. *Met.* A 6.987b20).

⁹³ Cf. *supra*, n. 88 and text thereto.

so about the Magoi either,⁹⁴ although both presumably are on his mind; this is because the thrust of his attack is directed against Plato and other early Academics. He excepts Speusippus whom he praises for stating that the One is not the good.⁹⁵ This is qualified praise, valid only in the dialectical discussion of the problems involved in a consistent two-principles theory, for we have noticed above that Speusippus is elsewhere criticized for *not* saying that the first principle is good.⁹⁶ However Aristotle does not now say that Plato and the other Early Academics actually affirmed the second principle to be evil (though he apparently suggests that some among them did). That the second principle is evil is a consequence which is logically entailed in the case of all those who say that the first principle is the Good. We remember that in Empedocles' case Aristotle did not say that Empedocles said in so many words that Love is the Good and Strife Evil, but argued that this is what he means, or what one may conclude from a study of his unclear wording.

In Plato's case, this becomes clear from a remark made by Aristotle at *Met.* A 6.988a14-17, that is to say at the end of his account of what he considers to be Plato's modification of Pythagoreanism. He has concluded that Plato posits two (types of) causes only, form and matter, which may be reduced to the One (the cause of the Ideas which are the formal causes of things) and the Dyad or 'the-great-and-the-small' (which pertains both to the level of the sensible things and that of the Ideas). He adds that Plato "has assigned the cause of good and that of evil to the elements [viz., to the One and the Dyad], one to each of the two, as we say some of the earlier philosophers tried to do, e.g. Empedocles and Anaxagoras" (ἔτι δὲ τὴν τοῦ εὖ καὶ τοῦ κακῶς αἰτίαν τοῖς στοιχείοις ἀπέδωκεν ἑκατέροις ἑκατέραν, ὥσπερ φαμέν καὶ τῶν προτέρων ἐπιζητήσαί τινες φιλοσόφων, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλέα καὶ Ἀναξαγόραν). The rather sloppy backward reference is to *Met.* A 4.984b30 ff., where as we have seen above this doctrine is indeed attributed to Empedocles (note the significant formula 985a3, ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρων, which is echoed in the later passage, 988a15), who is said not to have said so in so many words but to have implied it. But in the earlier chapter, this doctrine is *not* attributed to Anaxagoras, not even by implication. Presumably Aristotle thought that he had implied that Anaxagoras too could be mentioned in this connexion, for he had pointed out (1) that Anaxagoras' *Noûs* is the cause of what is good (A 3.984b15 ff. = *Vorsokr.* 59A58) and (2) that

⁹⁴ Cf. *supra*, n. 90.

⁹⁵ *Met.* N 4.1091b32-35 = Speus. Fr. 42a Tarán, continued.

⁹⁶ See *supra*, text to n. 89.

Anaxagoras belongs with those who posit two types of cause only, the material and the efficient(/formal) (A 5.987a2 ff.). From this it follows that Anaxagoras' infinitely many material elements (A 3.984a11 ff. = *Vorsokr.* 59A43), from the point of view of the theory of causes, could be seen as representing a single principle, and from what Aristotle says at A 6.988a14 ff. it follows that he considers this other principle to be, in some way or other, the cause of what is evil.

We may further note that Theophrastus (*Phys. op.* Fr. 4, *D.G.* 479.9 ff., *Vorsokr.* 59A41) according to Simplicius' verbatim quotation (*In Phys.* 27.17-22) actually said that "if we take it this way, we may assume that he [*scil.*, Anaxagoras] makes the material principles infinitely many, as has been said (by me), and the cause of motion and coming to be a single one. But if one were to assume that the mixture of all things is a single nature, indefinite both as to form and as to size, as in fact he seems to mean, it follows that he speaks of two causes, viz. the nature of the Indefinite and *Noûs*". Theophrastus seems to have made explicit a two-principles-interpretation of Anaxagoras which is only implicit in the accounts of Aristotle (a method he also applies in other cases). Furthermore, at *Met.* A 10.1075b8 ff., subsequently to the lines about Empedocles' two good and evil principles cited above, Aristotle argues that although Anaxagoras introduced *Noûs*, the efficient principle, as the good, he oddly failed to introduce the opposite of *Noûs* and the good (ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ ποιῆσαι τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ Νῷ). He adds that all those who mention opposites fail to use these as opposites, "unless one brings their views into the proper shape" (ἐὰν μὴ ῥυθμίσῃ τις). This is a clear confession. When elsewhere he argues that Anaxagoras (like Plato and Empedocles) has introduced a separate principle of evil which is opposed to the good, he has brought his views into shape and indeed presents his own inference as a report. We shall see in the next section that Plutarch actually cites Anaxagoras as a good-and-evil dualist.⁹⁷

Moreover, Anaxagoras features in Sextus' overview of dualists (starting with Homer and ending with the Stoics) at *M.* IX 4-11. Significantly enough, there is a reference to Aristotle on Hermotimus (*sic*), Parmenides, and Hesiod on Love, and Empedocles on Love and Strife as the moving cause, viz. to *Met.* A 3.984b15-31. But this does not directly derive from the *Met.* passage, for the remark about Hermotimus is a mistake, and the two quotations, viz. Hes. *Theog.* 116-20 (i.e. 116-7a + 120) and Parmen. *Vorsokr.* 28B13 are given in that order (just as at Plato *Symp.* 178b) while Aristotle has Parmenides first, and Sextus' quotations are

⁹⁷ See *infra*, text to n. 144.

more complete than Aristotle's (and though Plato also quotes the whole Parmenidean line, his excerpt from Hesiod is equally incomplete). Now at Sext. *M.* IX 6 Anaxagoras' doctrine is summarized thus (after a garbled quote of the famous opening words of his treatise followed by a statement on *Noûs*, a combination much resembling what is found e.g. at Cic. *Ac. pr.* II (*Varro*) 118 = *Vorsokr.* 59A49 and Aët. I 7.5 = *Vorsokr.* 59A48, 1st text): τὸν μὲν νοῦν, ὅς ἐστι κατ' αὐτὸν θεός, δραστήριον ὑποτιθέμενος ἀρχήν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὁμοιομερείων πολυμιγίαν ὑλικήν. Here the mixture of elements other than *Noûs* is indeed a single principle.

The commentators are not helpful this time. Alexander *In Met.* 60.13-26 gives a brief but rather straightforward paraphrase and exegesis of what Aristotle at *Met.* A 6.988a14-15 says about Plato, and correctly refers back to the earlier account of Empedocles in A 4. But he provides a very wrong interpretation of Aristotle's words, which are concerned with a duality of principles, and indeed is spinning a yarn when stating that Anaxagoras' *Noûs* is the cause of both good and evil.^{97a} Asclepius *In Met.* 52.31-53.12 first says that Plato does not mean pure evil but evil according to participation, and next simply reproduces what is found in Alexander (a phenomenon which is interesting enough in itself, as we have noticed above when discussing the check-lists of questions and solutions in the commentators).

Our conclusion can only be that Aristotle's argument that Plato made the Indefinite Dyad the principle of evil is an inference which has by no means a sounder basis than his similar inferences about Empedocles and Anaxagoras.

The motives behind the formulation of the theory of Pythagoras as expressed at Aët. I 7.18 now become clear. Empedocles was considered to be a Pythagorean, so from the point of view of ancient interpretive historiography of philosophy there is nothing amiss with attributing his ideas to Pythagoras. Empedocles according to Aristotle 'really' spoke of Good and Evil as two opposed principles. The Platonic One and Indefinite Dyad are widely attributed to Pythagoras according to the same historiographical methodology, Plato being a follower of Pythagoras; as a matter of fact, Aristotle in *Met.* A 6 had already argued that the Platonic theory of the principles is a revision of that of the Pythagoreans, and had said that Plato, Empedocles and Anaxagoras make their principles

^{97a} Pier Luigi Donini (*per litt.*) protests, and argues that *In Met.* 60.26 κακῶς may be a corruption for καλῶς (cf. 32.16.19 and esp. 33.13) He points out that Alex. *ibid.* 32.11-33.5 provides a correct interpretation of Anaxagoras and that Aristotle at *Met.* A 3.984b21 includes him among those who spoke of the causes of τοῦ καλῶς. He argues that Alexander wants to distinguish Anaxagoras, who posited a single efficient cause, viz. that of the good (and so did not introduce a cause of evil), from Empedocles who cut up the efficient cause in two opposed factors.

the cause of good and evil respectively. Similar remarks are scattered throughout the later books of the *Metaphysics*. Accordingly, Pythagoras was assumed to have posited two such principles as well. The One as Intellect attributed in the *Placita* both to Xenocrates, Plato's pupil, and to Plato himself may therefore be attributed to Pythagoras too. Aristotle had criticized the Pythagoreans for not making the Good their first principle; this gap has now been filled. Aristotle had argued that those who make the Good their first principle should from a logical point of view make their second principle Evil; this gap has now been filled as well. Justification, if desired, was available in that ἀγαθὸν–κακὸν occur in the famous Pythagorean *systoichia* at *Met.* A 5.986a22 ff., though not on top of the list but in the penultimate position. But ἀγαθὸν in the *systoichia* occurs in same the column as πέρας περιπτόν ἓν, and κακὸν in the same column as ἄπειρον ἄρτιον πλῆθος, and a dualistic interpretation of the *systoichia*, according to which the terms in each separate column belong together, is entirely feasible and did in fact take place.⁹⁸ The Pythagorean opposition between "Ev and Πλῆθος in this table corresponds to that between the first and second principle as formulated by Speusippus.⁹⁹ Finally, one may note that the exception Aristotle made in Speusippus' case¹⁰⁰ is quite faithfully echoed in the *Placita*, viz. at Aët. I 7.20.¹⁰¹ This strengthens the case for a form of Aristotelian influence on the other lemmata discussed above; one may think, among other things, of a creative reinterpretation of the accounts of Aristotle's predecessors in *Met.* A and the later books of the *Metaphysics*.

The *interpretatio platonica et aristotelica* of Empedocles at Aët. I 7.28 belongs in the same interpretive context;¹⁰² Platonizing and Aristotelianizing notions could be attributed to a follower of the Pythagoras who also counted Plato among his followers, and Aristotle after all was a pupil of Plato. There is a difference, however, in that at Aët. I 7.28 the One is not identified with Love, which is represented as one of the forms the One may possess. We have seen above that this is most

⁹⁸ For this interpretation in Eudorus and Plutarch see *infra*, Ch. X 4, and X 5, text to n. 141. Aristotle himself already speaks in similar terms in another work, see *Eth. Nic.* B 5.1106b29-30 (*Vorsokr.* 58B7), τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἵκαζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου.

⁹⁹ Burkert (1972) 51 f. suggests Speusippian influence on its redaction for this reason and because good—evil occur in the ninth position.

¹⁰⁰ See *supra*, n. 95 and text thereto.

¹⁰¹ = Speus. Fr. 58 Tarán, Σπύσιππος τὸν Νοῦν οὔτε τῷ Ἐνὶ οὔτε τῷ Ἀγαθῷ τὸν αὐτόν, ἰδιοφυῇ δέ.

¹⁰² Zeller (1920) 969 n. 2 in his account of the later interpretations of Empedocles' Necessity at *Vorsokr.* 31B115.1 in Cicero, the *Placita* and the late commentators, already points out: "auch Aristoteles in der eben ausgeführten Stelle Phys. VIII, 1 könnte Veranlassung dazu [viz., to this later interpretation] gegeben haben".

probably a consequence of the desire to meet another helpful criticism of Aristotle. At Aët. I 7.28, therefore, the fact that two different gaps are filled at the same time results in a doctrine which looks a bit bizarre but has the advantage of being consistent with a presentation of Empedocles' doctrine as being about a cosmic cycle (which the doctrines of Pythagoras Plato Xenocrates as depicted above are not).

X 4 *Eudorus?*

Summing up the argument of the previous two sections (X 2-3), we may point out that the interpretation, or reception, of Empedocles in the late commentators and the *Placita* is significant from several points of view.

First, the interpretation is systematic in that important doctrines, or notions, from the *Katharmoi* are integrated in the account that is given of the main theory found in the *On Nature*. Two ingredients which in *Vorsokr.* 31B115 belong together, viz. Necessity and the oaths on the one hand and the fall or descent of the *daimon*/soul on the other, drift apart and embark on a life of their own. In the late commentators, they are used as alternative, or complementary, ways of accounting for an exegesis which interprets the cosmic cycle in terms of a Platonist, or Neoplatonist, two-worlds theory. Necessity and its equivalents ('time' and the 'oath') acquire the status of a transcendental monadic principle beyond Love and Strife—an adumbration of which is already found at Aët. I 26.1, whereas at Aët. I 7.28, which also provides a law-like account, the point of view is an immanentist one. In this manner, a law-like metaphysics and physics are construed for Empedocles by the late Neoplatonists, and the various stages in the cosmic cycle are interpreted as pertaining to the co-eternal intelligible and sensible cosmoi, Love being mainly responsible for the intelligible and Strife for the sensible world.

In those cases where the lines about the 'exile' from the One are cited, they may be interpreted in various ways. The cosmic cycle as described by Empedocles is seen as in reality pertaining to the descent and ascent of the soul in the context of this dualist metaphysical system, and the final lines of B115 are then quoted in support of this interpretation. But the cosmic cycle as described by Empedocles may also be interpreted as in reality pertaining to two contrasting cognitive psychic movements, the one pertaining to the intelligible and the other to the sensible world, and the final lines of B115 are then quoted in support of this interpretation. Several times, the idea that Strife (the force in which the exile put his trust) is an evil principle is explicitly rejected.

Second, in the late commentators Love and Strife are often found to be on a par with the Pythagorean/Platonic pair of principles, viz. the One and the Indefinite Dyad, which themselves are placed under an even higher and ineffable principle.

Third, in the *Placita* this pair of principles (for which see also Aët. I 3.8) as ascribed to Pythagoras at Aët. I 7.18 is interpreted as Good, or God, versus Evil, or *Daimon* (lower divinity).

In its main metaphysical outline, this system exhibits an undeniable resemblance to the doctrine which Eudorus attributes to the Pythagoreans.¹⁰³ Taking his cue from Aristotle's treatment of the various forms of Early Pythagoreanism in *Met.* A 5, or so I believe,¹⁰⁴ Eudorus argued that the Pythagoreans present their doctrine in two compatible forms, viz. a monistic and a dualistic one, or according to a 'highest' and a 'second-best' account (ἀνωτάτω λόγον—δεύτερον λόγον). According to the former, the One is the cause of all things including matter, according to the latter there are two principles, viz. the One and its counterpart. A little bit later on, he tells us that these two principles, or elements as he calls them now, are the One and the Indefinite Dyad [originally, of course, these are the two principles of Plato's *Agrapha dogmata*], and that there is a difference between the first One, or principle (ἀρχή), and the other One, also called Monad by the Pythagoreans, which is the opposite of but on the same level as the Dyad. He further tells us that the Pythagoreans made the contraries in such a way dependent on the two principles (or elements) as to have what is *good* belong with the first and what is *evil* with the second (*ap. Simpl. In Phys.* 181.13-15, ὑποτάσσεσθαι δὲ πάντων τῶν κατ' ἐναντίωσιν ἐπινοουμένων τὸ μὲν ἀστεῖον τῷ ἐνί, τὸ δὲ φαῦλον τῇ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐναντιουμένῃ φύσει). He then produces a list of good and evil things which for the most part derives from the *systoichia* in Aristotle, telling us that these are the various appellations by which each principle is called, viz. "orderly,¹⁰⁵ limited, knowable, male, odd,

¹⁰³ Eudor. Frs. 4-5 *ap. Simpl. In Phys.* 181.10-30 (for the most part verbatim).

¹⁰⁴ See Mansfeld (1988a) 96 ff., 101 ff. (Neopythagorean antecedents of Eudorus' two Platonic principles, but see *infra*, n. 110), 103 ff. (for the Aristotelian *systoichia* and Eudorus), also for references to the secondary literature. Dillon (1977) 126 ff. argues that Eudorus combines elements "which were readily available to him from Plato", but this cannot be the whole truth. The One and Indefinite Dyad, moreover, are not found in the dialogues. I wish to repeat here what I have said elsewhere, viz. that the doctrine involved need not necessarily be attributed to Eudorus himself and that the current custom of considering him a Pythagorean is unfounded. "Rapporter une opinion est une chose, et l'approuver en est une autre", as Flacelière (1987) cxiii said on another occasion.

¹⁰⁵ The Platonic items orderly—disorderly (cf. *Tim.* 30a, Aët. I 7.6) and knowable—unknowable are not in Aristotle's *systoichia*, which presumably is not Eudorus' only source. We have noticed above that in Eudorus' account the transcendental One is also the cause of matter; if it is the cause of all things including matter, it

right, light" on the one hand and "disorderly, unlimited, unknowable, female, left, even, darkness" on the other.

In this systematic Platonizing interpretation of the Pythagorean table of opposites, the terms on each side have become synonyms in that they are alternative designations for unique referents. What is even more important is that the pair good–evil has developed into a common denomination for these pairings of opposites as such. The dualism is now so to speak dominated by the opposition good–evil, and although Eudorus does not say so explicitly, it is by no means unfair to say that in the Pythagorean system as construed by him the (second) One is a good and the Indefinite Dyad an evil principle. Apart from the passage at the end of Arist. *Met.* A 6 cited in the previous paragraph, I know of no pre-Eudoran account of the two Platonic principles which unambiguously ascribes these attributes to them; Aristotle, as we have noticed, did so only in the context of a critical discussion which also involves Empedocles, Anaxagoras and (in subsequent passages in the *Metaphysics*) a number of others.¹⁰⁶ The most plausible hypothesis is that Eudorus, who must have firmly believed that Plato's system derives from Pythagoras', interpreted Aristotle's remarks in *Met.* A 5-6 in a creative way.


Still, in the last resort (or according to the 'highest account') the two opposed principles, or elements, are superseded by the (first) One as a single ἀρχή, viz. as the principle which is the cause of all things, for either of them in itself is, so to speak, only the principle or cause of half of things (*In Phys.* 181.11, 15-7). Eudorus also incorporated other interpretations of Pythagoreanism in his synthesis. Furthermore, because ultimately they are produced by the first One, the two elements/principles *together* may be said to be one (*In Phys.* 181.28, ἀρχαὶ ἅμω ἐν ὄντι παλιν). Finally, the first One is said to be the 'highest God' (*In Phys.* 181.19, τὸν ὑπεράνω θεόν).¹⁰⁷ Where you have a highest God you also have lower gods;¹⁰⁸ the Monad and Indefinite Dyad, I presume. We may visualize this system in the following way, keeping in mind that, depending on one's point of view, the supreme Deity not only surpasses but also comprises polarity:

must also be the cause of the Forms (cf. Eudor. Fr. 2 *ap.* Alex. *In Met.* 58.25 ff.). The pair Form (good)—matter (evil) may therefore be added to the list, as may be others.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. *supra*, Ch. X 3.

¹⁰⁷ At Mansfeld (1988a) 95, 97, 99 and *passim* I have argued that Eudorus' creative interpretation of Aristotle's criticism of Xenophanes at *Met.* A 5.986b19 ff. contributed to his placing of the One (Ἔν) as a *God* beyond polarity.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Mansfeld (1988a) 101, 106 n. 59.



If we compare this scheme with the lemmata on Empedocles and Pythagoras in the *Placita*, a striking structural resemblance becomes visible. Let us take Pythagoras first. At Aët. I 3.8,¹⁰⁹ we find a shorter form of what Eudorus calls the 'second-best' or dualistic account of the principles according to the Pythagoreans, viz. the Monad (!) and the Indefinite Dyad,¹¹⁰ the former pertaining to τὸ εἰδικόν (*scil.*, αἴτιον, here further identified as the efficient cause and God the Intellect), the latter to τὸ ὕλικόν (*scil.*, αἴτιον, here further identified as the visible cosmos). These two principles appear also in the lemma on Pythagoras at Aët. I 7.18,¹¹¹ where as we have seen the Monad (!), or God and the *good*, is said to be equivalent to the One, and the Indefinite Dyad is said to be a *Daimon* and *evil*. The main differences between the contents of these two lemmata are that in the first the pair good–evil and in the second the identification of the second principle as *Daimon* are absent (the Monad being identified with the good both times), but this may be explained on account of the theme of Aët. I 7 and this doxographer's desire to confine the information contained in a individual lemma to the barest minimum; there is no contradiction. In Eudorus' account of Pythagorean dualism, the idea the Monad is good and the Indefinite Dyad evil is intimated in a way that is sufficiently clear.

If next we look again at the two accounts of Empedocles in the *Placita* discussed in the previous section (Ch. X 3), viz. those at Aët. I 7.28 (the second part of the lemma)¹¹² and I 26.1,¹¹³ we may observe that these exhibit a resemblance to Eudorus' representation of Pythagoreanism. If for the sake of the argument we assume—just as some among the late commentators of Aristotle did—that we may put (Empedocles') Love

¹⁰⁹ Cf. *supra*, n. 81 and text thereto.

¹¹⁰ See Mansfeld (1988a) 101 ff. for possible Neopythagorean antecedents of Eudorus' two Platonic principles (esp. Alex. Polyh. *ap.* Diog. Laërt. VIII 25 for the 'highest account'), among which however I would now hesitate to count the (doxographic predecessors of the) passages in Aëtius.

¹¹¹ Cf. *supra*, n. 79 and text thereto.

¹¹² Cf. *supra*, n. 67 and text thereto.

¹¹³ Cf. *supra*, n. 62 and text thereto.

and Strife on a par with the (Pythagorean) One and Indefinite Dyad, we may observe that the account at Aët. I 26.1 resembles the 'highest' Eudoran version of Pythagoreanism, in that it suggests a Monad (though not a One) which is beyond the pair of principles. On the other hand, the account at Aët. I 7.28 resembles the 'second-best' Eudoran version of Pythagoreanism, because here the Monad is not beyond the two principles which, as we have seen, are said to be its 'forms'; or rather, what it really resembles is the view put forward in Eudorus' concluding remarks, viz. the syncretist idea that the two principles *together* are one.

I do not argue that the interpretation of Empedocles discussed in the previous section (Ch. X 3) actually derives from Eudorus, for there is no evidence that Eudorus actually bothered about the philosopher from Akragas. However, I am prepared to suggest that Eudorus' interpretation of Pythagoreanism¹¹⁴ may have provided the grid for an interpretation *more Eudoreo* of Empedocles (as a to some extent idiosyncratic follower of Pythagoras). That Eudorus' interpretation of Pythagoreanism is involved in the way Pythagoras' doctrines are represented at Aët. I 3.8 and especially I 7.18 seems plausible. If this is correct, the implications for the history of at least some sections of the *Placita* are fascinating; but this is a subject I cannot pursue here. Caution is of course mandatory, for there is no proof Eudorus is the man behind all this. However, the modest conclusion that Eudorus' interpretation of Pythagoreanism and the passages on Pythagoras and Empedocles in Aëtius which have been discussed above are members of a *family* of interpretive traditions pertaining to doctrines of Plato and other Early Academics, as well as to reports and discussions by Aristotle and others about Plato, other Early Academics and certain Presocratics, is in my view entirely justifiable.

X 5 *Plutarch's Reportage; Numenius*

X 5.1 Plutarch's Cosmic Dualism

In his *De Iside et Osiride*,¹¹⁵ chs. 45-48, Plutarch gives a long and

¹¹⁴ And of Xenophanes, see *supra*, n. 107.

¹¹⁵ The *De Isid.*, not a dialogue but a treatise in which Plutarch speaks *in propria persona*, is generally considered to be one of the late works. A hurried account of the passage I discuss here is found at Brenk (1987) 296 ff., useful for references to the secondary literature. See also Griffiths (1970) 469 ff., disappointing, and Hani (1971) t. I, 339 ff. Dillon (1977) 203 affirms that "Plutarch, as in all probability Ammonius before him, seems to have been stimulated in his interpretation of Plato ... by a study of Persian religion", cf. Dillon (1986) 216, and a similar suggestion is formulated by Donini (1990) 47 f. Burkert (1975) 140 ff. persuasively argues that Plutarch's dualism has its roots in pre-Ammonian Alexandrian Middle Plato-

extensive overview of dualistic doctrines concerned with the cosmos. He begins by stating and rejecting two contrasting views, viz. that of Democritus-and-Epicurus and that of the Stoics, and by arguing for a *compromise*—the appropriate and standard dialectical way of getting a discussion of a philosophical *problema* or *zetema* going.¹¹⁶

This utterly important fact has not been noticed, so that Plutarch's aims and method have been misunderstood. The Atomists place the principles of the all (τὰς τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὰς) in inanimate bodies, whereas the Stoics posit a single Reason and Providence which 'prevails over all things'¹¹⁷ as the Demiurge of qualityless matter (369A).¹¹⁸

nism. I may add that one should recall the interpretation of Pythagoras in the *Placita* passage (*supra*, n. 79 and text thereto) and that of the Pythagorean *systoichia* by Eudorus (*supra*, text to n. 104 and n. 105). The early Alexandrian *interpretatio* of Pythagoreanism as attested in Eudorus, paralleled in Aëtius and anticipated in Aristotle—who interpreted Empedocles and Anaxagoras in a similar manner, see *supra*, Ch. X 3—in my view paved the way for the philosophical reception of the religious ideas of the Persians and Babylonians. On Plutarch's dualism see Dillon (1977) 202 ff. and Donini (1982) 118 ff., who is good on Plutarch's Protean presentations. *De tranq. an.* 15-16, 474BC (on which see Dillon (1977) 216 f. and *infra*, n. 121) is by no means exceptional. Yet Brenk (1977) 85 ff. and *passim*, Brenk (1987) 275 ff. and *passim*, and Froidefond (1988) 93 ff., 110 ff. try to play down Plutarch's dualism.

¹¹⁶ See Mansfeld (1990a) 3063 f., 3108 ff., 3117 ff., 3122 ff., 3137 ff., 3143 ff.; (1991a) *passim*. For another instance of the use of a doxographic diaeresis in Plutarch see *infra*, n. 172 and text thereto. Froidefond (1988) 29 calls the *De Isid.* a dialectical work and analyses what he believes to be its dialectical structure, but has what he calls the collecting and ascending dialectic of a Platonic dialogue in mind. *Ibid.* 120 he argues that "si Plutarque avait voulu s'en tenir à des positions dualistes, l'exposé doctrinal devait s'achever avec la doctrine iranienne", not accounting for the fact that although Plutarch argues for a *mitigated* dualism, he still argues in favour of *dualism*.

¹¹⁷ Heraclitean echo rightly surmized by Marcovich, Heracl. Fr. 23 (c) M. As a presentation of the Stoic position, this is not quite fair; Plutarch would perhaps have done better to adduce a different parallel and to refer to *Orph.* Fr. 21a Kern and its interpretation at ps.Arist. *De mund.* 7 (see *infra*, n. 158). But nicer distinctions are irrelevant in the context of a *diaphonia more doxographico*.

¹¹⁸ This *diaphonia* is *ad sententiam* the same as that at Aët. II 3, εἰ ἔμψυχος ὁ κόσμος καὶ προνοία διοικούμενος. Here the view of all the others that the world is ensouled and governed by Providence is opposed to that of Leucippus (omitted by ps.Plutarch, who however has "and all those who introduce the atoms" after his last name-label), Democritus, and Epicurus, who assume it is governed in an unrational way. Two compromise views are added (the first lacking in ps.Plutarch) which are different from that advocated in the *De Isid.* Parallels for the *diaphonia* at Aët. II 3.1-2 are at Cic. *Ac. pr.* II (*Luc.*) 120-1 (who opposes Strato of Lampsacus to the Stoics), and at Aenesidemus (no name-labels) *ap. Philo Ebr.* 199, Diog. Laërt. IX 84 and Sext. *P.* I 151 (for Cicero and Aenesidemus see Mansfeld (1989b) 134 f.), as well as at Quintil. VII 2.2 (no name-labels either). See also the argument against the Atomists and in favour of the Stoic position in the first pages of Sen. *De providentia*. For the Stoics' failure to explain the origin of evil cf. Plut. *De an. procr.* 6, 1015B, where he argues that Plato did not make this mistake because he acknowledged τὴν μεταξὺ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τρίτην ἀρχὴν καὶ δύναμιν. For Numenius' argument against the Stoics in a parallel context see *infra*, Ch. X 5.3. For the Stoic attack on

Both are wrong. If God is the cause of all things (the Stoics) there is no room for anything evil (φλαῦρον),¹¹⁹ and if there is no God (the Atomists) there cannot be anything good (χρηστόν). Plutarch then quotes Heraclitus and Euripides,¹²⁰ the former saying “there is a disturbed harmony [or: harmonious disturbance] of the cosmos, as of bow and lyre” and the latter that the good and the bad cannot be kept apart, but that there is some commingling, as there should be. The compromise, then, is that both good and evil should be put among the principles of the all and that in reality they are in one way or another always together—or even blended in various ways. It is most interesting that for this view Plutarch adduces Heraclitus, even if this is hardly unexpected in view of the latter’s well-known doctrine of the opposites that belong together also in the sense that you cannot have any of them without its counterpart. The Euripides fragment is quoted, apparently, to rub in the point that it is impossible to agree with either side of the *diaphonia*.

A rather long development follows, in which Plutarch argues that the compromise view pertaining to a duality of principles in one form or other is indeed the *opinio communis* of mankind as a whole, barbarians as well as Greeks; of theologians, lawgivers, and poets as well as philosophers. In Nature, there must be “two opposed principles and two wrestling forces” (369C, δυοῖν ἐναντίων ἀρχῶν καὶ δυοῖν ἀντιπάλων δυνάμεων). Human life is a mixture of good and evil, and this also holds for the cosmos—if not for the cosmos as a whole, then at any rate for the part below the moon (369CD). In fact, the good cannot be the cause of evil, so “Nature must have in itself a separate origin and source not only of good but also of evil” (369D, δεῖ γένεσιν ἰδίαν καὶ ἀρχὴν ὥσπερ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν).¹²¹

the Epicureans (a symptom of *diaphonia*) see e.g. *De comm. not.* 32, 1075E (= *SVF* II 1126, *Epic.* Fr. 368 Us.). At *De comm. not.* 34, 1076CD (= *SVF* II 1168) Plutarch argues that the Stoics τῶν κακῶν ἀρχὴν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα τὸν θεὸν ποιοῦσιν; cf. also *De Stoic. rep.* 34, 1050BD (= *SVF* II 937).

¹¹⁹ But note that at *De comm. not.* ch. 34, 1076C (*SVF* II 1168) Plutarch argues that the Stoics’ view of God as the active and of matter as the wholly indeterminate principle entails that they τῶν κακῶν ἀρχὴν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα τὸν θεὸν ποιοῦσιν. Clearly, much depends on what Plutarch wants to achieve in a given context; the tradition he wants or needs to follow in a particular case is also important.

¹²⁰ Heracl. Fr. 27 (ε²) M. (see also *infra*, n. 121, n. 153 and text thereto, for other quotations of this text in similar Plutarchan centos); Eur. Fr. 21 ²Nauck (see also *infra*, n. 121, for another quotation of this text together with that of Heraclitus in a similar Plutarchan cento). The full text of *Vorsokr.* 22B51, of which Plutarch only quotes the second half (interpolating κόσμου as suits his context) has only been preserved at Hipp. *Ref.* IX 9.5, see *supra*, Ch. IX n. 84 and text thereto. In the *De Isid.* passage, Plutarch returns to Heraclitus at the beginning of his account of the philosophers, citing three more fragments; see *infra*, text to n. 134, text to n. 135.

¹²¹ Ch. 46, 369BD (διὸ καὶ—φύσιν ἔχειν) is translated by Dillon (1977) 203, who comments; “This has merited extended quotation as being a definitive statement of

Some say that there are two rival Gods (ἀντιτέχνους), one being the Demiurge of what is good, the other of evil; others call the better one a God and the other a *Daimon* (369DE). We have noticed above that the latter view is attributed to Pythagoras in the *Placita*, viz. at Aët. I 7.18.¹²² Plutarch, who begins his overview with the ancient barbarians, attributes this doctrine to 'Zoroaster the Magos',¹²³ and mentions the names Oromazes, corresponding to light, and Areimanios, corresponding to darkness and ignorance.¹²⁴ In an earlier chapter, we have noticed that Hipp. Ref. I 2.12-13¹²⁵ says (perhaps on the authority of Diodorus (?) of Eretria and Aristoxenus of Taranto,¹²⁶ more probably on that of an intermediary source giving posh references) that Pythagoras learned from 'Zaratas the Chaldaean' about two causes of the things that are, a Father and a Mother.¹²⁷ The former corresponds to light, the latter to darkness; furthermore, there are according to Zaratas "two Divinities, a celestial and a chthonic one" (δύο δαίμονας εἶναι, τὸν μὲν οὐράνιον, τὸν δὲ χθόνιον); however, despite the associations the terms celestial and chthonic may evoke, Hippolytus does not say that one of these is good and the other evil.

Plutarch adds that midway between the God and the *Daimon* is Mithras; for this reason, the Persians call the 'mediator' by the name of Mithras.¹²⁸ Without any doubt, Plutarch here provides an *interpretatio platonica* of Persian religion, for in Middle Platonism, as indeed in

Plutarch's dualism". For human life as a mixture of good and evil see also Plut. *De tranq. an.* 15, 473F-474A, where the same part of *Vorsokr.* 22B51 and Eurip. Fr. 21²Nauck are also quoted. That God is exempt from evil is of course standard Platonic doctrine, e.g. *Resp.* II 379a ff.

¹²² Cf. *supra*, n. 79, n. 90, text to n. 111; also *infra*, n. 123 and text thereto.

¹²³ Aristotle seems to have attributed to the Magoi in general the idea that there are δύο ... ἀρχάς, ἀγαθὸν δαίμονα καὶ κακὸν δαίμονα (cf. *supra*, n. 90); note that the report of Diogenes Laërtius uses the word *daimon* both times. For two Gods, or rather one God and one *Daimon*, see also the passage from the *De E* quoted *infra*, text to n. 158.

¹²⁴ Light-darkness and unknowable (to which Plutarch's 'ignorance' corresponds), as we have noticed, are on the Pythagorean table of opposites as revised by Eudorus; see *supra*, n. 105 and text thereto. The proposal to write ὀφθαλμῶν instead of ἀγνοίας is counter-suggestive.

¹²⁵ Cf. also *Ref.* VI 23.2.

¹²⁶ Cf. Aristox. Fr. 13.

¹²⁷ See *supra*, Ch. VIII n. 75 and text thereto. For male and female on the Pythagorean table of opposites (also according to Eudorus) see *supra*, text after n. 105. Hipp. Ref. I 2.12-13 is 'Baustein' 67.1 in Dörrie (1990) 178, who however only provides a quotation of its first part; commentary *ibid.* 458 f.

¹²⁸ 369E, μέσον δ' ἀμφοῖν τὸν Μίθρην εἶναι· διὸ καὶ Μίθρην Πέρσαι τὸν μεσίτην ὀνομάζουσιν. The translation in the Loeb Plutarch, "for this reason the Persians give to Mithras the name of "Mediator"" is wrong (and so are those of Griffiths (1970) 46, Turcan (1975) 14, Dillon (1977) 80, and Froidefond (1988) in the Budé Plutarch), for μεσίτης, 'umpire', is a very common Greek word and the Persian name is *Mithras*; the position of τὸν before μεσίτην not Μίθρην clinches the matter.

Plutarch himself, mediating entities play an important role.¹²⁹ In fact Plutarch here provides an important parallel for the role of the μεσότης in the system of Marcion according to Hippolytus, and so helps to explain Hippolytus' reference to a precedent of this idea in Empedocles.¹³⁰

I skip the rest of the detailed account of Persion religion, and continue with Plutarch's brief note on the Chaldaeans (ch. 48, 370C). These held that of the (seven) planets, or Gods, δύο μὲν ἀγαθοεργούς, δύο δὲ κακοποιούς, μέσους δὲ τοὺς τρεῖς ... καὶ κοινούς. Plutarch's brevity is best explained on the assumption that he considers this doctrine to be a variety of that of the Persians, as indeed according to his presentation it is, the main difference being the pluralities of good, evil and middle powers involved.

He then turns to Greece where he finds dualism everywhere as well, and begins with a brief note on religion (370CD). Everyone knows, he affirms, that according to Greek mythology the good share belongs to Olympian Zeus and the abominable to Hades,¹³¹ or that Ἀρμονία¹³² springs from Aphrodite (Love) and Ares (War), the latter being harsh and eager for strife (φιλόνηκος),¹³³ the former mild and generative.

Vom Mythos zum Logos. Plutarch now turns to the Greek philosophers, who he says agree with those discussed up to now. He begins with Heraclitus, of whom no less than three fragments are partly quoted and partly paraphrased, viz. 29 (b),¹³⁴ 28 (c³) and 52 (a²)¹³⁵ M. We have seen above that, at the beginning of the account of dualism, Heraclitus is also quoted (369B),¹³⁶ and so to speak sets the tone for what is to follow. This means we have to consider the present trio of references in the light of Plutarch's interpretation of the earlier quotation. We may feel that the exegesis, suggested rather than explicitly given by Plutarch, is idiosyncratic, but it fits his argument. That 'war' is called by Heraclitus "the

¹²⁹ See e.g. Turcan (1975) 14 ff., Zintzen (1976) 643 ff., Donini (1990), and *supra*, Ch. IX n. 55.

¹³⁰ See *supra*, Ch. IX 1.4; *infra*, n. 162 and text thereto.

¹³¹ Cf. *infra*, n. 160 and text thereto.

¹³² This takes up a point made by means of the Heraclitus fragment as quoted at 369B, see *supra*, n. 120 and text thereto; cf. also *infra*, n. 139 and text thereto.

¹³³ This may anticipate the account of Empedocles' position, see *infra*, n. 138 and text thereto, but may also (and simultaneously) be a reminiscence of Heracl. B51, quoted 369B. Cf. ps.Plut. *De Hom.* 2 c. 101, where Aphrodite and Ares are allegorized as Empedocles' Love and Strife.

¹³⁴ Cf. *Vorsokr.* 22B53, complete only *ap. Hipp. Ref.* IX 9.4; see *supra*, Ch. IX text to n. 88.

¹³⁵ Quoted in a more complete form by Plutarch himself, *De exil.* 604A (*Vorsokr.* 22B94). For the interpolation of part of it in a Pythagorean *akousma* quoted by Hippolytus see *supra*, Ch. VIII n. 121 and text thereto.

¹³⁶ See *supra*, n. 120 and text thereto.

father and king and lord¹³⁷ of all” to Plutarch apparently means that the war among the opposites is a fundamental feature of the cosmos. Heraclitus criticized Homer for wanting to eliminate ἔρις, for in this way Homer unwittingly put a curse on the coming to be of all things, as these owe their birth to battle and antagonism (this is a stronger dualistic interpretation than that of Arist. *Eth. Eud.* H 1.1235a25 ff. = Heraclitus Fr. 28 (c²) M.).^{137a} According to Plutarch, we may infer, Heraclitus created the theoretical frame-work for a dualistic conception of things. Finally, the sun (which to Plutarch undoubtedly symbolizes the good power) is not to overstep his measures, otherwise the Erinnyes (grim powers, I assume), the helpmates of Dike, will find him out.

The next philosopher to be mentioned is Empedocles. Plutarch does not cite full lines (although in one case he comes close) but provides strings of names and epithets for each of his two principles, good and evil (370E):¹³⁸

Empedocles calls the beneficent principle ‘Philotes’ and Love, and often he calls it ‘Harmony’¹³⁹ sedate of countenance; the worse principle he calls ‘accursed Strife’ and ‘blood-stained Struggle’.

Hershbell is a bit cross with Plutarch for bringing together bits and pieces from both poems, and points out that the opposed forces in the *Katharmoi* fragment are “but two of several pairs”, and that “it seems

¹³⁷ καὶ κύριον interpolated by Plutarch. For an echo of this text elsewhere in Plutarch see *infra*, text to n. 164.

^{137a} *Il.* Σ 107. The line is quoted by ps.Plut. *De Hom.* 2, c. 134.2 as Homer’s proto-Stoic view on anger!

¹³⁸ ‘Εμπεδοκλῆς δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀγαθοῦργον ἀρχὴν Φιλότητα καὶ Φιλίαν, πολλάκις δ’ Ἀρμονίαν καλεῖ θεμερώπιν, τὴν δὲ χείρονα Νεῖκος οὐλόμενον καὶ Δῆριν αἱματώεσσαν. Diels - Kranz print ‘Εμπεδοκλῆς ... θεμερώπιν *ad Vorsokr.* 31B18, unfortunately leaving out the last clause, and accept Φιλίη as a fragment of one word (viz., B18), but the pair Φιλία—Νεῖκος is standard in the doxographic accounts of Empedocles (cf. e.g. the very brief note at Diog. Laërt. VIII 76, who then quotes as proof-texts B6.2-3 and B17.6-8, and ps.Plut. *De hom.* 2, cc. 99 and 101, who takes up Φιλότης with Φιλία) which in my view is why Plutarch adds Φιλία to the Φιλότης found at B17.7 and 20, whereas Νεῖκος οὐλόμενον is at B17.19. Cf. also *infra*, n. 212 and text thereto. The easiest assumption is that the first pair of opposed names and epithets in Plutarch derive from B17.19-20, two lines that follow one another in one and the same fragment of the *On Nature*. We must note that B17.20-1 are quoted by Plutarch at *Amat.* 13, 756D [here Φιλότης is interpreted as Eros; *ibid.* 756EF Plutarch quotes Parmenides, *Vorsokr.* 28B13, and refers to Hesiod’s doctrine of Eros (cf. also *De fac.* 12, 926F-927A). Hershbell (1971) 170 argues that this is a misrepresentation, but the combination Parmenides-Hesiod-Empedocles on *eros* or *epithymia* or *philia* ultimately derives from Arist. *Met.* A 4.984b23 ff., cf. Mansfeld (1985c) 7 ff., (1986a) 13 ff.]. An analogous situation obtains for his source of the other pair, which derive from one and the same line of the *Katharmoi*, B122.2 Δῆρις θ’ αἱματώεσσα καὶ Ἀρμονίη θεμερώπις (the only author to quote the whole fragment is Plutarch himself, *De tranq. an.* 15, 474BC). His ‘often’ is a nice exaggeration.

¹³⁹ Cf. *supra*, n. 132 and text thereto.

hardly likely" that "these are the same cosmic forces as Love and Strife in the physical poem".¹⁴⁰ But this is not the issue. The point is that Plutarch, on the look-out for striking epithets, has to fall back on the *Katharmoi* and in the process cannot avoid underpinning what is in the one poem with what is in the other. *Empedoclem ex Empedocle* again, just as in the late commentators on Aristotle, and in Hippolytus. To Plutarch in this context, the various pairs of opposed forces in *Vorsokr.* 31B122 apparently are manifestations of the two antagonistic forces in nature. As an interpretation of Empedocles this is not implausible, but this is by the way.

The next philosophers to be mentioned are the Πυθαγορικοί (370E). A systematic interpretation of the table of opposites is provided which is strikingly similar to that of Eudorus.¹⁴¹ Plutarch too speaks of a plurality of designations (διὰ πλειόνων ὀνομάτων) with one referent for each set; this time, good and evil have even advanced to the rank of the principles to which the various equivalent names are given. The good is called τὸ ἐν τὸ πεπερασμένον τὸ μένον τὸ εὐθὺ τὸ περιττὸν τὸ τετραγών(ον τὸ ἴσον τὸ δεξιὸν τὸ λαμπρόν. The bad is called τὴν δυάδα τὸ ἄπειρον τὸ φερόμενον τὸ καμπύλον τὸ ἄρτιον τὸ ἐτερόμηκες τὸ ἄνισον τὸ ἄριστερόν. If both δυάς and ἄπειρον are designations of the bad, the bad is equivalent to an Indefinite Dyad.¹⁴² By implication, Love and Strife, Empedocles' names for the good and the bad, are in Plutarch on a par with the One and the (Indefinite) Dyad, Pythagorean names for the good and the bad; several centuries later, this equivalence is stated in as many words by Syrianus and Asclepius.¹⁴³

Next, Plutarch finds the antagonistic forces in Anaxagoras and Aristotle as well, the former opposing Intellect to the Indefinite, the latter Form to Privation (370E). This is a rather idiosyncratic interpretation which it would be interesting to comment on in detail, a temptation I must resist, although I may refer to the previous section for Aristotelian precedent to Plutarch's interpretation of Anaxagoras, and to a more or less contemporary parallel in Sextus.¹⁴⁴ What Plutarch has to tell us

¹⁴⁰ Hershbell (1971) 167 f. *Ibid.* 182 he correctly points out that in this passage Love and Strife are made to support Plutarch's own 'theological dualism'. For the other instance in Plutarch where the one poem is interpreted by means of the other see *infra*, n. 173 and text thereto.

¹⁴¹ Cf. *supra*, text to n. 105. Plutarch's list is more complete than Eudorus'; the only items in Plutarch not paralleled in Aristotle's *systoichia* are the Platonizing terms (ἴσον-) ἄνισον and δυάς. We must note that the first list of appellations begins with the One and the second with the Dyad.

¹⁴² For the One and the Indefinite Dyad as primary 'numbers' at *De def.* 35, 428F see Dillon (1977) 199.

¹⁴³ For Syrianus see *supra*, Ch. X 2.2; for Asclepius *supra*, Ch. X 2.3.

¹⁴⁴ See *supra*, text to n. 97.

about Plato is important (370F-371A). First, he says that Plato used to speak about the two opposed principles in an obscure and veiled way,¹⁴⁵ calling the one Sameness and the other Difference.¹⁴⁶ But in his old age, when writing the *Laws*,¹⁴⁷ he came out into the open and no longer spoke δι' αἰνιγμῶν οὐδὲ συμβολικῶς, ἀλλὰ κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν. Here Plato explicitly stated that the cosmos is moved by a plurality of Souls, perhaps more than two but certainly not less than two, of which the one is beneficent and the other the Demiurge of what is the opposite of good. Between these he recognizes a third entity (τρίτην τινὰ μετὰ φύσιν) which, though rational and self-moved, depends on both the others and always yearns for the better principle/soul (ἐφιεμένην δὲ τῆς ἀμείνωνος αἰεὶ καὶ ποθοῦσαν καὶ διώκουσαν). Plutarch announces that the rest of his treatise will clarify the nature of this mediating force by means of an interpretation of Egyptian religion in terms of this Platonic doctrine (371A). In fact, in the next chapter (49, 371AB) he argues that in the World-Soul, where matters are mixed but the good predominates, Osiris is Intellect and Reason, the Leader and Lord of all that is good, and that in the cosmos Osiris is all that is order in the earth and wind and waters and heavens and stars. Typhon, on the other hand, represents what is irrational in the soul and disorderly in nature. Isis plays the role of intermediary power, and Horus represents the visible cosmos (chs. 53 ff., 372E ff.).

I am not concerned with the question whether Plutarch provides a fair picture of what Plato meant;¹⁴⁸ the important thing is that this is how Plato is interpreted, viz. his reception as a dualist who mitigated his dualism by introducing a third force (something which none of his Greek philosophical predecessors—as described here by Plutarch—did). The view ascribed to Plato in his old age resembles those of the Persians and Chaldaeans as interpreted at the beginning of Plutarch's account; the Platonic τρίτην τινὰ μετὰ φύσιν striving after the good he introduces represents the intermediary forces familiar from Middle Platonism. Plutarch is and remains a Platonist; in his universe, the good, helped by the intermediary power or powers, predominates.

Looking back from this passage to Greek philosophy as used by

¹⁴⁵ Cf. *supra*, Ch. VIII n. 114 and text thereto.

¹⁴⁶ A reference to *Soph.* 256c ff. and *Tim.* 35ab.

¹⁴⁷ The reference is to *Nom.* X 896d ff. At *De an. procr.* Plutarch's presentation is in some respects different and also more detailed, but here too he attributes to Plato the doctrine of the evil cosmic Soul at 6, 1014DE (referring to the *Laws* passage) and 7, 1015DE, and of two Souls at 9, 1017AB. Sameness in the Soul derives from the One and Difference from the Dyad, *ibid.* 24, 1024DE.

¹⁴⁸ For this problem see e.g. Cherniss (1976a) 187 n. f, Dillon (1977) 203, Froidefond (1988) 120 f.

Hippolytus in the *Ref.*, we may observe that the importance and preferential treatment accorded by Plutarch to (a Platonized) Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus and (a Pythagoreanized) Plato is paralleled in Hippolytus' emphasis on Heraclitus, Empedocles, the Pythagoreans and Plato. The doctrinal links between these main figures to some extent are also analogous in both accounts, although Plutarch, who is concerned with dualism and the intermediary power, focuses on a more limited objective than Hippolytus. We note moreover that Plutarch has much less to say about Aristotle than about the other ancients, and that he also inserts a brief reference to Anaxagoras.

A very much similar but shorter report is found at *De animae procreatione in Timaeo*¹⁴⁹ chs. 27-28, 1026A-1027A. Plutarch here takes as his starting-point his interpretation of *Tim.* 35ab¹⁵⁰ as meaning that the soul has a fundamentally dualist nature in which a monadic ingredient (~ Sameness) and a dyadic ingredient (~ Difference) have been combined; as a third element a blend of Indivisible (corresponding to Sameness) and Divisible (corresponding to Difference) is required as a sort of matter for Sameness as submerged in Difference (*De an. procr.* chs. 25-26). At 1026AB, he says that the soul in this way

brings together Sameness and Difference through the similarities and dissimilarities of numbers which produce agreement from diversity,¹⁵¹ and so is the rational Life of the All, and Harmony, and Reason, by means of Persuasion, guiding Necessity, which¹⁵² the many call Destiny, but Empedocles Love together with Strife [*Vorsokr.* 31A45, 2nd text], Heraclitus "retroverse harmony of the cosmos like that of bow and lyre",¹⁵³ Parmenides Light and Darkness, Anaxagoras Intellect and Indefiniteness, Zoroaster God and *Daimon*. ... The Egyptians in their mythology say in the form of riddles ... [a very brief summary of the myth of Horus and its proper interpretation follows]. In the soul nothing is pure or unmixed or separate from the rest, for "stronger than apparent is hidden harmony"¹⁵⁴ according to Heraclitus ...

Though adapted to its context, this list of what we may call *doxai* is virtually the same as that in the passage in the *De Isid.*; in fact, in the *De*

¹⁴⁹ This treatise, in which Plutarch again speaks *in propria persona*, is dedicated to two sons whom one does not suppose to have been child prodigies; it may either be a bit earlier or a bit later than the *De Isid.* Personally, I believe that it is a bit later, for the Platonizing interpretation of Egyptian mythology argued at length in the *De Isid.* is taken for granted at *De an. procr.* 1026C.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. *supra*, n. 146 and text thereto.

¹⁵¹ This refers to the construction of the cosmic soul-circles by means of the harmonical proportions produced by various numbers at *Tim.* 35c ff.

¹⁵² Viz., not Necessity alone (cf. *supra*, n. 67) but Necessity as influenced by persuasion and guided by Reason; in other words, the rational Life of the All, and Harmony.

¹⁵³ Cf. *supra*, n. 120 and text thereto.

¹⁵⁴ *Vorsokr.* 22B54, also quoted by Hippolytus, see *supra*, Ch. IX text to n. 91.

an. procr., Plutarch is *inter alia* concerned with the analogy between the soul and the cosmos. The Chaldaeans and, surprisingly, the Pythagoreans are now absent, but Parmenides has joined the company.¹⁵⁵ As to Heraclitus, *Vorsokr.* 22B51 occurs in both passages (although not in entirely the same form), but B54 is new. Looking back at Hippolytus for comparison, we may note that this time Heraclitus and Plato are the important philosophers.

Furthermore, in this same passage, *De an. procr.* 28, 1026EF Plutarch blends his doctrine of the antagonistic forces with an interpretation of the myth of Plato's *Politicus* (269c ff.), which is concerned with a sort of cosmic cycle. Plutarch argues that in the course of time the ingredient of Sameness falls asleep and allows its opponent to move things in the opposite direction, until it wakes up and straightens things out again. As Dillon has pointed out, this is odd in view of the fact that Plutarch elsewhere sticks to a generated but everlastingly orderly universe (or at any rate for the most part orderly, for the good is always stronger than evil). In the context of the present inquiry this inconsistency is a most welcome phenomenon. We have noticed above that in Hippolytus' account of Empedocles the cosmic cycle and the two-worlds theory in a way coexist peacefully.¹⁵⁶

We should also adduce a paragraph from the final part of Ammonius' speech in the *De E apud Delphos*,¹⁵⁷ which presents a somewhat

¹⁵⁵ For Parmenides as a Pythagorean see e.g. Diog. Laërt. IX 21 (Sotion Fr. 27, with Wehrli's comments (1978) 59 f.), Iambl. *De vit. Pyth.* p. 144.10. His pair of opposites in the form cited by Plutarch coincides with one on the Pythagorean *systoichia*. Parmenides himself, *Vorsokr.* 28B8.56-59 speaks of φλογός αἰθέριον πῦρ versus νύκτ' ἄδοῃ, at B9.3 of φάεος καὶ νυκτός and at B12.1-2 of πυρός and φλογός versus νυκτός. Accordingly, 'light' can be paralleled from the poem, but 'darkness' cannot; so Parmenides' 'night' has been replaced by Pythagorean 'darkness'. I note in passing that this rendering is different from that of Aristotle (who *Met.* A 5.986b27 ff. = *Vorsokr.* 28A24 speaks of "hot and cold, e.g. fire and earth"; so also elsewhere) and Theophrastus (*Phys. op.* Fr. 6 ap. Alex. *In Met.* 31.7 ff. = 28A7, 'fire and earth'). Froidefond (1988) 96 has missed the parallel in the *De an. procr.* and states that Parmenides is not cited by Plutarch as a dualist.

¹⁵⁶ Dillon (1977) 205; *supra*, Ch. VIII 2.7; Ch. IX, text to n. 20, text to n. 37.

¹⁵⁷ This treatise is generally considered to be earlier than the *De Isid.* Brenk (1987) 270 f., commenting on the passages mentioned in the text, argues that "Ammonios seems to be describing God-One in terms of both Eudoros' supreme and second One". But 'Ammonius' clearly introduces an independent second principle next to the first, and in no way argues in favour of a superior divinity embracing both sides of the polarity. It is true that at ch. 20, 393AC, Apollo is identified as the One, but this is the same Apollo, 'denying plurality', as at the end of the treatise. The attempt of Whittaker (1969) to identify the Apollo/"Ev at 393AC with the supreme principle of Eudoros' Pythagoreans (cf. *supra*, Ch. X 4) seems to me mistaken: at 393B, ἑτερότης is recognized as a second principle next to the One. See also Hershbell (1984) 76. I accept the interpretation of these passages in the *De Isid.* and *De E* argued by Flacelière (1987) clxviii ff.

different picture of Plutarchan dualism (ch. 21, 393F), again context-oriented. The speaker identifies the meaning of the 'E' as a 'Thou art' (and even as 'Thou art One', cf. 392A, 393AC) addressed to Apollo, and adds that this God has nothing to do with change. See also chs. 19-20, 392E-393C, where God is the eternal ὄντως ὄν and One (which is why at 393C he is called Ἀπόλλων ..., οἷον ἀρνούμενος τὰ πολλὰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀποφάσκων), and where he is opposed to the world of becoming. Change is the territory of another God, or rather of a *Daimon* in charge of Nature, Nature being subject to generation and decay.¹⁵⁸ At 394A, this is further clarified by an interpretation of divine names which come in antithetical pairs: Apollo (viz. ἄ-πολλῶν, 'not-many' i.e. one)¹⁵⁹ versus Plouton (another name for Hades), Delian v. Aidoneus¹⁶⁰ (or clear v. invisible), and Phoibos v. Skotios (or bright v. dark).¹⁶¹ 'Ammonius' adds that both these forces, viz. the God and the *Daimon*, have associates; the first the Muses and Mnemosyne (memory), the other Oblivion and Silence. Among the middle powers themselves according to this presentation there are therefore good as well as bad ones, and the dualist vision also applies to them.

What follows in Plutarch is of no interest to us here, but the Μοῦσαι and Μνημοσύνη as allies of Apollo, or the One who is the good God, are particularly interesting. We have found the explanation for Hippolytus' designation of the Muse as Empedocles' middle power, which in his view is the original inspiration of the 'right reason' of Prepon and the μεσότης of Marcion.¹⁶² It can only derive from a Middle Platonist source belonging with the same tradition as the Ammonian account of dualism.

The last passage I have to discuss here is from the early *De sollertia animalium* ch. 7, where Plato, Empedocles and Heraclitus are mentioned. Plato's philosophy is that of Plutarch; Heraclitus and Empedocles

¹⁵⁸ Cf. *supra*, text to n. 121. It is interesting to contrast the pantheist monism of ps.Arist. *De mund.* 7.401a12 ff. (εἷς δὲ ὢν πολυώνυμός ἐστι κτλ.), where the many names and corresponding functions, heavenly as well as terrestrial, are all attributed to the one God who is πάντων αὐτὸς αἷτιος (this is further supported by the famous quotation of Orph. Fr. 21a Kern, several lines of which have turned up in the *Derveni papyrus*).

¹⁵⁹ A form of this etymology appears to be attributed to Chrysippus at Macrob. *Sat.* I 17.7 (= *SVF* II 1095), ὅτι μόνος ἐστὶ καὶ οὐχὶ πολλοί. Plutarch seems to consider it Pythagorean, see Whittaker (1969) 187, also for further references.

¹⁶⁰ Compare the opposition Zeus-Hades in Greek mythology according to *De Isid.* 370C (*supra*, text to n. 131).

¹⁶¹ We may note that these two pairs correspond to light-darkness in the Pythagorean *systoichia*, and in Parmenides as elsewhere cited by Plutarch (*supra*, n. 155 and text thereto). Cf. also Whittaker (1969) 189 and n. 6.

¹⁶² Cf. *supra*, Ch. IX 1.4 (and *ibid.* n. 55 and text thereto); *supra*, n. 128 and text thereto, n. 130 and text thereto.

are appealed to as supporting the charge that man's treatment of the animals is unjust (964DE):¹⁶³

... Empedocles and Heraclitus ... often weep, and slander Nature, (calling her) 'Necessity' and 'War' (and stating that) she contains nothing that is unmixed or pure, and proceeds by inflicting much justified suffering. Whence they state that even birth itself springs from injustice, because what is immortal is joined to what is mortal, and what is generated is nourished unnaturally on limbs torn away from the parent.

Plutarch finds this picture too grim and argues in favour of what he calls Pythagoras' doctrine, viz. that destroying dangerous animals and domesticating others is permitted. What interests us here, however, is the cento of allusions to views expressed by or attributed to Heraclitus and Empedocles. We must note that in a way the passage is more about the latter than the former; only the War (also mentioned by Plutarch elsewhere)¹⁶⁴ and the weeping are directly reminiscent of Heraclitus. The Necessity is that of the *Katharmoi* (*Vorsokr.* 31B115.1), but the 'limbs torn away from the parent' seem to be the elements which arise from the Sphere as it dissolves (cf. the fragments from the *On Nature* at 31B30 and B31). The fall and punishment of the god or *daimon* (or soul) as described in B115 (here paraphrased as the 'birth resulting from injustice') is therefore placed in a physical context, and the Necessity of the *Katharmoi* is even identified with Nature.¹⁶⁵ *Empedoclem ex Empedocle* again. The conjoining of the immortal (soul) and the mortal (body) as described by Plutarch is an *interpretatio platonica* of what is in Empedocles; the terms 'immortal' and 'mortal' themselves are reminiscent of Heraclitus *Vorsokr.* 22B62, interpreted in terms of *metensomasis*.¹⁶⁶ The fact that Plutarch is capable of producing a patchwork of allusions which presuppose a unified interpretation of Empedocles as well as a blending of the views of Empedocles and Heraclitus shows that he depends on an earlier tradition. The far more detailed passages in his later works discussed above depend on the same tradition but use it in a much more generous way. What we have in the early passage is in many ways parallel to Hippolytus' treatment of Empedocles and

¹⁶³ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ... πολλάκις ὀδυρόμενοι καὶ λοιδοροῦντες τὴν φύσιν, ὡς Ἀνάγκην καὶ Πόλεμον οὖσαν, ἀμιγῆς δὲ μὴδὲν μὴδ' εἰλικρινὲς ἔχουσαν ἀλλὰ διὰ πολλῶν καὶ δικαίων παθῶν περαινομένην· ὅπου καὶ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτὴν ἐξ ἀδικίας συντυγχάνειν λέγουσι, τῷ θνητῷ συνερχομένου τοῦ ἀθανάτου, καὶ τρέφεσθαι τὸ γεννώμενον παρὰ φύσιν μέλεσι τοῦ γεννήσαντος ἀποσπώμενοις. This passage has been excellently interpreted by Burkert (1975) 139 f.

¹⁶⁴ See *supra*, text to n. 137.

¹⁶⁵ This can hardly count as a garbled reminiscence of the *Placita* lemmata discussed *supra*, Ch. X 3; rather, it is emblematic for the integration of the doctrine of the *Katharmoi* into that of the *Peri Phyeos*.

¹⁶⁶ See *infra*, Ch. X 7.

Heraclitus in *Ref.* I 3-4, although Hippolytus never attributes *metempsychosis* to the latter.

In what preceeds I have occasionally adverted already to similar parallels in Hippolytus for what we have found in Plutarch, and in this context mentioned the importance attributed to Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus and Plato in both authors. What one should emphasize here is that the Pythagoreanizing and Middle Platonist doctrines in Plutarch, and his reception of the thought of a number of earlier thinkers, are clearly focussed on a dualistic view of reality. This is particularly helpful for understanding Hippolytus' treatment of Empedocles and Heraclitus. Plutarch as a rule cites both these early Presocratics in cosmological contexts, emphasizing on the one hand Empedocles' fierce dualism and his stress on a good as opposed to an evil power, whereas Heraclitus' dualism is much softer, the emphasis being on harmony and the unity of the opposing forces. In the passage in the early *De soll. animal.* 964DE, the incarnation of the immortal soul is on the agenda as well. Hippolytus' exposition centers around the same features. His Empedocles is an unmitigated dualist, who even sports Strife as an evil Demiurge (~ Marcion), whereas his Heraclitus, though a dualist, goes in for the identity of opposites (~ Noëtus), but he is a weeping pessimist (*Ref.* I 4.1) just as Plutarch's (Empedocles—and—)Heraclitus in the *De soll. animal.* passage. What is more, Plutarch's interpretation of Empedocles' Strife as an evil principle/Demiurge, or rather the Middle Platonist position he represents for us, is resolutely and explicitly rejected by the late Neoplatonist commentators of Aristotle. Plutarch's dualism is only paralleled in Atticus and Numenius. So Hippolytus' source or sources belong with the traditions represented for us by Plutarch, Atticus and Numenius. The main distinction is that the doctrine of the soul of Hippolytus' Heraclitus is proto-Christian, not Pythagorean-Empedoclean-Platonic.

X 5.2 Plutarch on Soul and *daimon*

Plutarch's demonology is a difficult subject; it is, indeed, in mist apparelled. We have seen in the previous section that he is willing to call the autonomous and evil cosmic power a *Daimon*, but is equally prepared to accept a plurality of middle powers (good and evil ones) between the good God and this *Daimon* (I). In numerous other passages where he speaks of *daimones* as powers that are 'in between', their middle position is not between a good God and an evil *Daimon*, but intermediary between Gods and men (II). We may try to visualize these alternative but

not incompatible tripartite divisions as follows:¹⁶⁷

I


- | | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| (1) Good God | (2) Middle Power
(= ally of (1)) | (3) Evil Power (Daimon) |
| (other allies of (1)) | | |
| (allies of (2)) | | |

II

- | | | |
|------|------------------|-----|
| Gods | (2 + 3) Daimones | Men |
|------|------------------|-----|

The scheme according to (I) is concerned with a division pertaining to divine powers; that according to (II) includes humans, and *daimones* or lower divinities as such are always superior to men. The difference between both schemes is therefore one of perspective only; Plutarch is not inconsistent. But matters become even more complicated then they already are because according to Plutarch (and this, of course, is good Platonic doctrine) the souls of humans occupy an intermediate position too.¹⁶⁸ What is more, he is willing to call the *daimones* 'souls' and the human souls '*daimones*'. In other words, *daimon* in Plutarch may represent both a demonic divine being which is not a man, and the human soul, for such demonic beings may be punished by confinement in a human body. In those contexts where he discusses this subject, he may quote lines pertaining to the doctrine of the human soul, or *daimon*, in Empedocles' *Katharmoi* either as pertaining to such lower divine beings

¹⁶⁷ Alternatively:



The argument—see e.g. Froidefond (1988) 33, 36, 96 f.—that the demonology does not belong with Plutarch's philosophy but that his 'angélologie' is part of the doctrine of the intermediary powers impresses me as inconsistent. For *daimones* as human souls in Plutarch see e.g. Brenk (1977) 111.

¹⁶⁸ Cf. *De virt. mor.* 3, 441EF, where Plutarch first speaks of Plato's doctrine of the composition of the World-Soul and then argues that the human soul is μέρος τι ἢ μύμημα τῆς τοῦ παντός.

(or non-human souls) or as pertaining to human souls. What is important here is that there is not a single passage in Plutarch where he uses such quotations in the manner of Hippolytus and some late commentators on Aristotle, viz. to explain away the cosmic cycle. The only connections, in Plutarch, between the fate of the soul according to the *Katharmoi* and the doctrine of the *On Nature* is the fact that the fallen soul is spurned and hated by each of the physical elements and that the offspring is nurtured on 'limbs torn from the parent'.

In the *De Isid.*, from which in the previous section we have cited a passage demonstrating a quite outspoken dualist conception of the divine world and the cosmos, including a Platonic middle power which is the ally of God (chs. 45-48), there is an earlier passage which is about 'great *daimones*' intermediate between gods and men (chs. 25-26, 360D-361C). Here, Typhon, Osiris and Isis are neither gods nor men, but *daimones*. Plato, Pythagoras, and even Chrysippus (often spurned but now a welcome ally) are said to have subscribed to the doctrine that such beings exist; from Greek myth the Giants, Titans, Cronus and others are listed, and the notion according to Plutarch is also found in Plato (again, cf. 360D), Xenocrates (again, cf. 360D) and Hesiod. Finally, Empedocles is cited (361C) for the doctrine that the *daimones* pay the penalty for their sins, and *Vorsokr.* 31B115.9-12 is quoted.

According to Plutarch's reading of these lines, the elements one after the other chase away the *daimones*. Here, one does not immediately think of human souls. At *De vit. aer. al.* 7, 830F-831A, where he speaks of debtors spurned by one creditor after another, Plutarch quotes half a line less (*Vorsokr.* 31B115.9-12a δέχεται) and says of these unhappy persons that they "wander like the well-known Empedoclean *daimones* expelled from among the Gods and fallen from heaven" (πλάζονται καθάπερ οἱ θεήλατοι¹⁶⁹ καὶ οὐρανοπετεῖς ἐκεῖνοι τοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους δαίμονες).

At *De fac.* 30, 945B, on the other hand, creatures like Tityus and Typhon and the Python are said to belong to a class of irrational *souls* characterized by a *wandering* affective part (ἐξ ἐκείνων ἄρα τῶν ψυχῶν ἦσαν, ἐρήμων λόγου καὶ τύφῳ πλανηθέντι¹⁷⁰ τῷ παθητικῷ χρησαμένων), although even these souls are not beyond redemption. At the beginning of this chapter (944CD) Plutarch had spoken of the punishment some among the *daimones* that live on the moon undergo if, after having

¹⁶⁹ Cf. *Vorsokr.* 31B115.6, 'to wander', and 13, "an exile from God and a wanderer" (my emphasis; both these lines are quoted elsewhere by Plutarch, see below). Hershbell (1971) 171 rebukes Plutarch for the quotation in the *De vit. aer. al.*, which he sees as humorous (which of course to some extent it is); he seems unaware that to be always in debt is a quite unfortunate situation.

¹⁷⁰ See previous n.

come down to the earthly sphere, they act out of anger or envy. They are incarnated in human bodies (ὠθοῦνται γὰρ αὐθις ἐπὶ γῆν συνειργνόμενοι σώμασιν ἀνθρωπίνοις).

We should notice that in the context of the quotations of *Vorsokr.* 31B115.9-12 at *De Isid.* 48, 361C, and *De vit. aer. al.* 7, 830F-831A, Plutarch refers to other lines of B115 than the ones actually quoted verbatim, for he speaks of paying the penalty for one's sins (cf. B115.3), of being driven away from among the Gods (cf. B115.13), and of wandering (cf. B115.6 and 13). In the early *De esu carn.* I 7, 996BC, an Empedocles quotation has fallen out, but the exegesis has been preserved:

He states there allegorically that the *souls*, because they are punished for murders and the eating of flesh and cannibalism, have been confined to mortal bodies.¹⁷¹

Here the word 'murders' undoubtedly refers to *Vorsokr.* B115.3 φόνω, and Plutarch presumably also has B136 and B137 in mind. In fact, at *De esu carn.* 997D-998C, where Pythagoras and Empedocles are mentioned together, Plutarch points (997E) at what Empedocles said about the *soul* of a mother or father or friend or child (father or mother: *Vorsokr.* B137.5; son: B137.1). At 998C, he states that the souls ἐν ταῖς παλιγγενεσίαις use all sorts of bodies, and adds ἀλλάσσει δ' ἡ φύσις ἅπαντα (*scil.*, τὰ σώματα), which clearly alludes to *Vorsokr.* B115.8 μεταλλάσσοντα. He then quotes *Vorsokr.* 31B126.

To sum up: in various passages, Plutarch alludes to *Vorsokr.* B115.1.3.6.8.13. But lines 3, 6 and 13 of this fragment are only quoted once elsewhere, viz. at *De exil.* 17, 607C, where he transcribes B115.1.3.5-6.13. Lines 9-12, on the other hand, absent in the *De exil.* passage, are as we have seen quoted elsewhere in contexts which allude to other lines of the fragment. Diels' brilliant restoration of the continuous text has to be accepted. At *De exil.* 17, 607C, Plutarch provides a cento which is an abstract (*epitome*), or shorter version; he gives us the first line (also alluded to in the *De soll. animal.* passage), the third line, two lines from just before the middle, and one from near the end. This time, he argues (607D) that what Empedocles means is that the οὐσία of the *soul* is not "blood or commingled breath", i.e. is not corporeal,¹⁷² but has come

¹⁷¹ ἀλληγορεῖ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα τὰς ψυχὰς, ὅτι φόνων καὶ βρώσεως σαρκῶν καὶ ἀλληλοφαγίας δίκην τίνουσαι σώμασι θνητοῖς ἐνδέδενται. On this passage and esp. on the reference of φόνων see O'Brien (1981) 97 f. For similar references to lines from the *Katharmoi* in Plutarch see *De def. orac.* 16, 418E, τὸ δὲ τοῖς δαίμοσι τούτοις μονονουχὶ δράγδην λαμβάνοντας ἐκ τῶν ἐπῶν τῶν Ἐμπεδοκλέους ἀμαρτίας καὶ ἅτας καὶ πλάνας θεηλάτους ἐπιφέρειν κτλ.

¹⁷² Hershbell (1971) 164 f. and others have misunderstood this passage. Plutarch uses standard doxographic instances of the *soul qua* corporeal, cf. Aët. IV 3.14, Critias: blood, IV 3.3, the Stoics: warm and fiery *pneuma*, IV 5.8, Empedocles: the

hither from elsewhere (τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἀλλαχόθεν ἡκούσης δεῦρο) and that γένεσις is euphemistically called a 'journey', but that in actual truth the soul φεύγει καὶ πλανᾶται (allusions to lines 6 and 13), θείοις ἐλαιομένη δόγμασι καὶ νόμοις (an allusion to line 1). At 607E, *Vorsokr.* 31B119 is quoted, which in Plutarch's view pertains to the *soul's* loss of its former happiness.

There is one other passage in Plutarch where the main doctrine of the *Katharmoi* is adduced for the *interpretation* of a text from the *On nature* rather than conversely, viz. at *Adv. Colot.* 12, 1113D. Here *Vorsokr.* 31B15 is quoted, which in actual fact pertains to the eternal existence of the elements but is interpreted by him as being about the existence of the soul prior to incarnation and about its immortality: εἶναι .. οἰόμενον [*scil.*, Empedocles] καὶ τοὺς μηδέπω γεγονότας καὶ τοὺς ἤδη τεθνηκότας. As a move, this to some extent is parallel to Proclus' interpretation of *Vorsokr.* 31B2.2 by means of B115.13.¹⁷³

Although (just like Hippolytus) he speaks of the descent of the soul to the sensible world and of its confinement in a human body, Plutarch (unlike Hippolytus) never says explicitly that the original abode of the Empedoclean soul is the Sphere of Love, though he seems to allude, in the vaguest possible way, to this notion at *De soll. animal.* 964DE (one would not notice the allusion if the relevant lines of the *On Nature* had been lost). He does not say that Empedocles, when speaking about this Sphere or hinting at the origin of the souls, really means the celestial regions (or the sun, moon, or upper air) where the *daimones* and disembodied souls reside in Plutarch's universe. Quite the contrary: Plutarch firmly believes in the transmigration of the soul, and he in no way interprets this psychic cycle allegorically the way Proclus and Philoponus do, viz. in terms of cognition. Nor does he interpret Empedocles' utterances about the cosmic cycle as allegorical references to the soul's voyages in the manner of an Asclepius, or to the permanent relation between the intelligible and the sensible cosmoi in the manner of a Simplicius.

Consequently, we must conclude that Hippolytus remains our earliest indubitable witness for the idea of the origin of the Empedoclean soul, or *daimon*, from the *One*, or Sphere of Love. Insofar as the doctrine of

regent part in the blood. Practically the same instances are used by Lucretius III 43-4 (blood and air). Accordingly, Plutarch rejects the standard interpretation of Empedocles' doctrine of the soul as represented by Aët. IV 5.8. See further Mansfeld (1990a) 3065 ff., 3118 f., 3127 ff., 3145 f. and *passim*, and *supra*, n. 116 and text thereto.

¹⁷³ Cf. *supra*, n. 44. We have noticed above (see *supra*, n. 140 and text thereto) that when speaking of the two opposed principles Plutarch quoted from both poems and so interprets the *Katharmoi* by means of the *On Nature*.

the disembodied soul is concerned, Plutarch had an original axe of his own to grind. Recalling the exegesis made use of by Asclepius and presupposed by Philoponus' reaction to it, I believe we may assume that Hippolytus did not invent the interpretation according to which the fallen soul is a part of the Sphere. Consequently, we must assume a tradition earlier than, and shared by, both Plutarch and Hippolytus, and should observe that Plutarch's view of the Empedoclean soul, or *daimon*, is a much more traditionally Platonic/Pythagorean one than Hippolytus'; he provides a literal rather than an allegorical interpretation. A common tradition, with perhaps further intermediary sources in the case of Hippolytus, also explains the textual differences in those Empedoclean quotations which are found in both authors. Plutarch, moreover, had read Empedocles for himself, which (or so I believe) Hippolytus had not. This explains the extent to which Plutarch's interpretation both of the transmigration of the soul and of the cosmic cycle is historically more correct, although even he was inconsistent when quoting his own excerpts.¹⁷⁴

The accounts of Pythagoras, Plato, Empedocles and Heraclitus in Plutarch and Hippolytus which we have studied are members of the same family, but it is not the case that the passages in Hippolytus are linear descendants of those in Plutarch.

X 5.3 Numenius and Plutarch; Atticus

A few remarks must be made on the large and precious abstract from Numenius (Fr. 52, perhaps via Porphyry and perhaps from the dialogue *Περὶ τὰγαθοῦ* though no traces of the dialogue form have been pre-

¹⁷⁴ This may help to understand the wrong interpretation (for which see e.g. Hershbell (1971) 174 ff.) of *Vorsokr.* 31B27.1-2 at *De fac.* 12, 926EF, though one cannot exclude that the other use to which the quotation is put is deliberate. Hershbell (1973) 189 ff. is good on the striking textual differences between Plutarch's and Hippolytus' quotations. O'Brien (1981) 93 ff., following a hypothesis first advocated by Diels, argues that Plutarch's ten-book treatise on Empedocles was Hippolytus' source. But Diels' hypothesis has been revised by Burkert (1975) 139 ff., who speaks of an intermediary source between Plutarch and Hippolytus and states that Hippolytus' imprecise reference *Ref.* V 20.6 *περὶ ὧν Πλούταρχος ποιῆται λόγους ἐν ταῖς πρὸς Ἐμπεδοκλέα δέκα βίβλοις* (rather than to a particular book for the abstruse religious item cited) shows that he had not seen the treatise. We may add that the reference does not occur in the chapters dealing with Empedocles, and have moreover observed that the differences between Hippolytus' and Plutarch's interpretations, for all their similarity, are substantial enough. What is at any rate certain is that we are not in a position to check whether Plutarch is one of the (immediate) sources of Hippolytus, for the only work that is relevant in this context is the lost treatise; one does not imagine Hippolytus looking up the passages in the extant treatises I have discussed.

served) reproduced by Calc. *In Tim.* chs. ccxcv-ccxcix, pp. 297.7-301.20.¹⁷⁵ This epitomized account of what Numenius calls Pythagoras' doctrine of the principles with which that of Plato is in agreement (*de initiis ... Pythagorae dogmate, cui concinere dicit dogma Platonicum, In Tim.* p. 297.8-9) shows a striking resemblance with Plutarch's section on the history and importance of dualism at *De Isid.* chs. 45-48,¹⁷⁶ although it would be wrong to assume that the passage in Plutarch is Numenius' only source of inspiration.

Just as Plutarch, Numenius is concerned with the explanation of the origin of evil, and just as Plutarch he argues that *the Stoics* fail to provide an explanation, or at any rate one that that is adequate.¹⁷⁷ The important difference is that (at least according to the abstract) Numenius does not first oppose the Stoics to the Atomists in order to argue next for the Platonist view as a compromise position. But his procedure too is an instance of the standard dialectical way of arguing a *quaestio*. He contrasts two views that, although similar to a degree, are also different in an important and even crucial respect, and then argues against the one and in favour of the other precisely because the question *unde igitur mala* (p.299.4) can only be solved in a non-contradictory way by an appeal to this other doctrine. He is even able to argue that the Stoic explanation of the cause of evil, viz. 'perversions' caused by the motions of the heavenly bodies (*In Tim.* p. 299.4, p. 300.6-7, cf. p. 202.1), boils down to that of Pythagoras(-and-Plato), because the stars are corporeal and so may be ultimately traced back to matter as the other principle (p. 300.7 ff.).¹⁷⁸

Pythagoras (and therefore Plato's) two principles are said to be God, or the One, and matter, or the Indefinite Dyad (*In Tim.* p. 297.9-11). Numenius argues that some Pythagoreans wrongly derive the second principle from the first. This rejected view corresponds to that of Alexander Polyhistor's *Pythagorean Hypomnemata* and to the 'highest account' of the Pythagorean doctrine of the principles according to Eudorus.¹⁷⁹ We do *not* find it in Plutarch, which proves that, although Numenius may be indebted to Plutarch in other respects, his report of the doctrine

¹⁷⁵ See esp. the commentary by van Winden (1959) 295 ff. and his 'supplementary notes' to the reprint (1965) 245 ff. Waszink's references *in app. sup.* should also be consulted. To the best of my knowledge, the dialectical aspect of the argument and its overall relation to that of Plutarch in the *De Isid.* (for which see below) have not been studied before.

¹⁷⁶ See *supra*, Ch. X 5.1.

¹⁷⁷ *In Tim.* ch. ccxcvii, p. 299.1 ff., ch. ccxcviii, p. 300.4 ff.

¹⁷⁸ In the interest of his argument, Numenius has chosen to ignore other, more familiar Stoic explanations of evil; it is even possible that he has perversely interpreted the Stoic διαστροφή (for references see Adler's *Index s.v.* and further Den Boeft (1970) 58 ff.) which Calcidius' *perversitas* translates.

¹⁷⁹ See *supra*, n. 157, text to n. 145.

of Pythagoras also takes other views into account. Further differences with Plutarch are (1) that Pythagoras' (and Plato's) *matter*, not the evil World-Soul, is the cause of evil and (2) that there is no argument in favour of an intermediary power, at least according to the abstract in Calcidius.¹⁸⁰ But there are three further very significant and interconnected points of agreement. Numenius appeals to the 'ancient theologians' (*In Tim.* p. 298.17) which as we have seen are discussed at length by Plut. *De Isid.* chs. 45 f.¹⁸¹ Secondly, just as Plutarch, *De Isid.* 370D,¹⁸² he quotes Heraclitus' criticism of Homer (*In Tim.* p. 299.11 ff. = Heraclitus Fr. 28 (c⁴) M.)¹⁸³ in support of his argument that an autonomous principle of evil must be assumed. Thirdly (*In Tim.* 299.14 ff.), he 'quotes' (*laudat*)¹⁸⁴ Plato who *duas mundi animas autumet, unam beneficentissimam, malignam alteram, scilicet silvam* etc.¹⁸⁵ The identification of the evil World-Soul as matter is not in Plutarch; we have seen, however, that Plutarch too ascribes to the Pythagoreans the view that one principle, the One, is good and the other, viz. the Indeterminate Dyad, is bad.¹⁸⁶

This may be the right moment to point out that Pythagoras' dualism of Monad/*Good* versus Indefinite Dyad/*Evil* is paralleled in remarkable (and remarkably neglected) passage in ps.Plut. *De Hom.* 2 c. 145, too long to quote. At c. 145.2 ps.Plutarch says that Pythagoras "posited two highest principles, calling the determined (principle) Monad, the undetermined (principle) Indefinite Dyad, the former being the principle of what is good, the latter of what is evil" (δύο τὰς ἀνωτάτω ἀρχὰς ἐλάμβανε, τὴν μὲν ὀρισμένην μονάδα, τὴν δὲ ἀόριστον δυάδα καλῶν, τὴν μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τὴν δὲ τῶν κακῶν οὖσαν ἀρχήν). This is then explained in detail and the doctrine itself of course already found by the author in Homer. The parallel in ps.Plutarch, whose account is far less sophisticated from a philosophical point of view than those of Plutarch and Numenius, is interesting as further evidence that this *interpretatio* is not an isolated phenomenon in the second cent. CE.

¹⁸⁰ One may of course suggest that Numenius' Second God, or Demiurge, fulfills such a function (see e.g. Frr. 11 and 12). For matter as the evil principle in Celsus (ca. 175-80 CE) see Andresen (1955) 65 ff., 94 f., 295 f., who argues that Celsus is a representative of a dualistic trend in Middle Platonism.

¹⁸¹ See van Winden (1959) 111 who—arguing that not only Homer Hesiod Orpheus Musaeus etc. are meant—pertinently refers to *De Isid.* 369B, and *supra*, Ch. X 5.1; also note the appeal to the 'wise barbarians' in Numen. Fr. 1.

¹⁸² Cf. *supra*, text to nn. 134 ff.

¹⁸³ *Numenius laudat Heraclitum reprehendentem Homerum* etc. *Laudat* is generally translated as 'praises', but simply means 'quotes'.

¹⁸⁴ See previous n.

¹⁸⁵ For Plutarch's reference to the same *Laws* passage see *supra*, n. 147 and text thereto.

¹⁸⁶ See *supra*, text to n. 142.

What is important is that the sequence of authorities (or cento of references) in the Numenius abstract *ap. Calcidius* is the same as Plutarch's in the *De Isid.*: (1) the early theologians, (2) Heraclitus and (3) Plato, and that Numenius' quotations of Heraclitus and Plato as preserved in the abstract (there may have been more in the original) can be precisely paralleled from Plutarch. Although Numenius' account may therefore to some extent be dependent on Plutarch's, the important differences that stubbornly remain imply that both Plutarch and Numenius are (original and creative) representatives of a definitive development, or tradition, in Middle Platonism and Later Pythagoreanism. We have noticed above that a dualism concerned with the principles of good and evil is already attributed to Pythagoras before Plutarch and Numenius at *Aët. I* 7.18,¹⁸⁷ and to Plato (and Empedocles and Anaxagoras) as early as *Arist. Met. A* 6.988a14-15 and in other Aristotelian passages.¹⁸⁸ On the same occasion, we have concluded that Plutarch's dualistic accounts as found in various forms in several of his works must be indebted to earlier traditions. A trend may easily grow into a conviction; the main difference between Plutarch and Numenius in this respect is that the former saw himself as a Platonist and the latter as a Pythagorean, or at any rate felt obliged to trace Plato's doctrines back to those of the Pythagoras who is his real hero;¹⁸⁹ indeed, our sources often call Numenius a Pythagorean not a Platonist.¹⁹⁰ Pythagoras is the main protagonist in Numenius Fr. 52, and in Fr. 7 (a verbatim quotation from the *Περὶ τὰγαθοῦ* preserved by Eusebius) Numenius states that the views he has set out previously, even if they do not agree with those of Plato (but after this *captatio* he quotes *Tim.* 27d6-28a4 in support, so there is agreement with Plato after all), they are at least to be viewed as the doctrines "of another great man, such as Pythagoras". Compare also Numenius Fr. 24.18 ff. (another verbatim quotation preserved by Eusebius, this time from the *Περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν πρὸς Πλάτωνα διαστάσεως*), where Plato and Pythagoras are almost put on a par but Pythagoras still comes out the more important person: καίτοι ἄξιος ἦν αὐτοῖς ὁ Πλάτων, οὐκ ἀμείνων μὲν Πυθαγόρου τοῦ μεγάλου, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως οὐδὲ φλαυρότερος ἐκείνου, and *ibid.* 24.57, ὁ δὲ Πλάτων πυθαγορίσας.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁷ See *supra*, Ch. X 3.

¹⁸⁸ See *supra*, Ch. X 3 *ad finem*, and van Winden (1959) 110.

¹⁸⁹ See the programmatic statement at Numen. Fr. 1.

¹⁹⁰ See Numen. test. 4 Leemans (not reproduced by Des Places), and cf. e.g. Fr. 1 b and 1 c.

¹⁹¹ The blending of Socratic and Pythagorean motifs ascribed to Plato at the end of this fragment clearly is an interpretive echo of the position argued at *Arist. Met. A* 6.

Numenius, who has to be dated to the second century CE,¹⁹² is closer in time to Hippolytus than Plutarch. The views of this influential philosopher on the history of the main philosophical doctrines contribute to a better understanding of Hippolytus' interpretation and use of the history of Greek philosophy and its pagan precedents. That Pythagoras is the *fons et origo* of the philosophy that matters and Plato nothing but his faithful follower is also Hippolytus' view, and the doctrines of the principles ascribed to them by both authors are very much similar. The important differences are that Hippolytus does not attribute to Pythagoras and/or Plato the idea that the second principle is *evil*, and that his Pythagoras agrees with those Pythagoreans who according to Numenius provided a false interpretation of the doctrine because they derived the second principle from the first. Accordingly, Hippolytus seems to be indebted to—or to prefer—a different brand of Pythagoreanism than Numenius, but we may still hold (just as Eudorus did) that what we have here are two different varieties of one and the same doctrine. We have no information whatever about Numenius' view of Empedocles, and in fact do not even know that he had one. Hippolytus restricts the doctrine of the autonomous evil principle to (the Pythagorean) Empedocles, and in this respect is close to the tradition best represented for us by Plutarch, though anticipated in Aristotle. This is best explained on the assumption that in the *Ref.* Pythagoras had to be reserved for the attack against Simon and Valentinus, and Empedocles could best be used for that against Marcion's stark dualism. In this context, it is significant that the (anonymous) Empedoclean section embedded in the account of Pythagoreanism at *Ref.* VI 25.1-4¹⁹³ is silent about the moral qualities of the principles Love and Strife.¹⁹⁴

Atticus (second half of the second century CE) is even closer in time to Hippolytus than Numenius, and as to the origin of evil he represents the same trend, or conviction, as the latter and as Plutarch. I restrict myself to referring to Attic. *Frr.* 23 and 26,¹⁹⁵ from Proclus' *In Timaeum*. Proclus vigorously opposes the deviant view of Plutarch and Atticus. It would therefore seem that as to (Pythagoras-and-)Plato on evil Hippolytus, or rather the strand of the tradition he wishes to be indebted to, sides with the opponents of Plutarch, Numenius and Atticus. Restricting the

¹⁹² See Des Places (1973) 7; the *t.a.q.* is Clement, but during which period of the century he lived is in dispute.

¹⁹³ See *supra*, Ch. VIII 2.5.

¹⁹⁴ For Numenius on the wise barbarians as precedent for Hippolytus see *supra*, Ch. IV n. 6.

¹⁹⁵ See further Des Places (1977) 19 ff.

starkly dualist doctrine to Empedocles was an elegant idea of the author of the *Elenchos*.

X 6 *Plotinus on Plato's Predecessors Compared with Hippolytus*

In Plotinus, there are two important centos which may be usefully compared with what I have called the Hippolytean centos. Significantly enough, they are to be found in two early essays, viz. IV 8 [6], *On the Descent of the Soul into Bodies*, and V 1 [10], *On the Three Primary Hypostases*. The early Plotinus is closer to Middle Platonism than the late Plotinus. Here as elsewhere Plotinus is concerned with the construction or at least revision of a tradition, that is to say with the validation of his own thought as the correct interpretation of what Plato really meant. But in these passages (to which a number of less important parallels exist in the *Enneads*) he is also concerned with Plato's predecessors who, as he argues, if interpreted the correct way to a certain extent anticipated what was later said, or rather meant, by Plato.

There is no doubt that Plotinus, for all his originality, is indebted to previous interpretations and traditions; it would for instance be otiose to point out to what extent his doctrine of successively proceeding hypostases with a One at the top is dependent on Neopythagorean doctrines. His views about the predecessors of Plato too are indebted to his own Platonist and Pythagorean predecessors. What is important, however, is that he is only prepared to deal with views and personalities that, in whatever way, had been dealt with by Plato himself in the dialogues (though the fragments he quotes or paraphrases are often not derived from Plato!).¹⁹⁶ Two Presocratics who are irrelevant for Hippolytus, viz. Anaxagoras and Parmenides, play an important role in one of Plotinus' overviews because they too, as he believes, anticipate what Plato really meant. In other respects, his choice of ancients is the same as that of Hippolytus: Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, Empedocles, and Heraclitus, who all lead up to Plato and to the truth.

Enn. IV 8 [6], as is of course clear from its title, is about the

¹⁹⁶ I am much indebted to Gelzer (1982), who assembles and interprets the Plotinian evidence, is good on Plotinus' exegesis of the ambiguous doctrines of the ancients and of the contrasting statements of Plato (111 ff.), provides useful references to the secondary literature throughout (though he missed Burkert (1975)), proves that Plotinus only wishes to take those Presocratics which are discussed or mentioned by Plato into account, and points out that the importance granted to Pythagoras, which goes far beyond anything in Plato, derives from the Early Academy (ultimately), the Neopythagoreans and some Middle Platonists (110, 114 f.). The remarks of Armstrong (1984) Vol. IV, 398 f. n. 1, and Vol. V, in the footnotes at 38 ff., are not always helpful.

vicissitudes of the soul. In the first chapter, IV 8 [6] 1, Plotinus first subjoins (parts of) Heraclitean fragments. Heraclitus, positing 'necessary changes' from opposite to opposite, in his unclear way spoke of 'the way up and down',¹⁹⁷ of 'changing it is at rest' and of "weariness to toil at and be subjected to the same things".¹⁹⁸ Empedocles said that there is a law that erring souls must come down,¹⁹⁹ as in fact he has come down himself as "an exile from God, having put his trust in raving Strife",²⁰⁰ "just as Pythagoras, one may say, and his followers spoke in riddles²⁰¹ about this subject, as they did about many other matters". Empedocles who wrote poetry is not clear either. So we are left with Plato, who often spoke of the soul and of its arrival in this world though he does not say the same things everywhere—a civil way of saying that Plato is seemingly at variance with himself and so presents us with a problem of interpretation. Elements from various passages from the *Phaedo*, *Cratylus*, *Republic* and *Timaeus* are then swiftly cited and discussed—a Platonic cento with exegesis included. Plato has a low opinion of what is perceived by the senses and speaks of the association of the soul with the body as being in a prison, or as being entombed, or (according to what he calls a secret doctrine) as being in custody. His 'cave', just as Empedocles' 'den',²⁰² represents the visible world which the soul, when liberated, leaves to go to τὸ νοητόν. But in the *Timaeus* he praises our world and calls it 'god', and says that the blessed [world-]soul was given by the good Demiurge because the world had to be intelligent. Individual human souls were sent to make the world perfect, for there must be as many kinds of living things in the cosmos of sense-perception as in the intelligible cosmos.

In the chapters that follow Plotinus irons out the difficulties, and at the beginning of ch. 5 he says that there is 'no contradiction' (οὐ ... διαφωνεῖ ἀλλήλοις) between Plato's remarks about the descent on behalf of the perfection of the All on the one hand and what he says about the cave on the other. Nor is there anything inconsistent about Empedocles'

¹⁹⁷ *Vorsokr.* 22B60 = 33 (f) M. (also at e.g. Hipp. *Ref.* IX 10.4), an often cited fragment for which Plotinus is not our earliest evidence. He clearly alludes to *melensomatosis*; on this subject see Rich (1957).

¹⁹⁸ *Vorsokr.* B84a + B84b = 56ab (a) M., for which Plotinus is our earliest evidence.

¹⁹⁹ IV 8 [6] 1.18-9, ἀμαρτανούσαις νόμον εἶναι ταῖς ψυχαῖς πεσεῖν ἐνταῦθα. Henry-Schwyzler *ad loc.* and O'Brien (1981) 112 fail to indicate that this paraphrases the beginning of *Vorsokr.* 31B115: for the νόμος cf. B115.1, χρῆμα and ψήφισμα, for ἀμαρτανούσαις cf. B115.4 ἀμαρτήσας. Cf. also *infra*, n. 204.

²⁰⁰ *Vorsokr.* 31B115.13-4. For the text see *supra*, Ch. IX n. 33.

²⁰¹ See *supra*, Ch. VIII n. 114.

²⁰² ἄντρον, *Vorsokr.* 31B120. The whole line is quoted by Porphyry only; Plotinus provides our earliest quote.

banishment from the God and wandering,²⁰³ and ‘the error that is punished’,²⁰⁴ on the one hand and Heraclitus’ ‘rest’ during this banishment on the other. What we must note is that the drama of the soul is played against the backdrop of the cosmic and even metaphysical stage. The soul descends from the intelligible cosmos into the sensible cosmos and then returns to its former abode. Empedocles’ den equals Plato’s cave, or cosmos of sense-perception, so according to the unclear Empedocles too (as we may infer) the God from which the soul has been driven away represents the intelligible world. Heraclitus speaks of the soul’s ‘rest’ during what Empedocles calls ‘exile’ and so in his unclear way anticipates Plato’s view that the incarnation of the soul, when viewed in its appropriate metaphysical context, also serves a purpose that is good. The ‘way up and down’ must therefore be interpreted as alluding to the soul’s journeys from one cosmos to the other and back. Although Plotinus alludes to and quotes from both the beginning and the end of *Vorsokr.* 31B115, he does not mention Empedocles’ Ἀνάγκη.²⁰⁵ This is all the more surprising because he attributes ‘necessary changes’ (ἀμοιβὰς ... ἀναγκαίως) to Heraclitus which are not otherwise attested for or attributed to the Ephesian and which, in Plotinus’ present context, must refer to the soul’s journeys from one cosmos to the other.²⁰⁶ It would therefore appear that an Empedoclean notion has been attributed to Heraclitus. Because what these two men in their puzzling ways are saying according to Plotinus amounts to very much the same thing, this coalescence can be understood.

No quotation of riddling statements by Pythagoras and his followers is provided, because what these would impart does not differ from what Empedocles has to offer. We shall see presently that Pythagoras is mentioned but not quoted at the end of *Enn.* V 1 [10] as well.

²⁰³ Cf. *supra*, n. 199.

²⁰⁴ IV 8 [6] 5.5-6, ἡ ἀμαρτία ἐφ’ ἧ ἡ δίκη. Cf. *supra*, n. 199.

²⁰⁵ See *supra*, Ch. X 2-3.

²⁰⁶ What is at Theophr. *Phys. op.* Fr. 1 *ap. Simplicius*. In *Phys.* 24.4-6 (*D.G.* 476.1-2, *Vorsokr.* 22A5 2nd text, I p. 145.15-6) and *Aët.* I 7.22 and 27.1 (*Vorsokr.* 22A8, 1st and 2nd texts) is about ‘destined Necessity’ (Theophrastus in Simplicius’ paraphrase) and Necessity as a law of cosmic change, not about the soul, though *Aët.* I 27.1, which says that all things happen according to Destiny/Necessity, does not exclude the soul but certainly is not about its travels up and down; *Aët.* I 28.1 (*Vorsokr.* 22A8, 3rd text), couched in Stoic terminology, also is about cosmic change. *Diog. Laërt.* IX 7 (*Vorsokr.* 22A1, p. 141.10-11) and IX 8 (*Vorsokr.* 22A1, I p. 141.20-22) too are about cosmic change, the second text (from the more detailed or ἐπὶ μέρους doxography) even about a cosmic cycle. However, it remains possible that Heraclitus’ ‘exchange’ (see *Vorsokr.* 22B90 = Fr. 54 (a) M., πυρός τε ἀνταμοιβή τὰ πάντα κτλ.) was at some time by someone interpreted as pertaining to the soul as well, though this is not confirmed by the further texts collected by Marcovich in which this fragment is cited or alluded to.

This other essay, as is clear from its title, is first and foremost about metaphysics; its perspective therefore is to some extent different from that of IV 8 [6]. In *Enn.* V 1 chs. 8-9, Plotinus is concerned with establishing a pedigree for his doctrine of the three primary hypostases. He starts with a Platonic cento, first referring to the three levels described in the (spurious) *Second Letter*,²⁰⁷ then adding references to the *Timaeus* and *Republic*. Plato's predecessors included in the cento as further worked out are now Parmenides (especially the Parmenides in the second part of Plato's dialogue, who is more precise²⁰⁸ about the three levels) and, in ch. 9, Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Pythagoras and his followers, and Pherecydes, all of whom anticipate Plato, or at least Plato as interpreted by Plotinus. Treatment of Aristotle, who is later,²⁰⁹ comes after the passage on Heraclitus and Empedocles at the beginning of chapter 9 and before the brief remarks on Pythagoras and Pherecydes at the end; his doctrine is criticized for being a sort of relapse, though he recognized that there is something separate and intelligible.

Parmenides (ch. 8) spoke of the One which he identified with Intellect and considered to be incorporeal; his views are discussed at some length, whereas those of Anaxagoras, Heraclitus and Empedocles are treated much more briefly. Anaxagoras too (ch. 9), in his treatment of the Intellect, assumed a One that is separate, though he said so in an unclear way. For all its terseness, what Plotinus says about Heraclitus and Empedocles is highly interesting (*Enn.* V 1 [10] 9.3-7):²¹⁰

Heraclitus too knows²¹¹ that the One is eternal and intelligible, because the bodies forever come into being and are streaming. And for Empedocles Strife divides and Love (is, or perhaps rather: produces)²¹² the

²⁰⁷ See *supra*, Ch. VIII 2.11.

²⁰⁸ V 1 [10] 8.23-4, ὁ δὲ παρὰ Πλάτωνι Παρμενίδης ἀκριβέστερον λέγων κτλ.

²⁰⁹ V 1 [10] 9.7, ὕστερον.

²¹⁰ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος δὲ τὸ ἔν οἶδεν αἰδίων καὶ νοητόν· τὰ γὰρ σώματα γίνεταί ἀεὶ καὶ ρέοντα [Heracl. Fr. 51 (i) M., with a question-mark. For the parallel at Aët. I 7.22 = Heracl. Fr. 51 (b⁸) M. 2nd text, see below]· τῷ δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ τὸ Νεῖκος μὲν διαίρει, ἡ δὲ Φιλία τὸ ἔν—σώματων δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο—τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ὡς ὕλη.

²¹¹ This οἶδεν is a sort of technical term indicating *interpretatio*; cf. e.g. Clem. *Strom.* V i 9.4 (subsequent to *Vorsokr.* 22B28), οἶδεν γὰρ καὶ οὗτος [*scil.*, Heraclitus] ἐκ τῆς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας μαθὼν τὴν διὰ πυρὸς κάθαρσιν κτλ., V xiv 104.1 εἰδὼς, 104.2 ἥδει (see *infra*, n. 230), Hipp. *Ref.* IX 10.6 καὶ τὸν θεὸν οἶδε [*scil.*, Heraclitus] ταύτης τῆς ἀναστάσεως αἴτιον οὕτως λέγων (*Vorsokr.* 22B63 follows). See Mansfield (1983b) 197 ff., (1983c) 224 f.

²¹² Bréhier in the Budé Plotinus translates 'l'Amitié qui est l'Un', just as Armstrong in the Loeb Plotinus has 'Love is the One'; so also Gelzer (1985) 128, "bei Empedokles wird φιλία mit dem ἔν gleichgesetzt". But I believe we must mentally supply a verb to balance διαίρει. Gelzer (1985) 128 further says 'νεῖκος = πολλά' equals 'στοιχεῖα ὡς ὕλη', which is certainly wrong.

One—he too (makes) this [viz., the One] incorporeal—, and the elements (function) as matter.

Parmenides in his poetry as distinguished from what he says in Plato's dialogue, Anaxagoras, Heraclitus and Empedocles in their various imprecise ways remain at the level of the second and third hypotheses of the *Parmenides*, viz. that of the ἐν πολλὰ and the ἐν καὶ πολλὰ, and they therefore fail to distinguish the πρῶτον Ἐν, ὃ κυριώτερον Ἐν.²¹³ Gelzer has argued that what Plotinus says about Heraclitus and Empedocles ultimately depends on Plato *Soph.* 242de, the only passage in Plato where a doctrine concerned with the one and the many is attributed to these two early philosophers.²¹⁴ This is both true and important, though it is not the whole truth. Plato, *loc. cit.*, says that according to the Ionian and Sicilian Muses, i.e. to Heraclitus and Empedocles, being is both one and many and held together by Hatred and Love (τὸ δὲν πολλὰ τε καὶ ἓν ἐστίν, ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ φιλία συνέχεται). Heraclitus holds that it is always in the condition of being one-and-many (ἀεὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν), whereas Empedocles holds that it is now one and then many and then again one and so on (ἐν μέρει δὲ τοτὲ μὲν ἓν εἶναι ... τὸ πᾶν καὶ φίλον ὑπ' Ἀφροδίτης, τοτὲ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ πολέμιον αὐτὸ αὐτῷ διὰ Νείκος τι). Yet Plotinus' perspective is different from Plato's, because unlike Plato he attributes a two-levels doctrine to Heraclitus, one level being that of an eternal and intelligible One, the other that of the corporeal world which is in a permanent state of flux.²¹⁵ Furthermore, there is not hint whatever in the *Sophist* passage that these doctrines of Heraclitus and Empedocles are *Pythagorean*.

Plotinus has in a way extrapolated the One from the Heraclitean one-and-many as described in the *Sophist*. He may of course have seen quotations of (parts of) other Heraclitean fragments which are about ἐν τὸ σοφὸν μόνον (*Vorsokr.* 22B32 = Fr. 84 (a) M.) or σοφὸν ... πάντων κεχωρισμένον (*Vorsokr.* 22B108 = Fr. 83 (a) M.), but it is surprising that he does not quote from them. The only available parallel for Plotinus' αἰδίων seems to be Aët. I 7.22 (*Vorsokr.* 22A8, 1st text), Heraclitus says the περιοδικὸν πῦρ αἰδίων is God; this suggests that Plotinus' interpretation of Heraclitus and of Plato's Heraclitus is also indebted to intermediary

²¹³ Cf. V 1 [10] 8.25-6, and see further Gelzer (1982) 107 ff., 126 ff. I do not believe, however, *pace* Gelzer 113, that Anaxagoras, Heraclitus and Empedocles according to Plotinus already found 'das Richtige'.

²¹⁴ Gelzer (1985) 127; his analysis however is far from precise. Italics in the quoted texts are mine. See also *supra*, Ch. III n. 54.

²¹⁵ Gelzer (1985) 127 f. refers to Arist. *De cael.* Γ 1.298b29 ff., where the one thing that remains unchanged is not however transcendental. One may also compare Heraclitus on sensibilia according to *Met.* A 6.987a33 f. For Aët. I 7.22 see immediately below.

traditions. However, we must note that there is no evidence of two levels in the Aëtius passage.

We must also note that Plato, *loc. cit.*, attributes Love and Hatred to both Heraclitus and Empedocles while Plotinus, more accurately from a historical point of view, attributes Love (Φιλία not Ἀφροδίτη as in Plato and Empedocles, or Φιλότης as in Empedocles)²¹⁶ and Strife to Empedocles only. We must also note that his remark on Strife as the dividing factor and Love as being concerned with unity in fact agrees with the doxographic vulgate dealing with Empedocles' doctrines (Aristotle's view of the two moving principles, as we know, is a bit more sophisticated, cf. e.g. *Met.* A 4.985a23 ff., though for Love and Strife Plotinus of course could appeal to Plato *Soph.* 242e). The (four) elements as matter are already in Arist. *Met.* A 3.984a7 ff., then at e.g. Aët. I 7.28.²¹⁷ What Plotinus does emphasize, however, is Empedocles' concern with the One,²¹⁸ and what he superimposes on Plato's analysis is that this One is incorporeal (we may add: just as that of Plotinus' Parmenides and Anaxagoras). Accordingly, the *Sophist* passage has been transposed in a way which goes far beyond Plato's original intentions. Plotinus virtually attributes to both Heraclitus and Empedocles a doctrine of a supreme principle which is both a One and an Intellect—a doctrine attributed to Pythagoras at Aët. I 7.18.²¹⁹ We have noticed above that at *Enn.* IV 8 [6] 1 too he virtually attributes to Empedocles a concept of the intelligible world,²²⁰ and that in this chapter the 'way up and down' of Heraclitus, in the context in which it has been inserted by Plotinus, only makes sense as referring to the soul's journeys from the intelligible to the sensible cosmos and back. So his metaphysical reading of Heraclitus in the later passage, V 1 [10] 9, need not come as a complete surprise.

At the end of the chapter (V 1[10] 9.28-32), after his after all quite mild critique of Aristotle, Plotinus points out that

those among the ancients who took up positions closest to that of Pythagoras and those who came after him—and of Pherecydes²²¹—stuck to this (intelligible) nature. But some (among the ancients) worked this out further in their own writings, others did not do so and expounded it in unwritten lectures, whereas others again neglected it entirely.

²¹⁶ So he uses standard doxographic terminology, see *supra*, n. 138 and Gelzer (1985) 128.

²¹⁷ See *supra*, n. 67 and text thereto.

²¹⁸ This is also a feature at Aët. I 7.28 (see previous n.), but Plotinus does not identify One and Necessity.

²¹⁹ See *supra*, n. 79 and text thereto.

²²⁰ See *supra*, text after n. 204.

²²¹ Added because he came before Pythagoras and was often said to have taught him.

What he tells us here is that Pythagoras is the real *fons et origo* of the doctrine according to which one has to distinguish between an intelligible cosmos which is one and and a sensible cosmos. But no mention is made of Pythagorean riddles which might have been cited in support. As to those ancients who worked this out further in writing we may at any rate think of Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Heraclitus and Empedocles, quoted or cited by Plotinus. Those who only spoke about these matters to their pupils presumably are Pythagoreans who, just as the master himself, did not write,²²² whereas those who neglected the doctrine altogether must be those Presocratics who are incapable of being subjected to an *interpretatio platonica*.

What we learn from these two Plotinian passages is that he knew two centos in which Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus and Plato figured prominently, one focusing on the vicissitudes of the soul and the other (adding Parmenides and Anaxagoras) on the doctrine of the two cosmoi, the intelligible and the sensible. There are important respects in which these centos are related or overlapping; Plotinus moreover used them in a creative way in order provide his own doctrine with *lettres de noblesse* which the philosophical public was already familiar with in other ways. What he confirms, writing some thirty to forty years after Hippolytus composed the *Ref.*, is (1) that Hippolytus' selection of philosophical key figures is rooted in tradition, and (2) that the metaphysical two-worlds theory and the doctrine concerned with the vicissitudes of the soul, though interacting and interrelated, may to some extent be kept separate. The interrelation and separation of these two doctrines in Hippolytus is different. Another important difference is that Hippolytus, who is far closer to Neopythagoreanism than Plotinus professes to be, makes Pythagoras the protagonist and archegete, whereas Plotinus only briefly mentions him *honoris causa*, and has to do so because, after all, the tradition he was working in put Pythagoras at the head of the list. We only have to think of Numenius' position.²²³ But Plato is Plotinus' real hero; he has studied the dialogues and extensively quotes from them, whereas Hippolytus in the later books of the *Ref.*, as we have seen, gives Neopythagorean doctrines to Plato which earlier he had ascribed to Pythagoras.²²⁴ However, Hippolytus and Plotinus do agree in giving pride of place to a Pythagorean tradition in Greek philosophy.

A few further Plotinian passages may be briefly mentioned. In an

²²² Armstrong *ad loc.* says that this possibly is a reference to Plotinus' teacher Ammonius' practice, but Plotinus speaks of the ancients. One cannot of course exclude that he expects us to think of later people observing the same rules. Those who neglect the two-worlds doctrine after all were followed too, e.g. by the Stoics and Epicureans.

earlier chapter of the essay on the three primary hypostases, *Enn.* V 1 [10] 6.3 ff., he speaks of τὸ θρυλλούμενον δὴ τοῦτο καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πάλαι σοφοῖς, viz. the doctrine that the One produces Plurality or Two or Number (εἴτε πλῆθος εἴτε δυάς εἴτε ἀριθμός).²²⁵ This is close enough to Hippolytus' account of what is produced by the Pythagorean/Platonic first principle.²²⁶ An interesting parallel to what Plutarch says about Apollo²²⁷ is found at *Enn.* V 5 [32] 6.26-8, τάχα δὲ καὶ τὸ "ἐν" ὄνομα τοῦτο ἄρσιν ἔχει πρὸς τὰ πολλά, ὅθεν καὶ Ἀπόλλωνα οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ συμβολικῶς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐσήμαινον ἀποφάσει τῶν πολλῶν. Another debt to the Neopythagorean/Middle Platonist tradition, again creatively reinterpreted; for Plotinus, unlike Plutarch, does not recognize a second principle on the same level as the first.

X 7 *Three Centos in Clement of Alexandria*

Heraclitus, Empedocles, Plato, Pythagoras and others are also found in Clementine centos which as to their overall aims and several important details are strikingly parallel to some of the things we have in Hippolytus, but sufficiently different in other respects to warrant the assumption that there is no predominant linear relation. They belong to the same family. In other words, though Hippolytus may have known and used Clement, the latter is by no means his main source. Furthermore, some among Clement's utterances are relatively short and a bit cryptic and can only be understood against the backdrop of what is in Hippolytus and of the earlier traditions on which, as I have tried to prove, he depends. Centos tend to be cryptic since the fun is in the connections.

At *Strom.* V xiv 102.3 ff.²²⁸ Clement discusses a number of Platonic passages. At 103.2-4 he turns to the myth of Er in *Rep.* X and advises us that Er is Zoroaster. Plato says that after having lain for twelve days on the funeral pile Er 'came to life again' (ἀναβιώναι); according to Clement, this either is an enigmatic reference to the Resurrection or one to the soul's journey through the signs of the Zodiac towards its 'recovery'

²²³ See *supra*, Ch. X 5.3, and see further *supra*, Ch. VIII 2.

²²⁴ See *supra*, Ch. IV 6, VIII 2.2-5.

²²⁵ See Gelzer (1985) 109, and on the ancients as a set 115 ff. What Plotinus says amounts to pure Neopythagoreanism, including a reminiscence of Speusippus.

²²⁶ See *supra*, Ch. VIII 2.2.

²²⁷ See *supra*, n. 159 and text thereto, and Gelzer (1985) 117, 127.

²²⁸ Generous excerpts from *Strom.* V 89.1-134.1 are found at Eus. *P. E.* XIII 13.1-65, which proves that this passage was considered important. The section quoted below is at *P. E.* XIII 13.30-32, II pp. 208.13-209.11 (a few textual variants).

(or 'resumption', ἀνάληψιν), for he—*scil.*, Plato—says himself²²⁹ that the same journey is made when the soul descends to be born (viz., in a body). This amounts to the recognition, *sotto voce*, that Plato hints at the transmigration of souls. The twelve exploits of Heracles also symbolize this recovery and liberation of the soul from the cosmos. Clement continues (*Strom.* V xiv 103.6-105.2):²³⁰

I do not leave out Empedocles, who in his physical argument²³¹ refers in exactly this way to the resumption of all things, assuming that a change into the substance of fire will take place at some time.²³² Heraclitus of Ephesus subscribes to this tenet in as clear a way as you may wish, approving (the idea) that one kind of cosmos [a] is eternal and another kind of cosmos [b] perishing, though he knows²³³ that the cosmos according to its present arrangement [a] is not different from the other [viz., b] in a certain condition. That he knew²³⁴ about the eternal individual cosmos [viz., b] consisting of the totality of substance he makes clear by speaking as follows: "The cosmos which is the same of all things neither a God nor a man has made, but it always was and is and will be an ever-living fire, in good measure kindled and in good measure going out".²³⁵ That he also declared it to be generated and perishable [viz., a] is indicated by what then follows: "Turnings of fire; first sea,

229 Reception in the guise of a *Schwindelhinweis*. For ἀναλήψις 'going/returning to heaven' see Luc 9:51; in a pagan and Platonic sense the word occurs e.g. Hierocl. *In Carm. aur.* p. 5.3, τῆς οἰκείας εὐζωΐας ἀναλήψις. Cf. further *supra*, text to Ch. VIII n. 132.

230 οὐ παραπέμπομαι καὶ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα, ὃς φυσικῶς οὕτως τῆς τῶν πάντων ἀναλήψεως μέμνηται, ὥς ἐσομένης ποτὲ εἰς τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς οὐσίαν μεταβολῆς, σαφέστατα (δ') Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος ταύτης ἐστὶ τῆς δόξης, τὸν μὲν τινα κόσμον αἰδίων εἶναι δοκιμάσας, τὸν δὲ τινα φθιρόμενον, τὸν κατὰ τὴν διακόσμησιν εἰδὼς οὐχ ἕτερον ὄντα ἐκείνου πῶς ἔχοντος. ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν αἰδίων τὸν ἐξ ἀπάσης τῆς οὐσίας ἰδίως ποιὸν κόσμον ᾗδει, φανερόν ποιεῖ λέγων οὕτως. "κόσμον τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε τις ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἦν αἰεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ αἰείζων ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα". ὅτι δὲ καὶ γενητὸν καὶ φθαρτὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι ἐδογματίζεν, μὲνυει τὰ ἐπιφερόμενα. "πυρὸς τροπαὶ πρῶτον θάλασσα, θαλάσσης δὲ τὸ μὲν ἡμῖς γῆ, τὸ δὲ ἡμῖς πρηστήρ". δυνάμει γὰρ λέγει ὅτι πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ διοικούντος Λόγου καὶ Θεοῦ τὰ σύμπαντα δι' αἴρος τρέπεται εἰς ὕγρον τὸ ὡς σπέρμα τῆς διακοσμήσεως, ὃ καλεῖ "θάλασσαν". ἐκ δὲ τούτου αὖθις γίνεται γῆ καὶ οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ ἐμπεριεχόμενα. ὅπως δὲ πάλιν ἀναλαμβάνεται καὶ ἐκπυροῦται, σαφῶς διὰ τούτων δηλοῖ. "θάλασσα διαχέεται καὶ μετρέεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ὁκοῖος πρόσθεν ἦν ἢ γενέσθαι γῆ". ὁμοίως καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων στοιχείων τὰ αὐτά. παραπλήσια τούτῳ καὶ οἱ ἐλλογιμώτατοι τῶν Στωικῶν δογματίζουσι περὶ τε ἐκπυρώσεως διαλαμβάνοντες καὶ κόσμου διοικήσεως καὶ τοῦ ἰδίως ποιῶν κόσμου τε καὶ ἀνθρώπου *** [cf. *infra*, n. 240] καὶ τῆς τῶν ἡμετέρων ψυχῶν ἐπιδιαμονῆς. πάλιν τε αὖ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν μὲν τῷ ἐβδόμῳ τῆς Πολιτείας κτλ.

231 Or "by an argument of a physical kind". Eusebius reads ὁ φυσικὸς οὗτος not ὅς φυσικῶς οὕτως; this makes sense but seems to be a vulgarization.

232 Not in *Vorsokr.* or Bollack (1969a).

233 Cf. *supra*, n. 211.

234 Cf. *supra*, n. 211.

235 *Vorsokr.* 22B30 (Fr. 51 (a) M.). Here and in what follows I have tried to provide translations which fit the context in Clement.

and of sea the one half earth, the other half fiery storm".²³⁶ For to all effect he says that the fire via air is turned by the Reason and God who directs all things into the wet (which he calls 'sea') which serves as the seed of the cosmic arrangement, and from this (seed) earth comes to be and heaven and what is contained therein. In what way it is resumed again and converted into fire, he precisely shows in the following words: "Sea pours asunder and is measured up to the same amount it was before earth²³⁷ came to be".²³⁸ In a similar way (he affirms) the same things about the other elements. The most famous among the Stoics²³⁹ subscribe to views which come very close to his [*scil.*, Heraclitus'], as they dogmatize about and embrace the total conflagration and the administration of the cosmos and the ***²⁴⁰ of the individual cosmos and (the individual) human being, and the permanence of our souls. Plato, again, in book seven of the *Politeia*, says ...

It is clear that a version of the Stoic cosmic cycle is here already found in and so attributed to Heraclitus; it is also clear that a version of this cycle is attributed to Empedocles as well. We have to distinguish several layers of interpretation which in various ways contribute to Clement's medley, viz. (1) Plato's interpretation of Heraclitus and Empedocles at *Soph.* 242d-243a, (2) the *interpretatio stoica* of Empedocles and Heraclitus, (3) a subsequent *interpretatio platonica* of (2), and finally (4), the *interpretatio christiana* of (3).

Plato, as we recall,²⁴¹ placed Heraclitus and Empedocles on the same level in that both assume that things are both 'one and many', but pointed out that according to the former things are simultaneously one and many and according to the latter one and many by turns. Plato's Empedocles therefore speaks of a cosmic cycle, which Plato's Heraclitus does not. The Stoics, interpreting Heraclitus, attributed their own cosmic cycle to him and thus wiped out an important difference between Empedocles and Heraclitus established by Plato; they had a predecessor

²³⁶ *Vorsokr.* 22B31 (Fr. 53 (a) M.).

²³⁷ γῆ *omis.* Eusebius.

²³⁸ *Vorsokr.* 22B31 (Fr. 53 (a) M.), continued.

²³⁹ *SVF* II 590. For this distinction between the eternal and the changing world see e.g. Philo on the Stoics *Aet.* 8-9 (*SVF* II 620), where the role of fire is moreover emphasized. For the recurrence of the individual person see the reference to Chrysippus' Περὶ κόσμου in Alex. *In An. pr.* 180.31 ff. (*SVF* II 624, 1st text).

²⁴⁰ *lacunam indicavi; ἀναστάσεως addendum* (see Mansfeld (1983c) 232 n. 35). This 'resurrection' represents the Stoic eternal recurrence, cf. *supra*, n. 239, and Clem. *Strom.* V i 9.4 (*SVF* II 630) quoted *infra*, n. 252. I have discussed the *interpretatio christiana* of the *ekpyrosis* and eternal recurrence, for which the earliest evidence is found in Tatian who however makes a sharp distinction between the Stoic and the Christian doctrines (cf. *supra*, text to Ch. IX n. 100), in Mansfeld (1983c). See also *supra*, text to Ch. IX nn. 100 ff. for this idea in Hippolytus.

²⁴¹ See *supra*, Ch. I 4, Ch. III n. 54 *ad finem*, Ch. VIII n. 103 and text thereto, and this Ch., text to n. 214.

in Arist. *De Cael.* A 10.279b13-7.²⁴² The Stoics (at any rate Chrysippus) furthermore argued that the cosmos in one sense is eternal and in another always being reborn and dying, or that the cosmos as we know it is just the cosmos in a particular shape, as the cosmos during *ekpyrosis* is in another particular shape, in this way providing a Stoic version of the standard Platonic two-worlds theory, shored up by their interpretation of Empedocles and Heraclitus.²⁴³ The later *interpretatio platonica* emphasizes the role of the ascending and descending immortal soul in the context of this cyclic cosmic drama; that we are dealing with a Middle Platonist interpretation is also clear from the context, with its numerous quotations from Plato—appropriately explained—and its surprising statement (*Strom.* V xiv 102.2) that Pindar is a Pythagorean.²⁴⁴ The Clementine *interpretatio christiana* focuses on the Resurrection and the Final Judgement through Fire, and so eliminates the cosmic cycles of Empedocles and Heraclitus. The process is represented as linear.

The way Empedocles and Heraclitus, in this passage, are put on the same level and especially the attribution to Empedocles of Heraclitus' Fire are remarkably parallel to the treatment of these two philosophers at Hipp. *Ref.* I 3-4.²⁴⁵ A parallel however which again brings out a remarkable difference, viz. that Hippolytus does *not* attribute *metensomatosis* to Heraclitus,²⁴⁶ while Clement, who speaks of the ascent and descent of the soul in connection with Plato just before he comes to speak of Empedocles, implicitly makes this attribution. The fact that Clement offers no proof, that is to say fails to quote appropriate lines in support of his terse statement that Empedocles has all things (including the liberated soul) return to Fire—which of course he could not have done, for no such lines ever existed—shows that ultimately he depends on an earlier exegesis, which interpreted the Empedoclean Sphere as a (prefiguration of) the cosmos in its superior fiery state, as in Stoic physics, which interpretation in its turn made possible the assimilation to the doctrine of Heraclitus. Finally, the fact that Clement has the soul return in the end to the Empedoclean Fire (as he calls it) reminds one of the interpretation of the doctrine of the *Purifications* in the context of

²⁴² For the Early Stoics on Empedocles see Mansfeld (1979a) 169 ff. and esp. 171 f. n. 131.

²⁴³ This interpretation, presumably, is also behind Stob./Aët. II 4.3, 'Ἡράκλειτος οὐ κατὰ χρόνον εἶναι γενητὸν τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν.

²⁴⁴ Cf. also *Strom.* III iii 17.2, where Pindar is quoted in a similar context (for which see below),

²⁴⁵ For references see *infra*, n. 254. Marcovich, *ad Ref.* I 3.1 (Empedocles) νοερὸν πῦρ τὸν θεὸν καὶ συνεστάναι ἐκ πυρὸς τὰ πάντα καὶ εἰς πῦρ ἀναλυθῆσθαι, lists the parallel for Empedocles in Clem. *loc. cit.* Cf. also Aët. I 7.28 (*supra*, n. 67 and text thereto), according to which the cosmos is resolved unto God.

²⁴⁶ *Supra*, Ch. IX 2.4.

the cosmology of the *On Nature* which as we have seen is already presupposed in an early work of Plutarch, and in the *Placita*.²⁴⁷ In this Christianized Platonic/Empedoclean/Heraclitean/Stoic world, the vicissitudes of the soul are part of the cosmology involved. The fate of the psychic microcosm is part of that of the macrocosm.

The second Clementine cento that has to be discussed briefly is *Strom.* III iii 12.1-21.1, which is concerned with the soul only. The theme of the chapter is ἐγκράτεια. According to Clement Plato, the Pythagoreans and Marcion²⁴⁸ assume that to be born is bad (κακὴν τὴν γένεσιν, 12.1). A fairly substantial overview of Marcion's views is followed by a reference to Heraclitus, who declares that to be born is bad. As the proof-text *Vorsokr.* 22B20 is quoted (14.1): "once born they accept to live and have their fatal portions [i.e. to die]", or rather "to rest", "and they leave children behind that (other) fatal portions may be born". Empedocles, Clement continues, clearly agrees with Heraclitus, and he quotes *Vorsokr.* 31B118, B125 and B124 (from the *Purifications*) in support (14.2). A number of other poetic quotations follow (14.3-15.3), as well as a reference to Herodotus' Solon (16.1) and the famous Homeric line *Il.* Z 146 (16.2) on the generations of men as falling leaves. Then (16.3-20.3) we have a number of quotations from Plato and one from Philolaus (as well as one from Pindar): Plato *Crat.* 400bc (the body as a tomb) is followed by Phil. *Vorsokr.* 44B14, on the soul buried in the body; the Pindar fragment is followed by numerous other quotations from Plato, which are all duly explained in terms of the *damnatio* of coming-to-be-born, with occasional references to Marcion. This section is wound up with another quotation from Heraclitus, viz. *Vorsokr.* 22B21,²⁴⁹ and Clement says that just as Pythagoras, and as Socrates in the *Gorgias* (viz. 492e), Heraclitus θάνατον τὴν γένεσιν καλεῖ.

In this passage Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Plato and others are adduced to illustrate the view that the soul when in the body has a miserable life and that it only finds its freedom, or true life, when liberated from the body. This is good Pythagorean and Platonic doctrine (though, as Plotinus was to see, difficult to reconcile with that of the *Timaeus*), easily made subservient to a Christian purpose, but according to Clement's argument to be condemned as to its excesses as exemplified by the encratite doctrines of Marcion.

²⁴⁷ *De soll. animal.* 964DE (*supra*, n. 163 and text thereto); for Aëtius see *supra*, Ch. X 3.

²⁴⁸ See *supra*, Ch. IX 1.3, on Hippolytus' much similar treatment of Marcion's encratism.

²⁴⁹ For a suggestion as to the *constitutio* and interpretation of this fragment see Mansfeld (1984) 448.

The last cento in Clement I wish to discuss is at *Strom.* V i 9.1-7. He begins by quoting the three lines of Empedocles *Vorsokr.* 31B114 which he calls a hymn in praise of faith. Paul (1 Cor 2:5) said that only faith guarantees salvation. Heraclitus is quoted (*Vorsokr.* 22B28), on the man who remains faithful to what he knows and on the (Goddess of) Justice who will catch up with liars and false witnesses. For, Clement continues, Heraclitus too (*Strom.* V 1 9.4)

knew²⁵⁰ from the barbarian [i.e. Jewish] philosophy about the purification through fire of those who have led evil lives, which the Stoics later called total conflagration,²⁵¹ according to which they also hold that the individual (person) will rise again, honouring this as the Resurrection.²⁵²

Also Plato—passages from *Tim.* 22ce are quoted—spoke of the periodical purification of the cosmos by means of fire and water.²⁵³

In this section, the fate of the human soul(-and-body) is again firmly placed against a cosmological background. Again, the pagan authorities are Empedocles, Heraclitus, the Stoics and Plato. The Stoic cycle is again converted into a linear process, and the utterances of Empedocles and Heraclitus are used as testimony in support of the doctrine of the Final Judgement, whereas Plato purportedly mentioned the deluge as well. We may observe that Clement's remark that Heraclitus' purification through Fire was accepted by the Stoics who called this *ekpyrosis* is rather precisely paralleled at Hipp. *Ref.* I 3.1, where however the return of all things to Fire is attributed to Empedocles with whom Heraclitus subsequently is said to agree in almost every respect (*Ref.* I 4.2).²⁵⁴

X 8 The "Philonic Cento"

In a paper published half a dozen years ago and from which I merely pick out the more important points here (apologizing for the number of references to this earlier publication), I have argued that Pythagoras, Plato, Empedocles, Heraclitus and even Aristotle figure in a Middle Platonist cento which is a number of times used by Philo of

²⁵⁰ Cf. *supra*, n. 211.

²⁵¹ Cf. *supra*, n. 240.

²⁵² οἶδεν γὰρ καὶ οὗτος ἐκ τῆς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας μαθὼν τὴν διὰ πυρὸς κάθαρσιν τῶν κακῶς βεβιωκότων, ἣν ὕστερον ἐκπύρωσιν ἐκάλεσαν οἱ Στωικοί· καθ' ὃν καὶ τὸν ἰδίως ποιὸν ἀναστήσεσθαι δογματίζουσι, τοῦτ' ἐκείνο τὴν ἀνάστασιν περιέποντες. This Christian interpretation of the *ekpyrosis* has its roots in Paul I Cor. 3:13 (see further Mansfeld (1983c) 220 f.).

²⁵³ Cf. Mansfeld (1979a) 147 n. 52, (1985b) 150 f.

²⁵⁴ See *supra*, Ch. I 4, Ch. IV 6, Ch. VIII 2.7, Ch. VIII 2.8 *ad finem*, Ch. IX text to n. 19, Ch. IX 1.6, Ch. IX 2.2, Ch. IX 2.4 *ad finem*.

Alexandria²⁵⁵ but also occurs, in various forms, in a plurality of later authors, pagans as well as Christians. This cento is of crucial importance to Philo's doctrine of the soul.²⁵⁶

Cain's perpetual banishment when, just as Empedocles' *daimon* who put his trust in Strife, he has committed bloodshed, is described in terms which undoubtedly presuppose the interpretation of Empedocles *Vorsokr.* 31B115 as dealing with the unhappy wanderings of the exiled soul: one after the other, the elements wage war against him (*Quaest. in Genes.* I 71).²⁵⁷ The term 'exile' is repeatedly used by Philo at *Quaest. in Gen.* I 70-6, and had already been used *ibid.* I 45, in reference to Adam's banishment from paradise which has made all of us exiles on earth.²⁵⁸ As a matter of fact the idea that man is a sojourner on earth is very important in Philo's anthropology,²⁵⁹ so one understands why the Empedoclean ingredient in the cento came to have a special appeal to him. Other parts of the Philonic cento dealing with the condition of the soul are ultimately derived from Plato and/or the Pythagoreans, and even Aristotle's *Protrepticus*; the body as a tomb, life in the body as the burial of the soul, etc., the disembodied life as the soul's true life.²⁶⁰ The background is (Philo's version of) the Platonic two-worlds theory. We must observe that Philo, understandably, has eliminated all references to the transmigrations of the soul. There are in Philo also other and comparable reminiscencies of Empedocles' *Katharmoi*, e.g. *Somn.* II 133, where there is an unmistakable echo of Empedocles *Vorsokr.* 31B121-122; and at *Prov.* II 24 *ap.* Eus. *P. E.* VIII xiv 23, 31B121.2 is quoted, though in a garbled form.²⁶¹

Another very important ingredient of the cento is the famous Heraclitean oxymoron 'to die the life / to live the death'. Philo *Quaest. in Gen.*

²⁵⁵ E.g. *Quaest. in Gen.* I 67-76, *Quod Deus* 150, *Somn.* I 139, *Leg. all.* I 105-8, *Fug.* 53-64.

²⁵⁶ Mansfeld (1985b). The cento has also to some extent been analyzed in the pioneering and important paper of Burkert (1975) to which I am much indebted, but Burkert has missed the antecedents in Philo. Heracl. *Vorsokr.* 22B62 has been studied by Pépin (1971) 34 ff. (cf. *supra*, Ch. IX n. 96), who concentrates on its first part (ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοί ἀθάνατοι), does not look at the other ingredients of the cento and fails to include Philo in his overview.

²⁵⁷ Mansfeld (1985b) 134 f. See also *Deter.* 150 ff. with my comments at Mansfeld (1985b) 138 f., *Fug.* 53-64 with my comments *ibid.* 141 ff.

²⁵⁸ Mansfeld (1985b) 141, 150.

²⁵⁹ See Bitter (1982).

²⁶⁰ *Orph. Fr.* 8 Kern, Philol. *Vorsokr.* 44B14, Plato *Crat.* 400c, *Gorg.* 492e-493a, *Phaed.* 80e-81e, *Phaedr.* 248cd, Arist. *Protr.* Fr. 10b Ross. See Mansfeld (1985b) 132 ff., 144 (parallels for the use of elements from the cento in Celsus and Plotinus), and *passim*. Cf. also *supra*, Ch. VIII 2.8.

²⁶¹ See Mansfeld (1983b) 149 f., also for Philo's interpretation (paralleled in other authors) of Empedocles' nether world as the earth.

IV 152 (Heraclitus Fr. 47 (*d*)²⁶² M.)²⁶² points out that Heraclitus stole this thought: “that is an excellent saying of Heraclitus, who on this point follows the teaching of Moses, for he says Ζῶμεν τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τεθνήκαμεν δὲ τὸν ἐκείνων βίον”. In his tortuous way Philo spares no pains to find precedents in the text of the *Old Testament*. The fact that this Heraclitean text is quoted in practically the same form by Numenius and Hierocles is significant and shows that Philo uses a concatenation of ideas already at his disposal.²⁶³ Now the complete text of this fragment (*Vorsokr.* 22B62 = Fr. 47 (*a*) M.) is extant only in Hipp. *Ref.* IX 10.6:²⁶⁴ ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοὶ ἀθάνατοι, ζῶντες τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τὸν δὲ ἐκείνων βίον τεθνεώτες. Philo and others²⁶⁵ provide adapted quotes and assume that Heraclitus’ words apply to the incarnated and disincarnated states of the soul. What Heraclitus himself had in mind is unclear.²⁶⁶ To the present writer, the most attractive hypothesis is that he meant the elements, or the elemental aggregations of the one principle. Water dies when becoming earth, but at the same time earth dies when becoming water; water and earth etc. are always alive though always dying. Now Heraclitus in another fragment (*Vorsokr.* 22B36), describing the elemental cycle and using the words θάνατος (instead of the more neutral ‘perishing’) and γενέσθαι/γίνεται (obviously toying seriously with the meaning ‘to be born’), replaces ‘fire’ as the third element involved in the cycle fire—water—earth—water—fire by ‘soul’ and ‘souls’ (ψυχῇσι and ψυχῇ). Indeed, Philo *Aet.* 111 (Heraclitus Fr. 66 (*b*) M.) cites the first half of B36 as being about the transformations of the physical elements. At *Aet.* 109 he explains that “seeming to die, they [*scil.*, the elements] are made *immortal*” (my emphasis); this however derives from the first part of Heraclitus B62, which to the best of my knowledge Philo never quotes or alludes to elsewhere. We may safely assume this interpretation was not invented by Philo. Accordingly, the first part of B62 was used to interpret B36 (*Heraclitus ex Heraclito*),

²⁶² For the full text see below. The Philonic reference at *Leg. all.* I 107 is quoted by Marcovich as Fr. 47 (*d*¹) M., but there are more instances, e.g. *Deter.* 48, 49, 178, *Gig.* 14, *Fug.* 54, *Spec.* I 345. Gilles Quispel points out an interesting parallel in the *Corpus Hermeticum*, viz. the *logion* in the collection of *kephalaia* Fr. IX (35) (*ap.* Stob. I 41.1 p. 276.22-3) γένεσις ἀνθρώπου φθορᾶς, φθορὰ ἀνθρώπου γενέσεως ἀρχή. But note that Fr. IX (38) is much different.

²⁶³ Numen. *ap.* Porph. *De antro* p. 63.19 f. (Heracl. Fr. 47(*d*⁴) M., Numen. Fr. 30.13-4), Hierocl. *In carm. aur.* c. 24, p. 98.7-9 (Heracl. Fr. 47 (*d*⁵) M.), cf. Mansfeld (1983b) 145.

²⁶⁴ See *supra*, Ch. IX text to n. 96.

²⁶⁵ Cf. also Sext. *P.* III 230 (Fr. 47 (*d*³) M. [note the mistaken reference to *P.* II in Marcovich], who obviously cites an available quotation-cum-exegesis.

²⁶⁶ For attempts to read (or include) Orphic or Pythagorean ideas into this fragment see e.g. Pépin (1971) 35 ff., Kahn (1979) 216 ff.

and we may infer that the 'soul(s)' of B36 were used in the same way to interpret B62 as being about embodied, or entombed, and disembodied, or liberated, souls.²⁶⁷ These interpretations must derive from an early Alexandrian Middle Platonist, or more than one, writing in a learned way about the soul as involved in what occurs in the cosmos; a person or persons who, for us, remain(s) anonymous.

Philo also uses the (Empedoclean) theme of the persecution by the elements in other contexts. The Platonic view that the earth is periodically cleansed by fire or water²⁶⁸ is made subservient to his exegetical purposes as well. These philosophical doctrines enable him to provide a scientific interpretation of the deluge, of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, and of the plagues of Egypt.²⁶⁹ Here the context is primarily cosmological.

IX 9 *Conclusion*

What I have called the Philonic cento is not only important for its contents, but also for its date. The Platonizing and Pythagoreanizing interpretation of Empedocles and Heraclitus, emphasizing the vicissitudes of the soul against the backdrop of what occurs on the macrocosmic stage, has its beginnings in the first century BCE. Furthermore, the explicitly Stoic ingredients which characterize the cento in its Clementine shape are absent in Philo,²⁷⁰ although his Heraclitus has to a certain extent been Stoicized. There are of course important differences with the next stage in the life-history of the *interpretatio* of this cento which is visible to us, viz. what we find in Plutarch, but the main ingredients are already present in an embryonic way. Plutarch is the for us most important representative of a dualist reshaping, a precedent of which with regard to the Pythagorean ingredient is already found in the *Placita*, or so I believe. We may feel certain that Plutarch, and others, e.g. Numenius, made significant additions to and modifications in the tralatitious material.

What we find in Hippolytus, though in many respects similar to what is in e.g. Plutarch, also has its own specific colouring and purpose. Hippolytus knew what he was doing. However, the main textual-and-exegetical materials he used, though of various provenance, were without exception already available to him, and the roots of his views of the

²⁶⁷ See Mansfeld (1983b) 145 f.

²⁶⁸ Cf. *supra*, n. 253 and text thereto.

²⁶⁹ *Mos.* II 53 ff., *Abrah.* 1, *Mos.* I 96 ff., *Mos.* II 281 ff. Cf. Mansfeld (1983b) 150 ff., Runia (1986) 77 ff.

²⁷⁰ Perhaps there is a slight hint at *Prov.* II 48.

history of Greek philosophy are without doubt to be found in the exegetical and historical literature composed by the Greek philosophers (Middle Platonists as well as Aristotelians) of the first century BCE and the first two centuries CE. The philosophers he is really interested in are Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Plato and Aristotle; this corresponds with a Middle Platonist focus. As an intellectual Hippolytus is a child of his time. The triumphant victory of Neoplatonism over all the other varieties of Platonism and the other philosophical schools soon put him out of date, and it can hardly be an accident that in the West only the *Philosophoumena* enjoyed a certain amount of success, which moreover was probably in part due to the fact that it circulated under the name of the more famous Origen. Already in Antiquity, it was used as a source for Greek philosophy ... We may be certain that such was never the intention of its author.

APPENDIX ONE

SOME LITERATURE ON HIPPOLYTUS, HIS SOURCES AND HIS METHODS*

The ascription of the *Refutatio* to Hippolytus was rejected by Nautin (1947) and (1961) 177 ff., 203 ff., who argued that the doctrine and the mode of presentation of the *Ref.* are flagrantly different from those of Hippolytus' *Contra Noëtum* and that the former work is by a person (otherwise hardly known) called Josipus. This thesis failed to win general acceptance and was already pertinently criticised by Daniélou (1948). See further Loi (1977a), Loi (1977b), Simonetti (1977). Both Loi and Simonetti to some extent follow Nautin but desperately argue that we should distinguish between two different authors called Hippolytus, a Roman and an Oriental one. Frickel (1977b) however argues that the *Contra Noët.* is based on the *Ref.*, and that the latter not the former is by Hippolytus. The *Contra Noët.* has been edited, translated and studied by Butterworth (1977), who intelligently discusses the problems relating to this work. See also the overview of the literature in Vallée (1981) 41 ff. Nautin is loyally followed by Le Boulluec (1985) 16 f., who chose to omit Hippolytus from his valuable study. The traditional attribution is emphatically defended by Marcovich in the introduction to his edition, (1986) 8 ff.; for a balanced discussion of the *status quaestionis* see Norelli (1987) 9 ff. (note, *ibid.* 32 ff., the parallels between the *Ref.* and the *De Antichristo*). Frickel (1988) is entirely devoted to this problem and (partly retracting his earlier view) strongly and for the most part convincingly argues in favour of one Hippolytus as the author both of the *Ref.* and the *Contra Noët.* (and so of other works, such as the *Syntagma*, the *De universo*, the *Chronicle*, etc.); cf. also Frickel (1989). Simonetti (1989) modifies his earlier position to some extent, but still maintains that the *Contra Noët.* and the *Ref.* cannot have been written by the same man. Saxer (1989), who does not deal with the *Contra Noët.*, convincingly argues that both the *Ref.*, in view of its Roman setting (esp. the feud with Pope Callistus),¹ and the works listed in the catalogue inscribed—at a date which is about that of the composition of the *Ref.*—on the statue found and still to be admired in Rome, are to be attributed to Hippolytus of Rome. The hypotheses about the locality where the statue was erected and the reason why it was inscribed in the third century CE of Guarducci (1989) strain one's credulity; this paper also refers to earlier literature (cf. also Testini (1989)). Scholten (1990) 501 ff. argues at some length that there is insufficient evidence to support the two authors hypothesis.

For the working methods of ancient authors in general, the way they assigned tasks to their assistants, indicating where to find and transcribe

* The papers by I. Mueller announced at Mueller (1989) 234 n. 5 as forthcoming in a volume of *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* Teil II Bd. 36, viz. "The Author of the *Refutation of All Heresies* and his Writings" and "Heterodoxy and Doxography in Hippolytus' *Refutation of All Heresies*", had not yet been published when my book went to the press, and I have not seen them.

¹ On which the traditional attribution to Hippolytus, first argued by Döllinger (1853), depends.

excerpts, the production of rough and final versions, the importance of dictation etc. by all means see Dorandi (1991). For the ancients ways of using quotations see Whittaker (1989), who discusses modifications of word-order, the addition and subtractions of words, the substitution of words in place of the original, and conflated quotes (which I would prefer to call mini-centos).

At *D.G.* 145, wishing for reasons of his own to prove that Hippolytus was a painstaking plagiarist, Diels refers to *Ref.* X 6-8, where in his view Hippolytus transcribes *Sext. M.* X 310-18, and to *Ref.* IX 20-9, where as Diels argued he transcribes Joseph. *Bell. Jud.* II viii 2-13 (in neither of these cases, Hippolytus reveals that he borrows from a source). Diels says the transcription both times was made 'accurate' (N.B.: Diels wrote in Latin) but there is a most important difference. The correspondence with the Sextan passage is almost verbatim; note, however, that Janáček (1959) 19 ff.—a paper overlooked by Frickel and Marcovich—argues that Hippolytus and Sextus, because of minute divergencies in diction, must derive from a common source. One could say that such divergencies are the rule rather than the exception whenever something is copied out in writing, but Janáček may be right; in that case, or so I believe, the source at issue need not however be of Skeptical provenance. But against Janáček's assumption is the fact that *Ref.* IV 1 and 3-6 dealing with Chaldaean astrology (passages not mentioned by Diels) have been copied out almost verbatim, of course without acknowledgement again, from *Sext. M.* V (for the details see the upper apparatuses in Wendland and Marcovich; note that *Ref.* IV 5 for the most part is paraphrase, not quotation). This has been denied by Janáček (1964), but on insufficient grounds; he only selects a few passages and then focuses on minute divergencies of diction between Sextus and Hippolytus which, so he argues, show that Sextus made slight stylistic changes in his original source.²

But the differences at issue in the astrological chapters are far more substantial. For a better understanding of Hippolytus' methods and mannerisms, it is important to note that in *Ref.* IV, *loc. cit.*, he generally speaking follows Sextus' paragraph order, once in a while jumping several paragraphs or inserting a little piece from another one, and quite often compressing a colon or two, or modifying the word-order and especially the vocabulary of his source. The transcribed and partially paraphrased account of Chaldaean astrology itself has not been interpolated by Hippolytus in a tendentious way, but between *Sext. M.* V 37-9 + 44 (*Ref.* IV 1) and 50-61 (*Ref.* IV 3) he has allowed himself to wedge in a whole chapter (*Ref.* IV 2) on the Peratae. That at *Ref.* IV 3.4, 34.11 W. = 94.18 M. Hippolytus writes παραστήσω, not (as Sextus) παραστήσομεν is of course significant; he wants to pass off himself as the author, so Marcovich is wrong in changing the text of Hippolytus because of what is in Sextus.

Substantial sections of the accounts of the Gnostics in the *Ref.*, esp. in books VI-VII, have been faithfully transcribed from Irenaeus *Adversus Haereses*. These are easily found in the overview of the contents at Marcovich (1986) 22 ff. and esp. in the conspectus of Rousseau - Doutreleau (1979) 64 f. The editors of the Sources Chrétiennes text of Irenaeus, who survives complete in Latin only, print these passages under their Latin text and French translation.

² His further argument that in the lost preceding account of Hippolytus parallels to what has been preserved in Sextus must have been present seems valid, but of course does not prove that a vanished treatise rather than Sextus was Hippolytus' source in the lost section.

On the other hand, in the freely paraphrased passage (*Ref.* IX 20-9) dealing with the three Jewish philosophies which has been taken from the *Bellum Judaicum* of Flavius Josephus, highly significant and tendentious interpolations have been added (the cento method, see *supra*, Chs. VIII-IX) and alterations made according to Hippolytus' grand heresiological design; see Koschorke (1975), who shows that Hippolytus refutes the Gnostics by proving to his own satisfaction that their wisdom derives from the Greeks, and that Greek wisdom derives from the Egyptians and Egyptian wisdom from the Jews, whereas Christianity derives from the Jews in a direct way and even is an improvement thereof. For the general idea, common among both Jewish and Christian authors, that Moses is both better and earlier than the Greek poets and philosophers and often their (partly understood) ultimate source of inspiration see the useful compilation of Droge (1989), who stresses the influence of the view of Hecataeus of Abdera (and its antecedents in Plato *Tim.* 22ac and other Greek authors, e.g. Herodot. II 143 on the experiences of Hecataeus of Miletus) that civilisation and culture derive from Egypt, and the analogous efforts of Berossus of Babylon and Philo of Byblus who have these begin in Mesopotamia or Phoenicia, and discusses the fragments of the early Jewish historians and the works of Flavius Josephus and (very briefly) Philo of Alexandria, of the apologists Justin, Tatian and Theophilus, and of the ecclesiastical authors Clement, Origen and Eusebius, with rather full references to the secondary literature. I fail to understand how Scholten (1990), who 521 f. accepts that Hippolytus' report about the Jewish sects is derived from Josephus, can say, *ibid.* 520, that the account of the Essenes is 'ebenbürtig' with that of Josephus. See also Mansfeld (1983c), where I prove that in the chapter on the Stoics at *Ref.* I 21.5 (*SVF* II 469) the puzzling and for the Stoics entirely inappropriate term ἀνάστασιν has been cleverly interpolated by Hippolytus in order to have the Stoics toe the line of his Pythagorean *diadoche* and grand heresiological design.³

Hippolytus on occasion also copied out his own text; e.g., *Ref.* X 7.6-7, 268.1-4 W. = 383.33-36 M. (on Plato—not in the parallel text in Sextus) is from *Ref.* I 19, with only minute verbal differences (cf. above, on *Ref.* IV in relation to Sextus). Frickel (1968) 51 wrongly denies that this is the case, but Marcovich in the upper apparatus to *Ref.* X 7.6-7 provides the correct backward reference. An interesting interpolation is to be found in the Sextan text copied out by Hippolytus without acknowledgement in *Ref.* X 6-8 as an easy substitute for the summary of the philosophical doctrines from bk. I that one would expect him to provide and which, characteristically, he pretends to offer. Sext. *M.* X 318 speaks of "Democritus and Epicurus and a good many others". Hipp. *Ref.* X 7.5 interpolates ὡν ἐκ μένους πρότερον ἐμνήσθημεν, thus adding an obfuscating backward reference to *Ref.* bk. I; Marcovich *ad loc.* says 'om. Sext.', which amounts to reversing the roles. For his summary of Gnostic doctrines in *Ref.* bk. X Hippolytus did not excerpt the preceding books of the *Ref.* but used the original source(s) for the second time—these, in my view, presumably included his own *Syntagma* (for which see below)—; see Frickel (1981). An in my view not implausible hypothesis is that Hippolytus 'wrote' the treatise and its summary at the same time. Unfortunately, the differences are no longer visible in the text as edited by Marcovich.

Koschorke argues that Hippolytus' method in the passage deriving from Josephus in *Ref.* bk. IX is characteristic, and that Hippolytus wilfully adapts

³ Marcovich emends to ἀνάκρασιν, *alii* to *alia*.

and interpolates his sources to further his own purpose. Frickel argues that the method in the Sextan passage in *Ref.* bk. X is characteristic and that as a rule Hippolytus transcribes his sources almost verbatim (see also Frickel (1984) 253 ff., but note that he fails to account in a proper way for the doctored Josephus transcript, neglects the evidence concerned with the partial reshuffling of Sextus' treatment of astrology in *Ref.* bk. IV and refuses to take the grand heresiological design of the *Ref.* established by Koschorke into account). Marcovich (1986) 27 posits that Hippolytus' source for the Jewish philosophies is 'a Christianized version' of the Josephus passage copied almost verbatim, but this suggestion should be rejected. On Hippolytus' methods see also Marcovich (1986) 35 ff., 49 ff., where he strongly defends the view that Hippolytus very much preferred to copy out his sources verbatim or at least to present a string of excerpts (not necessarily in their original order) although occasionally he also paraphrased them in his own words, but where in my view he mistakenly insists that Hippolytus refrained from doctoring.

For the nature of the Gnostic material at Hippolytus' disposal see, apart from the studies by Frickel cited above, Aland (1977), and Abramowski (1981), who argues that the Gnostic pieces at *Ref.* V 12-8, 19-22, 23-7, VI 9-18, 29-37, VII 20-7, VIII 8-11 and VIII 12-5, to which in her view the commentary on Aratus at IV 46-9 should be added, constitute a dossier assembled and worked over by a Christian Gnostic 'Redaktor'. See however Marcovich (1986) 47 ff., who argues that, on the contrary, the Gnostic sects (or rather authors) extensively borrowed from one another; this of course is true for the *Nag Hammadi Corpus* and related works, and so may be valid for the documents used by Hippolytus. One should however object that interpolations from one Gnostic document treated in the *Ref.* to be found in another discussed there may equally be due to Hippolytus himself. At any rate, Abramowski's argument that the formula τοῦτ(ό) ἐστὶ is the *shibboleth* of a Christian Gnostic 'Redaktor' is refuted by what we find at *Ref.* IV 51.3, where it is beyond any possible doubt Hippolytus himself who interpolates his substantial account of Pythagoras at *Ref.* IV 51.1 ff. with the remark καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ λέγει Σίμων οὕτως, 75.3 W. = 137.18 M.—a quotation from the *Apophysis* then follows, for which see *Ref.* VI 14.6; for τούτέστι (twice) see also *Ref.* IV 8.2. Consequently, also the somewhat garbled quotation from the *Apophysis* (for the better version see *Ref.* VI 9.4) integrated in the account of the Naässenes (VI 9.5) could indeed have been put in by Hippolytus.⁴ Furthermore, it is also inconceivable, at least to me, that a unifying and eirenic 'Redaktor' would have devoted so much energy to carefully distinguishing the different Gnostic sects and would have found it worth his while to start with the presumed archegete of Gnosticism. This procedure smacks of the heresiologist (cf. Justin's reference to his own *Syntagma* at *Apol.* 1.26, and see e.g. Wisse (1971) 213 ff., and Perkins (1976) 194, 197 f., and the literature cited in these two papers). Scholten (1990) 524 a bit too cautiously calls Abramowski's 'Redaktor' hypothesis 'unbeweisbar'.

It should be pointed out that the currents in Gnosticism distinguished by modern scholars are to some extent different from and certainly much more restricted in number than those listed by the ancient heresiologists. The books in the *Nag Hammadi Corpus*, moreover, do not proclaim to which individual sect they belong. Quite conceivably the 'Redaktor' is Hippolytus himself, who

⁴ For τούτέστι(v) as a standard term in pagan exegetical contexts see e.g. Sext. M. VII 110 (exegesis of Xenophanes), 112 and 114 (exegesis of Parmenides). An equivalent is ὅπερ ἐστὶ (M. VII 114, exegesis of Parmenides; M. VII 135, exegesis of Democritus).

Ref. Procem. 1 alludes to his own previously published short account of the Gnostic doctrines (πάλαι μετρίως τὰ δόγματα ἐξεθέμεθα), the so-called *Syntagma*, unfortunately lost, which contained a *diadoche* and identified the various heretic sects. For the reconstruction of this work the monographs of Lipsius (1865) and (1875) 91 ff. are still useful. However, Lipsius does not adduce the evidence from *Ref.* IV-X. For the discussion about the *Philosophoumena* and books IV-X and the question of their authorship since the '50s of the 19th century see Frickel (1988) 93 ff. Volkmar (1855) is still worth consulting.

For Hippolytus' *Syntagma* see further Dräseke (1903), Quasten (1953) 169 f., Isser (1976) 33 ff., 57 ff., Loi (1977b) 70 f., Marcovich (1986) 51, Frickel (1988) 33 f., 78, 113 f., and Scholten (1990) 518. According to the summary at Phot. cod. 121, it began with the Dositheans and (just as the *Ref.*) ended with Noëtus—the spiritual predecessor of Callistus, Hippolytus' most cherished enemy in the *Ref.*—and the Noëtians (cf. Osborne (1987) 135 n. 10). Consequently, it covered about the same period as the *Ref.*, Dositheus being a Samaritan contemporary or according to some sources even the teacher of Simon Magus (see Fossum (1985) 47 ff.), the founding father of the Gnostic *diadoche* according to Justin, Irenaeus and Hippolytus in the *Ref.* The Dositheans in the lost Hippolytean *Syntagma* may therefore have included Simon.

Photius also tells us that Hippolytus said in his (earlier) booklet that he summarized the oral teaching of Irenaeus; this probably entails that the contents of the *Syntagma* to a considerable extent differed from those of the published work of Irenaeus, viz. the *Adversus haereses* we still have. The remark about the oral teaching of Irenaeus need not imply much more than an appeal to authority, but it is of course theoretically conceivable that Irenaeus discussed Gnostic literature with Hippolytus (and others) or perhaps even lectured on or talked to colleagues about further evidence which had become available to him after the publication of the *Adv. haeres.*, and that Hippolytus had used this information, or knew about it. Cf. also Scholten (1990) 499, arguing that it is unclear whether the relation to Irenaeus "im Sinne des persönlichen Lehrverhältnisses oder nur der Abhängigkeit der antihäretischen Tätigkeit gemeint ist", and *ibid.* 518 f. The appendix (chs. 45-53) to Tertullian's *De praescr. haer.* is generally believed to correspond to the lost Hippolytean *Syntagma*, but this ps.-Tertullianic *Adversus omnes haereses* is merely a meagre excerpt.

That Hippolytus in the *Ref.* 'above all' used his own *Syntagma* is actually postulated by Marcovich (1986) 51; it should be noted, however, that at *Ref.* I *Procem.* 1-5 Hippolytus tells us that his present work is much more detailed than the earlier one. But the pattern of *Syntagma* and of the greater part of the *Ref.*, that is to say the *identification* of the Gnostic heresies and heresiarchs must have been the same, viz. the since Justin and Irenaeus traditional construction of a Gnostic *diadoche*. That (perhaps influenced by contemporary currents in Gnosticism) Hippolytus not unintelligently could have fabricated a systematic *logos*-theology for the Gnostics he wanted to refute which is at odds with what he considers to be his own doctrine (for which see Abramowski (1981) 20 ff.) would, I think, be absolutely in character and indeed fit in with the norms of ancient polemics (for Irenaeus' procedure see van Unnik (1977) 200 ff., and Perkins (1986) where references to further literature are provided. Perkins suggests that Irenaeus may have given the systems of his heretic opponents, esp. the Valentinians, a too Platonic colouring). The exceptionally learned inquiry of Krämer (1964), Ch. III a.2) 'Die Gnosis', should therefore be used

with caution. I do not wish to deny the influence of (Middle) Platonism on some of the more sophisticated Gnostics (see e.g. Whittaker (1987) 121 ff., who in my view goes a bit too far, especially where Hippolytus is concerned), but am reluctant to swallow the allegations of their critics hook, line and sinker.

That Hippolytus also drew from original Gnostic material in order to compose the *Syntagma* is plausible. Irenaeus, after all, went beyond Justin or may even have used an updated version of the latter's *Syntagma*, and he appears to have consulted contemporary Valentinian documents perhaps deriving from Ptolemaeus and his circle. Hippolytus' booklet must have been more up-to-date than the lost *Syntagma* of Justin (updated or not) apparently used by Irenaeus and than Irenaeus' own great work. The often-encountered view that Hippolytus discovered a sort of Nag Hammadi Library *after* he had published the *Syntagma* is not implausible but impossible to prove. At any rate, he not only adduced his earlier work but also his original sources for the *Syntagma* once again, for he explicitly tells us, *Ref.* I. Proœm. 1-2, that in the earlier work he refrained from speaking openly and in detail about the Gnostic 'mysteries'—which may entail that he could have informed his readers about them at the time if he had wished to do so. However, one cannot exclude that further original evidence had come to his notice in the meantime; his rather good account of Basilides in *Ref.* VII, for instance, would support such a suggestion. *Iren. Adv. Haeres.* præf. 3.37-8 and 51-4 had already said that he would make public the hidden mysteries of the Valentinians and others. Hippolytus in the *Ref.* may be echoing this statement in order to stress the fact that he too provides something new, that is to say an account that is both exhaustive and up-to-date.

Frickel's hypothesis that for the so-called *Apophasis Megale*⁵ Hippolytus used a Gnostic exegetical commentary in which quotations from the original writing were already embedded has been recently challenged by Osborne (1987) 212 ff., who argues that with each $\phi\eta\sigma\iota(v)$ Hippolytus takes up a new point found in the original document written by Simon, or an immediate pupil of Simon. But this is not entirely correct; at *Ref.* VI 14.5 (not mentioned by Osborne (1987) 218 n. 11), the $\phi\eta\sigma\iota$ -passage beyond any doubt is the paraphrastic exegesis of the preceding verbatim quotation from the *Apophasis* introduced by λέγει. It should be kept in mind that $\phi\eta\sigma\iota$ signifies both 'he says' (i.e. often 'it is written') and 'he means', although when used parenthetically it can only mean the former.⁶ But $\phi\eta\sigma\iota$ meaning 'he says' or 'writes' is by no means an iron indication that the quotation is verbatim or the paraphrase accurate (for instances where extant original texts prove a $\phi\eta\sigma\iota$ -quotation to be a mere paraphrase or even summary see, e.g., *Anon. Lond.*, *CAG* Suppl. III 1, col. VII.18 and 22, col. XVII.4 and 11). Yet it would seem that the original *Apophasis* or at least a considerable number of extensive excerpts were still accessible to Epiphanius, whose account at *Panarion* I 21 contains a number of verbatim quotations

⁵ This, in my view, is a false title, due to a slovenly reference or textual corruption at *Ref.* VI 11.1; the correct title is *Apophasis*, viz. the *Revelation* of—ultimately—the Great Power, cf. the fragment at VI 9.4-5, the corresponding reference at V 9.5, and the fragments at VI 14.6 and VI 18.2.

⁶ For a series of $\phi\eta\sigma\iota$'s introducing verbatim quotations (Democritean fragments) see *Sext. M.* VII 135 ff., but note that in the same passage (138) $\phi\eta\sigma\iota\nu$ is part of the paraphrase of an ensuing quotation introduced by λέγει δὲ κατὰ λέξιν (139; cf. *ibid.* ἐπιφέρει λέγων). The verbatim Plato quotation at *M.* VII 141 is introduced by λέγει δὲ οὕτως. $\phi\eta\sigma\iota$ is not part of the fixed terminology distinguishing verbatim quotation from paraphrase (cf. also Barnes (1988) 330 and n. 7).

some among which are accompanied by the word *φησί*. On the other hand, Hippolytus also uses *φησί* to attribute an idea or quotation to someone in cases where we know this person never said or wrote what he is alleged to have said. In one of his reports about the doctrines of Pythagoras (*Ref.* VI 24.4), Hippolytus writes: *ἐκεῖνο [scil., the intelligible world] γὰρ οὔτε ὀφθαλμός εἶδεν οὔτε οὖς ἤκουσεν οὐτ' ἔγνω, φησί [scil., Pythagoras], τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων οἰαδητισοῦν*. But the words *οὔτε ὀφθαλμός εἶδεν οὔτε οὖς ἤκουσεν* are an adapted quotation from Scripture, viz. 1 Cor 2:9 ἃ ὀφθαλμός οὐκ εἶδεν καὶ οὖς οὐκ ἤκουσεν, itself a Rabbinical quotation of Js 64:3 ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος οὐκ ἠκούσαμεν οὐδὲ οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ ἡμῶν εἶδον θεόν; cf. also the *Gospel according to Thomas*, 17: "I shall give you what eyes have not seen, what ears have not heard, what hands have not touched"⁷ etc., which is even closer to Hippolytus (τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ~ 'touched'). For the complicated traditions of the various Jewish and Christian centos involved see Onuki (1991). One may also quote, from the same report (*Ref.* VI 24.1), the twice repeated expression τὸ ἰ', ἡ μία κεραία, which is a quotation from Matth 5:18 ('iota and tittle') and not from the source or sources about Pythagorean doctrines which Hippolytus used. Examples of this kind could be multiplied. A nice example of a *Schwindelhinweis* with *φησί* is *Ref.* VI 28.1, ἥλιον ... ἐστηρίχθαι ... ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κόσμῳ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι ψυχὴν, ὡς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων· πῦρ γάρ ἐστιν ἥλιος, ψυχὴ, σῶμα δὲ ἡ γῆ. Plato never said this.

The study concerned with Hippolytus' sources for the Gnostic material and with its nature and origins lies beyond the scope of the present inquiry, and so does the inquiry concerned with the question of Hippolytus' value as a source for Gnosticism, a subject one must leave to the experts in the field. For the Neopythagorean (and to some extent also Middle Platonist) aspects of the Gnostic doctrines involved see e.g. the paper by Aland quoted above and the literature there cited, and for the Middle Platonist aspects see e.g. Whittaker (1980) and the very convenient overview of van den Broek (1983b) 61 ff. But I would not be surprised if it turned out to be the case that he treated his heretics no better than his philosophers.

A fresh approach to Hippolytean *Quellenforschung* has been advocated by Osborne (1987). This book has been reviewed at some length by Barnes (1988), who to the present writer seems to overrate its importance, and who does not deal with the problem of the sources, or at any rate does not provide alternatives to e.g. Osborne's treatment of the sources for the sections on Aristotle, but at any rate is critical both of her general method and of its application in the case of Heraclitus in *Ref.* IX. A more critical review is that by Mourelatos (1989), and an outstanding review article which is quite critical of Osborne's methodology was published by Mueller (1989).

It should be noted that Osborne has missed several recent and even less recent contributions, e.g. Abramowski (1981), Aland (1977), Frickel (1977a), Frickel (1981), Frickel (1984), Janáček (1964), Mansfeld (1983b), Mansfeld (1983c). A major advantage of her inquiry is that it takes the passages on Aristotle, Empedocles and Heraclitus in the subsequent books of the *Ref.* into account. Quite correctly, Osborne argues that quotations or fragments of philosophers found in later sources should not be studied without taking the context into account. Apparently, this obvious truth needs to be advocated in some circles; be it noted, however, that knowledge of the immediate environment of a given quotation is by no means a substitute for what one really needs, that is

⁷ Transl. Layton (1987) 383.

to say for a serious acquaintance with the quoting author and of the tradition, or traditions, he is indebted to as well as the methods used by him. Osborne also quite correctly points out that Hippolytus is not a mere scissors-and-paste man. But she goes too far in positing that the context in Hippolytus often provides all-important clues for a more correct interpretation of such fragments and testimonies as we owe to his pedantic diligence (cf. also Barnes' review).

What is more, in order to establish what was Hippolytus' method she introduces what she calls two 'test cases' that are new, viz. the account of Aristotle in *Ref.* VII 15-19.8, Osborne (1987) 35 ff., and that of the life of Simon Magus in *Ref.* VI 19-20, *ibid.* 68 ff.. It has to be gratefully acknowledged that she shows that in *Ref.* VI 19-20 Hippolytus rearranged the material mostly deriving from Irenaeus' biography of Simon in a not unintelligent way (cf. Quispel (1987) 347 f.), and that in bk. VII his sources for the doctrines and the few quotations of Aristotle adduced in order to unmask and expose Marcion contain interesting information (it is simply false, *pace* Barnes (1988) 336 n. 17, that the account is "incompatible with any serious reading of" *Categ.*, *Met.* Z and *Phys.* A). But the further inference that Hippolytus actually studied some of Aristotle's more difficult works on his own, and in a highly intelligent way at that, is mistaken; see above, Chs. V-VII, where I have tried to ferret out the traditions Hippolytus is indebted to in this particular case. Edwards (1990) has argued (mainly against Marcovich) that Hippolytus attacked Aristotle—and through him the Gnostic Basilides—from the point of view of the anti-Aristotelian Middle Platonist Atticus, to whom a lost *Commentary* on the *Cat.* is hypothetically attributed (on surprisingly thin grounds) by Des Places (1977) 9, 80 ff. This is by no means good enough, but on the right track. Cf. also Scholten (1990) 516 f., who argues that it cannot be proved that Hippolytus studied Aristotle's works, "zumal viele seiner Argumente gegen Aristoteles aus skeptischer Tradition stammen". Mueller (1989) 238 ff. emphasizes the Middle Platonist background and correctly affirms that Hippolytus "is much more interesting as a source for second- and third-century conceptions of Aristotle than he is for the interpretation of Aristotle" (240) and that he is likely to be "relying directly on a Platonist source for his treatment of Aristotle's doctrine of substance"; he adds (cf. Edward's view, cited above) that Hippolytus' critique of Aristotle reminds one of Atticus (242 n. 15).

As to quotations at one or more removes, one may for instance adduce the chapter on Plato (*Ref.* I 19) which contains a number of verbatim passages from the dialogues. That these were already embedded in the source(s) excerpted is absolutely clear from Hippolytus' own report, which shows that these quotations were used by various groups of warring Platonists in order to shore up their own particular exegesis of Plato. Also note that the substantial quotation from Plato *Tim.* 40ab at *Ref.* IV 8.1 is not preceded by Plato's name but by λέγουσι δὲ ταῦτα, that it is embedded in a ὑπόμνημα transcribed by Hippolytus (which contains a number of φησὶν's and τούτέστιν's), and that it becomes only clear at IV 10.1 that Hippolytus (or at any rate his source) apparently knew the quotation is from Plato. On the other hand, the quotations from the spurious Platonic *Second Letter* in *Ref.* VI 37.2-5 are more likely to come from the original document than from an intermediary source, see *supra*, Ch. VIII 2.11, although Hippolytus' interpretation is indebted to that of the Middle Platonists and of the Christian authors who followed the trend.

Consequently, the transcripts of the Sextan passages in *Ref.* bk. X (for which the account in Osborne (1987) 89 ff. is unsatisfactory) and bk. IV (a few cavalier remarks *ibid.* 14 n. 24, 21; note however that Hippolytus' method in

setting out the life of Simon may be compared to his procedure in transcribing the Sextan account of astrology), and the rewriting of the Josephus passage in bk. IX (to which Osborne does not refer although Koschorke (1975) is listed in her bibliography) remain the really important test cases. This is so because here we are in a position to compare the texts actually plagiarized by Hippolytus.

My own conclusion is that we should assume that Hippolytus *both* copied out texts almost verbatim or faithfully paraphrased them (often enough rearranging them to some extent)⁸ and felt free to carry out modifications, to rearrange his material and to add interpolations whenever this was convenient to his heresiographical purpose or whenever he wanted to claim that his book was a well-constructed and consistent whole that is entirely the work of his own pen. What is even more important than the question as to whether or not Hippolytus is (on some occasions) a faithful plagiarist is the underlying question as to what was the method used by him in (re)arranging his material. In Ch. VIII, I have argued that this method is a blend of cento and exegesis. Furthermore, we should view Hippolytus' mode of presentation against the backdrop of biased ancient polemics which attributes to its opponents doctrines, or surmised implications of doctrines, these opponents never held or subscribed to, or doctrines in an interpretive form which the original authors could hardly have anticipated (cf. e.g. Plutarch's or Alexander of Aphrodisias' polemical works against the Stoics). The ancients could have called him a plagiarist (see the magisterial article of Ziegler (1950)). Hippolytus systematically accuses the Gnostic heretics of 'stealing' and throughout the *Ref.* makes ample use of the ancient terminology for plagiarism (cf. Ziegler (1950) 1956 ff., κλοπή being the most usual term), so he must have known all along what he was doing himself. Maybe, however, he thought he was not really stealing because, unlike the Gnostics as monotonously depicted in his book he did not subscribe to the doctrines (or a variety of the doctrines) the accounts of which he took from others.

The reception of *Ref. I* in the Arabic world has been studied by Rudolph (1989) and (1990). Ps. Ammonius and the author of the *Turba* use Hippolytus (and other sources) for their own purposes in an eclectic way. These Arabic works (to be dated to ca. the tenth century CE) cannot be used as aids for the *constitutio* of the text of the *Ref.* Ps. Ammonius mainly used *Ref.* bk. I, whereas large sections of the first nine chapters of the *Turba* are not only based on the Sextan summary in *Ref.* bk. X but also on the accounts of the philosophers in the other books. We may therefore assume that a translation either of the whole *Ref.* or of a florilegium consisting of its philosophical portions (which may have been part of another anthology) was available in the East, but this has not yet been found.

⁸ Cf. Scholten (1990) 512: "Eine genaue Abgrenzung der Quellen vom Anteil H.'s ist unmöglich, weil H. seine Vorlagen nicht schematisch rezipiert, sondern nach Belieben zitiert, paraphrasiert, selektiert oder neu arrangiert. Die Benutzung von Zitationsformeln wie φησί u. somit das, was sie jeweils anzeigen (direkte oder indirekte Rede) will im einzelnen verstanden sein".

APPENDIX TWO

DIAERESIS

The fullest history of diaeresis from Plato to Late Antiquity I know is to be found in the monograph of Talamanca (1977) 3-189, but it should be noted that Talamanca excludes the *definitio per genus et accidens* from his overview and does not seem to have heard of Middle Platonism.

On the method itself, which seems to have vanished from today's logical handbooks, see the instructive account of Joseph (1916) ch. V, 110 ff., "The Rules of Definition and Division: Classification and Dichotomy". The first good example of a *divisio utens* (if the term may be permitted) is in Gorgias *ap. ps. Arist. MXG 5.979a14-8* (cf. also Xenoph. *Mem.* I 1.14), see Mansfeld (1986a) 36 ff. Plato *Phaedr.* 269e ff. argues that Hippocrates already used diaeresis; *pace* Lloyd (1991a) 197 I stick to my guns; see Mansfeld (1980) as to the use of such a *divisio utens* in *Airs Waters Places*. Fuhrmann (1960) 127 ff. plausibly argues that methods of classification were first developed by the Sophists and that these influenced the rhetorical handbooks, or tracts, as well as those pertaining other disciplines (for the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* see *ibid.* 11 ff.). This entails that the method of the author of *Airs Waters Places* (Hippocrates, I presume) derives from the Sophists. I would say, however, that a *divisio docens* was first worked out by Plato and further developed by his early pupils, and that this method significantly influenced the handbook and treatise traditions. Fuhrmann's inquiry into the structure of the *Ars* of Dionysius Thrax (*ibid.* 29 ff.) has lost its paradigmatic value, see Di Benedetto (1958/1959) and Pinborg (1975).

It has to be acknowledged that the Antiochean doctrine of 'the ancients' described Cic. *De fin.* IV 8 looks different, for here definition does not seem to be dependent on division; one is left with the impression that these two operations are distinguished rather than integrated and were treated in different works (*qui* [the *antiqui*, i.e. the Early Academics and Peripatetics] *et definierunt plurima et definiendi artes reliquerunt, quodque est definitioni adiunctum* [!], *ut res in partes dividatur, id et fit ab illis et quemadmodum fieri oporteat traditur; item de contrariis, a quibus ad genera formasque generum venerunt*). As a matter of fact, separate treatises on diaeresis and division are known to have existed and some survive, viz. the *De divisione* by Boethius and the *Liber de definitione* by Marius Victorinus. Cf. also Cic. *De fin.* IV 5: *tum definientes, tum partientes*. It should however be recognized that elsewhere in Cicero definition and division are clearly linked. The account of Prantl (1855) 512 ff., who had read the ancient sources, is still a good guide (it is not difficult to read around his value judgments). See also the informative overview of the use of division and classification in the learned Latin literature of the first part of the first century BCE in Rawson (1985) ch. 9, 'Dialectica', 132 ff.; *ibid.* 147 ff. on the *De inventione* and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*; and *ibid.* 201 ff. on the juridical literature. For the date of the *De inventione* (between 87-81 BCE, when Cicero was a quite young man) see MacKendrick (1989) 29 ff. Cicero and the author of the (less philosophically oriented but otherwise much similar) *Rhetorica ad Herennium* are heavily indebted to Greek handbooks to be dated to the later second century

BCE. See further Rawson (1978), which includes Cicero. On the teaching and teachers of rhetoric and *grammatike* in the second and first centuries BCE see also Hadot (1984) 41 ff., Dihle (1989) 34 f. One may add that these savants must have provided a general overview of the state of the art and of the views of its more important theoreticians, and done so using the available techniques of presentation. The most systematic treatment of division and definition by Cicero is found at *Top.* 28-31; see Wallies (1878) 13 f., 23 f., and Riposati (1947) 62 ff. (interesting critical review by Günsberg (1950), apposite criticism at Talamanca (1977) 143 n. 145). See also Nörr (1972) 20 ff., which contains much information on Cicero and his predecessors, Schmidlin (1970) 138 ff., and esp. Talamanca (1977) 105 ff. Huby (1989) is weak as to the bibliography and generally disappointing, and so is MacKendrick (1989) 231. One may quote Cic. *Top.* 28: ... *definitiones aliae sunt partitionum, aliae divisionum* [cf. Talamanca (1977) 105 ff.]. ... *Divisionum autem definitio formas* [Cicero's preferred translation of εἶδη] *omnis complectitur quae sub eo genere sunt quod definitur hoc modo: abalienatio est eius rei quae mancipi est aut traditio alteri nexu aut in iure cessio inter quos ea iure civili fieri possunt.*¹ And *ibid.* 29 (on *quid sit definiendi modus*): *sic igitur veteres* [cf. *De fin.* IV 8, *antiqui*] *praecipunt: cum sumpseris ea quae sint ei rei quam definire velis cum aliis communia, usque eo persequi, dum proprium efficiatur ...* Further *ibid.* 30: *in divisione formae* [scil., *sunt*], *quas Graeci εἶδη vocant, nostri, si qui haec forte tractant, species appellant*—a remark which is important because it attests that the division of the genus into species was also used by Latin contemporaries and predecessors of Cicero. Among these contemporaries, one may single out Varro and quote e.g. *R. rust.* III 3, *eius disciplina genera sunt tria ... harum singula genera minimum in binas species dividi possunt, in prima parte ut sint ... tertii generis item species duae*, etc. Cic. *Ac. po.* I (= Varro) 8 (cf. also *infra*) says that unlike the Epicureans who fail to employ definition and diaeresis Varro and he himself obey the rules of the dialecticians and rhetoricians (*praeceptis dialecticorum et oratorum*); Varro, *ibid.* 8, says that in his works written in imitation of Menippus there were *multa dicta dialectice* (but few things worthy of note are found in the surviving fragments of these works). On Varro's use of diaeresis see further Fuhrmann (1960) 69 ff., Skydsgaard (1968) 10 ff., 26 ff., Rawson (1978) 14 ff., Rawson (1985) 137 ff. Cicero's friend Servius Sulpicius Rufus, using dialectic in a systematic way in his voluminous works, had made the *ius civile* into a scientific discipline (Cic. *Brut.* 152-3). Both Servius and Cicero had been pupils of Quintus Mucius Scaevola († 82 BCE), who in his treatise in eighteen books on the *ius civile* had likewise used division. Behrends (1976) 286 ff. oddly argues that the Stoics did not practise diaeresis and so tries to prove that Mucius did not either. Schmidlin (1976) 106 ff., who correctly argues that the definitions of the early lawyers Mucius Scaevola (who wrote a treatise called *Horoi*) and Antistius Labeo (who wrote a treatise called *Pithana*) are Stoic, that is to say not *per genus et differentiam*, seems to be equally unaware that the Stoics practised diaeresis. The use of the Stoic method of definition, in other words, does not preclude that of diaeresis.

One of Varro's teachers, the learned Stoic Lucius Aelius Stilo (Cic. *Brut.* 205 ff.), wrote on propositions (Gell. *N.A.* XVI 8.2 ff.); although we do not know whether he employed, or taught, division, it is more likely that he did than that he did not (testimonia and fragments in Funaioli (1895) 51 ff.). The

¹ Tr.: "Transfer of property of a thing which is not one's full property is either transfer with legal obligation or cession at law between those who can do this in accordance with the law".

teacher of the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* may have taught in Latin but certainly used Greek writers on rhetoric (Rawson (1978) 18). Finally, we may quote Cic. *Top.* 31: *genus et formam definiunt hoc modo: genus est notio ad plures differentias pertinens; forma est notio cuius differentia ad caput generis et quasi fontem referri potest.* An important text is *De orat.* I 189: *genus autem id est quod sui simile communione quadam, specie autem differentes, duas aut plures complectitur partes. partes autem sunt, quae generibus eis, ex quibus emanant, subiciuntur; omniaque, quae sunt vel generum vel partium nomina, definitionibus, quam vim habeant, est exprimendum;* here the link between division and definition is very clear, and we should note that *ibid.* 187-8 Cicero argues that this method is indispensable to the arts and sciences. See further *Brut.* 151 on the discipline *quae docet rem universam tribuere in partes, latentem explicare definiendo*, and *Tusc.* V 72, on the part of philosophy *quae rem definit, genera disperit*, etc. In *Ac. po.* I (= Varro) 5, Cicero criticizes Roman Epicureans because *nihil definiunt, nihil partiuntur*; the same criticism is laid at the door of Epicurus himself *De fin.* I 22: *tollit definitiones, nihil de dividendo ac partiendo docet* (cf. Talamanca (1977) 55 n. 204). At *Orat.* 113 ff. the perfect orator is advised to study the dialectic of Aristotle and/or Chrysippus; division is important, 116: *explicato genere cuiusque rei videndum est quae sint eius generis sive formae sive partes, ut in eas tribuatur omnis oratio* (cf. *ibid.* 16: *nec vero sine philosophorum disciplina genus et speciem cuiusque rei cernere neque eam definiendo explicare nec tribuere in partis possumus* etc.).

In a rhetorical context, or in less strict accounts such as that of Varro, *species* (or *forma*) and part (*pars*) may be used indiscriminately, see Villey (1945) 17 ff., Nörr (1972) 39 ff. Cf. also Cic. *Orat.* 116, cited *supra*, and what follows *ibid.* 117 (*De inv.* I 32 only speaks of the *partes* of a genus). But at *Top.* 31 Cicero utters a formal warning: *formas qui putat idem esse quod partis, confundit artem* (cited Quintil. V 10.62; important parallel at Gal. *Plac. Hipp. Plat.* IX 9.44, p. 608.15-7, see below).² For diaeresis and definition in Augustine (and to some extent before Augustine) see Lorenz (1955/56) 240, Pépin (1976) 166 ff., Hadot (1984) 113, 115 f.

It would be naive to suggest that this far from rigorous use of division and definition in scholarly, or rhetorical, works derives from Antiochus, or from the post-Carneadean Academy. Rather, we may assume that in the Hellenistic period rhetorical theory to some extent had already absorbed such techniques as it could apply, and that such influence as it exercised in other fields coincided with that of philosophy proper; cf. the still indispensable viii. *Abschnitt* "Die Rhetorik. Uebergang rhetorisch-logischer Lehre zu den Römern" in Prantl (1855) 505 ff., and Hadot (1971) 81. Antiochus may have contributed to Cicero's awareness that these doctrines have a history going back to the 'ancients', and Cicero, who had a more philosophically oriented mind than his colleagues, is an exception anyway. That he was influenced by Antiochus was argued by Wallies (1878) 42 ff.

We must however note that in the Ciceronian passages quoted *supra* no hint is found that definition and division are first and foremost concerned with *substance*. According to Plato and the Early Academics, divisions are concerned with *forms*, not substances. According to Aristotle, division and definition are concerned with genus and species, i.e. with secondary substances. Stoic division is concerned with genus, species and particular, not with sub-

² Yet *partitio* and *divisio* may be used indiscriminately, also by Cicero himself who loves *variatio*; see e.g. *N. D.* III 6, on a *divisio* into four questions which is then called *partitio* (as it should be).

stance. Andronicus may have taken up the subject where Antiochus and others left off and have treated it with greater precision, insisting—as a true-blue follower of Aristotle—that definition is primarily concerned with *substance*.

Nörr (1972) 21 f. argues that the first to have made this distinction between the division of the genus into species and of the whole into parts is Arist. *Rhet.* B 23 (list of *topoi*, not of ways to find a definition): διαίρεσις at 1398a30-3, *partitio* at 1399a7-10, ἄλλος [*scil.* τόπος] ἐκ τῶν μερῶν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς ποία κίνησις ἢ ψυχή κτλ. But on checking the reference to the *Topics* [B 4.111b15 ff.] one finds that Aristotle at *Rhet.* B 23.1399a7-10 uses 'part' in the sense of 'species' (cf. Talamanca (1977) 48 f.). One may add that at *Top.* Z 13.150a133 ff. Aristotle argues that one cannot define a whole by listing its parts, which to all effects is a rejection of what later came to be called *partitio*. In fact, Aristotle's argument is already anticipated at Plato *Thet.* 207a ff. (one cannot say what a wagon is by giving a full list of its parts, or even a list of its main parts). Talamanca (1977) 24 ff. and n. 103, 114 f. n. 347, 144 ff. points out that Plato and Aristotle and on occasion even the late commentators use the words 'part' (μέρος) and 'species' (εἶδος) indiscriminately. Stoic μερισμός (Crinis, *SVF* III vii.2 *ap.* Diog. Laërt. VII 62) is the division of a genus according to τύπους, e.g. "of good things some pertain to the soul, others to the body". This is different from the division of a whole into its parts called *partitio* in Latin (and occasionally μερισμός in Greek); rather, it pertains to the division of the genus according to the parts of *something else*. Furthermore, μερισμός in Crinis' sense should not be confused with the μερισμός practised by the grammarians (mainly, but not only, concerned with the parts of speech) which is described by Sext. *M.* I 159 ff.; on this subject see Glück (1967) 13 ff. The *partitiones* literature is not restricted to grammar; the oldest extant example is Cicero's *Partitiones oratoriae*, a simple introduction to rhetoric according to the σχῆμα κατὰ πένδιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν.

On the kinds of division listed by Alcinous and others see Talamanca (1977) 64 f. and n. 124, 73, but his reports are not always accurate. An important but little noted parallel for Alcinous' modes is to be found at ps.Gal. *Philos. hist.* ch. 14, the very short chapter περὶ διαρέσεως *ap.* D.G. 607.1-5: diaeresis of words into meanings, wholes into parts, genera into species, and (if we follow Diels' reconstruction of the text) of species into individuals, homonyms into differences (?), substance into accidents. The importance of this parallel is not in its meagre contents but in the fact that in this way we have proof that a chapter *On Division* was a standard feature of the logical section of a general handbook (or of an *Introduction to Logic*; compare also Mart. Cap. IV 350-4); note that ps.Galen's chapters on definition and on division are separated from one another by two chapters dealing with other topics. That an account of division was a standard feature is also proved e.g. by the discussions of the various kinds of diaeresis at Amm. *In Isag.* 81.17 ff.; Olympiod. *In Cat.* 84.34 ff. (three kinds); the so-called *Dialogues of Severus* which seem to derive from Philoponus (*ap.* Baumstark (1900) p. 195.28 ff.); Elias *In Isag.* 67.23 ff., 70.15 ff. (six kinds); David *Prol.* 55.13 ff. (eight kinds of which only three are acceptable, viz. the same as those in Clement for which see *supra*, Excurs. 2); Stephan. *In De int.* 4.11 ff. (three kinds); and finally Joh. Damasc. *Dialect.* ch. 6, 64-68, who just as David distinguishes eight kinds. For these late authors see Richter (1964) 92 ff., who fails to refer to ps.Gal. *loc. cit.*, and 98 n. 236 only mentions the parallel in Clement, not those in Alcinous and Seneca. See further the detailed account in Talamanca (1977) 66 ff., 77, 82.

Another important parallel—De Lacy in his upper apparatus excellently refers to Albinus [i.e. Alcinous] *Didasc.* ch. 5—is found at *Gal. Plac. Hipp. Plat.* IX 9.42 ff. (cf. Talamanca (1977) 68, who whoever has not seen its implications). Galen derives the method of division from Plato, but what he tells us, though a bit Galenic, clearly is of Middle Platonist origin. He successively discusses (1) the diaeresis in the literal sense, viz. of a continuous whole into its parts, and (2) in the metaphorical sense, viz. of a genus into its differentiae or species. We may note that, just as Cicero (*Top.* 31, see *supra*), he says that ignorant people are incapable of distinguishing the division of a substance into its parts from that of genera and differences and species. Thirdly (3), he says that the dialecticians use diaeresis for the division of words into their meanings and fourthly (4) mentions the diaeresis into οὐσία and συμβεβηκότα. Note, however, that οὐσία here is ‘unqualified substance’ in a Middle Platonist sense (‘matter’), not Aristotelian substance. For Galen’s use of diaeresis see further von Müller (1897) 445 ff., Edlow (1977) 49 ff., Frede (1987b) 288 f., 292, and the preliminary remarks of Barnes (1991) 65 ff., 72 f. and n. 75, also for reference to other Galenic passages, but note that Frede (1987b) 288 f. and Barnes (1991) 68 (“Plato was his master”) and n. 60 fail to refer to the scholastic background. I assume that Galen’s interest in the method (which, characteristically enough, induced him to study its appearance in Plato and to quote substantial sections from the dialogues in order to illustrate the technique) derives from the fact that it was an important part of logic in the Middle Platonist, the Later Aristotelian and the Stoic curricula.

For Aristotle’s objections to the Platonic and Academic methods of diaeresis see Cherniss (1944) ch. 1; although diaeresis is useful for discovering definitions (cf. e.g. *Met.* Z 12.1037b27 ff.), it is not, *pace* the Platonists, a method of proof and so in this respect inferior to the apodeictic syllogism (Cherniss (1944) 27 ff., 35, 62; see further Pellegrin (1981), who studies the critical discussions of diaeresis at *An. Pr.* A 31, *An. Po.* B 5, *ibid.* B 13.96b25 ff., and *Met.* Z 12, and argues that according to Aristotle a—revised—form of diaeresis is indispensable for finding definitions). At *De part. animal.* A 2-3 Aristotle strongly protests against the use of *dichotomous* divisions by means of single differentiae one of which negates, or is the privation of, the other, for there can be no subdivisions of the non-existent; and he stipulates both that, in order to be useful, divisions should include a plurality of functional differentiae from the very start, and that each subsequent differentia should be a further refinement of its predecessor. Fundamental discussion at Cherniss (1944) 48-52; for Aristotle’s criticisms of dichotomous division cf. also Le Blond (1945) 62 ff.; Lloyd (1961) 71 ff., repr., with important preliminary remarks (1 ff.) referring to the discussion since 1961, in Lloyd (1991a) 17 ff.; Balme (1972) 101 ff.; Preus (1983) 346 ff.; and Lloyd (1983) 15 ff. For Aristotle’s application of diaeresis on a large scale see von Fragstein (1967); for Aristotle’s developing views on the subject and the use of diaeresis and classification in the biological and other treatises see Pellegrin (1986), Balme (1987) 69 ff.; also consult Balme (1962). See now also the overview by Lloyd (1991b). For division-cum-collection in the Neoplatonist systems see the remarkable (and remarkably difficult) study of Lloyd (1990) 13 ff., 31 ff., and *passim*, who however does not study its Middle Platonist and Middle Aristotelian phases.

Two collections of *Divisions*, in seventeen books and in one book respectively, are listed in the bibliographies of Aristotle’s works *ap.* Diog. Laërt. V 23 (Nrs. 42 and 43; Nr. 62 may be a doublet of 43) and in the *Vita Menagiana*, or *ps.* Hesychius (Nrs. 41 and 42); see Moraux (1951) 83 ff., 92, 197. A *Divisions* in

two books is in the bibliography of Theophrastus *ap. Diog. Laërt.* V 46 (Nr. 119; text newly edited by Sollenberger (1985)). Such collections may have contained the materials for definitions, and the treatise in seventeen books attributed to Aristotle, just as the extant *Problemata physica*, may have been compiled in part or even entirely by his early pupils. Speusippus appears to have used dichotomous division on a large scale (the term *diaeresis* occurs in a title in the bibliography *ap. Diog. Laërt.* IV 5, Nr. 20; see further Tarán (1981) 64 ff., and Cherniss (1944) 54 ff. Aristotle refers to αἱ γεγραμμένοι διαίρεσεις—maybe Speusippus—at *De gen. animal.* A 2.642b12). Xenocrates wrote a *Divisions* in eight books, presumably in the Platonic manner (bibliography *ap. Diog. Laërt.* IV 13, Nr. 58). See further Mutschmann (1906) xviii f. (a third version of the *Divis. aristotel.* was discovered by Moraux (1977)). The collection has been provided with a commentary by Rossitto (1984). For division according to the Stoics see e.g. *Diog. Laërt.* VII 43 (cf. *FDS* 1203) and 60-61 (cf. *SVF* III *Diog. B.* 25 = *FDS* 521, and Long - Sedley (1987) 30C, 32 C). Chrysippus wrote a treatise in two books *Περὶ εἰδῶν καὶ γενῶν πρὸς Γοργυπίδην* and a monograph *Περὶ τῶν διαίρεσεων* (bibliography at *Diog. Laërt.* VII 200 = *SVF* II 16, p. 9.7-8). Hülser (1987/8) 716 says “zu Gattung und Art waren keine weiteren Texte zu finden”. Cf. however *SVF* II 81; Philo *Agric.* 139-141 = *SVF* II 182; Sext. *P.* II 219; Long - Sedley (1987) 190 ff. and the abundant material in *SVF* III on the *diaeresis* of virtue. On part of this material see Hahm (1983), Long (1983), Hahm (1990) 2967 f., 2994 ff. On Stoic division see further the important pages of Rieth (1933) 45 ff. on “Definition und Dihairesis”; cf. also Mansfeld (1986b) 359.

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